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SUMMARY 
 
The focus of this thesis is the study of the demand side of the shadow economy. To achieve this, 
the informal consumption of Peruvian families located in urban areas is studied. This is possible 
thanks to a household survey collecting information on where people acquired their goods. The 
main contribution of the research is that it identifies an unexplored area in the literature with 
limited theoretical discussion and few empirical applications. Information about why people 
purchase from informal markets will supplement wider knowledge of labour allocation on 
informal opportunities. The thesis uses an Almost Ideal Demand System in order to verify some 
demand properties of informal consumption: income and price elasticities, the existence of 
linkages between working and purchasing decisions and explore the effects of bargaining on 
expenditure allocation. Four robust results are encountered. First, the inferiority of informal 
consumption is rejected. Formal and informal expenditure are classified as normal, but income 
responses on the latter (necessity) are lower than on the former (luxury). Second, there are linkage 
effects between working and purchasing in the informal and formal sectors. These effects are 
stronger for informal consumption and among the self-employed. Linkages are also not equally 
applicable across all goods. Better results are found within quasi-substitutes with leisure. Third, 
formal and informal food consumption reveals elastic demand curves and imperfect substitution 
between them, with higher compensated own-price and cross-price elasticities for formal markets. 
Fourth, household members bargain in their allocation decisions across markets, with females’ 
decisions being closer to less-informal purchasing baskets. This result is clearer in the case of 
food consumption. Public policy recommendations based on these results are derived, where it is 
found that formalization policies will need to take into account their negative distributional 
effects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent estimations by Schneider and Buehn (2007) reveal that the Peruvian economy is one of 
the most informal economies around the world. According to their comparative study, the size of 
the shadow economy in 2006 was around 60% of GDP, with figures that have changed only 
slightly during the last decade. Looking at the ranking constructed in that study for a total of 120 
developed and developing countries, Peru is one of the top five informal countries, with higher 
figures shown only in the cases of Georgia (69%), Bolivia (68%) and Panamá (65%). The 
consequences of informality in the economy have been investigated by Loayza (2007). Using 
cross-country evidence for developed and developing countries, Loayza concludes that increasing 
one standard deviation in the indicators of informality produces a reduction of between 1 and 2 
percentage points in GDP growth. Using a similar approach, but restricted only to Latin American 
countries, Loayza (1997) found similar results.  
 
Loayza explains that the main drivers of the negative correlation between informality and 
economic growth are the sub-optimal allocation of production factors, the congestion of public 
infrastructure and lower tax payments reducing the quality of public goods and service provision. 
Perry et al. (2006) also attribute lower incentives to invest to informality and, in general, a 
reduction in the productivity ratio. Other authors have found additional negative impacts of the 
informal economy, mainly in terms of higher corruption levels (Schneider and Enste, 2000) and 
negative welfare effects (Perry et al., 2007). In this last case, the authors indicate that, in highly 
informal countries, most households remain unprotected from economic and other external 
shocks, family incomes are more volatile and earning sources less secure (see also Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2004). When the impacts of informality on household welfare are tested, 
a positive correlation is generally found between working in the informal sector and self-rated 
poverty (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2004; Beuran and Kalugina, 2005; Arias and Lucchetti, 
2007).1 
 
Therefore, it is possible to recognize social and individual costs attached to informality, 
exacerbated in those developing countries where informal ratios tend to be extremely high. In this 
context, it is not surprising that, over the last fifteen years, and once democratic regimes return to 
                                                 
1 Most of these results are driven not only by the earnings gap between formal and informal opportunities, 
but also by non-pecuniary factors like worse working conditions in the informal sector or less access to 
social benefits (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2004). However, it is difficult to generalize as long as 
most of these results are country-specific and depend on particular economic contexts and the type of 
informal job considered (Perry et al., 2007). In fact, depending on the informal earning opportunity under 
analysis, positive welfare effects associated with informality could be encountered, such as more flexible 
schedules or financial advantages, given that there is generally no payment of most regulation costs like 
taxes or contributions (see also Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani, 2004 and Perry et al., 2007).    
2 
 
the Peruvian government, the formalization of economic activities in the country has been at the 
top of the public agenda.2 However, the results are far from satisfactory. Although in that period 
the economy has seen growth at sustainable levels (6.2% on average)3 and this expansion has 
partly resulted in a reduction in informality, as reported in Chacaltana and Infante (2014), the 
Peruvian economy is still characterized by severe productivity gaps where small-scale and highly 
informal firms are still the dominant sector.  
 
One possible explanation for this underperformance is the limited number of policy tools available 
and the incomplete understanding of informality as an economic phenomenon. As long as 
informality has been seen only as a problem on the supply side of the economy (why formal firms 
form or why people work in the informal sector), little scholarly attention has been paid to the 
demand considerations around it (Fortin et al., 2000; Pisani, 2013a). However, the only reason 
for an informal firm to exist is because it is selling its products, maybe some of them to other 
informal and formal firms (Böhme and Thiele, 2012a), but most probably to consumers.4 The 
question overlooked by the empirical literature and public policy design is why households decide 
to purchase from informal or formal outlets. The research presented here is an attempt to fill this 
gap, focusing on the study of the demand side of the shadow economy in order to empirically 
explore the main theoretical properties of informal consumption and derive complementary public 
policy recommendations oriented towards the formalization of economic transactions in 
developing countries. From the literature review undertaken during this research, this is one of 
the first investigations that uses formal demand theory in the study of informal consumption. This 
is the major contribution of this thesis.  
 
The closest precedents encountered are Fortin et al. (2000), Gardes and Starzec (2002, 2009), 
Reilly et al. (2006), Böhme and Thiele (2012b) and Pisani (2013b), where the main focus of the 
research was testing specific hypotheses around informal consumption using a demand 
framework. In general, the focus of attention of these studies has been on the income effects on 
consumption allocation between formal and informal markets, the quantity effects of labour 
supply (formal and informal) on the same allocation process, the relationships between formal 
and informal consumption and the effects of demographic variables on market participation. 
These applications are carried out in sub-regional contexts like the South Texas borderlands in 
the case of Pisani (2013b), in country studies in Canada, Poland and Serbia in the cases of Fortin 
                                                 
2 Taken from the presidential discourse of Alejandro Toledo, Alan García and Ollanta Humala at the 
beginning of their 5 year mandate available at www.congreso.gob.pe.    
3 See www.bcrp.gob.pe  
44 Böhme and Thiele (2012a) provide some estimates for African countries and reveal that around 80% of 
informal firms sell to households. Also, Dasgupta (1992) and de Soto (1986) comment that an important 
destination of informal commerce is household consumption.     
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et al. (2000), Gardes and Starzec (2002, 2009) and Reilly et al. (2006), respectively, and in cross-
country evidence for four African countries in the case of Böhme and Thiele (2012b). The thesis 
presented here departs from these studies, and extends them in several ways (see below).  
 
As explained above, the focus of attention is Peru, one of the most informal countries in the world. 
The specific questions to be answered during the research are related to the main drivers of 
informal consumption. First, an in-depth exploration of expenditure effects is provided in order 
to derive the income elasticities that characterize market allocation. The objective is to verify if 
informal consumption could be classified as normal or inferior (a question which, right across the 
limited literature, has produced mixed results when tested) and see whether different responses to 
income shocks between formal and informal expenditure can be identified. The results in this case 
will be crucial for policy design, since it will inform how the resource allocation of households 
responds to economic cycles – a key aspect to be considered when other actions are undertaken 
in order to formalize the economy or protect families from recessive periods. Also, in line with 
Böhme and Thiele (2012b), it will be possible to inspect quality differences between formal and 
informal consumption using their income elasticities (with lower values in the case of informal 
markets if quality there is lower). Using this evidence, as stated by the authors, it will be possible 
to conclude whether informal goods are constrained from the demand side in the sense that the 
demand of goods using informal distributional channels is income-inelastic (i.e. mainly bought 
by the poor).  
 
Second, the existence of linkages between working in the informal sector and purchasing from 
informal markets is also tested. There are reasons to believe that this linkage exists. As originally 
noted by Fortin et al. (2000), informal workers might have better and more timely information 
about the supply or quality of informal goods increasing the likelihood to purchase there. Also, 
as other authors have noted using observational studies (to be presented later), informal workers 
may have strong reasons for preferring informal transactions if they want to remain hidden or if 
they have characteristics that facilitate these kinds of transaction: eventuality in their incomes, 
payments in cash and so on. If these linkages exist, then public policies that focus on the 
formalization of the supply side of the economy acquire an additional meaning, given their 
potential effect on the demand side, generating second-round effects to be accounted for. The 
limited empirical research investigating this issue in developed and European transitional 
economies concludes that both activities are in fact linked. However, other efforts in African 
countries conclude that no effect is encountered, suggesting that the existence of such a linkage 
is possibly country-specific. The added value proposed in this research is to re-test the hypothesis 
in a different context in order to contribute to the construction of an empirical regularity. Also, in 
contrast to previous studies, the estimations presented here allow for some heterogeneity in the 
4 
 
working options of the family members. Instead of using aggregated formal and informal labour 
supply in the empirical model, five earning opportunities are implemented (formal and informal 
in the wage-earning or self-employment sectors) in order to inspect in which labour segments 
linkages could be stronger or weaker.  
 
Third, own-price and cross-price elasticities for formal and informal food consumption are 
estimated. The objective here is to verify the degree of responsiveness of formal and informal 
consumption to price shocks and to compute the substitution effects between them. The literature 
review has revealed that this is the first time that a result like this is provided and, as recognized 
by Reilly et al. (2006) in their suggestion for further research, this is a key point in the 
understanding of informal demand that must not be overlooked. Own-price responses and the 
degree of substitutability among consumption profiles are key elements in the design of any policy 
intention that tries to take advantage of the incentive structure of economic agents.  
 
Finally, the effect of bargaining power inside the family in terms of market allocation is the last 
empirical question. For this purpose, informal consumption is modelled using a collective utility 
approach. The objective is to verify whether some members’ expenditure is closer to formal or to 
informal consumption in order to exploit redistribution policies in the formalization objective of 
the government. There are reasons to believe that a result like this is plausible. The research 
undertaken using bargaining demand models (see, for example, Haddad et al., 1997) and the 
anthropological traditions (some of which are quoted in Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995), have 
attributed to mothers’ better expenditure patterns in terms of the type of goods they prefer (food, 
schooling, child health). This research takes these results as its point of departure and asks whether 
better expenditure means not only the type of goods consumed, but also the sources used to 
purchase them. If quality is also a concern, mothers´ expenditure could be less biased towards 
informal markets. From the literature review it is possible to conclude that this is the first time 
that a question like this is answered.      
 
The data to be used in the thesis come from the National Household Survey (ENAHO, in Spanish) 
for the year 2006, conducted by the National Statistics Office (INEI, in Spanish), restricted to 
urban households in order to obtain a better identification of the main variables of interest. In fact, 
the main property of this database is that it contains detailed information on consumption (which 
goods the family purchases and where the expenditure takes place), detailed information on labour 
supply (the condition of informality of the worker and the firm where he or she works), detailed 
information on incomes (who specifically receives income from which source) and permits the 
computation of prices (or unit values) for food consumption. To construct expenditure variables, 
the information on outlets was exploited in order to classify them between informal and formal 
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markets. Therefore, the approach is closer to Böhme and Thiele’s (2012b) and Reilly et al.’s 
(2006) identification of informal channels of commercialization than to those of Fortin et al. 
(2000), Gardes and Starzec (2002, 2009) and Pisani (2013b), who use responses on unregistered 
purchases made by households.  
 
However, one critical point must be mentioned: informal activities are, by definition, hidden, so 
data construction is not free from arbitrary choices made when both labour supply and 
consumption were classified between formal and informal sectors. The key point was to answer 
the question as to which signals are the data giving in order to infer where an informal relation is 
arising or among which agents could be clearer. Experience of the particular economic framework 
being analysed, the previous literature reviewed, alternative data sources and anecdotal evidence 
collected during this research helped to make better choices, but it was impossible to ensure the 
exact ones. Thus, important issues to consider were to make explicit the assumptions, recognize 
the degree of precision and control for possible deviations changing the definition of informality 
(when possible). This is what has been undertaken in the thesis. 
 
The document presented here is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a summary of the literature 
reviewed during the research is presented in order to provide an adequate theoretical framework 
for the rest of the thesis. This chapter is further divided into three main sections. The first discusses 
the definitions of informality to be adopted during the research. As mentioned there, informality 
will be understood at the level of market relationships maintained by agents lacking adequate 
institutional enforcement. The second briefly presents the most representative literature on the 
supply side of the shadow economy. The objective there is to understand the main stylized facts 
around firms’ formation and labour allocation that will help in the interpretation of the empirical 
results to be presented in subsequent chapters. The third section is the main focus of this chapter 
and contains a discussion of the literature on informal consumption. As shown there, this literature 
is scant in terms of formal models and empirical applications. Most of the research has been 
undertaken based on qualitative evidence and observational studies and these constitute the main 
sources of stylized facts to be considered during the research. 
 
In Chapter 3, based on the literature review, a simple theoretical model for informal consumption 
is proposed in order to formally present and justify the hypothesis to be tested. The objective is 
to study three main demand properties of informal and formal consumption: expenditure effects, 
own-price and cross-price effects and quantity effects related to labour supply (both formal and 
informal). The structure of the model responds to a partial equilibrium short-run unitary 
maximization process under two different budgeting assumptions and preferences’ ordering. In 
the first one, the household allocates its resources between formal and informal markets, facing 
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transactional costs in each and conditioned to budget constraints and predetermined leisure time. 
This model is referred to as the aggregate version, since it produces two conditional demand 
functions for estimation purposes: one for overall formal market consumption and the other for 
overall informal market consumption. In the second one, a two-stage maximization process is 
considered for households deciding in the first stage which goods they will purchase and, in the 
second, where these goods will be bought (formal or informal markets). This model is referred to 
as the disaggregated version and will produce several demand systems (for informal and formal 
consumption), one for each good (or consumption group) considered.  
 
In Chapter 4, the database used for estimation purposes is presented, and the general 
characteristics of the main sample as well as the complementary data sources included are 
considered. At the same time, in this chapter the assumptions used in the construction of the main 
variables of interest to be used during the estimation are discussed: expenditure, prices and labour 
supply. The chapter also provides some preliminary inferences, using descriptive statistics 
obtained from the main variables.  
 
In Chapters 5 to 7 the model presented in Chapter 3 is estimated. For that purpose, given its 
attractive empirical and theoretical properties, the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) is used as the main specification for fitting the demand equations. 
In Chapter 5, the estimations for the aggregate version of the model are discussed. The objective 
here is to study both income effects and quantity labour effects in a context of overall formal and 
informal consumption allocation. This application is the closest to the previous empirical 
applications encountered in the literature, so comparisons with Fortin et al. (2000), Gardes and 
Starzec (2002), Reilly et al. (2006) and Böhme and Thiele (2012b) could be carried out. Two 
empirical strategies are followed. The first considers a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
model with robust (White/Huber) standard errors, referred to as the SUR–GLS estimator under 
the assumption of exogenous expenditure and labour supply. Given the simplicity of the model, 
most of the robust checks in terms of specification issues, sub-population estimations and 
definitions of informality are done. The second empirical strategy drops the assumption of 
exogeneity of the main variables of interest (expenditure and labour supply) and estimates several 
IV models. These estimations are more austere in their specification and are specifically 
constructed to re-test the hypotheses of interest in a better empirical context. The chapter then 
presents the main implication using policy simulations of the effect of income and labour supply 
on the demand of formal and informal markets.  
 
In Chapter 6, the estimations for the disaggregated model are presented and the same effects as 
earlier are inspected, but for specific consumption groups. The objective is to analyse whether the 
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income effects prevail when detailed consumption profiles are considered (as was the case in 
Böhme and Thiele, 2012b) and to verify whether the linkage hypothesis is more plausible in some 
types of consumption than in others (as suggested for further research in Fortin et al., 2000). In 
this case the main econometric problem faced was the relatively high incidence of zero-
consumption values in most expenditure categories. In order to control for possible censoring bias 
using system estimation, the procedure of Shonkwiller and Yen (1999) is used for estimation, 
based on a first-step PROBIT model and a second-step SUR estimation for the whole sample, 
with correctional terms included. The within-standard errors are computed using robust 
techniques (White/Huber) and the between-equations variance covariance is computed with the 
algorithm developed by Weessie (1999). This is henceforth referred to as the S&Y estimator. This 
procedure helps to construct the conditional and unconditional elasticities for income and hours 
of work, considering the parameter estimates of both steps using the formulas provided by Su and 
Yen (2000) and Carpentier and Guyomard (2001). Policy simulations are carried out and 
compared with those in the previous chapter.   
 
In Chapter 7, prices (or unit values) are included in the analysis. The model is restricted to food 
consumption, which is the expenditure group where unit values were identifiable in the survey. 
Again, the main econometric problem handled was censoring, so the S&Y procedure is again 
used. The model estimates the Slutsky matrix for different definitions of prices and different ways 
to impose the theoretical demand restrictions. Then both compensated and uncompensated price 
elasticities are computed. The analysis again provides policy simulations in order to verify the 
effectiveness of formalization for different price-shock combinations. The welfare effects of these 
policies are investigated using compensated valuation techniques.  
 
In Chapter 8 the assumption of unitary maximization process used in previous chapters is dropped 
in order to test the influence of bargaining power on market allocation. The final specification of 
the model follows the collective demand framework used by Chiappori’s (1988, 1992) and 
Bourguignon et al.’s (1993) theoretical insights around sharing rules. Three empirical strategies 
are followed. In the first, as undertaken by Lancaster et al. (2006) and Monge (2007) for 
consumption-groups systems, a theoretically plausible non-linear specification for bargaining 
power is estimated considering a SUR–GLS technique under the assumption of exogenous total 
expenditure and bargaining power. This assumption is dropped in the second empirical strategy, 
where the specification is simplified to a less theoretical, but more tractable linear version, as 
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) for consumption groups. In this case, standard IV estimation 
methods are used to re-test the hypothesis. The third strategy replicates the first, but for the 
disaggregated version of the model, in order to inspect the effects of bargaining inside 
consumption groups.    
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In Chapter 9 the main conclusions of the thesis are summarized and policy implications discussed 
in a broader way. Similarly, the main limitations of the research undertaken are explicitly 
mentioned and the agenda for further research is outlined.     
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
II.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter the literature review on informal consumption is presented in order to define the 
theoretical framework for the research. The discussion begins with a brief presentation of the 
definitions around informality, focusing on the concepts of both exit and exclusion that explain 
the emergence of this phenomenon in developing countries. Next, the revision of the literature on 
informal labour and goods markets is considered. In the first case, the objective is not to yield a 
complete review of the huge discussion around informal labour markets produced throughout 
decades of research. On the contrary, only some representative models and theoretical 
approximations are revised in order to take into account the main stylized facts. The focus is 
placed on the second case, where the literature on informal consumption is presented using the 
limited theoretical and empirical discussions around the issue and the larger insights provided by 
the qualitative research. The chapter finishes with some concluding remarks.         
 
II.2. What is informality? 
 
A distinct aspect in developing countries is the existence of a broad spectrum of informal 
transactions.5 These are economic relationships maintained by individuals outside the legal or 
established markets, where traditional explicit norms no longer hold and are replaced by implicit 
regulations or conventions. In the words of Feige (1990), informality can be understood as ‘those 
actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institutional rules or are denied 
their protection’; in those of Castells and Portes (1989), informality includes ‘activities that are 
not regulated by the state in social environments where similar activities are regulated’ (taken 
from Centeno and Portes, 2006). Using this last definition, then, it is possible to argue that any 
formal market has its informal parallel in some sense. Informal labour markets, informal goods 
markets and informal insurance or credit markets are some of the examples encountered in the 
literature.  
 
Following Thomas (1992) and Tokman (2000), the first characterization of the informal economy 
was provided by Hart (1970) and the social scientists of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO, 1972). For these authors, the concept of informality was introduced to deal with the 
particularities observed in the labour markets in developing countries. In general in these 
                                                 
5 In this thesis the terms informal, shadow, irregular, unregulated, underground, unregistered and 
undeclared economy are all used as synonyms to describe the phenomenon being analysed: informality. 
However, from a theoretical point of view, they can refer to different aspects of it (see Thomas, 1992 or 
Portes, 2000).     
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countries, in the absence of unemployment benefits, few can afford to be unemployed, so most of 
them will need to find alternative ways of earning money, not necessarily via the production or 
distribution of illegal goods. Some of these alternative ways of earning money were found in 
economic activities that avoid recognition, regulation and protection from the government. In 
particular, rural migrants to the cities who experienced difficulties engaging with the formal 
economy, found a way of life in this sector.  
 
However, as argued by de Soto (1986), this conceptualization of informality has a pejorative 
connotation, seeing it as the result of some kind of exclusion process. For de Soto this is incorrect; 
he prefers to explain the emergence of informality as the natural response of (possibly poor) 
individuals to a state unable to satisfy their demands and ambitions. As explained by Portes 
(2000), in de Soto´s view, informality is seen as a rational decision and a genuine expression of 
market forces gaining space in an over-regulated context, with governments incapable of 
enforcing regulations. As a result, informality is no longer just a means of subsistence; it is also 
a way to accumulate capital in developing countries outside the legal framework. 
 
Perry et al. (2007) recognize the validity of both approaches and propose an intermediate (or more 
general) interpretation, preferring to call informality a multidimensional phenomenon where 
agents interact with the government in some dimensions and not in others, thus creating a large 
grey area between compliance and non-compliance. Furthermore, compliance in some cases will 
be determined by exit strategies (the rational choice of agents given the high costs or lower 
benefits of formality) and in others by exclusion patterns (where access is explicitly or implicitly 
denied). For that reason, if all the possible relationships maintained by firms, workers and 
consumers are considered, it is difficult to think in terms of a homogenous, well-defined informal 
sector. On the contrary, it is better conceptualized as a web of informal relationships that emerge 
in a particular market, socially determined, continuously changing and mixed up with the formal 
ones.  
 
II.3. Informality in the labour market 
 
In their original works, Harris and Todaro (1970) saw informality as a transitional phenomenon 
in the urban labour market, generated by the rural-urban migration implied in the first stages of 
development. The authors proposed the idea that rural workers’ migration to the city (attracted by 
higher wages) produces an increase in urban labour supply. However, given some market 
imperfections (fixed wages set above the equilibrium level), only a fraction of these new workers 
find a job in the formal sector, while the others must accept some kind of informal arrangements. 
Although simple, the argument implies several unsatisfactory hypotheses. For example, in this 
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context, informal jobs must be non-permanent, a result which is difficult to verify in reality, as 
noted by Sethuraman (1981), Rauch (1991) and Thomas (1992). Moreover, Williamson (1988) 
observes that both the little attention paid to informal labour market behaviour and the simplistic 
story of the rules embodied in the formal one, undermine the Harris–Todaro model as an adequate 
explanation of how the urban labour markets in developing countries actually work (see also 
Kannappan, 1985).   
 
Given these difficulties, several authors have tried to formalize the emergence of the informal 
sector in the labour market. One such attempt was made by Rauch (1991), who extended the 
Lucas (1978) model of firm size distribution. Following his argument, the production function of 
the economy depends on entrepreneurial ability and there are both managers with different 
managerial abilities and homogeneous workers. Under universally enforced minimum wages (set 
above the competitive level) labour supply increases, labour demand falls and unemployment 
emerges. However, if this minimum wage is not universally enforced and can only be imposed 
on large firms (probably due to the government’s lack of enforcement power) then small-scale 
firms offering wages below the minimum level (and below the clearing market wage level) will 
form. At the equilibrium, there is a group of managers with a high enough entrepreneurial ability 
who decide to work at the profit-maximizing level of labour, paying the minimum wage (the 
profits of producing at this level compensate the higher costs), while others who are less talented 
will not be able to afford the higher wage and will be producing at a low scale. The first group 
(workers and firms) constitutes the formal sector and the second group the informal one.  
 
The structure of Rauch’s model has proved to be flexible enough to include other stylized facts 
of the shadow economy without violating its original structure. For example, Fortin et al. (1997), 
Straub (2005), de Paula and Scheinkman (2006) and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007) 
introduce tax payments, evasion costs, benefits of producing in the formal sector (better access to 
credit markets or to public goods), penalties of being informal and the enforcement ability of the 
government. At the same time, Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) modified the behaviour of the 
labour market, switching to a ‘search model’, while Levenson and Maloney (1998) propose, from 
a dynamic perspective, a characterization of informality based on institutional participation. The 
diagnosis of the urban labour market provided by these extensions to Rauch’s model amplified 
the scope of the analysis on the supply side of the economy and introduced the concept of net 
gains on participation for each earning opportunity.  
 
The theoretical implication of Rauch’s model is the emergence of two kinds of dualism in the 
urban labour market or, more precisely, in the supply side of the economy: size dualism and wage 
dualism. In the first case, small firms will be informal and large firms formal while, in the second 
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case, formal workers will earn more than their similar informal counterparts. At the same time, 
the theoretical and empirical applications lead to the assumption that the emergence of informality 
is a problem only of entrepreneurial ability, where only a firm’s choices matter and worker 
choices are not taken into consideration. This implies, for the labour market as a whole, a non-
competitive (or segmented) structure where workers cannot choose their preferred allocation of 
time.  
 
Arguments against this assumption were proposed originally by Rosenzweig (1988), who 
describes the labour market as competitive; however, given workers’ characteristics, some will 
choose formal jobs and others informal. Similar ideas are developed by Amaral and Quintin 
(2006), who replicate most of the stylized facts of Rauch’s model without the assumption of wage 
dualism. The general idea is that agents are heterogeneous in their managerial abilities and 
education, and choose between becoming formal or informal entrepreneurs, or workers. In the 
same way, workers can move freely between both sectors, so the wages are the same for similarly 
skilled workers in informal or formal firms. Other characteristics of the model are that formal 
firms pay taxes and obtain credit while informal ones do not. In the equilibrium model, more able 
managers operate with a higher capital:labour ratio (size dualism), hire skilled workers and choose 
to become formal (returns to external financing exceed the additional tax cost). Informal firms 
are credit-constrained and hire unskilled labour, since this is a better substitute for capital 
shortages.  
 
Mixed evidence around the segmentation hypothesis6 led Fields (1990, 2007) to argue over two 
narratives about urban labour markets: neither purely segmented nor competitive and possibly 
country-specific. In fact the author proposes to focus on two types of informal labour supply: 
‘upper-tier jobs’ which are good jobs in the informal sector and which some workers will freely 
choose, and ‘free-entry jobs’, which are bad jobs in the informal sector which people choose only 
because of the difficulties in access to formal or ‘good informal’ positions. For the Peruvian case, 
Yamada (1996) found evidence in favour of Field’s arguments, with the informal self-
employment sector better described as a competitive one and the informal wage-earning sector 
better described as a segmented market. A similar result is commented on by Perry et al. (2007) 
for other Latin American countries.  
 
More complex structures for exploring the relationship between formal and informal labour 
supplies are considered in Lacroix and Fortin (1992) and Lemieux et al. (1994) using an extended 
                                                 
6 See Magnac (1991), Maloney (1999, 2004) and Pradhan and van Soest (1997).  
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version of the Cowell (1985) model for tax evasion. In this approach, agents choose to work in 
the regular or irregular sector and can hold down more than one job. The decision process is 
defined by tax avoidance attitudes but at a cost of risk detection. Then the individual follows some 
kind of strategic behaviour and different regimens arise in equilibrium: only formal, only 
informal, formal/informal and not working. The model also allows for constrained and 
unconstrained situations in access to formal labour markets. The empirical application strongly 
rejects perfect substitutability between formal and informal jobs, but supports the idea that labour 
supply in both sectors is negatively related; however, informal labour supply is more responsive 
to formal earnings than conversely. 
 
II.4. Informality in the goods market 
 
Despite some remaining debates, firm behaviour and worker behaviour have been modelled under 
most of the stylized facts of the shadow economy in a developing country. Thus, the emergence 
of informal firms or labour relations and the linkages between them and formal ones is not an 
under-researched area in the literature. However, as noted by Fortin et al. (2000), while these 
studies provide useful information on the supply side of the irregular sector; little is known about 
the factors influencing the demand for goods and services produced in that sector. In fact, the 
academic literature around the demand side of the shadow economy is not as deep as that in the 
supply side. This view is shared by Pisani (2013a), who recognizes that informal consumption 
has received scant scholarly attention.     
 
One of the first references found to informal consumption is by Cermeño (1987). The author 
develops a model where large and small firms interact with poor, middle-class and rich 
consumers. The structure presented is very simple and assumes that (formal) goods produced by 
bigger firms are of higher quality and price in comparison to those (informal) goods produced by 
smaller firms. Then, using lexicographic preferences, the model establishes that formal goods are 
only purchased by rich consumers and informal goods only by poor ones. This is explained using 
a critical-income level not attained by this last group, which prevents them from being able to 
afford the more expensive formal consumption. However, when the income of the poor increases 
and they become middle-class consumers, they start substituting informal goods with their formal 
counterparts, up to the point where they become rich and their purchasing basket is completely 
composed of formal goods.  
 
As a result, the model predicts the existence of two demands. One for formal goods, negatively 
related to its own price and positively related to income (for rich and middle-class consumers) 
and one for informal goods negatively related to its own price, positively related to poor 
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consumers’ income and negatively related to middle-class consumers’ income. Therefore, formal 
goods tend to be normal (as long as only middle-class and rich consumers can afford them), while 
informal goods can be normal or inferior depending on the size of the income elasticities for poor 
and middle-class consumers and the relative importance of the consumption share of each type of 
individual on total informal consumption. Finally, cross-price elasticities are positive in the 
model, revealing that formal and informal goods will behave as (imperfect) substitutes.     
 
Cermeño does not provide concrete empirical evidence for his arguments; however, it should be 
emphasized that this two-demand framework is in some way supported by a traditional line of 
thinking by other authors in developing countries, where informal commerce is associated with 
the needs satisfaction of low-income families (Portes, 2000) and motivated by the lower prices 
obtained there (Pisani, 2013a). For example, Tokman (1978) argues that informal firms can 
compete successfully in developing countries with large supermarkets, since only a relatively 
small proportion of households have a sufficiently high level of consumption, storage capacity 
and transportation facilities to buy in bigger outlets. Similarly, Yamada (1996) argues that 
informal repair services for cars or electrical appliances (typical informal services) emerge where 
only a few households can afford to replace these goods. As a result, as stated by Livingstone 
(1991), informal goods are mainly the target of low-income consumers. 
 
Quantitative evidence around this issue is provided by Pisani (2013a) for the South Texas 
borderlands, where he reports that poor people allocate 22% of their income to informal 
consumption, with middle-class and richer individuals allocating 15% and 5%, respectively. A 
similar relationship is found in developed countries, where Williams and Windebank (2005) 
report, in their study on Leicester, that poor families are responsible for between 70% and 85% 
of the acquisition of informal goods. Both results are in line with the location decision of informal 
and formal sellers reported in de Soto (1986) for Lima. De Soto shows that, in general, petty 
traders and city markets (typically informal outlets) are located in low-income neighbourhoods 
with formal outlets concentrated in the richer or more modern ones.  
 
Although there is an evident relationship between poverty and informal consumption (or, more 
precisely, the liquidity constraints faced by households), this does not necessarily mean that 
informal consumption is inferior. When formally tested, the hypothesis has produced mixed 
evidence. For example, Gardes and Starzec (2002) and Reilly et al. (2006) all show that informal 
expenditure is normal in their studies of Poland and Serbia, respectively, whereas Fortin et al. 
(2000) in Canada found that it is inferior or unrelated (depending on the specification used). The 
differences could be interpreted in terms of the countries used for estimation. In Canada, a 
developed country with a large formal sector, inferiority would be a reasonable result while, in 
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Eastern and Southern European countries with a large informal sector, it would not. Similar results 
were obtained by Böhme and Thiele (2012b), who show for a sample of African countries that 
the inferiority of informal markets is rejected, but they recognize differences in the income 
elasticities that characterize informal and formal channels of commercialization: the former lower 
(below 1) than the latter (above 1). Therefore, as they propose, a better characterization is to 
consider informal markets as normal necessities and formal ones as normal luxuries.  
 
This result, as Böhme and Thiele explained, is consistent with quality dualism in the demand 
structure of African countries and occurs in a context where demand segmentation (as suggested 
in Cermeño, 1987) is not necessarily verified. As reported, there appears to be a strong 
overlapping consumer base between the formal and the informal sectors. This result is consistent 
with the observations of Arellano (2010) and Arellano and Burgos (2010) in Lima, who show 
that, although formal supply is still limited or inadequate in most of the poorest neighbourhoods 
in the city (in line with de Soto, 1986), formal and informal markets are more evenly distributed 
than in the past, with formal and informal outlets expanding to new markets. Similarly, Dasgupta 
(1992), in his study of petty traders in Calcutta, reports how these sellers are not exclusively tied 
to low-income markets. In fact, thanks to their greater ability to adapt to consumers’ needs, they 
have been increasingly capturing the middle-income and richest segments defining a spatial 
configuration throughout the city.   
 
This has generated changes in consumer behaviour, as reported in Arellano and Burgos (2010) 
and a call for additional explanations for informal/formal consumption beyond a simplistic 
segmentation approach where consumers’ choices rather than exclusion patterns explain their 
demand. A similar interpretation is provided by Williams (2002) and Williams and Windebank 
(2002) using the market structure of two English cities (Southampton and Sheffield) and Williams 
(2008) using information on other European cities. For these authors, in a context where informal 
channels of commercialization are not the dominant ones, they identified that in at least 70% of 
the transactions carried out there is a matter of the free choice of clients rather than of exclusion, 
with positive attributes attached to these outlets beyond reduced prices – for example, more-
flexible supply conditions and greater product variety (also mentioned in Böhme and Thiele, 
2012b).      
 
Therefore, consumers could be better described in terms of having a strategic behaviour approach, 
where households are in permanent search of optimal combinations of quality (lower at informal 
markets) and price (higher at formal markets) given their preferences and economic possibilities. 
Also, in a context of quality differentials where quality is inadequately signalled in informal 
16 
 
markets (as in the lemon market in Akerlof, 1970), searching costs (in the form of Nelson, 1970) 
will be also a driver of consumption.    
 
This last interpretation is close to the models developed by Kesselman (1989) and Anbarci et al. 
(2012). In the firs case, goods in the formal and informal sector are imperfect substitutes, but 
consumers will prefer to purchase formal goods given their better reputation, follow-up service, 
warranty or return policy, lower search costs and so on. Therefore, to successfully compete, 
informal vendors will need to sell at lower prices, even if the goods are practically identical. As 
a result, Kesselman imposes a demand behaviour where households of any kind purchase both 
types, with demand functions depending on relative prices (negatively) and total income 
(positively). In the second case, the coexistence of informal and formal markets is investigated in 
a context where buyers and sellers can move freely between sectors depending on their relative 
net participation gains. In the model, and given the quality differentials between markets, buyers’ 
payoffs will depend on the expected utilities of consumption, prices and transactional costs 
generating differences in access to the preferred market. 
 
Fortin et al. (2000) extend the demand side of Kesselman’s model and incorporate the possible 
influence of labour supply on informal demand. In their model, workers behave in the way used 
by Lacroix and Fortin (1992) and Fortin et al. (1997); however, instead of only choosing labour 
allocation, they now have preferences in the ordering of goods: formal (produced and sold in the 
formal sector) and informal (produced and sold in the informal sector). The distinctive feature of 
the model is that consumers face transactional costs in the informal sector (negatively related to 
informal hours of work) which are part of the price structure of such goods and some consumers 
will pay in order to avoid taxes.  
 
This framework allows the authors to derive a consumption function for informal goods 
conditional on labour supply (as in Pollak, 1969; Browning and Meghir, 1991) which will depend 
on the hours worked in each sector, prices, total income and exogenous variables. The influence 
of the informal labour supply is then deconstructed into three effects: income effect (positive as 
long the informal good is normal); non-separability effect (zero, positive or negative if labour 
supply in the irregular sector and consumption of irregular goods are weakly separable, 
complements or substitutes, respectively); and network effect (positive as long as the irregular 
good is not a Giffen one). The authors suggest that this network effect is a key element in the joint 
behaviour of labour allocation and consumption in the shadow economy. They argue that there 
are strong reasons to believe that participating in the informal sector as a worker leads to a higher 
consumption of informal goods. In fact, informal workers will have better access to the output of 
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this sector, given their better and ‘more timely’ access to information on the availability and 
quality of goods and services produced there.  
 
The empirical application by Fortin et al. (2000) in Canada and others like Gardes and Starzec 
(2002) and Reilly et al. (2006) in Eastern Europe countries revealed evidence in favour of this 
network effect. However, Böhme and Thiele (2012b) for African countries found that informal 
labour supply and informal consumption are unrelated. This is probably a country-specific 
characteristic (possibly driven by the overlapping of consumers reported by the authors) that must 
be taken into consideration when testing Fortin et al.’s hypothesis in developing countries.    
 
An additional source of transactional costs is proposed by Phumpiu and Triveño (2007). In their 
unpublished paper, they develop a model to explain the emergence and consequences of the size 
of the informal sector but from the demand side. In short, the authors consider that ‘doing 
business’ in both the formal and the informal sector is costly, but the cost will be negatively 
correlated with the skills or the ability to reduce the probability of being cheated or deceived 
developed by consumers. The skills in this case are obtained from interaction and experience in 
each sector, so two types of consumer emerge: those with enough skills to ‘do business’ in the 
formal sector and those with the skills to ‘do business’ in the informal one. Considering these 
arguments, it is easy to reinterpret them in terms of Fortin et al.’s (2000) observations around 
network effects: there are transactional costs in the purchasing process in each sector that generate 
some kind of implicit barriers to entry, with a final effect on demand similar to the costs of access 
modelled by these authors. As long as these costs increase the perceived (or final) price of the 
good, previous experience in the informal or formal sector (maybe as a worker) will reduce such 
costs in absolute terms, generating a source of ‘linkage’ effect between working and purchasing.  
 
Other explanations of the emergence of linkages around informal transactions are based on the 
sociological tradition of embedded social networks and interpersonal relations (Granovetter, 
1985). Using this conceptual framework, Portes (2000) explains the existence of informal market 
relationships in the developing world, where strong confidence links constructed among 
participants (producers, sellers and consumers) are the only resource against fraud in a context 
where no other enforcement mechanism exists. The confidence in this case, Portes continues, is 
generated both in terms of shared identities and feelings and in the expected social sanctions that 
each participant will receive (like the exclusion of the group) if this confidence is betrayed. Pisani 
(2013b) makes a similar interpretation. In his article, he quotes the study done by Short (1996) 
that goes one step further, arguing that, in some cases, informal transactions driven by embedded 
kinship turn into ‘familiar obligations’ and it becomes difficult (or even impossible) to replace 
them by formal ones.  
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However, not every social structure will support these informal relationships, since the social ties 
need to be strong enough to make fluent market transactions and protect participants from 
government repression. This is probably why, within this literature, community linkages are those 
most commonly identified as supporting long-lasting informal markets, where informal goods are 
normally produced by specific groups in a country (migrants with a similar ethnic background, 
for example) and are therefore better sold to members of that group. The case studies reported in 
Portes (2000), as well as those undertaken by Sanchis (1982), Capecchi (1989), McGee et al. 
(1989), Espinoza (1992), Guarnizo (1992) and Bailon and Nicoli (2009) support this idea. The 
authors all show, with some contrasts in their arguments, that the first clients of a ‘new migrant’ 
informal producer are the members of his or her ethnic group previously established in the city. 
These ‘old migrants’ are normally engaged in the informal sector in one way or another (probably 
through work) and eventually help new migrants to migrate, build a house and establish a 
(probably informal) business in the same neighbourhood.  
 
Other determinants of informal consumption have been explored by the social psychologist 
literature, where the market misbehaviour of consumers has been researched in terms of their 
preferences for illicit goods (counterfeit, stolen or pirated). Although the conclusions are not 
necessarily applicable to informal expenditure (where goods are not necessarily illegal), some of 
them could be useful in taking into account the attitudinal factors behind demand relations. A 
overview of these studies is provided by Peace et al. (2003), Eisend and Schuchert-Güller (2006) 
and Pisani (2013a). It is worth focusing on two of them: stigma and perceived risk. In the first 
case, stigma emerge from the moral concerns that an individual may have when he or she buys 
goods ‘off the books’, as long as they are not legally recognized and potentially harmful for 
society as a whole. In the second case, perceived risk will depend on the enforcement ability of 
the government but, more importantly, on the attitudes towards risk of each person. Although 
enforcement ability in developing countries is low (Pisani, 2013a) and penalties are normally 
reduced or non-existant for consumers (Fortin et al. 2000; Pisani, 2013a), attitudes toward the 
risk itself will be different between consumers. Even small fines or superficial deterrence could 
have significant impacts on some consumers, while others will be less concerned about the 
consequences of their actions, even in the presence of strong institutional frameworks.    
 
Finally, a surprising issue revealed during the literature review was that, although substitution 
between formal and informal goods is an intuitive point of departure for most of the theoretical 
models that study the emergence of the informal sector in developing countries,7 explicit 
                                                 
7 Recent examples are Restrepo-Echevarría (2011) and Charlot et al. (2013). 
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hypothesis-testing for this issue was not found. The only references found that directly include 
price variables are marketing studies of the social psychology literature for on demand 
misbehaviour (see Eisend and Schuchert-Güler, 2006 for a review). Most of these applications 
reveal intuitive negative own-price and positive cross-price effects on the intention to purchase 
counterfeit and pirated goods, but these studies are normally restricted to small samples of 
university students specially selected for the analysis of attitudes toward illegal consumption. 
Further estimations using country samples are done by Chiarini and Marzano (2006) and Gardes 
and Starzec (2009) for Italy (using a macro model) and Poland (using demand specifications), 
respectively. However, given the data limitations, the authors test quantity rather than price effects 
between formal and informal consumption. Interestingly enough, the first application found 
quasi-complementarities between both sectors and, in the second, quasi-substitution was limited 
only to a small portion of the informal goods: health, education and cultural expenditure (around 
a mere 11% of household expenditure).8      
 
II.5. Concluding remarks 
 
For the purposes of this research, a working definition of informal and formal transactions is 
needed. Considering the review presented here, informality will be better understood at the level 
of relationships maintained by agents in a particular market. When conventions and regulations 
are not observed, informality arises, but its emergence in a particular market relationship does not 
imply its existence in another. For example, a firm could be registered and pay taxes (a formal 
relationship with the government) but hire workers without a contract (an informal relationship 
with the workers). At the same time, the worker could hold a contract (a formal relationship with 
the firm), but buy goods in the informal sector (as an informal consumer). Thus, the key point of 
analysing informality is to identify whether or not a market relationship lacks institutional 
enforcement, given that this is mainly a multidimensional phenomenon that could be driven by 
both the free choice of agents or exclusion.  
 
Based on this general definition, some of the stylized facts around the emergence of informality 
in both the labour and the goods markets have been revised in this chapter. As stated previously, 
when compared to the supply side of the shadow economy, the academic literature has paid only 
limited attention to informal consumption (the demand side). Theoretical models and empirical 
applications are scarce and most of the stylized facts have been constructed based on qualitative 
                                                 
8 Other references encountered during the review was the paper by Fomba and Mvolo (2010), who estimate 
own-price and cross-price elasticities for formal and informal goods in order to implement the parameters 
in their simulation model of tax evasion. However, the elasticities published (though not explained in depth) 
seem to be for two different systems (goods inside formal markets and goods inside informal ones), so it 
was not possible to assess their results in terms of the hypothesis-testing proposed here.     
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evidence and observational case studies. Although this literature provides some important 
concepts on informal consumption, systematic hypothesis-testing is practically non-existant. 
Therefore, instead of theoretical or empirical regularities, the literature review offers a wide range 
of open debates where proper demand theory has rarely been used. This is the main gap identified 
in this thesis, and justifies the research agenda already outlined in the previous chapter.  
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III. A SIMPLE MODEL FOR INFORMAL CONSUMPTION 
 
III.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present a simple theoretical model of informal consumption in highly 
informal developing countries like Peru. This model is based on the original ideas of Fortin et al. 
(2000), and includes the insights of standard demand theory discussed in Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980b), Browning and Meghir (1991) and Carpentier and Guyomard (2001). Slight 
modifications have been introduced in order to include some of the stylized facts around 
informality in developing countries already discussed in Chapter 2. As already explained, in 
highly informal developing countries there are neither purely formal nor purely informal 
consumers. In fact, there are just consumers deciding on optimal combinations of price and quality 
according to their budget possibilities. There are two available markets for that purpose: formal 
and informal. As a result, optimal decisions will imply consumption baskets with products from 
different combinations of formal and informal sources, where the shares are basically determined 
by inherent preferences, income, prices and transactional costs.  
 
The model is developed using unitary utility optimization processes in a static (short-run) partial 
equilibrium framework for households choosing consumption conditional on their previous 
labour allocation decisions. Two possible preference orderings are allowed. Under the first, in the 
initial stage of the decision process, the household with enough knowledge about the 
characteristics of the market and the supply of goods within it decides the amount of its budget 
that will be allocated and then which goods it will purchase on these markets. Considering this 
framework, the only relevant stage at which to reveal the main aspects of informal consumption 
(income elasticity, own- and cross-price elasticities and labour effects) will be the first.9 This 
model (later called the aggregate version) is the one used by most of the empirical approximations 
encountered in the literature (Fortin et al., 2000; Gardes and Starzec, 2002, 2009; Reilly et al., 
2006; Böhme and Thiele, 2012b).  
 
Under the second preference ordering, the family with enough knowledge of the goods they will 
purchase and the markets where these goods are sold first decides on the allocation of funds 
between the items to be consumed and then where they will be bought (formal or informal 
markets). In this framework, just observing one of the stages is not enough; to derive the main 
aspect of informal consumption, both stages in the decision process need to be modelled and 
                                                 
9 The second stage of this approximation is the decision on which goods to purchase on each market. This 
stage is not developed in this document, but can easily be incoporporated without changes to the main 
insights presented here.  
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estimated. This model (later called the disaggregated version) is less standard in the literature and 
avoids aggregation since it recognizes that income, price and labour supply effects will be 
different for the various goods consumed by the family. A similar version of the model was used 
earlier in the empirical approximation of Böhme and Thiele (2012b).   
 
A priori, there is no one correct assumption on how to model household preferences and the 
literature reviewed has revealed no insights on this issue. The objective of this chapter is not, 
however, to solve this theoretical question, which is beyond the scope of the present research. By 
contrast, in this application a better way to proceed is to formalize the existence of the two 
simplest (and possibly most extreme) allocation procedures constructed under their own (and 
restrictive) simplifying assumptions in order to justify and investigate the hypothesis which is of 
particular interest for the application. As will be seen in the next chapters, in empirical terms the 
two models offer complementary information.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In sections two and three, the aggregated and disaggregated 
versions of the model are presented and discussed. The main objective here is to formalize the 
conditional and unconditional marginal effects of income, prices and hours worked on informal 
and formal consumption in the two different budgeting processes. In section four, the Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) is presented and discussed as 
this is the general empirical specification selected for demand estimation for both models. In 
section five, some concluding remarks are presented.  
 
III.2. The aggregated version of the model 
 
The simplest way to model informal consumption is to consider two markets10 (formal and 
informal). Therefore, the simplifying assumption introduced by the model is that the household 
procedure of resource allocation is the decision as to where family goods and services will be 
bought. In general, the term jc will refer to consumption allocated in market j  ( ifj ,  with 
:f formal and :i informal) at prices jp . Using this framework, three stylized facts of informal 
consumption are allowed: imperfect substitution among fc  and ic  given quality differences, price 
differentials and transactional costs.  
 
In the first case, as discussed in Cermeño (1987) and Kesselman (1989), the quality of informal 
consumption will generally be lower than that of its formal counterparts. Cermeño (1987) justifies 
                                                 
10 As for classification issues, the available markets are, in fact, three: formal, semi-formal and informal. 
However, in this discussion the semi-formal category is excluded to facilitate exposition of the arguments.  
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this assumption in considering that informal producers (small firms) will compensate for their 
lower productivity by using cheaper and lower-quality inputs, paying lower wages and allowing 
their products and services to deteriorate. By contrast, as mentioned earlier, Kesselman (1989) 
argues that, even if both sectors offer the same good (a possible situation, as reported in Dasgupta, 
1992), certain attributes of formal outlets – such as a better reputation, follow-up, warranty and 
return policy – will justify the differences in the quality perceived by consumers. Arellano and 
Burgos (2010) show qualitative evidence in favour of these arguments for Peruvian cities.   
 
In the second case, a natural consequence of quality differences is price differentials, as long as 
lower-quality products will need to be sold at lower prices in order to successfully compete with 
higher-quality ones (Kesselman, 1989). As a result it is expected that if pp   in the general 
situation. However, other sources of price differential exist. First, there will be a financial 
advantage to informal producers (or sellers), obtained from not paying most of the existing 
regulation and registration costs like licences, taxes or permissions (see Farrell, 2004; Fukuchi, 
1998 for a discussion). This advantage is not compensated by other hiding or evasion costs (Fortin 
et al., 2000; Arias et al., 2010) paid by informal produces, since they are possibly low because of 
the low enforcement (and the low risk of detection) in developing countries (Pisani, 2013a). 
Second, the limited supply of formal outlets in highly informal countries (as reported in de Soto, 
1986; Arellano and Burgos, 2010) generates different price formations (as discussed in Cermeño, 
1987), with formal producers under a quasi-monopolistic structure and informal ones under 
competition, with higher prices in the former than in the latter. Third, the location decisions of 
formal producers in modern or richer neighbourhoods could generate some kind of Balassa–
Samuelson effect.11  
 
In the third case, as originally proposed by Fortin et al. (2000), the model recognizes the existence 
of transactional costs with differentiated effects on formal and informal consumption.  These costs 
could reflect the marginal investments done by consumers in order to make a ‘good deal’ in the 
preferred market and could take different forms. For example, searching costs in a context of 
quality differences with higher incidence in the sector where quality standards are hidden for 
consumers (informal). In fact, it is assumed that, in informal markets, the probability of being 
cheated is perceived as relatively high and consumers must pay in order to avoid this risk. By 
contrast, in the formal sector, the consumer will not need to search for quality (the formal 
condition of the seller will serve as a sign to the consumer with no cost in order to avoid distrust), 
but possible complex rules to be followed there in order to perform the purchase will constitute a 
                                                 
11 According to Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), consumer prices in richer countries are 
systematically higher than in poorer countries. 
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transactional cost (in time and effort), as discussed in Phumpiu and Triveño (2007). Similarly, in 
both cases, if the supply of formal and informal goods is geographically segmented or if there is 
asymmetric information, the consumption possibilities offered by each market will not be 
completely evident for all consumers, so transactional costs constitute true access costs to each 
market supply.    
 
These costs are denoted by ja  with different size depending on the market ( j ). Under such 
conditions, the complete price12 paid for purchasing in the formal or informal market is 
)1( jj ap  where  )1()1( ffii apap   or )1()1( ffii apap   depending on the size 
of ja  and jp . It is assumed that ja  will depend on household characteristics – mainly previous 
linkages maintained with the formal or informal sector. In this model, these previous linkages 
come in the form of labour supply, since this will reflect the experience or knowledge developed 
by the consumer in each sector. In general, ),( ifjj hhaa   with 0/  ff ha , 0/  ii ha
, 0/  if ha  and 0/  fi ha . These relationships are identified as the source of the linkage 
effect discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Therefore, the problem of the consumer can be summarized in the following way. A household 
decides to purchase fc  and ic  (where the quality of fc  is higher than of ic ) at prices fp  and ip  
(where if pp  ), facing transactional costs fa  and ia , and has a budget of M  to do so. Using 
the full income restriction of Becker (1981) and the conditional demand framework13 of Pollak 
(1969) explained in Browning and Meghir (1991), with leisure ( l ) as the pre-allocated good at 
level *l , it follows that the expression will take the form: 
  
max.  ),,( lccWW fi         
s.t.  ffiffifiii chhapchhapslYsTM )],(1[)],(1[ 
  
(III.1) 
                                                 
12 Gardes and Starzec (2009) also provide preliminary empirical evidence for the existence of such costs in 
informal consumption. The multiplicative way of representing transactional costs is similar to that used by 
Muellbauer (1981) in the context of durable goods (it will facilitate manipulation of terms under the log 
specification of the empirical model).  
13 There are several advantages to using conditional demand systems when labour supply is introduced in 
demand systems. As explained in Browning and Meghir (1991), among other reasons, the conditional 
framework helps to avoid separation between labour and consumption in a very simplistic way. Also, it 
helps to adequately model the demand for free goods without modelling the determination of predetermined 
goods explicitly or its budget constraint. Moreover, it will be correctly specified even if hours of work are 
not chosen optimally or are under the presence of non-linearities (corner solutions). This provides a 
methodological advantage since it is possible to focus on demand on goods without caring about things like 
labour supply or unemployment.  
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*ll   
 
The function W is a good representation of preferences and has all the desirable properties of 
utility and is increasing in all its arguments, s are salaries, T is total time available and Y is non-
labour income. Replacing the final restriction on the utility function and the full income 
restrictions, and considering that 
r
rhTl
*
, for rh  ( ifr , ) representing formal ( f ) and 
informal ( i ) earning opportunities, (III.1) can be expressed in the following way14 
 
max.  ),,;,( iffi hhccWW         
s.t.  ffiffifiiiiiff chhapchhapYhshsM )],(1[)],(1[ 
  
(III.2) 
 
where additional household determinants   have been already introduced in the model as 
preferences shifters. In this model, the vector   is defined according to observations by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980b), Theil (1952–53), Houthakker (1952–53) and Cox and Wohlgenant 
(1986), where quality choices will depend, beyond income, on household size and composition, 
as well as on other characteristics such as education, age profiles, gender and so on (Lazaridis, 
2003; Vassilopoulos et al., 2009). However, considering that quality standards are attached to a 
particular market previously identified by the consumer,  must be extended by additional 
controls influencing participation in the informal or formal economy. For example, issues already 
discussed in Chapter 2 – like location, ethnic and migration conditions and enforcement capacity 
– also need to be introduced in the model.  
 
Solving (III.2) for fc  and ic , and once optimization conditions are reached, it is possible to 
demonstrate the existence of a demand function like 
 
],,;,,[ iffi
D
jj hhMppcc         (III.3) 
 
which is the conditional demand function of Pollak (1969), with all its desirable properties over 
the ],[ if cc dimensional space: homogeneity of degree zero with respect to prices and income 
                                                 
14 Note that salaries could be defined as ff sbts )1(   and ii srs )1(  with t for marginal tax 
rates, b for social benefits, r for any payment made by informal workers to avoid detection and rs as gross 
salaries. In empirical terms, only t  and b are identified; r is not. Thus, for the rest of the discussion it is 
preferable to impose 0r . This is possibly a gross assumption but, in a context of highly informal 
countries with a very low governmental enforcement capacity, r is maybe low enough to be neglected.       
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and diagonal negative semi-definite Slutsky matrix where )1( iii app  , )1( fff app  . 
From (III.3) marginal effects of prices and income could be computed and interpreted, as could 
those of previous linkages with the formal and the informal sector. Taking partial derivatives with 
respect to M , gp  and rh ;  (where ifg , ) results obtained are:  
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Expression (III.4) is the income effect, positive as long as jc  is normal and negative if it is inferior. 
In fact, a testable proposition of the model is to verify whether informal consumption can be 
considered inferior or not and whether there are noticeable differences in income responses 
between formal and informal consumption. Expressions (III.5) and (III.6) reveal a set of ordinary 
(denoted by superscript O ) and Hicksian (denoted by superscript H )  price effects, respectively. 
When jg  , (III.6) must always be negative and (III.5) negative as long as the good is not a 
Giffen one. When jg  , (III.5) and (III.6) must be positive under the maintained assumption that 
jc  and gc  are considered substitutes and weighted income effects are lower than cross-price 
effects.  
 
Expression (III.7) reveals linkages between working and purchasing in the preferred sector, 
holding total expenditure ( M ) constant. It is composed of two effects: network effects (first term 
on the right in brackets) and non-separability or preferences effects (second term on the right). In 
27 
 
the first case, the theory suggests that the network effect will be positive when jr   and  negative 
when jr  . These effects will prevail as long as formal and informal consumption are not Giffen 
and imperfect substitution holds between them (with weighted income effects lower than cross-
price effects). Under such conditions, 0/  i
D
i pc , 0/  f
D
i pc , 0/  f
D
f pc , 
0/ 
i
D
f pc , 0/  ff ha , 0/  ii ha , 0/  if ha  and 0/  fi ha .  
 
In the second case, the non-separability effect defines the quantity relation between the freely 
chosen good ( jc ) and the pre-allocated good ( rh ) when total income ( M ) is held constant. This 
implies a re-allocation procedure of the unit relaxation of the budget constraint in (III.2) where 
the consumption of some components of jc  will be increased and some will be reduced (Deaton, 
1981). As discussed in Pollak (1969), when a positive relation is observed, 
rh and jc  will be 
defined as quasi-complements and, when a negative relation is observed, they will be defined as 
quasi-substitutes. In general, it will be expected that 0/  r
D
j hc  when jr   and 
0/  r
D
j hc  when jr  .  
 
There are several reasons for such a result. For example, unregistered transactions will be 
preferred by informal workers since this type of individual wants to keep hidden, and formal 
producers will prefer to buy formal goods only if they can enjoy the fiscal advantage of tax 
deduction. Similarly, if, as argued by Fortin et al. (2000), stigma or tax morale prevents people 
purchasing from informal outlets, then those who already work in the informal sector will have 
fewer reasons to avoid this type of outlet, while formal workers will have more. Furthermore, as 
noted by Arellano (2010), a well-established result for informal workers is the infrequency of 
their payments, which precludes any planning of their purchases (on a weekly or monthly basis) 
and the ability to buy in high volume. This will force them to find outlets – like informal ones –
which can be highly flexible in the volumes sold. Williams (2006) and La Porta and Shleifer 
(2011) also comment that cash transactions facilitate informal consumption – a characteristic 
more notably seen in the type of payments received by informal workers. Formal workers, instead, 
considering their less-flexible work schedules and their more-regular incomes, will favour formal 
outlets where planned (and larger) purchases can be made.  
 
Without knowledge of the cost function ja , the two effects cannot be disentangled so, instead of 
testing them separately, they will be treated as a joint effect, referred to here as the linkage effect. 
Under these assumptions, a positive result of (III.7) when jr   and negative when jr   will 
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be enough evidence to conclude that working and purchasing in a similar sector are linked 
activities. However, deviations from the maintained assumptions15 could obscure the results. In 
such circumstances it is possible that (III.7) yields similar signs for jr   and jr  . In those 
cases, the evidence in favour of the linkage hypothesis comes in the form of higher values of 
(III.7) when jr   than when jr  , in absolute terms. This is exactly how Fortin et al. (2000) 
test their hypotheses.  
 
Finally, (III.8) is the full hours’ effect which is the same as (III.7) but without holding M  constant 
and using the income restriction in (III.2) to derive these effects. It will reveal the effect of 
working one additional hour in the formal or informal sector, considering both the linkage effects 
discussed previously and the additional labour income produced by working more hours. This last 
effect is captured by the term r
D
j sMc )/(   at the end of the right-hand expression. Therefore, 
it will just increase or reduce the linkages encountered by the previous expression, depending on 
whether consumption is normal or inferior and the positive or negative linkage derived from 
(III.7). In fact, (III.8) is possibly a more interesting result for public policy design as long as it 
reveals the total impact on informal or formal consumption of, for example, supply-side policies 
oriented to change the labour allocation of household members.         
 
III.3. The disaggregated version of the model 
 
In the previous model, households order their preferences around broad market allocation, which 
in turn implies the joint consumption decisions of selecting markets (formal or informal) and 
goods sold there. As explained previously, this second model tries to disentangle the allocation 
process between goods and markets. For the following discussion, we consider a utility-
maximizing household which has preferences over n  goods and is not indifferent to the place 
where these goods are bought. In fact, the household will choose from two possible markets: 
formal ( f ) and informal ( i ). To simplify the allocation process, it is convenient to employ a 
two-stage procedure: in the first, the household decides ‘which’ goods to consume; in the second, 
once optimum allocation is reached, the household decides ‘where’ the goods will be bought.  
 
The term kjc  refer to goods of type k  ( nk ,...,1 ), purchased in the market j  ( ifj , ). 
Under enough weak separability assumptions of the indirect utility function, the maximization 
process consists of one main utility function composed by n  sub-utility programs that can be 
                                                 
15 As pointed out by Fortin et al. (2000), working on the formal sector could provide some information on 
goods provided on the informal one and vice versa although, to be consistent with the discussion presented, 
the effects will be lower.   
29 
 
solved independently for the allocation process among each of the two markets, conditional on 
the total expenditure on each of the n  goods. In this framework, the preferences of the household 
can be represented using the two-stage demand model explained in Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980b). The expression takes the form   
 
)],(),...,,(),...,,([ 111 ninfnkikfkif ccvccvccvUU       (III.9) 
 
where U is the utility function revealing the broad group allocation process and kv  represents the 
sub-utility functions for places where the broad group must be purchased. Both functions (U  and 
kv ) are good representations of preferences, have all the desirable properties of utility and are 
increasing in all their arguments. However, it must be recognized that an expression like (III.9) 
imposes important restrictions on household behaviour, mainly the substitution possibilities 
between markets in different groups: substitution effects between formal and informal markets 
for the same good are completely modelled, but this substitution for different goods in different 
markets can only happen through the income effect in the budget constraint.  
 
The first stage 
 
In the first stage of the model, the household chooses which goods to purchase, taking into account 
a budgeting process where the consumer is first interested in defining the amount of resources to 
be allocated between goods (or broad groups of goods). The assumption behind this is that 
preferences can be ordered in such a way that allocation is possible given only the household’s 
knowledge of total income and group prices and with no care (at this initial stage) about the 
markets (formal and informal) where these goods will be purchased. As explained in Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980b), this problem is based on a standard utility optimization with a budget 
constraint. However, the exact solution requires non-satisfactory assumptions, so it is better to 
solve it as a good approximation of the exact result. For this purpose, special caution is needed in 
the construction of quantity and price indexes since both must define a synthetic maximization 
procedure with perfect results, in a sense that needs to be identical as a one-step optimization with 
full information.  
 
In this model, the approximation of Carpentier and Guyomard (2001) is adopted. This means that 
broad quantity indexes are approximated by constant price composites and broad group prices by 
an implicit price deflator, under the assumption that the empirical variation of the True Cost of 
Living (TCOL) with respect to the utility level is sufficiently small to be neglected. In this 
application, this assumption will hold when within-group prices are highly collinear, i.e., formal 
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and informal prices inside each group.16 This will be true if price formation acts as a guide for the 
informal economy or, according to Cassel (1984), if price increases in the formal economy spill 
over into the informal economy through the mechanism of relative prices. The full derivation can 
be reviewed in Deaton (1986), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) and Carpentier and Guyomard 
(2001). Simplifying the notation for the purposes of this research, the first-stage maximization 
problem is approximated by:  
 
max.  ),,...,,...,( 11 lCCCFU nk     
s.t.  
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1
n
k
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 *ll   
 
which is a standard maximization problem of choosing broad group quantities ( kC ) subject to an 
income constraint and broad group price indexes ( kP ), conditional on previous leisure ( l ) 
decisions. The remaining arguments are defined as before. Once (III.10) is solved for formal and 
informal hours of work and the set of additional demand shifters ( Z ) is introduced, the program 
takes the form:      
 
max.  ],,;,...,,...,[ 11 ZhhCCCFU ifnk     
s.t.  



1
1
n
k
kkiiff PCYhshsM       (III.11) 
 
Solving (III.11) implies a household deciding its consumption for 1n  free goods ( kC ) 
conditional on the consumption level over the pre-allocated goods or, in this framework, 
conditional on labour supply decisions (
rh ). Once this optimization program is solved, it is easy 
to demonstrate that final demands take the form: 
 
),,,,,...,,...,( 1 ZhhMPPPCC ifnk
D
kk        (III.12) 
 
which is the conditional demand function of Pollak (1969), with all its desirable properties over 
the 1n dimensional space. Considering (III.12), the marginal effects of prices, income and hours 
                                                 
16 Note that, under the aggregate model, if broad market allocation is thought of as the first stage of the 
problem, similar solutions must be adopted.           
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of work could be computed taking partial derivatives with respect to M , qP  and rh . These 
expressions take the form: 
 
M
C
M
C Dkk





          (III.13) 
 
q
D
k
q
O
k
P
C
P
C





          (III.14) 
 
 
M
C
C
P
C
P
C Dk
q
q
O
k
q
H
k








        (III.15) 
 
r
D
k
r
k
h
C
h
C





          (III.16) 
 
Expression (III.13) is the expenditure effect, positive for normal goods and negative for inferior 
ones. Expressions (III.14) and (III.15) are the ordinary and Hicksian price effects, respectively, 
where 1,...,,...,1  nkq  is a broad group with kq   for own price derivatives, always 
negative (barring Giffen goods) or kq  for cross-price derivatives, negative for ordinary or 
Hicksian substitutes and positive for ordinary or Hicksian complements. Expression (III.16) is the 
marginal effect of labour allocation. This expression is only the non-separability effect, but at the 
level of goods with a similar interpretation in terms of quasi-complements and quasi-substitutes, 
as in the previous case.    
 
The second stage 
 
Once the household completes the first stage and decides which goods to consume, then a second 
step is to decide where these goods are going to be bought: at informal or at formal markets. It is 
obvious that this second allocation procedure shares most of the characteristics of the aggregate 
model and could be formalized with just minimal changes in the notation. In principle, from the 
previous stage it is possible to find the budget allocation in the desired good (or broad group) 
which, in turn, is kkk mPC   for broad good k . Then km will be allocated within the j markets 
available for the consumer. From the sub-utility function k  of (III.9), it follows that these 
preferences can be described with ),( kikfk ccv . 
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Again, it is expected that kikf pp   and that there will be quality differences between formal and 
informal outlets (higher in the case of formal options). Similarly, transactional costs are allowed 
in the form kja , with different size depending on the market ( j ) under analysis and with the 
consumption group ( k ) considered (since relative incidence of transactional costs will differ 
according to the nature of the good purchased). Finally a set of additional household 
characteristics   are also allowed. As a result, the maximization problem of the household in 
this second stage will be defined by the following optimization program:  
 
max.  );,( kikfkk ccvv          (III.17) 
s.t.  kffikfkfkifikikik chhapchhapm )],(1[)],(1[        
 
It is important to note in (III.17) that the maximization program is no longer in a conditional 
demand setting. Once solved, the first stage of the allocation process, separation between labour 
and consumption, could be imposed in the second. Therefore, once the optimization conditions 
for kfc  and kic  are reached, it is possible to demonstrate the existence of a demand function like     
 
],,,[ kkfki
D
kjkj mppcc           (III.18) 
 
where )1( kikiki app  , )1( kfkfkf app  . From (III.18), again, income and price marginal 
effects are computed as well as those of previous linkages with the formal and the informal sector. 
Taking partial derivatives with respect to km , kgp  and rh ; the results obtained are:  
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which are similar expressions to those obtained for the aggregate market, but conditional on goods 
expenditure. Expression (III.19) is the income effect, positive as long as good k  purchased in 
market j  is normal and negative if it is inferior. Expressions (III.20) and (III.21) reveal a set of 
ordinary and compensated (or Hicksian) price effects, respectively. When jg  , (III.20) and 
(III.21) must be always negative (excluding Giffen goods). When jg  , (III.20) and (III.21) 
must be positive under the maintained assumption that jc  and market gc  are considered 
substitutes and weighted income effects are lower than cross-price effects.  
 
Expression (III.22) is of particular interest and reveals linkages between working and purchasing 
in the preferred sector, holding expenditure km  constant. In contrast to the aggregated model, it 
is composed only of the network effects as long as labour and consumption in this stage are 
assumed as separable. Therefore, the informational channel already discussed could be better 
analysed in this particular context. A negative (positive) sign in (III.22) when jr  ( jr  ) will 
be sufficient evidence to conclude in favour of the network effect, but weaker evidence is again 
allowed when (III.22) is in a similar direction for jr   and jr  , but is larger for jr   than 
jr  , in absolute terms.   
  
Unconditional elasticities 
 
The second stage of the model provides an adequate framework in which to study linkages 
between working and purchasing in the formal or informal market as well as to derive price and 
income elasticities in each case. However, it should be recognized that the results are conditional 
on expenditures already allocated in broad groups. Therefore, the final effects provided will be 
incomplete for two reasons. First, from a public policy point of view, the result of resource 
allocation between formal and informal outlets is more relevant if it can be interpreted in terms 
of changes in total income or expenditure. Second, as seen in the first stage of the problem, labour 
allocation will also influence the demand for broad groups via non-separability and income 
effects. In such circumstances, unconditional effects for income, prices and linkages will differ 
from conditional ones, something that must be incorporated in the analysis.  
 
For this purpose, the first and second stages will be merged, following the procedures of Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980b), Deaton (1986) and Carpentier and Guyomard (2001). According to these 
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authors, income, price or other marginal effects computed inside a broad group can be corrected, 
with marginal effects computed for the first stage in order to make them comparable with the 
aggregate model. Under the assumptions of weak separability imposed, the channel that connects 
the demands inside one broad group with the demands from another is the expenditure or income 
effect (i.e. changes in the amount of resources allocated to purchase the broad group). Therefore, 
unconditional versions of conditional marginal effects need to recognize correction terms 
constructed from implied changes in group expenditure.   
 
Considering the condition kkk mPC  or kk
D
k mPC   established earlier, and expression 
(III.12), it is possible to re-write the demand function (III.18) in the following way:  
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Therefore, if the objective is to obtain the marginal effect Mckj  /  (the unconditional 
expenditure effect, denoted by superscript  U ), then it will be expressed as 
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where the first multiplicand of the right-hand expression is obtained from the second-stage 
problem and the second from the first stage. It is assumed that all broad groups defined in the first 
stage of the problem are normal, so signs previously encountered in the second stage must hold.  
 
The unconditional counterparts for expressions (III.20) and (III.21) are more complicated, since 
they will depend on the assumption of the TCOL imposed and the construction of the price 
indexes followed. As previously discussed, in this model the methodology already developed by 
Carpentier and Guyomard (2001) is followed. The authors use the expression 
)/)(/)(( BbAaABabab mcmcscs    with )/( BABAAB PHPP   where abs  is the 
unconditional Slustky substitution term between goods a  and b  in two broad groups A  and B  
respectively ( Aa  and Bb ); absc is the conditional Slustky substitution term ( absc  exists if  
BA  , but 0absc  if BA  ); AB   is a proportionality term depending on groups A  and B  
(
BAAB   ); ac  and bc  are the consumption levels of goods a  and b ; Am  and Bm  are the total 
expenditure on broad groups A  and B ; 
AP  and BP  are the price indexes; and AH  is the 
compensated demand for broad group A .  
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Using these expressions, it is possible to derive the unconditional Hicksian price elasticities for 
the model presented above, using mOCPHPO ABBABA  ///  (Slustky equation), 
where O stands for the ordinary demand, m  for total income and C  for the consumption level; it 
is possible to transform it in terms of ordinary price elasticities. For that purpose, consider broad 
groups k  and q  where markets j  ( ifj , ) and g  exist ( ifg , ) with kj  and qg . 
After some algebraic manipulation, the resultant expressions are:     
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where kq  is the Kronecker delta ( 1kq  when qk  and 0kq  when qk  ). It follows 
also that, when qk  , 0/  qg
O
kj pc  and 0/  qg
H
kj pc . Therefore, as shown previously, 
when both markets under analysis are in the same group, the conditional price elasticities 
encountered in (III.20) and (III.21) are adjusted, basically, by the own-price derivatives of the 
broad groups and the income effects: third and second term in the right-hand expression of (III.25) 
and second term in the right-hand expression of (III.26). Under the maintained assumption of 
normality in the first and second stages, Hicksian unconditional own-price effects will be the same 
(in sign) to the conditional ones. In the case of Hicksian cross-price effects, substitution between 
markets will hold in the unconditional version only for low enough adjustment terms. If inferiority 
of any of the markets is allowed, unconditional own-price Hicksian effects are no longer equal 
(in sign) to conditional results (given a high enough adjustment effect). Similarly, conditional 
substitution among markets encountered in the second stage will always hold. In the case of 
ordinary unconditional price effects, interpretation of the results is more complex since, as usual, 
its size and sign will depend on the size and sign of the first-stage income effects.   
 
When the markets under analysis are in different groups, the substitution limitations imposed by 
the separability assumption are evident. In principle, it should be recognized that, in this case, 
unconditional own-price and cross-price elasticities for markets do not exist. Therefore, the price 
effect that will prevail is that between broad groups. For example, if groups q and k are substitutes 
(complements), then markets i  and j of q  will be substitutes (complements) of markets i  and j  
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of k , independent of the relation of i  and j  inside q  or k . This is an important result, since it 
allows complementarities between formal and informal consumption, even under the maintained 
assumption of substitution between markets inside a similar broad group.    
 
In the case of hours worked, it is possible to use (III.27) to derive the unconditional version of 
rkj hc  / . The resultant expression will take the form:     
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when M is held constant. The first term of (III.27) of the right-hand expression is the conditional 
derivative obtained from the second-stage problem and the second term comes from the first stage. 
Therefore, to estimate the unconditional version of expression (III.22), it must be corrected by the 
first-stage non-separability effect (between hours and broad groups). If kC  and rh  are quasi-
complements (substitutes) and 0)/(  kkj mc , the last term will be positive (negative) so any 
positive linkage encountered above will be increased (reduced). By contrast, when kc  and rh  are 
quasi-complements (substitutes) but 0)/(  kkj mc , the last term of (III.27) will be negative 
(positive) so any positive linkage encountered above will be reduced (increased). The converse 
applies when a negative linkage is encountered in the second stage of the problem. As a result the 
sign for the linkage effect revealed by the unconditional expression could be different from the 
predicted sign of the conditional expression if the first-stage non-separability effects are 
sufficiently strong.  
 
However, as mentioned, (III.27) is computed under the assumption that total expenditure M  is 
maintained constant. As discussed previously, a more interesting result for public policy purposes 
will be the total effects: the pure effect of hours plus the income effects generated by the additional 
hour of work. Therefore, to compute the whole effect of hours of work on consumption, besides 
the second-stage linkage effects and first-stage non-separability effects, an expenditure or income 
effect should be recognized. This expression takes the following form (where superscript UT  is 
just used to denote the unconditional total effect of hours): 
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Note that (III.28) is just (III.27), but with a second term in the right hand extended by the term 
)/( MCs kr   inside the brackets. Therefore, the income effect will work just by increasing 
(decreasing) the first-stage non-separability effects for quasi-complements (substitutes), with the 
same consequences and interpretation as before.    
 
III.4. Empirical specification  
 
The main specification considered for estimation of the demand functions discussed follows the 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) and discussed 
in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b). As demonstrated by the authors, this kind of specification is 
desirable since ‘it gives an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system it satisfies 
axioms of choice exactly; it aggregates perfectly over consumers without invoking parallel linear 
Engel curves; … and it can be used to test restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry’ (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980a: 312).   
 
As originally proposed, the AIDS specification departs from a cost function that represents 
preferences of the PIGLOG class (see Muellbauer 1975, 1976) which, in turn, takes the form17    
 
)](log[)()](log[)1(),(log pbupaupuc       (III.29) 
 
where c  is the cost, p the price level and u  the utility level lying between 0 (subsistence) and 1 
(bliss). Then using the flexible (and arbitrary) functional forms of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) 
for  )](log[ pa  and )](log[ pb  the AIDS cost for good k  can be expressed as 
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where 
*
00 ,,,, kqkk   are parameters and ),(log puc is linearly homogenous in p given 
 
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ia 1 , 0
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q
q
k
kq
q
kq  . Taking partial derivatives of the cost function in order 
to obtain quantities for good k , multiplying both sides by ),(/ pucpk and after some algebraic 
manipulation used in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a), the budget share function is obtained as:  
 
                                                 
17 Any log function always refers to a natural logarithm. 
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with  
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with Mcpw kkk / . In order to accommodate the specification to standard consumer theory, 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) show that restrictions to be imposed in the models are the adding-
up restriction:   
k
k 1 ,  
k
kq 0 and 
k
k 0 ; the homogeneity restriction:  
q
kq 0 ; 
and the Slutsky symmetry condition: qkkq   .   
 
As proposed by the authors, when prices are closely collinear, (III.31b) could be replaced by the 
Stone (1953) price index: 
k
kk pwP )log(*log , leading to the linear approximation of the 
AIDS. This simplifying solution is adopted here for estimation purposes. Finally, using the 
conditional demands version of the AIDS of Browning and Meghir (1991), but allowing 
conditioning goods ( rh ) to affect non-conditional demands only through the intercept, the final 
specification of the model takes the form:18  
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where 
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using a general nomenclature for any item   (group of goods, markets or markets inside group 
of goods),   to identify additional demand shifters, as in Deaton (1997), and e  as the 
disturbance with all desirable properties: ),0(~ 2

 eNe . Provided there are some modifications 
                                                 
18 The derivation of this expression and others used throughout the thesis are explained in Appendix 1. 
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in order to derive elasticities (explained in subsequent chapters), the parameters   will be used 
to identify price effects,   to identify income effects and r to identify linkage effects which, 
in turn, as discussed in Fortin et al. (2000), will implicitly take into account all the labour effects 
discussed previously.  
 
III.5. Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has presented a simple theoretical model for informal consumption based on standard 
demand theory. Two versions of the model considering different preferences ordering have been 
reviewed. First, the aggregated version, where the household with enough knowledge of the 
characteristics of informal and formal markets and the supply of goods inside them decides the 
amount of its budget that will be allocated in each. Second, the disaggregated version, where the 
family makes the decisions in stages: first, which goods to buy and then where they will be bought 
(formal or informal markets). The objective of presenting these models was to formalize the main 
issues investigated in this research: income effects, the linkage effects and own-price and cross-
price effects. 
 
In the first case, the testable hypothesis to investigate is whether informal consumption should be 
classified as a normal or an inferior good (income elasticity higher or lower than zero, 
respectively). Also, if normal, whether this type of expenditure is closer to consumption 
necessities (income elasticity lower than one) or consumption luxuries (income elasticity higher 
than one) should also be tested. Finally, it should be explored whether informal goods are income-
inelastic, with lower elasticities, when compared to formal ones (income elastic) in order to 
investigate the existence of quality differentials associated to markets or conclude if the informal 
sector is constrained from the demand side. In the second case, the testable hypothesis is to verify 
that working more hours in informal labour opportunities is associated with more informal 
consumption baskets. Also, that working more hours at formal jobs biases household consumption 
towards formal markets. This second case then inspects which formal or informal type of 
employment (wage-earners or the self-employed) generates the higher linkage effects. In the third 
case, using the Slutsky matrix, it will be possible to verify whether formal and informal 
consumption could be classified as imperfect substitutes and to test via the own- and the cross-
price elasticities which type of consumption is more price-responsive.            
 
The empirical specification that will be used throughout the research follows an Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS). Its desirable theoretical properties and its empirical tractability make 
the AIDS a reasonable choice. The basic specification has been presented here, but some 
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modifications will be allowed in subsequent chapters in order to fit it to the available data. In fact, 
in view of the database used in this application, the models presented above are estimated using 
three complementary procedures.  
 
The first procedure, to be presented in Chapter 5, corresponds to the estimation of the aggregate 
version of the model. The second procedure, to be presented in chapter 6, corresponds to the 
estimation of the disaggregated version of the model. The two models will offer complementary 
information. While the former investigates the aggregated behaviour of informal consumption, 
the latter will explore whether the patterns identified are similar across different goods. However, 
since there is no information on prices for most of the consumption categories used, Working-
Leser Engel curves (Working, 1943; Leser, 1963) instead of full demands are estimated. This 
means that empirical specifications (III.32a)–(III.32b) are used, but under the standard procedure 
in cross-sectional work of price normalization. As a consequence, only the income effects and the 
hours’ effects will be computed here. This model is closer to empirical applications encountered 
in the literature (Fortin et al., 2000; Gardes and Starzec, 2002; Reilly et al., 2006; Böhme and 
Thiele, 2012b). The third procedure, to be presented in Chapter 7, is developed to supplement 
previous findings, providing estimations of price effects, but only for those consumption 
categories where prices were available. In this application, price availability is restricted to food 
consumed in the house. Therefore, the Slutsky matrix to be provided is developed in the context 
of the disaggregated version of the model and conditional on total outlay on food consumption. 
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IV. THE DATA AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 
 
IV.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter the main data source used throughout the research is described. The objective is 
twofold. First, to show the assumptions made in the construction of the dataset, the main variables 
used and the exclusions. Second, to review the main stylized facts that a descriptive analysis of 
the data reveals. This chapter is divided in terms of the three crucial variables included in the 
research: labour supply, consumption and prices (or unit values). Final thoughts are presented as 
concluding remarks.         
 
IV.2. General considerations 
 
The main database used in the research corresponds to the Peruvian National Household Survey 
(ENAHO, in Spanish) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI, in 
Spanish) during 2006. The total sample size is 20,577 households and 96,236 individuals. The 
inference level of the survey is for the whole country, the main areas (urban and rural), eight 
geographical regions (the northern, central and southern coasts, the northern, central and southern 
highlands, the jungle and the metropolitan area of Lima) and 24 departments (sub-national 
administrative units). The database also provides information for two lower geographical 
aggregations: provinces (189 in the sample out of a total of 194) and districts (880 out of a total 
of 1,818). The objective of the research is to provide results for the urban areas, so an initial 
restriction to the sample was made. The sample size of urban areas is 11,631 households made up 
of 49,152 individuals.19 
 
There are two main reasons for focusing the analysis on urban areas. First, the definition of 
informality as a working condition is more clearly applicable there. In rural areas, the high 
presence of small farmers reduces the ability to identify formal or informal relationships without 
further and possibly non-satisfactory assumptions. By contrast, in urban areas the combination of 
big and small firms, government activities and several contractual arrangements and registration 
options adequately identified in the sample help to obtain greater variability in the sample and a 
clearer identification of the working status of the labour force. Second, the main issue of the 
research is to study informality from the demand side. Since the identification of informal 
consumption is made through the classification of places where the household obtain its products, 
the focus is placed on purchases. In rural areas, markets are more difficult to classify and the 
greater importance of own consumption reduces the adequacy of studying purchases alone.     
                                                 
19 See www.inei.gob.pe for methodological issues of the surveys.    
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Other data sources included in the research are the National Registry of Municipalities 
(RENAMU, in Spanish) for the period 2004–2006, the Population Census of 2007, the Economic 
Census of 2008 and other public and private data sources for different years.20 These data sources 
were used to construct indicators at the district and provincial levels (lower geographical 
aggregations). The data are obtained for 2006 (year of the survey), or the closest information 
available to that year, in order to accurately reflect the cross-sectional variance between districts.  
 
IV.3. Labour supply 
 
The population has been classified in eight mutually exclusive categories: out of the labour force, 
not working, formal workers in formal firms (formal/formal), informal workers in formal firms 
(informal/formal), informal workers in informal firms (informal/informal), formal self-employed 
(self/formal), informal self-employed (self/informal) and family workers.21 The definitions of 
these categories for the primary activity are presented in Table VI.1.  
 
Table IV.1: Classifications of the working status of the sample, primary activity 
 
 
In this application, ‘Out of the labour force’ is assumed to be only for people under the age of 14. 
People of retirement age (over 65 years old) have been included in the labour force, since it was 
possible to obtain information about their work situation. It appears that around 30% of people 
                                                 
20 UNDP (www.pnud.org.pe), INEI (www.inei.gob.pe), Health Ministry (www.minsa.gob.pe), Education 
Ministry (www.minedu.edu.pe), Transport and Communication Ministry (www.mtc.gob.pe), Economy 
Ministry (www.mef.gob.pe), Labour Ministry (www.mintra.gob.pe), National Police Office 
(www.pnp.gob.pe), Macroconsult (2010) and Instituto Cuanto (2007).    
21 When constructing the database, an additional category appeared: formal workers (with a signed contract) 
working in informal firms (not registered with the tax authority) in 381 cases. This situation is difficult to 
explain but can appear if the worker has signed a contract with the manager of the firm as an individual. 
However, given the informality condition of the firm, this kind of contract as a labour relationship is not 
completely enforcable, so the workers could find themselves in the same situation as those who not signed 
a contract. Therefore, these observations were added to the informal/informal category.  
Working status Definition
Out of labour force
People below 14 years old (labour module of the survey was 
not applied). 
Not working
People in the labour force, but not employed, i.e. do not work at
least one hour. 
Formal/Formal
Formal wage-earners (have a signed contract) working in
formal firms (are registered with the tax authority).  
Informal/Formal 
Informal wage-earners (do not have a signed contract) working
in formal firms (are registered with the tax authority).  
Informal/Informal
Informal wage-earners (do not have a signed contract) working
in informal firms (are not registered with the tax authority).  
Self/Formal Self-employed  registered with the tax authority.  
Self/Informal Self-employed  not registered with the tax authority.  
Family workers People working without payment in family-based activities.
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over 65 years old work at least one hour per week, mainly in the informal self-employment sector. 
Possibly their retirement situation without adequate retirement benefits is influencing their 
decision to engage in this sector. The not-working status includes both non-participants and 
unemployed people, while the employed status is assumed for all individuals who spend at least 
one hour per week at work.  
 
In the classification of working status, three sets of questions were used. The first enables to 
classify workers as managers, independent workers, dependent workers, family workers or in 
domestic service. From these categories, managers and independent workers were classified as 
self-employed, and dependent workers and those in domestic service as wage-based; family 
workers remained a particular category (as long as they were not wage-earners). The second 
question helps to identify whether the firm where the individuals were working was registered or 
not. The condition of registration (formality) was assumed to be ‘holding a juridical personality’ 
in the case of wage-based workers. In the case of self-employment, as well as this question, the 
special module for independent workers was used. Here, is possible to identify additional 
registration options which are particularly available for this sector.22 Therefore, holding one of 
them was considered as a formal requisite. The third question was used to classify workers 
according to their (formal) relation with the firm. If they had any contractual arrangement, they 
were identified as formal. By contrast, informality was defined the lack of contractual 
arrangements. A direct question about this condition helped to classify all the workers in the 
wage-based sector.  
 
There were some individuals who it was not possible to classify in these categories. First, there 
are the missing values in the labour force module (173 cases) or in the module for independent 
workers (162 cases). Second, independent agricultural workers in urban areas lack most of the 
information enabling classification in one of the previous categories. In order to reduce the data 
loss in this case, special questions about the registration of the farms was used (holding a property 
title was the relevant category for formality). However, for some observations (443 cases) it was 
impossible to obtain even this information. Third, all managers and independent workers who 
were owners of firms employing more than ten workers (a small-size enterprise) were also 
categorized as unclassified (42 cases).  
 
With these issues in mind, the final balances of the sample in terms of the described categories 
were computed. The results are shown in Table IV.2. ‘Total working’ corresponds to 23,289 
                                                 
22 The alternative registration classifications were ‘Owner of a business as a natural person’ and ‘Registered 
with the tax authority’ (RUC for natural persons, RUS, REIR and other systems). A general description of 
the systems can be found at www.sunat.gob.pe.    
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observations. From these, at least 57% have some relation to the informal sector (working without 
a contract or working in an unregistered firm) and 30% can be classified as formal in all of the 
relations they hold. The rest are family workers (13%). Considering the high figures of informality 
for the Peruvian economy (around 60%, as mentioned earlier) it is not surprising that this is 
identified as the dominant sector. At the same time, most of the informal workers are concentrated 
in the self-employment sector (30% of total workers), while most of the formal ones are working 
in formal firms (23%).  
 
Table IV.2: Working status in urban areas, primary activity 
 
 
Different aggregations for the groups presented could be useful for establishing different 
definitions of informality (excluding family workers). In Table IV.3, the definitions of extended 
formality and informality correspond to those previously presented and the most aggregated 
definition of the sector. As shown, only 34% of the people working have no relation with the 
informal sector while 66% have at least one type of relation. The wage-earning sector constitutes 
58% of the sample, while the self-employment sector makes up 42%. In the first case, informality 
can be constructed either from the worker’s perspective (lacking a contract), where informality 
affects 54% of the wage-earning sector, or from the firm’s perspective (not being registered) 
where informality constitutes 43%. In the second case – self-employment – informality dominates 
in more than 80% of the cases. Therefore, it is possible to conclude from these figures that the 
dominant category of the Peruvian labour market is the wage-earning sector. However, this sector 
does not constitute the formal side of the economy. Only around one half of it can be defined in 
this way; the other half is exposed in some way to informality. By contrast, in the self-employment 
sector informality is dominant, though it is still possible to find some formality in this case.    
 
Levels % obs.
Formal/Formal 5,322 22.9           
Informal/Formal 1,361 5.8             
Informal/Informal 4,952 21.3           
Self/Informal 6,922 29.7           
Self/Formal 1,631 7.0             
Family workers 3,101 13.3           
Total working 23,289 100.0         
Not working 12,495 49.9           
Out of labour force 12,548 50.1           
Total not working 25,043 100.0         
Unclassified 820 1.7             
Total sample 49,152 100.0         
Informal: 
13,236 (56.8%) 
Formal: 
6,978 (29.9%)
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Table IV.3: Working status in urban areas, different aggregations, primary activity 
 
1/.Excluding family workers. 2/. Formal/Formal + Self/Formal. 3/.  Self/Informal +  
Informal/Informal + Informal/Formal.  
 
In Table IV.4, basic statistics for workers are presented. Here, hours of work are treated in weekly 
terms, as the survey records it. This variable has been computed to take into account the normal 
number of hours a worker spends in his or hers job, in order to avoid any possible division bias. 
Income, in annual terms, is constructed using most types of labour income received by the 
worker.23 This includes: monetary income, in-kind income and own consumption. Income has 
also been constructed excluding taxes and including most regular benefits (as a concept of net 
income). Wages are constructed from these estimates and expressed in per-hour terms. Finally, 
firm size is expressed as the proportion of workers in firms with ten or or fewer employees.  
 
In terms of firm size, (by construction) all individuals in the self-employment sector work alone 
or own firms that employ fewer than ten workers. However, differences appear in the other labour 
categories. In general, from the estimates, is possible to infer that, in the wage-based sector, 
formal firms tend to be larger. As shown, 86% of the individuals in the informal/informal category 
work in small firms while only 5% in this situation are in the formal/formal category. However, 
it is interesting to note that hiring without a contract is not necessarily a condition only of small 
firms. At least 62% of informal workers holding a job in the wage-based sector are working in 
firms with more than ten employees.  
 
                                                 
23 The referential exchange rate for the period according to the Peruvian Central Bank is S/. 3.274 per dollar 
See www.bcrp.gob.pe. Values of income and expenditure are deflated at the midpoint of the survey period. 
Levels % obs.
Total Workers 1/ 20,188
  Wage-earning sector 11,635 57.6           
     From the perspective of the worker
     Formal 5,322 45.7           
     Informal 6,313 54.3           
     From the perspective of the firm
     Formal 6,683 57.4           
     Informal 4,952 42.6           
  Self-employment sector 8,553 42.4           
    Formal 1,631 19.1           
    Informal 6,922 80.9           
Extended Formality 2/ 6,953 34.4           
Extended Informality 3/ 13,235 65.6           
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Table IV.4: Job characteristics, working status in urban areas, primary activity 
 
Note: Income and wages are in S/. (Nuevos Soles). Standard deviations in parenthesis.  
 
Similarly, we can see that hours worked in the formal sector appear to be higher. This evidence 
is consistent with previous findings (see, for example, Lemieux et al., 1994 for Canada; Gasparini, 
2001 for Argentina). The differences are more obvious in the self-employment sector. In the 
wage-based sector, hours of work tend to increase when the work relation is more formal, but it 
is interesting to note that the differences are not significant between formal and informal workers 
when they work in formal firms. This is possibly the result of job-related policies in this kind of 
firm that do not differentiate between workers with a contract or those without one. At the same 
time, the standard deviations of hours worked are higher for the informal sector. This result is 
consistent with the argument that working in the informal sector tends to be more flexible and 
less subject to institutional constraints (see Lemieux et al., 1994).  
 
Patterns on income and wages are similar to earlier ones. Both variables are, in general, greater 
in the formal sector than in its informal counterparts, with the lowest figures in the case of 
informal workers at informal firms (similar patterns are found in Perry et al., 2007 for other Latin 
American countries). Arguably, for the aggregate sectors, incomes and wages for the formal 
sector are double the informal figures. However, in this case standard deviations are larger in the 
Hours (week) Income (annual) Wage (per hour) Size (% <=10 w.)
Formal/Formal 47.5             12,116               5.9                    4.9                    
(15.872) (10724.100) (8.425)
Informal/Formal 47.4             6,433                 3.2                    37.9                   
(19.565) (5590.722) (4.278)
Informal/Informal 45.9             4,857                 2.5                    85.8                   
(21.190) (3781.929) (2.5318)
Self/Informal 44.1             5,353                 3.2                    100.0                 
(25.359) (6235.926) (7.629)
Self/Formal 51.2             11,933               5.5                    100.0                 
(22.752) (17164.060) (8.738)
Total workers 46.2             7,619                 3.9                    67.2                   
(21.648) (9143.784) (7.044)
Formal 48.3             12,073               5.8                    27.2                   
(17.797) (12534.170) (8.501)
Informal 45.1             5,279                 2.9                    88.3                   
(23.343) (5394.997) (5.904)
t-test
Formal vs Informal 10.92 43.15 25.28
Self (Formal vs Informal) 11.06 15.25 9.48
Wage (F/F vs I/F) 0.13 18.90 11.59
Wage (F/F vs I/I) 4.21 46.37 28.74
Wage (I/F vs I/I) 2.46 9.80 6.13
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formal sector. This means that incomes and wages are higher, but also more variable in the formal 
than in the informal one. This result is similar to that shown in Lemieux et al., (1994).  
 
To analyse security in incomes, workers were directly asked for the stability of their family 
incomes, as set out in Figure IV.1. As shown, informal labour opportunities are clearly less stable 
than formal ones. This is a common result considering that normally informal work is less secure. 
In terms of the extended definition of informality, while 80% of formal workers consider their 
family incomes as stable, only 59% of informal workers are in the same situation. Similar 
differences are encountered even when the analysis is conducted for wage-earners and the self-
employed. In the first case, 84% of formal wage-earners in formal firms have stable incomes, 
while 59% of informal workers at informal firms consider their family incomes as stable. 
Similarly, although self-employment shows less stable incomes when compared with wage-
earners, inside them there are still large differences. For example, 68% of formal self-employed 
have stable incomes in contrast to the 58% of informal self-employed.  
 
Figure IV.1: Stability of family incomes for different labour options, in urban areas, 
primary activity (in %) 
 
Note: results reveal the percentage of people who consider their family incomes as stable. 
 
In Figure IV.2, socio-economic characteristics like the age, educational level and gender patterns 
of the workers are tabulated. As shown, the formal self-employed are the oldest individuals; the 
younger ones work in the informal self-employment sector. The gender patterns indicate higher 
informality among women, with particularly high figures in the informal self-employment sector. 
Where educational attainment is concerned, formal firms tend to hire people with higher 
educational levels, with those hired under a proper contract showing the highest figures (>14 
years). The rest of the sample exhibits lower and very comparable educational attainment: around 
84.2 
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ten years of education. At the bottom of the distribution, the informal self-employed have the 
fewest years of education at around 9 years. 
 
Figure IV.2: Other characteristics of workers, in urban areas, primary activity 
 
Note: Age (in years), job duration (time spent in the last job, in years) and education (years spent in formal education). Male and 
female figures reveal the percentage of each group of workers under the different earning opportunities.   
 
Under the variable ‘job duration’, less-permanent jobs are informal ones in the wage-based sector 
with a duration of around two or three years. By contrast, formal jobs in the wage-based sector 
tend to reveal longer durations (8.5 years on average). This evidence is consistent with previous 
analysis undertaken by Pasco-Font and Saavedra (2001), who show, for the beginning of the past 
decade, that formal workers stayed around 7 years in their jobs and informal ones around 2 years. 
They also found that jobs in the self-employment sector tended to be more permanent than in the 
wage-based sector. Similar evidence is found here with self-employed showing average durations 
of 8.4 yeras vs 5.4 years shown by wage earners but, again, informal opportunities tended to be 
less permanent than formal ones (here 8.4 vs 14 years).24 This information clearly reveals some 
heterogeneity between informal earning opportunities. On the one hand, those working for others 
without a contract tend to have more risky labour opportunities than those individuals who have 
decided to run a business, even if this business is informal.  
 
The results explored are more-or-less related to previous observations found by Fields (1990, 
2007) about the good (upper-tier) and bad (free-entry) informal earning opportunities. This is the 
case for Peru, as analysed by Yamada (1996), with the informal self-employment sector and the 
informal wage-earning sector, respectively. As shown, informal workers in informal firms, 
although they have highly comparable educational levels to the informal self-employed, they earn 
less and have less-secure earning opportunities. Similarly, as shown in Table VI.5, the decision 
                                                 
24 It is possible to argue that duration in formal self-employed jobs could be over-estimated, since 
respondants could be including their informal self-employed past in their answer. From the survey, it was 
not possible to track the level of over-estimation.    
Age Educ Male Female
Formal/Formal 38.2 14.3 29 23
Informal/Formal 31.3 12.0 7 6
Informal/Informal 32.1 10.5 26 23
Self/Informal 42.2 9.4 29 42
Self/Formal 48.6 10.5 9 6
Total 38.4 11.2 100 100
2.0
2.9
8.4 8.5
14.0
0
4
8
12
16
Informal /
Formal
Informal /
Informal
Self /
Informal
Formal /
Formal
Self / Formal
Job duration
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to work in self-employment is not necessarily related to difficulties in finding other jobs. In the 
case of informal self-employment, the percentage of people who began a business because of 
difficulties in entering the wage-based sector is around 37% and for formal self-employment just 
25%. Clearly, most of the people working in this sector have decided to do so either based on a 
free decision of higher expected earnings or simply because they just want to do it.  
 
Table IV.5: Reasons for engaging in the self-employment sector (in %) 
 
 
Table IV.6: Working status in urban areas, primary activity, household head and spouse 
(in %) 
 
Note: head of household in the vertical and spouse in the horizontal. 
 
In Table IV.6, the distribution of labour within the family is presented. The sample used is 
restricted to those households where there is both a head and a spouse, and where both are 
working. The sample size in this case is 1,697 observations. As shown, looking the aggregate 
categories, when the main earner (head of household) works in the formal or informal sector, the 
second earner (spouse) tends to work more than proportionally in the same sector. Similarly, when 
the categories are opened, similar patterns are detected for the extremes: formal workers in formal 
firms (F/F) and informal self-employment (S/I). These results suggest that, in the Peruvian case, 
network strategies (secondary earners follow primary earners’ decisions) are a better description 
Earn more 25.3          21.1            21.6              
Want to be independent 35.2          26.0            27.2              
Family tradition 8.6            5.5              5.9                
Other reason 6.3            9.9              9.4                
Did not find a job 24.6          37.5            35.8              
TOTAL 100.0        100.0          100.0            
Self/Formal Self/Informal Self-employment
75% 63% 64%
F / F I / F I / I S / F S / I Total
Formal/Formal 49           5             11           5             31           100         
Informal/Formal 27           13           20           2             38           100         
Informal/Informal 8             5             31           5             50           100         
Self/Formal 27           5             9             13           46           100         
Self/Informal 15           5             22           6             52           100         
Total 29           5             18           6             42           100         
Note: Aggregate categories
Formal Informal Total
Formal 51          49          100         
Informal 19          81          100         
Total 35          7            100         
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of family interactions, as defined in Lehman and Pignatti (2007). However, when other categories 
are analysed (I/F, I/I and S/F), coping strategies (changing the labour allocation) emerge, as 
defined in Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007) – although this result is influenced by the absolute 
high incidence of S/I among secondary earners. 
 
IV.4. Informal consumption 
 
To construct formal and informal consumption variables, data on expenditure at the household 
level are used. A first methodological issue to consider is the data restrictions imposed and the 
resultant missing observations when both modules (labour supply and consumption) were 
merged. As a result, 818 households were excluded. At the same time, since the interest is on 
purchases, those observations with zero-purchasing (5 households) do not provide information so 
are also excluded. Therefore, 10,808 observations with complete data on consumption and labour 
were identified.  
 
Table IV.7: Definitions for consumption groups 
 
 
The survey identifies purchases for specific commodities together with the places where these 
were obtained. In order to perform the analysis, the commodities were divided into seven 
consumption groups (see Table IV.7). The groups constructed are very close to those used by 
Group Definition
Food to be consumed 
inside the house (Fon)
All food purchased by the household to be consumed within it,
including food consumed outside the home by members less
than 14 years old and excluding food for domestic animals.
Food to be consumed out 
of the house (Foff)
All food consumed off the premises by household members
older than 14, that could be made in conjunction with other
household members or not. 
Clothing and personal care 
(CC)
All expenditure on clothing - including textiles, shoes, fashion
accessories and school clothing - and personal care items
(soap, shampoo, cream, baby care and hairdressing)
Health goods and services 
(HEA)
All expenditure on medicines and health services. Includes all
kinds of insurance premiums.
Transportation and 
communication services 
(TC)
Related expenditure for public and private transportation and
communication (phone, internet, mail service). Fuel used for
transport is also included.   
Education and culture (ED)
Expenditure for regular and non-regular schooling, cultural
expenditures and different items (pencils, pens, diskettes) that
can be considered closely related to this kind of consumption.   
Other goods and not 
classified items (OT)
Includes a wide range of general household expenditure like
housing (rent, taxes due on the house, fuel used for cooking and
general services), maintenance (washing and cleaning, painting
and related maintenance services), furniture, other services like
housekeeping, garage, etc; and all other expenditures not
classified elsewhere.      
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INEI.25 In Table IV.8, a comparison of the breakdown of expenditure between the total and 
restricted sample is presented.  As far as the different consumption strategies of households in 
urban areas are concerned, the main and most common strategy is purchasing. It represents 76% 
of total consumption and almost all the households are involved in a purchasing activity. The 
emphasis is relevant since the models to be estimated are based only on this kind of consumption. 
The reason is simple:  this is the only strategy that can adequately be classified in terms of the 
informal condition of the place where the good was obtained. Therefore, just focusing the 
attention on purchases, the classification of expenditure by consumption groups is consistent with 
earlier estimates (see Herrera, 2003; Monge, 2007) where food consumption (inside and outside 
the household) explains around 45% of total expenditure and, as a mean budget share, is close to 
0.5. At the same time, most of the households purchase from each of the gross groups constructed. 
However, zero consumption could be problematic in at least four of the seven groups: Foff, HEA 
and ED. Therefore, corrections to sample selection bias must be made, as proposed in subsequent 
chapters.   
 
Table IV.8: Total expenditure in urban areas: strategies and groups 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
   
                                                 
25 See www.inei.gob.pe. 
Total expenditure by strategy
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0 Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Purchasing 14,979        76.2           0.747 100.0         14,868        76.3           0.748 100.0         
(12236.48) (0.18) (12172.17) (0.18)
Own & Kind 2,668         13.6           0.134 91.3           2,608         13.4           0.133 91.1           
(4053.87) (0.12) (3971.92) (0.12)
Private transfer 1,215         6.2             0.074 78.3           1,216         6.2             0.073 78.3           
(2809.41) (0.13) (2860.16) (0.13)
Public transfer 675            3.4             0.037 73.5           681            3.5             0.037 73.5           
(1648.57) (0.06) (1681.4) (0.06)
Other 123            0.6             0.008 25.0           123            0.6             0.008 24.8           
(1328.27) (0.03) (1372.82) (0.03)
Total 19,660        100.0         100.0         19,496        100.0         100.0         
(14918.19) (14824.24)
Total expenditure (purchasing) by group
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0 Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Fon 4,866         32.5           0.359 96.4           4,856         32.7           0.362 97.2           
(3409.71) (0.17) (3348.43) (0.17)
Foff 1,813         12.1           0.130 85.5           1,790         12.0           0.130 85.4           
(2134.55) (0.14) (2109.29) (0.14)
CC 1,206         8.1             0.081 95.5           1,221         8.2             0.083 96.3           
(1397.13) (0.06) (1391.87) (0.06)
HEA 900            6.0             0.054 82.6           887            6.0             0.053 82.1           
(1757.06) (0.08) (1761.88) (0.08)
TC 2,350         15.7           0.137 94.6           2,316         15.6           0.136 94.5           
(4391.02) (0.1) (4449.06) (0.1)
ED 1,341         9.0             0.067 86.6           1,304         8.8             0.066 86.7           
(2830.78) (0.09) (2721.7) (0.08)
OT 2,502         16.7           0.171 99.6           2,494         16.8           0.172 99.6           
(3136.04) (0.104) (3146.76) (0.1)
Total (purchase) 14,979        100.0         100.0         14,868        100.0         100.0         
(12236.48) (12172.17)
No. observations 11,631 10,808
Total sample Restricted sample
Total sample Restricted sample
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The available data on outlets were then used to classify purchases according to their 
formal/informal nature. In general, the objective was to identify, as accurately as possible, where 
a formal or informal transaction is the more likely to happen. However, as long as the data do not 
provide information on the registration of the transaction done or the institutional enforcements 
followed by each of the places considered, the classification was carried out based on the 
appropriate literature (suggestions as to how to classify markets), previous knowledge of the 
country under investigation and anecdotal evidence collected during the research. Collection of 
this last piece of evidence was via non-systematic observation of a number of outlets (street 
vendors, city markets, stores, shops, restaurants, pharmacies, supermarkets) located on both the 
most- and the least-developed districts of Lima (the capital city), and in cities such as Trujillo, 
Arequipa, Cajamarca, Huaraz and Juliaca. During the visits, the objective was to look at the 
external characteristics of the outlet, buy something (in order to record the transaction) and have 
a short conversation with the seller about the general management of the business.          
 
Two strategies are followed, as shown in Table IV.9. The first considers an aggregation of three 
markets and the second further disaggregates these three markets into five (from more informal 
to more formal). As will be explained later, this is done in order to control for possible 
classification problems and to allow change to be made to the definition of informality as a robust 
check in the empirical analysis.   
 
Table IV.9: Market classification according to outlet type 
 
 
The identification of informal outlets follows previous work done by de Soto (1986), Dasgupta 
(1992), Reilly et al. (2006), Arellano and Burgos (2010) and Böhme and Thiele (2012b), who 
identify this sector as street vendors and city markets – i.e. unregistered and unlicensed 
establishments (see Swaminathan, 1991). In the survey, the former were identified as side-walk 
sellers, kiosk-sellers, fairs or in any type of vehicles; the latter was fully identified so no further 
assumptions were needed. In both cases, the operational characteristics described by Thomas 
(1992) – competitiveness, ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family-owned 
Category I Category II
Market 1
street vendor (side-walk sellers, fairs, kiosk-sellers, 
vehicles), other informal.
Market 2 city markets.
Semi-
formal
Market 3
stores, shops, book stores, barber shops, hardware, 
bazaar, other (includes unclassified markets).
Market 4 bakeries, restaurant, pharmacies.
Market 5
supermarkets, social centres, educational centres, health 
centres and other formal.
Markets 
Outlets
Informal
Formal
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businesses, small-scale operations and labour-intensive methods of production with low-skilled 
workers – were verified by observation and anecdotal evidence. In general, it was also noticed 
that no receipt or ticket was given when certain direct purchases were made there. Considering 
these last issues, it was possible to conclude that most of the activities in this sector could be 
adequately presumed to be unregistered. However, a distinction is made between street vendors 
and city markets since these latter, given their permanent location in the same place, are subject 
to greater inspection by local governments; in fact it was possible to verify that they belong to 
associations and adhere to municipal regulations (like having a licence to operate). This 
observation is in line with that of de Soto (1986), who argues that commerce in city markets can 
be considered less informal than that carried out through street vendors. This is recognized under 
the five-market definition.  
 
Identifying formal outlets was a more difficult task due to the lack of concrete information about 
the registration of the transactions made in the rest of outlets identified. One option (commonly 
used in the literature) considers all other transactions as formal and focuses on informal 
consumption. However, one objective of the research is to also produce information for the formal 
sector for comparative purposes, so at least an approximation was needed; however, to avoid any 
misclassification of outlets, construction of both a formal and a semi-formal option was preferred. 
In the first category, the definition of modern channels of commercialization like supermarkets, 
as defined in Arellano and Burgos (2010), was used. Institutional providers of goods and services 
– such as health, educational and social centres – were classified here (in a similar manner to 
Fomba and Mvolo, 2010; Böhme and Thiele, 2012b). For classification purposes, these were 
always identified as formal, although note that, in the last three cases, it is possible to encounter 
informal providers (small and clandestine); however, they are presumably a small part of the 
market.26  
     
Other formal outlets identified were pharmacies, restaurants and bakeries (as in Fomba and 
Mvolo, 2010), though they are considered less formal than the others once the five- market 
definition is used. The main reason is that the incidence of informality in these cases could be 
greater. For example, for pharmacies, Calderon (2010) shows that the split of the market between 
big pharmacies (i.e. as part of national or international chains) and small ones (individual 
pharmacies) is 60% and 40%, respectively. Although not all the individual pharmacies can be 
                                                 
26 Using information from ENAHO, it was observed that, of the total observations carried out in the previous 
month, only 16% of those in urban zones were done in private centres; again, only a fraction of these are 
presumed to be clandestine so, for simplicity, private attentions were also classified as formal. In the case 
of educational centres, ENAHO data reveal that, of those who attended such centres last year, the total share 
of alumni in private centres was 22%, with only a fraction attending unregulated ones. Again, for simplicity, 
it was assumed that all purchases made here were formal.     
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considered as informal, it is likely that the fraction will be greater than for other outlets. A similar 
structure could be assumed in the case of restaurants, but with an incidence of informality that 
could be even greater.27     
 
The semi-formal category is composed of those outlets not classified previously. The most 
significant of these were shops and stores. Their definition in the sample was too generic to enable 
adequate classification, so it was preferable to include them in a similarly generic semi-formal 
category. Anecdotal evidence reveals that these outlets covered a wide range of formats: small 
and medium-sized firms and department stores, either in independent locations or in commercial 
centres. These latter were not necessarily all modern ones (where all stores are formal), by contrast 
it were identified other organizational structures where a high degree of informality was 
identified. In fact, modern retail explains only a small proportion of purchasing. Using data 
provided by Regalado et al. (2009), we can see that their share is around 10% of total sales. 
Therefore, it is possible to infer that, in stores and shops, the incidence of informality could be 
greater. 
 
The other informal and other formal categories were constructed because some items are not 
normally commercialized in these typical outlets, but the goods themselves give a good idea of 
formal or informal consumption. For example, in the case of house expenditure, payments to 
public security (serenazgo) and housing taxes were classified as formal, while general services 
for the house – normally paid in cash without a receipt (private security, domestic services and 
others) – were classified as informal. Expenditure on electricity was classified as formal while 
water was differentiated by the type of connection (if it was a public connection then it was 
classified as formal). In the case of transport and communication, payments on private parking 
(normally made in cash without a receipt) were classified as informal and public and private 
communication services (such as phone calls) as formal. Public transport was directly answered 
in terms of formality, so was included in the corresponding category. Insurance premiums were 
assumed to be formal and private transport to the school (normally paid in cash without receipts) 
informal. Other items were not classified (expenditure on fuel for cooking, maintenance of the 
building, rent, house improvements and internet services in public points) and were included in 
the semi-formal category.    
 
 
                                                 
27 Anectodal evidence collected during the research reveals that individual pharmacies show most of the 
characteristics described in Thomas (1992); however, in general, proper receipts were usually given for 
transactions and it was possible to check that the pharmacies follow most of the regulations of the sector 
(like possession of a municipal licence). Similar patterns were detected in the case of small restaurants, but 
transactions without a receipt were more common, mainly outside Lima.  
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Table IV.10: Total expenditure (purchasing) in urban areas: markets 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
In Table IV.10 the results of this classification are presented. Using the restricted sample and 
focusing solely on the three-market approach (top panel), informal consumption explains 37% of 
total purchases, and formal consumption around 35%. These figures are lower when compared to 
the size of the shadow economy – around 60% of GDP in 2006 (Schneider and Buehn, 2007) – 
which is a reasonable result considering that only a fraction of informal household consumption 
is considered in the classification. In fact, if the informal consumption constructed here is 
extended to include own consumption, private transfers and other sources and if we further 
assume that the semi-formal category is distributed equally between formal and informal markets, 
then the distribution of total consumption is 60% for informal transactions and 40% for formal 
ones – a result highly comparable to GDP figures. In terms of the mean budget shares, informal 
purchases represent 0.4, which is higher than the 0.3 identified for formal ones. Moreover, both 
markets show very high and similar rates of participation (close to 100%), indicating the strong 
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Informal 5,496         37.0                0.390 99.4
(4221.03) (0.18)
Semi-formal 4,213         28.3                0.318 99.8
(3930.) (0.19)
Formal 5,158         34.7                0.292 99.1
(7734.17) (0.18)
Total (purchase) 14,868        100.0              
(12172.17)
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Market 1 2,398         16.1                0.174 98.4
(2323.02) (0.13)
Market 2 3,098         20.8                0.216 90.4
(3014.57) (0.17)
Market 3 4,213         28.3                0.318 99.8
(3930.) (0.19)
Market 4 1,584         10.7                0.101 88.8
(2115.82) (0.11)
Market 5 3,575         24.0                0.191 98.0
(6692.99) (0.15)
Total (purchase) 14,868        100.0              
(12172.17)
…the consumer purchase from (%):
Only one market
Two markets
The three markets
Only one market
Two markets
Three markets
Four markets
The five markets
No. observations
3.0                                      
16.1                                    
80.1                                    
5-market definition
Three-market approach
Five-market approach
10,808
Overlapping of the consumer base
3-market definition
0.2                                      
1.4                                      
98.4                                    
0.2                                      
0.6                                      
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overlapping consumer base between the formal and informal sectors, as identified by Böhme and 
Thiele (2012b) for African countries. This overlapping is more evident in the results presented in 
the lower half of Table IV.10 where as shown almost everyone in the sample purchase from the 
three markets.     
 
In terms of the five-market approach (the middle section of Table IV.10), it follows from the data 
that the main purchasing places are Market 3 and Market 5, representing 28% and 24%, 
respectively, of total expenditure. However, we should note that both categories include a very 
different array of places, so it does not necessarily mean that the specific places included in these 
categories are the main sources of goods for Peruvian households. In fact, the main locus of 
consumption is the city market (Market 2) with 21% of the consumption purchased there. 
Therefore, this outlet constitutes the main channel of engagement with the informal sector. 
Another interesting case occurs in Market 1 (street vendors), with more than 98% of participation 
and 16% of total expenditure; considering the low scale of consumption in this market, these 
ratios enable us to infer the relatively high importance of this sector. Again, the participation rate 
and the information presented at the bottom of Table IV.10 help to demonstrate the strong overlap, 
even if the definition of informal markets has changed. 
 
The results of informal consumption can be compared with international evidence. In this 
application, for the Peruvian economy the participation rate in informal outlets is close to 100% 
and budget shares are closer to 40%. Fortin et al. (2000) calculate a participation rate of 15% and 
a budget share of 1.4% in Canada. Gardes and Starzec (2009), in Poland, show a similar 
participation rate, but do not present results for the budget share. Reilly et al. (2006) show a 84% 
participation rate and a budget share of 28.5% for Serbia, whereas Böhme and Thiele (2012b) 
showed no participation rates, but revealed budget shares of 78% on average for West African 
countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In principle, the 
differences can be explained by the size of the informal economy in each country. In Canada, the 
size of the shadow economy is calculated at around 12% of GDP (Schneider and Buehn, 2007)28 
or between 2% and 5% (Fortin et al., 2000). In Poland, the size is almost 26% (Schneider and 
Buehn, 2007), in Serbia around 33% (Krstic, 1998) for ex-Yugoslavia, and in African countries 
around 42% on average (Schneider and Buehn, 2007).29 Therefore, Peruvian consumption figures 
are higher than those for Canada, Poland and Serbia, but below those for Africa. It is also 
interesting to note that, as we saw for Peru, household consumption shares are below GDP shares 
in three of the four studies reviewed here.    
                                                 
28 The figures of Schneider and Buehn (2007) are the closest to the date of the surveys of the studies 
referred to.  
29 Calculations exclude Senegal since no results are reported for this country.   
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However, methodological differences also deserve some commentary. First, Böhme and Thiele 
(2012b) will be always higher than other estimates as long as the authors include own 
consumption as part of informal expenditure, something that is avoided by Fortin et al. (2000), 
Gardes and Starzec (2009), Reilly et al. (2006) and here, as long as the focus of attention is only 
market purchases. Second, as already stated, the results of Fortin et al. (2000) and Gardes and 
Starzec (2009) are based on subjective responses to unregulated transactions, so they are not 
necessarily comparable to the market classifications shown here, in Böhme and Thiele (2012b) 
and Reilly et al. (2006). In principle, an individual should have good knowledge of the registration 
of transactions made, but under-reporting could emerge if a stigma prevents them from revealing 
the total amount of their informal purchases. This second problem is solved via market 
classification, but incomplete information on registration will generate the downward bias of 
informal estimates, too.   
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this research, we must recognize that some measurement error in 
the dependant variables remains.  As discussed in Wooldridge (2002), this is not necessarily a 
problem as long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
However, if this is not the case (and we should presume that it is not), the new error structure will 
cause a simultaneity bias. As a consequence, IV strategies of estimation must be used in the 
empirical chapters.   
 
Table IV.11: Composition of informal and formal baskets (three-market definition) 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). 
 
In Tables IV.11 and IV.12, the distribution of consumption groups are presented for both the 
three-market and the five-market definitions. As expected and discussed in Fortin et al. (2000) 
and Böhme and Thiele (2012b), there are some goods which are more commonly obtained from 
informal sources and others from formal ones. This information must be incorporated in demand 
models, since preferences of purchasing from one or other market will also reveal decisions on 
purchasing particular goods only sold there. In Table IV.13 a deeper analysis of the consumption 
% % % %
Fon 3,063         55.7   1,348         32.0   444            8.6     4,856         32.7   
Foff 338            6.2     518            12.3   933            18.1   1,790         12.0   
CC 483            8.8     637            15.1   100            1.9     1,221         8.2     
HEA 57              1.0     68              1.6     761            14.8   887            6.0     
TC 891            16.2   148            3.5     1,276         24.7   2,316         15.6   
ED 132            2.4     201            4.8     971            18.8   1,304         8.8     
OT 530            9.6     1,292         30.7   672            13.0   2,494         16.8   
Total (purchase) 5,496         100.0 4,213         100.0 5,158         100.0 14,868        100.0 
Informal Semi-formal Formal Total (purchase)
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groups in terms of the formal, semi-formal and informal markets is presented. The table shows 
the results for the sample of non-zero expenditure on the group analysed, therefore they are 
interpretable conditional on the decision to purchase a particular good (i.e., given that the 
household has decided to consume it). This exercise is done only using the three-market 
definition, given the lack of information for some group/market combinations when the five-
market definition is used. This is also why the disaggregated models are run only on the three-
market approach.  
 
Table IV.12: Composition of informal and formal baskets (five-market definition) 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). 
 
 
Table IV.13: Purchasing markets by expenditure groups 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). (>=0) means that both zero and non-zero results are considered; (>0) means that only 
non-zero results are considered.  
% % % % % %
Fon 448    18.7   2,615 84.4   1,348 32.0   232    14.6   212    5.9     4,856     32.7       
Foff 338    14.1   -     -     518    12.3   933    58.9   -     -     1,790     12.0       
CC 254    10.6   229    7.4     637    15.1   45      2.8     55      1.6     1,221     8.2         
HEA 57      2.4     -     -     68      1.6     373    23.5   389    10.9   887        6.0         
TC 891    37.2   -     -     148    3.5     -     -     1,276 35.7   2,316     15.6       
ED 112    4.7     20      0.6     201    4.8     -     -     971    27.2   1,304     8.8         
OT 296    12.4   234    7.6     1,292 30.7   1       0.1     671    18.8   2,494     16.8       
Total (purchase) 2,398 100.0 3,098 100.0 4,213 100.0 1,584 100.0 3,575 100.0 14,868   100.0     
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 5 Total (purchase)
Fon (>0) 4,998             100.0       
Informal 3,153             3,264           0.600 0.621 96.6         63.1         
Semi-formal 1,388             1,493           0.329 0.354 92.9         27.8         
Formal 457               965             0.071 0.150 47.3         9.1          
Foff (>0) 2,097             100.0       
Informal 396               695             0.264 0.463 57.0         18.9         
Semi-formal 607               1,909           0.212 0.666 31.8         29.0         
Formal 1,093             1,427           0.524 0.684 76.6         52.1         
CC (>0) 1,267             100.0       
Informal 502               623             0.416 0.517 80.5         39.6         
Semi-formal 661               706             0.510 0.545 93.7         52.2         
Formal 104               350             0.073 0.246 29.8         8.2          
HEA (>0) 1,080             100.0       
Informal 70                 373             0.065 0.347 18.7         6.5          
Semi-formal 83                 218             0.154 0.406 38.1         7.7          
Formal 927               1,036           0.781 0.873 89.4         85.8         
TC (>0) 2,449             100.0       
Informal 943               1,060           0.467 0.525 89.0         38.5         
Semi-formal 157               251             0.095 0.151 62.5         6.4          
Formal 1,350             1,628           0.438 0.528 82.9         55.1         
ED (>0) 1,504             100.0       
Informal 152               209             0.288 0.394 73.0         10.1         
Semi-formal 232               338             0.241 0.351 68.7         15.4         
Formal 1,119             1,307           0.471 0.550 85.6         74.5         
OT (>0) 2,503             100.0       
Informal 532               624             0.199 0.233 85.2         21.3         
Semi-formal 1,296             1,314           0.495 0.502 98.7         51.8         
Formal 675               730             0.306 0.331 92.4         27.0         
Mean (>=0) Mean (>0) B. Share (>=0) Sample
10,501
B. Share (>0) % > 0
Prop. (%) 
(>=0)
10,218
9,374
9,226
10,412
10,770
8,878
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Using this information we can comment on the different channels via which the families engage 
in the formal and informal markets. It is clear that the most noticeable informal consumption 
group is food in the household (Fon). Given that this sector constitutes the main consumption 
group in the Peruvian economy, it will also be the main channel for engaging in informal 
transactions. This is not a surprising result, considering that the main purchasing place for 
Peruvian households is the city market, where food is the main commercialized good. These 
figures are also consistent with INEI (1992), which shows (for 1986) that the main category of 
products sold by informal outlets is food: 60% of informal vendors are dedicated to its sale. These 
figures have probably not changed over time. The second-biggest channel is clothing and personal 
care (CC) – again, an unsurprising result considering the importance of the sale of such goods 
(mainly personal care products) in city markets.   
 
By contrast the most formal goods are health and education. This is probably associated with the 
nature of these consumption groups where, as explained, health services are provided mostly by 
public or private (formal) hospitals and education by public or private (formal) schools. Therefore, 
only related goods such as medicines, books or stationery have relevant informal markets, where 
it is also difficult to verify a dominant influence, although it is true that the participation rates of 
education in the informal market are also associated with the leisure and cultural expenditure 
included in this group. Finally, a third channel to formal markets is food eaten outside the 
household, as explained by the importance of restaurants in this category. In the case of transport 
and communication (TC), it seems that they are evenly distributed between formal and informal 
markets. Although informal transportation dominates public transportation services in Peru (see 
INEI, 1992; Ghersi, 1997; Bielich, 2010), formal private transportation and communication 
services seems to compensate the figures for the group. Interestingly enough, the gross results are 
highly comparable to those of Böhme and Thiele (2012b), with informal channels of 
commercialization more important in the case of food, beverages and clothing, less important in 
health and education, and more or less evenly distributed in the case of transportation and 
communication.  
 
A final issue to consider, given its relevance in subsequent chapters, is the relation observed 
between working and purchasing from informal markets. A first look at the data is presented in 
Table IV. 14, where the mean budget share of formal and informal consumption is presented. The 
value has been calculated for the different sub-groups of the population according to the sector of 
labour allocation (those already presented in the last section). The analysis takes into account the 
hours a household allocates to each particular earning opportunity. The results correspond to cases 
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where the household allocates zero hours (Hj=0), where it allocates positive hours (Hj>0) and 
where the sector under analysis is the only earning opportunity in the household (Hj>0 / Hi=0).  
 
Table IV.14: Formal and informal consumption shares by earning opportunities 
 
Note: Formal and informal consumption is defined using the three-market categorization.  Hj defines the earning opportunity under 
analysis and Hi the others in the table. Aggregate formal and informal jobs follow the extended definition of Table IV.3. T-tests are 
calculated for unknown and heterogeneous population variances for samples without replacement. 
 
Focusing on the overall formal and informal earning opportunities, it follows that those 
households that have a connection with the informal sector via labour supply also allocate a higher 
budget share to consumption in this sector. However, at the same time we can conclude that even 
formal (informal) workers have at least some informal (formal) consumption, evidence which is 
in line with the high overlapping of the consumer base presented earlier.  For example, families 
with only informal workers allocate 41.2% of their budget on informal goods and 24.0% on formal 
ones, while the figures for families with only formal workers are 33.9% and 37.1%, respectively. 
For more-specific job opportunities, similar patterns emerge.  Those with higher shares on 
informal consumption are families with workers only in the informal self-employment sector 
(42.9%) followed by workers without a contract in unregistered firms (38.3%). Also, those with 
higher formal consumption are families with only formal workers at formal firms (37.2%) 
followed by the formal self-employed (34.8%).   
 
Figure IV.3: Formal and informal consumption shares by hours worked in each sector 
 
 Note: Aggregate formal and informal jobs follow the extended definition. The vertical axis stands for consumption budget shares on 
each market and the horizontal axis for the proportion of hours of work that the family allocates in each working sector.  
Hj=0 Hj>0 Hj>0 / Hi=0 Hj=0 Hj>0 Hj>0 / Hi=0
Formal/Formal 0.401 0.368 0.341 0.262 0.347 0.372
Informal/Formal 0.389 0.398 0.375 0.292 0.288 0.286
Informal/Informal 0.385 0.401 0.383 0.312 0.248 0.220
Self/Formal 0.394 0.362 0.328 0.286 0.328 0.348
Self/Informal 0.363 0.420 0.429 0.317 0.264 0.252
Formal 0.408 0.368 0.339 (A) 0.253 0.339 0.371 (C)
Informal 0.350 0.408 0.412 (B) 0.354 0.264 0.240 (D)
(A) vs. (B) -15.16 (A) vs. (C) -5.66
(C) vs. (D) 26.45 (B) vs. (D) -42.75
Informal consumption Formal consumption
t- tests for Hj>0 / Hi=0
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
100%
informal
100%
formal
Informal Semi-formal Formal
(A)
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
100%
informal
100%
formal
Market 1 Market 2 Market 4 Market 5
(B)
61 
 
 
Similar evidence is presented in Figure IV.3. Here, the horizontal axis shows the percentage of 
working time expended by the household on informal or formal activities; the vertical axis 
indicates the consumption shares for formal, semi-formal and informal goods. Panel (A) shows 
the results for the three-market and Panel (B) for the five-market definition. In the five-market 
approximation, Market 3 is excluded, since it is similar to the semi-formal market already 
presented. Therefore, the calculations given here suggest that linkages between working and 
purchasing in the informal or formal sector could be important. However, additional information 
can be gleaned from these figures. First, informal consumption is more stable across earning 
opportunities compared to formal expenditure. Second, the behaviour of semi-formal shares (in 
this uni-dimensional analysis) is more comparable to informal figures. Third, when the markets 
are opened using a five-category approach, we can see more clearly the higher response of the 
extremes (Market 1 and Market 5) than the intermediates (Market 2 and Market 4).  
 
IV.5. Food prices (unit values) estimation 
 
The available data on food prices (unit values) will help to implement an in-depth analysis for 
this particular category in order to reveal the substitution relationships between formal and 
informal markets. Although the analysis is not carried out for overall formal and informal 
consumption or for other categories, the relatively high importance of food in Peruvian purchases 
could be at least a good approximation of the phenomenon. Also, as long as food consumption is 
more or less homogeneous across households, focusing only on food will also facilitate 
interpretation of the results.  
 
The details of the structure of food consumption have been already commented on in a previous 
section, where we saw that this consumption accounts for around 30% of total purchases of 
Peruvian urban households. Also, it is biased in favour of informal markets, which explains more 
than 60% of total purchases, with formal ones below 10% and rates of participation of 97% and 
47% in informal and formal markets, respectively. Although these differences are large, the joint 
consumption (households purchasing both formal and informal markets) is about 46% of total 
food consumers, which is considered adequate for price analysis. However, the main difficulty is 
that, although homogenization across food is good, it is not perfect. The composition of the food 
basket in terms of food groups is presented in Table IV.15. Therefore, since the composition of 
the formal and informal baskets is not exactly the same, some influence of goods within the 
consumption groups is still allowed and needs to be recognized in the interpretation of the results 
in the corresponding chapter.  
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Table IV.15: Composition of the formal and informal consumption baskets 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). 
 
To avoid any bias in the results, a correct identification and estimation procedure of the price 
vectors for formal and informal markets must be followed. In this section, the methodology used 
to compute prices as well as the robust checks performed are presented. In order to maximize the 
amount of information used in price computation, this analysis is restricted only to the three-
market definition. In this context, the survey distinguishes between expenditure on and quantities 
of 49 food products (see below), for which it was possible to obtain the implicit unitary values.  
 
These unitary values are the best available price data for the study but, as emphasized by Deaton 
(1997), they may be subject to important measurement error and quality effects that can bias the 
results. To solve this, there are techniques that partially control for this bias during estimation. 
One is proposed by Deaton (1988, 1990, 1997) and is based on a stripped-down model of demand 
and unit values. Although intuitive, when tested the procedure did not perform well. Systematic 
tests of Deaton’s procedure are done by Niimi (2007), showing that the ability of the technique 
to reduce bias is very limited. According to Niimi, when the computed elasticities are compared 
to estimates using market prices, the differences are still high. We cannot, therefore, conclude that 
the procedure provides a significant reduction in bias in its demand estimation. In fact, during her 
empirical application, Niimi (2007) shows a better performance when community mean unit 
values are used, which motivates her to recommend this alternative as a second-best option in the 
absence of adequate market price data. Niimi’s recommendation is particularly attractive in this 
context, where the stripped-down model with censoring implies the estimation of several 
parameters, something that could complicate the econometric application. Therefore, the kind of 
work to be done here is to compute mean unit values at the district level (lower geographical 
disaggregation) and use them as prices.30  
 
The procedure entails the computation of the household unit values for each of the products in 
each of the markets where these products can be bought.31 Then, the district means for each of the 
                                                 
30 In this research, the terms ‘unit values’ and ‘prices’ are used as synonyms although they are not.    
31 For the imputation and homogenization of price data between different quantity units, INEI 
methodologies were followed (www.inei.gob.pe).  
% % % %
Bread and Cereals 442        14.0       395        28.4       137        30.0       974        19.5       
Meat and Fish 965        30.6       199        14.3       65          14.3       1,229     24.6       
Milk, Eggs, Fats 385        12.2       321        23.1       67          14.6       772        15.4       
Fruits 364        11.5       33          2.4         14          3.1         411        8.2         
Vegetables 658        20.9       97          7.0         19          4.2         774        15.5       
Other 339        10.8       344        24.8       154        33.7       837        16.8       
Total (Fon>0) 3,153     100.0     1,388     100.0     457        100.0     4,998     100.0     
Informal Semi-formal Formal Total (Fon>0)
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product/market combinations is estimated and the combinations are placed into six broad food 
subgroups (see Table IV.16) so similar sub-group/market combinations can be computed. Finally, 
the aggregate district unit values for each market are estimated (see Table IV.17). This procedure, 
done in steps (later called the 4-step procedure), will help to maximize the identification of market 
prices as long as within a district at least one product in one market is purchased reducing loss of 
information when averages are taken. The aggregation of products into sub-groups follows the 
methodologies explained in INEI (2001) and INEI (2008), and each price vector is computed 
using geometrical means with weighting factors defined at the district level. Niimi (2007) shows 
that this weighting strategy outperforms reduction of the commented bias associated with unit 
values, so this will be the base price vector considered in this estimation. However, Niimi also 
comments that the results could be sensitive to the choice of weights, so other alternatives are 
explored with weighting factors at the national and regional (departmental) levels. These will also 
be used during our estimation, but only for the purposes of comparison.     
 
Table IV.16: Food-on consumption sub-groups 
 
 
Table IV.17: Food-on market classification according to type of outlet for food 
consumption 
 
 
There are 147 individual prices to be computed (49 products in 3 markets). A first issue is to 
identify the number of data points available for estimation, given that there must be at least one 
Sub-group Products
Cereals
Bread, cakes, rice, maize and derivatives, wheat and
derivatives, quinoa and derivatives, noodles.  
Meat and Fish
Red meat, chicken and other white meat, sub-products of
meat, sub products of chicken, sausages, mliver, tripe, fresh
fish, canned fish, shellfish and other sea products.
Milk, Eggs and 
Fats
Milk, eggs, cheese, margarine, butter, other milk products, oil
and fats.
Fruits
Lemon and lime, tangerine, orange and papaya, banana,
other fruits.
Vegetables
Potatoes, hot pepper, grains and derivatives, onion, tomato,
carrot and pumpkin, corn, sweet potato, yucca and melloco,
other vegetables.
Others
Alcoholic drinks, non-alcoholic and soft drinks, water and
juices, sugar, salt, spices, coffee, tea, cocoa, herbs and
coca, sweets other food, prepared food, unclassified food.    
Informal
street vendors, vehicles, fairs, city 
markets.
Semi -
formal
shops and others.
Formal Bakeries, restaurants and supermarkets.
Market Outlet
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household which reports a unitary value for each of these 147 products over the whole sample. If 
not, some products will need to be dropped from the sample. The total number of households 
available for estimation (those which report at least one price over all urban households) is 11,212 
and the responses per product is in the range 16–8,559, with the product having the least number 
of household responses being 16 and the highest 8,559.  
 
With these data, then, the second issue to solve is to identify the possible outliers and replace 
them. Following Niimi (2007), outliers were identified as those that are more than five standard 
deviations away from their means. The analysis is done at the household level and 858 data points 
out of 313,267 are classified as outliers (less than 1%). Given their lower incidence, the treatment 
of outliers will not be a source of bias in this application. However, their replacement was 
considered necessary. Thus, the mean values of the immediately superior geographical 
aggregation are used, until the problem is solved. Therefore, since the data used are at the 
household level, the first aggregation was districts, followed by provinces, departments, zones, 
areas and, finally, the whole country. 
 
Once outliers have been replaced, estimation of the mean unitary values at the district level is 
performed (the values for households in the same district are averaged). However, several missing 
values appear. This happens because, in some districts, certain products may not be consumed or 
– in terms of the identification of markets – some simply do not exist. From the 52,479 data points 
to be identified (147 prices in 357 districts), there are ‘real’ observations for 27,758 (53%) of 
them. With these data, the 4-step aggregation procedure commented earlier is performed, with the 
objective of reducing the amount of imputation needed when market prices are identified. In fact, 
once the final stage is reached (aggregated markets), only 55 out of 1,071 data points (5%) were 
found to be missing, most of them (53 data points) corresponding to formal markets. This result 
was to be expected given the lower participation rates displayed previously for formal food 
consumption. As long as a demand system cannot be estimated with missing prices, imputation 
will be needed. The strategy is the same as for the replacement of outliers: the mean values of the 
immediately superior geographical aggregation are used, until the problem is solved. Finally, with 
the complete vector of district prices, geographical identification codes are used to merge this 
database with the household sample.  
 
Using this final database, the results for the price vectors constructed are presented in Table IV.18 
and Figure IV.4. The results correspond to unit values once outliers have been replaced, and both 
the results before and after the imputation of missing values are displayed. Note that, in the case 
of food consumption groups, only the versions pre-imputation are shown, since the replacement 
of missing values was performed only at the market level. 
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Table IV.18: Results by unit value vector 
 
Note: Results in S/. per kg, correspond to the mean values for the 10,501 observations identified for Fon consumption. Standard Deviations in parenthesis.  
 
Figure IV.4: Box-plots of unit value vectors 
Fon: Food to be 
consumed inside 
the house                     
(post-imputation)
Fon: Food to be 
consumed inside 
the house                     
(pre-imputation)
Bread and 
cereals            
(pre-imputation)
Meat and fish            
(pre-imputation)
Milk, eggs and 
fats                  
(pre-imputation)
Fruits                 
(pre-imputation)
Vegetables            
(pre-imputation)
Others             
(pre-imputation)
Informal 3.246 3.246 2.422 6.034 4.917 1.439 1.525 5.888
(0.589562) (0.589562) (0.475283) (0.732015) (1.208971) (0.270463) (0.268034) (2.221092)
Semi-formal 4.101 4.101 3.158 7.687 5.299 1.608 1.786 4.612
(0.460803) (0.460803) (0.710708) (1.642458) (0.461668) (0.645529) (0.456398) (1.016956)
Formal 7.613 7.592 4.287 10.321 6.272 3.208 2.343 12.579
(2.953409) (2.912742) (1.672881) (2.142203) (2.520382) (2.750535) (0.833985) (3.655869)
Informal 3.222 3.222 2.409 6.028 4.900 1.438 1.522 5.912
(0.403718) (0.403718) (0.449303) (0.636204) (1.211180) (0.273070) (0.267367) (1.977229)
Semi-formal 4.079 4.079 3.127 7.487 5.269 1.601 1.754 4.553
(0.346229) (0.346229) (0.632594) (1.312761) (0.429951) (0.618624) (0.394486) (0.807169)
Formal 7.526 7.500 4.223 10.238 6.190 3.208 2.368 12.569
(2.872085) (2.829222) (1.528170) (2.045902) (2.529059) (2.746278) (0.872204) (3.612467)
Informal 3.248 3.248 2.423 6.067 4.692 1.430 1.511 6.036
(0.324242) (0.324242) (0.351441) (0.749053) (1.171600) (0.239368) (0.214434) (1.746712)
Semi-formal 4.093 4.093 3.092 7.310 5.240 1.555 1.759 4.534
(0.321504) (0.321504) (0.486138) (1.204125) (0.403798) (0.552361) (0.379970) (0.521527)
Formal 7.342 7.322 4.189 10.294 6.182 3.209 2.341 12.893
(2.214346) (2.162436) (1.488874) (2.082579) (2.451883) (2.747338) (0.846651) (3.537252)
UV-2
Departmental 
weights
UV-3
National 
weights
UV-1
District 
weights
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
Informal Semi-formal Formal
UV-1
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
Informal Semi-formal Formal
UV-2
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
Informal Semi-formal Formal
UV-3
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The figures show the expected results: informal prices are lower than formal ones. At the same 
time, there are no noticeable differences in the estimates either according to the different 
methodologies or when imputation is or is not taken into account. On average, informal prices are 
around 57% lower than formal ones and show a higher dispersion. At the same time, semi-formal 
markets seem to be an intermediate category between these two extremes. These results are also 
verified when prices are computed for each of the food sub-groups considered in the estimation 
except for the ‘others’ category, where the great variety of goods included could possibly be 
affecting point values. For the disaggregated results, the highest gap between formal and informal 
markets seems to be on fruit (around 55%) and the lowest gap on milk, eggs and fats (around 
22%).    
 
Without appropiate market prices, it is difficult to assess the robustness of the calculation made 
here. However, a crude way to verify accuracy is to use market prices for food groups and to 
replicate the unit value computation at that level. For that purpose, data on market prices were 
obtained from ENAPROM (Encuesta Nacional de Propósitos Múltiples) for 1994 and constructed 
using INEI methodologies (see INEI, 2001, 2008). The results were translated into 2006 terms 
using departmental inflation rates and then merged into the ENAHO dataset. Items contained in 
each data source vary, with more-detailed data in ENAPROM than in ENAHO. In fact, 
ENAPROM includes information on 941 food items compared to ENAHO’s 186, but both sources 
can be arranged in terms of the 49 food products discussed earlier, showing significant overlap in 
terms of the food sub-sub-groups.    
 
Although this exercise demonstrates that the market prices computed here are comparable with 
unit values, there are at least three limitations to the data and subsequent exercises. First, 
information on market prices does not distinguish between markets (formal or informal), so 
comparisons made here are only applicable to sub-group and overall food prices. Second, the data 
are only available at the departmental level (i.e. there are only 25 unique values for each market 
price computed). Thus, in order to compare unit values with market prices, mean departmental 
unit values were calculated, with the result that the quantity of data used to perform the tests is 
dramatically reduced, with the natural implications that this will have on statistical precision. 
Third, the basis for the calculation of market prices is a dataset for 1994 (more than ten years’ 
difference with the sample used for estimation purposes), so changes in tastes or consumption 
patterns coiuld account for some ‘measurement errors’ in market prices. For all these reasons, it 
is preferable to interpret the results of the robust checks not as conclusive, but as good references 
with the best available data.       
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Mean comparison and correlation could be performed using these data. Departmental mean 
comparisons are shown in Table IV.19. As expected, unitary values are not market prices so there 
are differences detectable at the mean value of each estimate. However, it is possible to verify 
that the calculation of unit values done here shows results close to market prices. The average 
mean value difference is around 7% when food prices are computed and around 4% when mean 
differences across consumption groups are simply averaged. Similar gaps computed in Niimi 
(2007) were around 18% on average (using comparable methods to those used here in the 
computation of prices). At the same time, in contrast to the results presented by Niimi, in this 
application most of the differences are not statistically significant at the conventional level; 
however, considering the small sample used here, it would be preferable to consider this last result 
only as referential.     
 
Table IV.19: Unit values vs market prices (mean values and mean differences) 
 
Note: MP= market price, standard deviations in parenthesis, mean difference t-test performed: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Point 
value differs from results presented in Table  IV.17 since, here, mean departmental results are displayed and in the previous table the 
household mean was used.  
 
Table IV.20: Correlation coefficients (unit values vs market prices) 
 
 
Similarly, when the correlation coefficients are calculated (Table IV.20), we can see the positive 
association between unit values and market prices in all cases except the ‘Other’ category, where 
the association is negative. This is not a surprising result given the differences in the composition 
MP UV-1 UV-2 UV-3
Fon: Food to be consumed inside the house 3.575  *** 3.581 *** 3.623  *** 3.861 -7.4 -7.3 -6.2
(0.403) (0.392) (0.267) (0.499)
Bread and Cereals 2.781  2.784 2.820  2.710 2.6 2.7 4.1
(0.305) (0.318) (0.264) (0.469)
Meat and Fish 6.254  *** 6.266 *** 6.299  *** 7.356 -15.0 -14.8 -14.4
(0.521) (0.501) (0.599) (0.999)
Milk, Eggs, Fats 5.023  5.003 4.865  4.977 0.9 0.5 -2.2
(0.418) (0.439) (0.524) (1.024)
Fruits 1.426  ** 1.427 ** 1.428  ** 1.607 -11.2 -11.2 -11.1
(0.265) (0.256) (0.216) (0.397)
Vegetables 1.518  1.515 1.510  1.535 -1.1 -1.3 -1.6
(0.276) (0.271) (0.204) (0.293)
Other 5.775  5.811 6.018  5.955 -3.0 -2.4 1.1
(0.669) (0.673) (0.438) (0.854)
Mean difference (%)
UV-1 UV-2
Mean value
UV-3
Fon: Food to be consumed 
inside the house 
0.591 0.577 0.563
Bread and Cereals 0.674 0.662 0.680
Meat and Fish 0.463 0.406 0.415
Milk, Eggs, Fats 0.624 0.637 0.686
Fruits 0.413 0.408 0.285
Vegetables 0.604 0.615 0.631
Other -0.040 -0.022 -0.063
UV-1 UV-2 UV-3
68 
 
 
 
of the ‘Other’ category in each sample. In general, correlations seem to be very similar across 
methodologies, although far from perfect. On average, given that the value of the aggregate food 
consumption correlation is around 0.58 and using the average of consumption groups, this value 
is around 0.45. These correlation coefficients are highly comparable to those of Niimi (2007), 
who conducted a similar exercise – in fact, she computes on average a coefficient of 0.48.  
 
IV.6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter the main data issues have been discussed and some descriptive statistics on 
informality – both in the labour and the goods’ markets – presented and discussed. In terms of 
labour supply, for example, the informal sector proves to provide the main earnings opportunity, 
basically explained by the relatively high importance of the self-employment segment. Also, most 
of the stylized facts related to labour and the observable characteristics of workers are evident: 
informal workers tend to earn less than their formal counterparts; they are employed by small 
firms and have more flexible work schedules. At the same time, formal workers shows higher 
levels of human capital (in terms of education), enjoy more permanent jobs and more stable 
incomes. However, it is not completely true that the informal sector, as a whole, is a residual 
activity. In contrast, at least for the self-employed, it is found that, for the majority of workers, 
this is an option freely undertaken. Finally, when family interactions are included in the analysis, 
it would appear that household networking arrangements are in force in the Peruvian case: 
secondary earners tend to work in the sector that primary earners have already chosen.   
 
In terms of the goods’ market, the information revised here shows a relatively high importance of 
informality in consumption in Peruvian households. At least 40% of household expenditure is 
allocated there, with formal consumption accounting for around 30%. Interestingly enough, the 
data also revealed that almost all Peruvian families located in urban zones participate in both 
markets to some extent. The main channels of engagement identified in the informal sector are 
city markets (Market 2) while supermarkets (Market 5) are the main channels for formal 
consumption. Finally, the data also reveal that informal and formal purchasing baskets are 
different. According to the purchasing groups constructed here, ‘Food to be consumed in the 
house’ and ‘Clothing and Personal Care’ are mainly bought in the informal sector and ‘Health 
goods and services’ and ‘Education and Culture’ products mainly in the formal market.   
 
In terms of prices, the analysis has been restricted to food consumption, where it was possible to 
identify unit values. The methodology for price construction uses the district means of unit values 
of products bought in the different markets (formal or informal), aggregated using weighted 
geometrical means. The weights are defined at the district, departmental and national levels. The 
69 
 
 
 
base estimation correspond to weights defined at the district level, following Niimi (2007), who 
demonstrates that these types of unit value help to reduce quality and measurement bias. The 
estimation reveals that informal goods are, in general, cheaper than formal ones, with average 
gaps of around 57%. Unit values constructed here also show a higher correspondence with 
average market prices at the sub-group level and overall food consumption. However, although 
the differences are small (relative to other studies), the unit values are still not market prices; this 
must be taken into consideration when interpretating the results.   
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V. ESTIMATION OF THE AGGREGATED MODEL 
 
V.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the first empirical application of the theoretical model is presented. As discussed 
earlier, this application corresponds to the estimation of the aggregated model for informal 
consumption already presented in Chapter 3. The general specification followed is the Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a); however, given the 
data restrictions already explained in Chapter 4, prices in the current chapter are normalized to 
the unity. Therefore, the final specifications are more Working-Leser Engel curves. This 
estimation is closer to those encountered in the literature, where the conditional demand 
framework is exploited in order to identify the total expenditure elasticities and test the existence 
of linkages between working and purchasing from the informal (and formal) sectors.  
 
Two empirical exercises will guide the discussion. The first is based on the assumption of 
exogenous expenditure and labour supply. Although simplistic, the flexibility of the econometric 
procedures helps to provide an in-depth exploration of the results and is considered to be an 
adequate initial reading of the information. Different exercises are proposed in this context. First, 
in terms of the specification of the demand equations and in order to provide a better exploration 
of the linkage hypothesis here, different types of labour opportunity are included (as explained in 
Chapter 4, five earning outcomes are included). Secondly, the results for different definitions of 
informality (three- and five-market approaches) will be explored. Thirdly, calculations are 
undertaken for different sub-population groups: individuals at different points of the income 
distribution and living in cities with different levels of development.    
 
The second exercise explicitly deals with the potential endogeneity of total expenditure and hours 
of work. However, as long as the number of potentially problematic variables (at least 15) is too 
high, for identification reasons the dimension of the problem is restricted only a amsll number of 
endogenous covariates (only three). At the same time, the empirical approximation is less 
ambitious than the previous one in terms of the exercises presented. For example, the demand 
specification using five earning opportunities is replaced by two opportunities (overall formal and 
informal) and household expenditure uses a unique definition of informal consumption wn no 
results for different sub-groups of the population is presented. This is more or less the type of 
demand equation encountered in the literature.     
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the specification is explained, the mathematical 
expression of the elasticities is presented and the econometric issues around the estimation 
procedures are discussed. In Section 3, the regression results for each of the empirical exercises 
71 
 
 
 
are presented and commented on. In Section 4, the computed elasticities and the policy 
implications of the results are discussed. Finally, in Section 5, the main findings of the application 
are summarized in the form of concluding remarks.     
 
V.2. Empirical specification and econometric issues 
 
Using (III.32a)-(III.32b) and once prices are normalized to unity, the Working-Leser Engel curve 
employed for estimation purposes take the form:   
 
  jj
r
rjrjjj ehMw   )()(log*       (V.1) 
 
Following Banks et al. (1997), the major contribution of Muellbauer (1976), Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980a) and Jorgenson et al. (1982) was to place this kind of specification within 
consumer theory. The most desirable property for its use is the satisfaction of the adding-up 
property. This means that, given the estimation for n  goods (or markets), the parameters show 
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0 . This makes Working-Leser functions 
extremely useful in empirical work. The superiority of the specification is discussed in Leser 
(1963) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in (V.1) the parameters of main interest are j  and jr . The first, as 
in Reilly et al. (2006), will capture the effects of total income on the budget shares for informal 
and formal consumption and the second, as in Fortin et al. (2000), will implicitly take into account 
all the effects associated with 
rh  (network and non-separability or preferences effects). As 
mentioned, without knowledge of the cost function ( ja ) and once prices are set to 1, individual 
effects cannot be distinguished, so jr  will be more generally referred to as the linkage effect.      
 
All the terms are defined as in Chapter 3 but with two modifications, given the discussion in 
Chapter 4. First, j  refers to the three different markets constructed: informal, semi-formal and 
formal. Second, in terms of hours of work (
rh ), r  now refers to five earning opportunities: formal 
workers in the wage-earning sector employed in formal firms (Hrs_ff), informal workers in the 
wage-earning sector employed in formal firms (Hrs_if), informal workers in the wage-earning 
sector employed in informal firms (Hrs_ii), the formal self-employed (Hrs_sf) and the informal 
self-employed (Hrs_si). In order to model all the labour supply opportunities that are available 
for the family, hours of work devoted by family workers and secondary job opportunities are also 
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included, but particular interest is only placed on the first five. Hours of work are expressed in 
weekly terms. Participation dummies for each earning opportunity are also included. As discussed 
in Browning and Meghir (1991), the inclusion of these variables is relevant as long as they help 
to control for possible misspecification in the demand equations. These variables take into account 
the participation costs in each of the earnings opportunities and will pick up the non-linear effects 
of hours of work on consumption. This makes less clear the interpretation of the participation 
dummies, but facilitates the interpretation of the continuous part of labour supply.   
 
The definition of income used is the natural logarithm of annual per capita expenditure 
considering only purchased consumption, as defined in Chapter 3, where the discussion revealed 
that this is the main consumption strategy of the household (more than 75% of total consumption) 
and the only one that can be disaggregated between formal and informal expenditure. Although 
the definition used helps the model to accommodate adding-up restrictions and the multiple-step 
budgeting process, it also implies a separation between purchasing and other consumption 
strategies (own consumption, private and public donations etc.).  
 
Other variables included as part of the vector   are the standard demand shifters (demographics) 
selected from similar studies (Fortin et al., 2000; Gardes and Starzec, 2002; Reilly et al., 2006): 
logarithm of family size, dummy variables for the presence of different members (spouse, son or 
daughter, others), proportion of men, characteristics of the head of the household (age and age-
squared, gender and years of education) and a dummy for Lima (capital city). These variables are 
maintained across all estimations since they are considered the vector of characteristics used to 
model quality choices.  
 
Additional regressors are included to control for possible exogenous variables both influencing 
decisions on purchasing and on working in the same sector. They are grouped according to the 
theoretical discussion presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The first group is location, introduced on the 
assumption that firms and markets are located depending on the observable characteristics of 
cities or neighbourhoods. The variables included are the logarithm of the district’s population and 
its square, the population density of the district and three dummy variables: if the family house is 
not in a slum, if the family lives in a different departmental capital to Lima and if the family lives 
in a department on the borders of the country (except those in the jungle).The second group is 
related to research by Portes (2000), who argues in favour of cultural background or social ties as 
important factors in the emergence of informality in developing countries across some specific 
groups. In this application, certain dummies are included to identify these effects: if the head of 
the household or the spouse is indigenous, if the head of the household or the spouse is a migrant, 
and if at least one of the family members belongs to a group such as workers’ unions, social clubs, 
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associations of producers, etc. The third group is related to the enforcement capacity of the 
government in order to prevent informality. Several proxies have been included – for example, 
the number of police stations in the district per thousand inhabitants, the number of workers in 
local government per thousand residents, the logarithm of the local government’s budget 
expressed in per capita terms and a dummy variable if the local government has a slums 
development plan. 
 
As a result, the estimations are carried out with four different specifications: (1) the base model 
with only demographics, (2) the base model plus location variables, (3) the base model with 
cultural background, and (4) the base model with enforcement.32 Given the linear nature of the 
Working-Leser Engel curve, the coefficients that accompany each of the regressors will have the 
standard interpretation of marginal effects on the budget shares for informal and formal markets. 
However, in order to derive the elasticities on total consumption, some manipulation is needed. 
In this application, directly applying the definition of elasticity to (V.1) it is possible to 
demonstrate that the resultant expressions for the variables of particular interest are:   
 
1
ˆ




j
j
j
j
j
wc
M
M
c 
          (V.2) 
 












j
r
jr
j
r
r
j
jr
w
h
c
h
h
c
ˆ
ˆ
         (V.3) 
 
j
rr
jr
kj
r
r
UT
kjT
jr
M
sh
c
h
h
c

ˆ
ˆˆ



        (V.4) 
 
All expressions are completely identifiable once rrj sMhw ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ are set at sample means. In this 
case (V.2) is the expenditure elasticity, (V.3) is the elasticity with respect to changes in hours 
worked and (V.4) is the same expression but allowing movements in total income – i.e., this is 
the total effect for public policy simulations. However, note that since, empirically, hours of work 
are expressed in weekly terms and expenditure in annual terms, rr sh ˆˆ  in (V.4) is multiplied by 48.     
 
The econometric application to be specified deals with several issues to be carried out during 
estimation. First, the demand system described earlier must be estimated following a simultaneous 
                                                 
32 The definition of all variables is presented in Appendix 2, with their basic tabulations (sample means and 
standard deviations). 
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equation model if there are cross-equation correlations. In such cases, in order to avoid efficiency 
losses, the natural choice is the Seemingly Unrelated Regression model (SUR), but modified in 
order to cater for intra-equation heteroscedasticity.33 This is done using Gould et al.’s (2006) 
maximum likelihood SUR procedure with robust standard errors, like those of White (1980) and 
Huber (1967). This method is referred to as the GLS–SUR. 
 
Second, as discussed in Deaton (1986), the expenditure system uses the AIDS add-up perfectly, 
generating a singular variance–covariance matrix of the error term, where the usual generalized 
least-square estimator is not defined. The solution proposed by Deaton (1986) is to drop one of 
the categories in the system. In this application, Deaton’s recommendation is followed, dropping 
the semi-formal category and focusing attention on formal and informal consumption.  
 
Third, there are several potential endogenous variables in the application that could lead to 
inconsistent estimates of the SUR–GLS models. The most evident that are of particular interest 
for the research are expenditure and labour supply. The main reason for suspecting the 
endogeneity of M  is that it is the sum of individual expenditure and therefore, if individual 
consumption is assumed to be endogenous in the model, the sum will be simultaneously 
determined. The bias introduced by ignoring simultaneity in the context of the demand analysis 
has been explored in detail by Deaton (1986). According to him, the bias will be small if the 
equations fit well and zero under the rational random behaviour model (Theil, 1971, 1976; 
Deaton, 1975). Although these arguments probably justify most of the applications encountered 
in the literature, under the assumption of exogenous total expenditure (see Deaton, 1997 for some 
examples), in the present application it is preferable to at least deal approximately with 
simultaneity issues, given the possible measurement error in the dependant variable, as already 
mentioned. Also, this more conservative way of proceding is undertaken in order to control for 
possible sources of scepticism in the results. As noted in Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), large 
purchases will affect both sides of the equation in cross-sectional frameworks and aggregation 
across goods (or markets) could generate categories with large shares of total expenditure. This 
problem may be more pervasive when a small number of categories are included as dependent 
variables, as here.         
 
The main reason for suspecting endogeneity on 
rh  is that, in the standard consumption model, 
leisure and consumption decisions are undertaken at the same time and at the same stage in the 
                                                 
33 This was properly tested using the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg heteroscedasticity test. Chi-squared 
values were between 15 and 50 for the estimations done (higher than the critical 3.84). Cross-equations 
were also tested using Breusch–Pagan. Chi-squared in this case were between 1,600 and 1,800 (above the 
critical 3.84).   
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decision process. Therefore, as long as leisure is just an additional ‘good’ in the demand setting, 
there is a problem of reverse causality of hours influencing consumption and consumption 
influencing labour decisions. However, in the context of a conditional demand framework, as 
developed in the previous chapter, this is not necessarily the case. In equation (III.2), leisure is a 
predetermined good (i.e., quantity exogenous for a consumption decision among goods or 
markets). This issue is discussed in detail in Pollak (1969, 1971), Deaton (1981) and Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980b), where fixed commitments, institutionally determined hours of work or long-
term contractual arrangements are used to justify labour decisions, as pre-allocated at specific 
levels when consumption decisions are taken. Arguments like this justify the assumption of 
exogenous labour supply in demand analysis (as in Hayashi, 1995; Reilly et al., 2006), but again 
seems to be a risky option given that an inflexible labour supply may be reasonable for some, but 
not necessarily all, individuals in the sample. For that reason, it is preferable to deal explicitly 
with potential endogeneity that arises from the inclusion of a choice variable on the right-hand 
side of the regression equation.  
 
Therefore, there are at least 15 potential endogenous variables: expenditure, 7 variables for hours 
of work and 7 participation dummies. However, leading with a high number of endogenous 
variables was not a practical choice. For that reason, in order to deal with endogeneity, a reduction 
in the dimension of the problem and some modifications to the original model are proposed. In 
the first instance, variables that are not of particular interest in the application – like hours of work 
as family workers and moonlighting – are left aside, as are their participation dummies. To 
formalize this decision, the original estimation sample is restricted to only those households with 
no family workers and to members having only one job a. In the second case, the five earning 
opportunities of interest are grouped into formal and informal hours of work (with their respective 
participation dummies) following the extended definition of informality already discussed in 
Chapter 4. In third place, as long as they are not of particular interest, participation dummies are 
assumed to be truly predetermined in the short run (between hours and participation, to place the 
assumption on the latter is probably less controversial) so the potential endogeneity of these 
variables is not treated explicitly. The validity of this last assumption is tested using the C-statistic 
for exogeneity of included instruments (explained in Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al., 2003). 
 
As a result, there are three potentially endogenous variables: total expenditure, formal hours of 
work and informal hours of work. The procedure proposed handles each problematic variable 
separately. Therefore, two exercises are proposed: an IV estimation for total expenditure under 
the assumption of exogenous labour supply and an IV estimation for labour supply under the 
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assumption of exogenous total expenditure.34 The exclusion restrictions imposed in the model are 
justified by both theoretical and statistical reasons. For example, to identify total expenditure, 
inter-temporal separability is assumed (as in Browning and Meghir, 1991) so proxies of 
permanent income are included as long as they will affect current expenditure, but not 
preferences. The variables included were the value of total assets in the household and house 
characteristics (also used in Böhme and Thiele, 2012b in their composed index). Fortin et al. 
(2000) also includes property rents and extraordinary incomes (like lottery winnings, 
inheritances).  
 
To identify hours of work, salaries in both sectors are included (as suggested by Browning and 
Meghir, 1991), using the district means and following an imputation procedure similar to unit 
values (see Chapter 4). Also, as in Fortin et al. (2000), a variable that identifies rationed workers 
(working less time than preferred) is included as long as it will influence labour allocation in 
informal sectors. Finally, in order to obtain enough over-identification restrictions, a set of 
exogenous shocks experienced by the household in the last year were also included. The shocks 
identified in the sample were: a household member losing his or her job, the family business going 
bankrupt, a family member dying, a member being critically ill or having an accident, the head of 
the household abandoning the family, the family experiencing a fire in the house, the family being 
burgled or suffering from some other crime against it, the family experiencing a natural disaster 
and other shocks not classified previously.  
 
However, it should be recognized that some of the exclusion restrictions may be controversial in 
the empirical context of this application. For that reason, rigorous statistical procedures were 
followed in order justify the validity of the econometric exercises presented. Therefore, the 
orthogonality for excluded instruments was adequately tested using the Hansen–Sargan J statistic 
(see Hayashi, 2000) and, for relevance, using both individual F-tests (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) 
and multiple-endogenous-regressors tests proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) with critical 
values derived from Stock and Yogo (2005). When a valid set of instruments is found, then 
exogeneity for potentially endogenous regressors is tested using the C-test (as explained in 
Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al., 2003). 
 
V.3. The regression results 
 
First empirical exercise: estimation under the assumption of exogeneity 
                                                 
34 Some exercises were developed to deal with 5 and 3 endogenous variables. In these cases, although 
orthogonality was achieved under most of the specifications used, the set of instruments that maximizes 
relevance tests defines an extremely weak instrument context so the decision was to exclude these exercises. 
These results are not presented in order to conserve space.  
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In Table V.1, the results for the SUR–GLS estimator are displayed for the variables of main 
interest under the four specifications mentioned previously (full regression results for these and 
other estimates in the chapter are in Appendix 3). The total sample size used once missing values 
for control variables were dropped is 8,007 observations. Using the simplest specification (first 
column), the results show, in general, adequate goodness-of-fit measures with significant Wald 
statistics for both overall and group variable estimates. However, considering the value of the R2 
reported, it follows that there is still some noise in the estimation. This seems to be particularly 
problematic in the case of informal consumption. This conclusion is similar to that of Reilly et al. 
(2006) and is used to justify the inclusion of additional covariates in the models (Columns 2 to 
4). The new regressions again show adequate goodness-of-fit measures with significant Wald 
statistics for both overall and group variable estimates. Also, the goodness-of-fit measures 
reported has increased and the information criteria used (AIC and BIC) help to conclude that 
regressions perform better. However, as in the previous case, R2 values are still low. Again, the 
problem seems to be more pervasive in the informal specification so, although the global 
adjustment of the regression has improved, a good deal of work is still needed on the determinants 
of informal consumption.     
 
The point estimates of the variables tell an interesting story about consumption allocation and, in 
most cases, with intuitive appeal according to the theoretical model. Also, it is worth noting that 
signs for the core variables of the application do not change across the specifications used and are 
very similar in the estimated magnitudes displayed. In the case of the logarithm of family 
expenditure, it is well determined and shows a negative correlation with informal budget shares 
and a positive correlation with its formal counterpart. Therefore it is possible to argue that income 
effects are differentiated between formal and informal channels of commercialization. The 
estimates suggest that we can expect families to actually change the composition of their 
consumption baskets given changes in their income: more informal as income decreases (possibly 
because of protection strategies) and more formal as income increases (possibly because of their 
higher preference of better-quality goods). This is an expected result. For example, as stated by 
Cermeño (1987) and Pisani (2013a), from an economic point of view, poor people will be closer 
to informal markets and rich people closer to their formal counterparts, given the higher prices to 
be paid in the latter. At the same time, according to Böhme and Thiele (2012b), quality 
differentials could be behind a result like this; they suggest that families will substitute informal 
consumption for more formal options as they become richer in order to increase the overall quality 
level of their consumption basket. Similarly, from a sociological perspective, Portes (2000) helps 
to explain this result if informality is seen as the way of life encountered by those marginalized 
from the legal or regular economy. It could be argued that these excluded groups are the poor 
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revealing the contraints of the informal sector from the demand side (see Böhme and Thiele, 
2012b). Arellano and Burgos (2010) extend this last argument, arguing that scarce formal supply 
to poor neighbourhoods will determine a positive correlation between informal consumption and 
poverty, even if poor households actually prefer to purchase from formal options.  
 
The value of the expenditure coefficient shows that, holding everything else constant, a 10% 
increase in annual income (or expenditure) will lead to a reduction of around 0.3 of one percentage 
point in the budget share of informal expenditures and an increase of about 0.8 of one percentage 
point in the budget share of formal ones. However, given Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980a) 
discussion, these results are not revealing the inferiority of informal market purchases. As will be 
seen later, the negative effects of income on budget shares are not related to negative elasticity 
estimates. In fact, estimated elasticities for informal markets are lower than the unity, but still 
positive. These results suggest that informal consumption can be classified as normal necessities 
and formal ones as normal luxuries for the Peruvian economy. In consequence, inferiority is 
rejected on average and ceteris paribus.  
 
The results of ‘hours of work’ are in line with the linkage hypothesis discussed earlier: working 
more hours at informal earning opportunities is correlated with higher informal consumption 
shares and lower shares in its formal counterpart. The converse is also applicable: working more 
hours in formal job opportunities tends to bias household consumption in favour of formal shares. 
As explained in Chapter 3, the intuition behind the results is that previous experience in a sector 
(as a worker) helps the consumer to reduce transactional costs or reveals a preference of the 
worker to stay there as a consumer. Although neither effect can be disentangled, the positive 
(negative) correlations encountered and tested between formal and informal hours of work with 
formal (informal) and informal (formal) consumption, respectively, are considered enough 
evidence to conclude in favour of the linkage hypothesis. Considering the different specifications 
used, this result seems to be robust to the inclusion of the additional variables possibly correlated 
with working and purchasing activities.  
 
However, in contrast to previous applications (see, for example, Fortin et al., 2000; Gardes and 
Starzec, 2002; Reilly et al., 2006), an important result outlined in this chapter is that not all 
informal or formal earning opportunities have the same effect on consumption. The hypothesis 
testing presented at the bottom of Table V.I shows that the five-labour specification is superior to 
other alternatives. In short, the differences encountered between informal and formal options and 
the self-employment or wage-earning options are statistically significant and robust to changes in 
the controls included in the model. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the various types of 
labour supply affect consumption differently.  
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Table V.1: Results for the SUR–GLS regression (different specifications) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.02679*** 0.08424*** -0.03744*** 0.08121*** -0.02526*** 0.08400*** -0.02597*** 0.08291*** 
  (0.00413) (0.00384) (0.00425) (0.00386) (0.00415) (0.00389) (0.00412) (0.00382) 
Hrs_ff -0.00027*** 0.00022*** -0.00027*** 0.00022*** -0.00027*** 0.00022** -0.00028*** 0.00022*** 
  (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) 
Hrs_if 0.00017 0.00011 0.00013 0.00013 0.00017 0.00010 0.00016 0.00012 
  (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00020) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) 
Hrs_ii -0.00012 -0.00032*** -0.00013 -0.00028*** -0.00013 -0.00032*** -0.00012 -0.00032*** 
  (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00006) 
Hrs_sf 0.00006 0.00054*** -0.00007 0.00056*** 0.00002 0.00054*** 0.00009 0.00053*** 
  (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) 
Hrs_si 0.00029*** 0.00006 0.00023*** 0.00007 0.00027*** 0.00006 0.00028*** 0.00006 
  (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.01063 -0.00110 0.01395** -0.00065 0.00893 -0.00057 0.01174* -0.00249 
  (0.00684) (0.00629) (0.00672) (0.00622) (0.00683) (0.00630) (0.00683) (0.00626) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.01265 -0.01452 -0.01211 -0.01483 -0.01214 -0.01433 -0.01315 -0.01468 
  (0.01158) (0.00930) (0.01143) (0.00923) (0.01167) (0.00931) (0.01159) (0.00931) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.00449 -0.00970* 0.00401 -0.01051** 0.00379 -0.00987* 0.00419 -0.00914* 
  (0.00650) (0.00520) (0.00643) (0.00516) (0.00650) (0.00521) (0.00647) (0.00519) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.02336** -0.00404 -0.00658 -0.00657 -0.02294** -0.00378 -0.02578** -0.00320 
  (0.01138) (0.01084) (0.01096) (0.01074) (0.01140) (0.01085) (0.01137) (0.01080) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.01158** -0.00846* 0.01020* -0.00773* 0.01163** -0.00858* 0.01066* -0.00733 
  (0.00563) (0.00472) (0.00555) (0.00469) (0.00561) (0.00471) (0.00561) (0.00471) 
Observations 8,007 8,007 8,007 8,007 
Goodness of fit                 
R-squared 0.0947 0.2822 0.1265 0.2918 0.1002 0.2824 0.0996 0.2871 
Pseudo LogL 7926.212 8154.336 7955.881 7973.908 
AIC -15742.42 -16174.67 -15789.76 -15821.82 
BIC -15358.08 -15706.47 -15363.49 -15381.57 
Wald (overall) 1/ 3640.04*** 4255.44*** 3698.89*** 3748.43*** 
Chi2 (participation)  2/ 24.57*** 22.08** 23.48*** 25.01*** 
Chi2 (hours)  3/ 103.15*** 88.44*** 100.59*** 104.56*** 
Chi2 (demographics)  521.28*** 425.04*** 513.04*** 517.30*** 
Chi2 (location)      846.28***     
Chi2 (background)        57.31***   
Chi2 (enforcement)         69.14*** 
Income effects                 
Chi2 (informal vs. formal) 4/ 266.23*** 294.98*** 253.09*** 258.60*** 
Hours effects 5/                 
Chi2 (informal vs formal) 4/ 111.85*** 78.36*** 112.29*** 107.60*** 
Chi2 (pooled, joint hours) 6/ 301.97*** 263.91*** 303.73*** 297.39*** 
  Intra-equation 104.60*** 161.27*** 68.57*** 149.00*** 105.57*** 162.41*** 103.07***  156.97*** 
Chi2 (pooled, formal and informal) 7/ 192.77*** 167.59*** 192.57***  194.33*** 
  Intra-equation 60.39*** 56.44*** 45.16*** 53.67*** 58.84*** 56.45***  61.06*** 58.31*** 
Chi2 (pooled, self and wage) 8/ 206.01*** 183.00***  208.36*** 199.43*** 
  Intra-equation 64.19*** 145.50*** 36.83*** 134.03*** 66.03*** 146.63*** 62.48*** 140.04*** 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 1/ All variables included; 2/ Includes  D(Hrs_ff),D( Hrs_if), D(Hrs_ii), D(Hrs_sf), 
D(Hrs_si); 3/ Includes Hrs_ff, Hrs_if, Hrs_ii, Hrs_sf, Hrs_si ; 4/ Test of parameter differences between the formal and informal equation; 5/ Includes participation 
dummies; 6/ Tests the specification of five labour options against a unique hours supply vector that sums the five of them ; 7/ Tests the specification of five labour 
options against two labour options (formal and informal). The definition of informality is the extended version used in Chapter 4; 8/ Tests the specification of five 
labour options against two labour options (self-employment and wage-earners).   
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In terms of informal consumption, the strongest evidence for a positive linkage is found for the 
informal self-employed (Hrs_si). This is highly intuitive considering that most of the arguments 
around the network or preference hypotheses seem to be more applicable to those informal 
consumers who are also informal producers or sellers. Informational advantages (in terms of 
quality and quantity of goods supplied in the informal sector) could be higher for them. Also, they 
will be more interested in remaining hidden. Similarly, if, as stated by Yamada (1996) and 
discussed in Chapter 4, this sector is a freely chosen one, there will be less of a stigma in buying 
informal goods, so preferences to remain as an informal consumer could be also strong. 
Interestingly enough, the positive linkage between informal consumption and working in the 
informal self-employment sector is not necessarily reflected in a negative linkage with formal 
consumption (the coefficients are not statistically different to zero), suggesting that these 
consumers adjust their semi-formal consumption.  
  
The negative linkage with formal consumption is found for informal workers at informal firms 
(Hrs_ii). In this case positive linkages are probably less applicable (correlations with informal 
consumption are not detected) all the while that their condition as wage-earners reduces 
information flows to them. However, at the same time, they will show greater difficulties in 
buying in the formal sector. The result is understandable considering that incomes of these 
workers are the most inestable among others options (see Chapter 4). Also, as described by 
Yamada (1996), this part of the informal sector in Peru constitutes the segmented proportion with 
marginal jobs. Then it would also be natural to conclude that this sector would mainly absorb 
marginalized individuals (Portes, 2000) or that it constitutes a segment of developing societies 
where discriminatory practices act as additional barriers to modern transactional channels 
(Arellano and Burgos, 2010). 
 
By contrast, formal wage-earners (Hrs_ff) reveal a higher aversion to purchasing from informal 
outlets possibly because of a fear of stigmatization or of moral concerns, a result not detected for 
other formal labour options like the self-employed (Hrs_sf). This is a reasonable result since it 
can be argued that these concerns are less probable for the formal self-employed, given that this 
sector is closer to informality. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the formal self-employed 
workers have become formal after a period in informality and that there is great mobility across 
these two sectors. Although there are no studies that properly prove this hypothesis in Peru, some 
descriptive results encountered in Diaz (2014) suggest similar behaviour. However, positive 
linkages are found for both formal labour options. When tested, the marginal effects between 
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them are not significantly different35, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the reasons for the 
linkage could, in fact, be different. For example, beyond any informational advantage or 
preference effect affecting both formal labour options, small-size formal producers or sellers will 
have additional reasons to bias household consumption through formal markets: they could use 
family expenditure (in the formal sector) to reduce the amount of taxes paid (via tax credit 
mechanisms), an option not available to other formal workers.  
 
In terms of the participation dummies, the results are less clear, but most are still in line with the 
linkage hypothesis. The two robust results detected across the specifications used are the positive 
effect of engaging in the informal self-employment sector – D(Hrs_si) – over informal 
consumption and the negative effect of engaging in the informal wage-earning sector – D(Hrs_ii) 
– over formal consumption. Similarly, negative effects of D(Hrs_sf) and D(Hrs_si) over informal 
and formal consumption, respectively, are encountered in three out of four specifications. 
However, a positive effect of D(Hrs_ff) on informal consumption is also found. This is a counter-
intuitive result possibly generated by non-linearities at the zero-hour level, and which is difficult 
to explain with the theory to hand. In any case, this result is found in only two out of four 
specifications so does not necessarily obscure previous findings.     
 
The other variables (as presented in Appendix 3) show the expected signs. For example, in the 
case of demographic characteristics, the presence of spouses and the higher proportion of women 
tend to bias the budget allocation in favour of informal markets. This is an interesting finding, 
especially if spouses and women are mainly responsible for purchasing activities and have 
developed trust in the sellers. Then, if informal consumption needs investments in time in order 
to search for quality, this family structure (with member with free time) will reasonably predict 
better access to informal markets. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in Peruvian families, 
purchasing activities (mainly food) tend to be done by non-working women36, so they sometimes 
enjoy a better knowledge of the available markets and their characteristics and, in most cases, 
have built up relationships of trust with some traditional (informal) sellers (in most cases also 
women).  
 
In the case of the education of the head of household, more-educated households purchase a 
higher proportion of their goods from formal markets and a lower proportion from informal ones. 
This is possibly related to the more sophisticated tastes associated with education or to consumers 
                                                 
35 Chi-squared Hrs_ff vs. Hrs_sf: (1) 2.64; (2) 3.00*; (3) 2.27; (4) 2.57 
36 It is preferable to interpret these results as the effect of non-working women in the household in order to 
reconcile this evidence woth that presented in Chapter 8. There, proper bargaining models are estimated 
between husbands and wifes. Using that specification results reveal that increasing control over money of 
wifes in fact reduces informal consumption.    
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who are better prepared for complex transactions in the formal sector. By contrast, the effect of 
the age of the household head seems to have a non-linear effect on informal consumption, 
increasing it for young heads and decreasing it for older ones. The inflexion point identified for 
informal consumption is around 47 years old. In the case of formal consumption, a non-linear 
relation is also identified, but the inflexion point is found to be around 97 years, possibly 
suggesting that the relation could be defined as linear in this case.   
 
The additional variables also reveal an interesting story. For example, in terms of the proxies of 
location, the size of the district has an inverted-U effect over the informal budget share. A result 
like this is consistent with the Harris–Todaro approach, which describes an increase in informality 
in the early stages of urbanization in developing countries until the point where cities reach 
maturity. Also, lower formal shares are associated with living in slums and higher informal shares 
with life in the borders of the country. This last result is in line with the black commerce 
(contraband) that occurs in these places, where police control of smuggled goods is practically 
non-existant (see SUNAT, 2011). Interestingly enough, the dummy that identifies Lima is 
possibly capturing the highest heterogeneity in the channels of commercialization in the main 
city, since both formal and informal markets tend to be larger compared to the semi-formal option. 
However, the point estimates could be interpreted as showing that, even in this most developed 
city, informality dominates.     
 
In terms of cultural background, indigenous or migrant families generally show higher 
proportions of informal expenditure in their purchasing baskets – an intuitive result. Also, in terms 
of proxies for enforcement capacity, it seems adequate to argue that higher enforcement efforts 
by local government result in lower informal and higher formal shares. For example, more police 
stations per thousand individuals increases formal consumption shares and reduces its informal 
counterparts (at least in one of the two specifications). Similar results are driven by the number 
of municipal workers. In the case of local budgets, no significant results are encountered. This is 
possibly explained because only a small proportion of these budgets is used for control activities. 
Finally, in the case of the particular public policies adopted (slum development plans), the effects 
are not clear since they appear to have a negative and statistically similar effect on formal and 
informal shares. 
 
In order to explore with more detail the core results, the expenditure and hours effects are 
estimated for different points in the expenditure distribution. For this purpose, five regression 
models are estimated for the sub-populations in each quintile of the per-capita expenditure 
distribution. In order to perform cross-quintile parameter testing, between-model covariances are 
calculated using Weesie’s (1999) procedure. If previous results are sensitive to the absolute value 
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of resources enjoyed by the family (and, thus, their monetary poverty), then this exercise should 
reveal it. The results are presented in Table V.2, where the estimations are done only for 
specification (1) and the main variables of interest are displayed. Other results show similar 
patterns and are omitted for the sake of brevity. It is interesting to note that marginal effects are 
sensitive to the position of the household on income distribution.  
 
Table V.2: Total expenditure and hours effects for different points in the income 
distribution 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) 0.04337*** 0.00736 -0.00206 0.08551*** 0.00728 0.15719*** -0.07818** 0.10435*** -0.10473*** 0.10236*** 
  (0.01359) (0.01348) (0.04019) (0.03100) (0.04296) (0.03855) (0.03413) (0.03196) (0.00956) (0.01196) 
Hrs_ff -0.00031 0.00014 -0.00046* 0.00051* 0.00008 -0.00010 -0.00028* 0.00012 -0.00015 0.00012 
  (0.00036) (0.00028) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00019) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00015) 
Hrs_if 0.00019 0.00016 0.00039 0.00043 -0.00011 0.00008 0.00027 -0.00026 -0.00003 0.00050 
  (0.00040) (0.00026) (0.00051) (0.00043) (0.00033) (0.00023) (0.00047) (0.00036) (0.00043) (0.00036) 
Hrs_ii -0.00029 -0.00011 -0.00035** -0.00012 -0.00015 -0.00022* -0.00005 -0.00059*** 0.00016 -0.00089*** 
  (0.00018) (0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00028) (0.00032) 
Hrs_sf 0.00013 0.00158*** 0.00083* 0.00025 -0.00030 0.00055 -0.00043 0.00099*** -0.00004 -0.00005 
  (0.00063) (0.00054) (0.00049) (0.00042) (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00027) (0.00038) 
Hrs_si 0.00024* 0.00032*** -0.00001 0.00033*** 0.00029** -0.00003 0.00033* -0.00025 0.00063*** -0.00027 
  (0.00014) (0.00011) (0.00014) (0.00011) (0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00023) (0.00022) 
Observations 1,602 1,601 1,602 1,601 1,601 
Goodness of fit                     
Pseudo LogL 1423.676 1614.402 1811.801 1772.687 1871.271 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with the adjustment for between vce using Weesie (1999), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
In the case of total expenditure, estimates for informal consumption show that the effect tends to 
turn from positive to negative as long as we move from the left (poorest households) to the right 
(richest ones). In fact, there are three identifiable ranges. The first one is defined for poor 
households (in Q1) where increasing total expenditure actually increases informal budget shares. 
The second is defined for middle-income families (in Q2 and Q3) where informal consumption 
shares seem to be practically invariant to total expenditure. The third range, for the richest 
individuals of the sample (Q4 and Q5), reveals negative marginal effects. Although, point values 
for Q5 are slightly higher (in absolute terms) than those for Q4, when formally tested they are not 
statistically different37 at conventional values. The estimates for formal consumption seem to be 
more stable across quintiles. Only for those households at the bottom of the distribution (Q1) is 
the marginal effect statistically equal to zero. For all other consumers, the expected positive effect 
of expenditure on formal consumption shares encountered previously is replicated. Although the 
point-value estimates seem to define an inverted-U relationship (with higher results in the 
                                                 
37 Chi-squared L(expenditure) Q4 vs. Q5: 0.56.  
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middle), when formally tested, the computed coefficients across Q2 and Q5 are not statistically 
different38 at conventional values.  
 
This evidence is probably associated with the greater preferences of poor people for informal 
markets in contrast to those located at the top of the distribution range. As explained in Wan 
(1996) and Böhme and Thiele (2012b), when demand models are estimated for households at 
different points in the income distribution, some necessities are found to be luxuries for extremely 
poor households as the main concern of these families is subsistence consumption and therefore 
quantity instead of quality. Similarly, following the arguments of Arellano and Burgos (2010), 
we can see that, if the poor are typically limited in their participation in the formal economy 
(because, for example, of scarce formal supply in their neighbourhood or of liquidity constraints), 
it is more or less obvious that, for some in the lower ranges of the income distribution, any 
additional “Nuevo Sol” in the pockets of consumers will tend to increase more than proportionaly 
their allocation of resources to informal markets.  
 
Differences are also found in the case of hours of work. The results are very informative in terms 
of the validity of the linkage hypothesis in each quintile of the distribution. In fact, validity seems 
to be clearer for the upper range, defined as between Q3 to Q5, than for the lower, defined as 
between Q1 and Q2. In the former, most of the effects previously identified are replicated. For 
example, in the case of Q3, the detectable effect of informal consumption is its positive correlation 
with informal self-employment and the detectable effect in terms of the formal equation is the 
negative correlation with the informal wage-earning sector. For Q5, these effects are also found; 
for Q4, both effects are accompanied by the negative effect of Hrs_ff on informal shares and the 
positive correlation between Hrs_sf and formal consumption. In the latter, some counter-intuitive 
correlations displayed (mainly in Q2) at least cast doubts on the validity of the hypothesis.  
 
The data may support conflation of the first two quintiles, so the results presented here do not 
deviate from our hypothesis. However, at the lower end of the distribution, weaker evidence in 
favour of the linkage hypothesis could also be an expected result. If the effect of labour supply is 
related to some kind of strategic behaviour by consumers, these attitudes are probably better 
developed by individuals with some minimum living standards. For the rest (the poorest elements 
of the population), as long as most of their decisions are dominated by subsistence behaviour, less 
space for strategies is allowed, so income effects will prevail and may well be enough to explain 
their consumption allocation.  This argument is similar to those of Williams (2002), Williams and 
                                                 
38 Chi-squared L(expenditure): Q2 vs. Q3: 2.10; Q2 vs. Q4: 0.18; Q2 vs. Q5: 0.26; Q3 vs. Q4: 1.11; Q3 vs. 
Q5: 1.85; Q4 vs. Q5: 0.00.  
85 
 
 
 
Paddock (2003) and Williams and Windebank (2005) and Williams (2008) who, using attitudinal 
data in both English and European cities, found that economic constraints are the main 
explanation for the participation of the poor in informal markets, with any other reason being 
generally less important.  
 
Beyond the total resources enjoyed by the family, it is also interesting to demonstrate the validity 
of the hypothesis considering cities at different stages of development, as long as the formal and 
informal markets can emerge in different ways. One way to approximate this issue is by using the 
classification provided in Macroconsult (2010). According to this study, the urban structure of 
the country can be classified in terms of metropolitan areas (the biggest ones, better developed in 
economic terms and can be considered as commercial anchors for the whole country), major cities 
(cities with secondary importance with influence at the macro-regional level with primary 
articulation to the metropolitan area), intermediate cities (cities of third importance with influence 
at the regional level and with primary articulation to the major cities), minor cities (cities at the 
bottom of the urban structure with commercial influence at the local level and with primary 
articulation to intermediate cities) and of surroundings (small cities with influence only on the 
rural area around them and primary articulation with minor cities).  
 
Table V.3: Total expenditure and hours effects for different urban structures 
  Metropolitan areas Intermediate cities Minor cities 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.07134*** 0.11111*** -0.02711*** 0.08614*** -0.00290 0.06479*** 
  (0.00826) (0.00677) (0.00706) (0.00575) (0.00625) (0.00646) 
Hrs_ff -0.00029* 0.00021 -0.00013 0.00010 -0.00038** 0.00034** 
  (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00016) 
Hrs_if 0.00006 0.00025 -0.00005 0.00013 0.00055 -0.00018 
  (0.00027) (0.00022) (0.00034) (0.00030) (0.00038) (0.00025) 
Hrs_ii -0.00017 -0.00039*** -0.00015 -0.00022* -0.00023 -0.00027** 
  (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00011) 
Hrs_sf -0.00035 0.00063 -0.00007 0.00032 0.00000 0.00076*** 
  (0.00041) (0.00043) (0.00025) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00027) 
Hrs_si 0.00035*** -0.00008 0.00024** 0.00012 0.00022* 0.00013 
  (0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
Observations 2,140 2,718 3,149 
Goodness of fit             
Pseudo LogL 2376.565 2880.827 2875.03 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with the adjustment for between vce using Weesie (1999), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
To implement this classification in the model, the categories were aggregated between 
metropolitan areas (as defined in the study), intermediate cities (including major and intermediate 
cities) and minor cities (including minor cities and their surroundings). The classification could 
be thought of as areas at different stages of the urbanization process, with the first group 
representing the biggest and most modern cities and the last group the smallest and least-modern 
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ones.39 If the results differ according to the urban structure, the following exercise should reveal 
this. The results are presented in Table V.3 only for specification (1) to conserve space.  
 
The first result to note refers to the expenditure effect, which is greater, in absolute terms, for both 
formal and informal shares, as long as the cities are larger. In addition, the gap between 
coefficients in metropolitan areas is almost double those in intermediate cities and almost three 
times those in minor cities. Similar differences are found when intermediate and minor cities are 
compared. The differences are statistically significant40 at conventional levels, so it is possible to 
verify that the effects of income on the re-composition of the purchasing basket will be stronger 
for those families living in the biggest urban areas of the country. The explanation for is probably 
the better access to and size of the formal sector in bigger cities, the greater presence of wealthier 
families, the wider quality gap between formal and informal goods or the major preference for 
quality in areas in latter stages of the urbanization process.  
 
When hours of work are analysed, it is worth noting that the linkage hypothesis is equally valid 
for the different urban areas considered. In fact, the robust results encountered are, again, the 
positive linkage of the informal self-employed with informal consumption and the negative 
linkage of the informal wage-earning sector with its formal counterparts. These results are 
statistically similar across the different types of city.41 Other interesting results are the negative 
effect of Hrs_ff on informal consumption in metropolitan areas and minor cities and the positive 
effect of both Hrs_ff and Hrs_sf on formal consumption in minor cities; again all are in line with 
the linkage hypothesis. In general, the first results suggest that moral concerns or the aversion of 
formal wage-earners to purchasing from informal markets are equally applicable to bigger and 
smaller cities, but not to intermediate ones. The second result suggests that the positive linkages 
of formal workers to formal consumption are better determined in smaller cities with the lowest 
level of development.   
                                                 
39 The identification made is at provincial and district levels. The metropolitan areas identified were Lima, 
Arequipa, Trujillo and Chiclayo. The major cities were Piura, Chimbote, Iquitos, Cusco and Huancayo. 
The intermediate cities were Tacna, Ica, Sullana, Chincha Alta, Huaraz, Pucallpa, Cajamarca, Ayacucho, 
Huanuco, Tarapoto, Juliaca and Puno and the minor cities Tumbes, Talara, Pisco, Moquegua, Cerro de 
Pasco, Puerto Maldonado, Tingo María, Moyobamba, Huancavelica, Aguaytía, Chachapoyas, Tocache and 
Abancay. The surroundings were all other cities. They were identified in the sample using the geographic 
codification. To confirm Macroconsult (2010) arguments around development level of the areas considered, 
the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2007 was calculated for the areas under consideration (as long 
as this information was available at the provincial and district levels). The results are (where bigger index 
numbers reveal higher development levels): i) metropolitan areas: 0.677; ii) intermediate cities: 0.622; iii) 
minor cities: 0.582.  
40 Chi-squared informal equation: metropolitan vs major (16.56***), metropolitan vs minor (43.63***), 
major vs minor (6.59**).  Chi-squared formal equation: metropolitan vs major (7.91***), metropolitan vs 
minor (24.49***), major vs minor (6.09**).   
41 Chi-squared Hrs_si: metropolitan vs major (0.38), metropolitan vs minor (0.56), major vs minor (0.03).  
Chi-squared Hrs_ii: metropolitan vs major (1.22), metropolitan vs minor (0.74), major vs minor (0.09).   
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In Table V.4 the income effect is calculated for each of the working groups identified in the 
sample considering specification (1). However, as long as the sample used in this application is 
at the household level and hours of work are the sum of the labour supply of the family, the 
working groups are not mutually exclusive. In this context, interaction terms in the original 
sample will be difficult to interpret. To overcome this problem, the sample was restricted in order 
to take into account only mutually exclusive groups. This means that, for this exercise, households 
with members working in different sectors were excluded and only households where labour is 
allocated in one of the five earning opportunities were included. The size of this new sample is 
4,216 observations (almost 50% of the original sample). Previous estimates were replicated in 
this new context, given the interactions between the participation dummies and the logarithm of 
expenditure.  
 
Table V.4: Total expenditure marginal effects by labour options 
  D(Hrs_ff) D(Hrs_if) D(Hrs_ii) D(Hrs_sf) D(Hrs_si) 
Informal  -0.07184*** -0.02302 -0.00597  -0.03463***  -0.02026*** 
  (0.00776) (0.02045) (0.01184) (0.01154) (0.00802) 
Formal 0.11446*** 0.12219*** 0.04642*** 0.07721*** 0.07233*** 
  (0.00748) (0.01749) (0.01463) (0.00906) (0.00653) 
Observations 4,216 
Goodness of fit           
Pseudo LogL 3875.4751 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The negative income effects on informal consumption shares and positive on their formal 
counterparts are maintained in almost all the labour groups. This means that the effect of total 
expenditure on consumption allocation holds, independent of the labour supply allocation of the 
family. However, some differences deserve comment. First, in the case of the informal equation, 
it seems that marginal effects on those households with formal workers at formal firms show a 
stronger negative effect when compared with households composed of individuals taking other 
labour options. Specifically, the results show that, for the remainder of the wage-earning sector 
(informal and semi-formal options), the marginal effects are not well determined and for the self-
employment sector (both formal and informal) – although a negative result is encountered – in 
both cases they are significantly weaker42 when compared with formal wage-earners. Second, in 
the case of the formal equation, the positive effect of income on formal shares is encountered 
across all the labour options. However, as in the previous case, the marginal effects for the most 
                                                 
42 Chi-squared results for equality on parameters (informal equation). Hrs_ff vs. Hrs_sf: 7.93***. Hrs_ff 
vs. Hrs_si: 26.34*** 
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modern sector (Hrs_ff) are generaly statistically stronger43 when compared to all other labour 
options.  
 
These results can be interpreted in line with the linkage hypothesis if formal wage-earners show 
a greater preference for formal and a lesser preference for informal consumption. Then, when 
compared to other labour options, any increase in income will have higher reallocation effects in 
favour of formal budgets. This result is accounted for by the wider gap between expenditure 
parameters on the formal and the informal equations. At the other extreme are those households 
– composed of informal wage-earners – where the reallocation of resources, given the changes in 
their living conditions, has the lowest effect (narrowest gap). If, as stated previously, this is the 
segmented working sector where it is difficult to purchase from formal markets, then their 
reallocation ability will be reasonably lower.44 Different is the case for the self-employment 
sector. Here, it seems that, for both formal and informal segments of this sector, the reallocation 
of resources driven by expenditure changes has a similar effect. 45         
 
Although these results seem intuitive, as mentioned earlier, they could be driven by the arbitrary 
definition of informal consumption used. To control for this issue, the estimation is replicated for 
formal and informal markets, but defined using the five-market approach. As in the discussion 
presented in Chapter 4, only Market 1 is considered the informal sector and Market 5 its formal 
counterpart. This more restrictive notion of informality helps to estimate the model for the ‘very’ 
formal and ‘very’ informal markets. The regressions are presented in Table V.5 – for the main 
variables of interest only, in order to save space. As shown, most of the conclusions already 
discussed around the core variables appear to be robust in this new exercise.46  
 
In the case of total expenditure, under the four specifications used, this regressor again has a 
negative and significant effect on informal consumption shares and a positive and significant 
effect on its formal counterpart. The point estimates show that a 10% increase in total annual 
expenditure will decrease informal shares by about 0.2 percentage points and will cause formal 
shares to grow by around 0.6 percentage points. These results seem to be slightly lower (in 
absolute terms) when compared with the previous definition of informality in both the formal and 
                                                 
43 Chi-squared results for equality on parameters (formal equation). Hrs_ff vs Hrs_if: 0.17. Hrs_ff vs Hrs_ii: 
20.43***. Hrs_ff vs Hrs_sf: 11.37***. Hrs_ff vs Hrs_si: 22.40***.  
44 Chi-squared results for equality on parameters (formal equation): Hrs_ii vs Hrs_if: 11.86***, Hrs_ii vs 
Hrs_sf: 3.51*, Hrs_ii vs Hrs_si: 3.07*. 
45 Chi-squared results for equality on parameters. Informal equation: Hrs_sf vs Hrs_si: 1.17; Formal 
equation: Hrs_sf vs Hrs_si: 0.22 
46 However, it should be noted in Appendix 3 that the direction of some of the effects for the additional 
variables included and commented on above do not hold. This is a striking result that deserves further 
investigation.    
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the informal equations. Therefore, households are less sensitive to income changes when more-
restrictive definitions of informality are considered in estimations. As will be seen later, these 
results still reject inferiority.       
 
Table V.5: Results for SUR–GLS regression (different specifications), five-market 
definition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.01895*** 0.06207*** -0.01912*** 0.05936*** -0.01550*** 0.06221*** -0.01952*** 0.06075*** 
  (0.00308) (0.00347) (0.00308) (0.00344) (0.00304) (0.00352) (0.00306) (0.00344) 
Hrs_ff 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00001 -0.00009 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00004 -0.00008 
  (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) 
Hrs_if 0.00051*** -0.00024* 0.00049*** -0.00022* 0.00052*** -0.00024* 0.00053*** -0.00023* 
  (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) 
Hrs_ii 0.00023*** -0.00041*** 0.00019*** -0.00038*** 0.00022*** -0.00041*** 0.00024*** -0.00041*** 
  (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) 
Hrs_sf 0.00009 0.00040*** 0.00010 0.00043*** 0.00007 0.00041*** 0.00008 0.00041*** 
  (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) 
Hrs_si 0.00049*** -0.00015*** 0.00044*** -0.00014*** 0.00048*** -0.00014*** 0.00048*** -0.00015*** 
  (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) 
Observations 8,007 8,007 8,007 8,007 
Goodness of fit                 
Pseudo LogL 11051.017 11286.781 11123.226 11195.208 
AIC -21992.03 -22439.56 -22124.45 -22264.42 
BIC -21607.69 -21971.36 -21698.18 -21824.17 
Wald (overall) 2578.835*** 3221.053*** 2697.863*** 2801.823*** 
Chi2 (hours) 167.22*** 144.23*** 164.03*** 167.17*** 
Income effects                 
Chi2 (informal vs formal) 251.33*** 236.16*** 230.21*** 247.93*** 
Hours effects                 
Chi2 (informal vs formal) 286.26*** 243.56*** 276.70*** 290.24*** 
Chi2 (pooled, joint hours) 222.59*** 205.47***  214.25*** 208.32*** 
  Intra-equation 65.57*** 145.96*** 56.97*** 133.87*** 62.52*** 143.32*** 60.98***  139.47*** 
Chi2 (pooled, formal and informal) 98.84*** 86.91*** 97.42*** 92.78*** 
  Intra-equation 44.54*** 43.70*** 34.62*** 41.14*** 43.17*** 43.72*** 39.66** 45.24*** 
Chi2 (pooled, self and wage) 183.12*** 168.49*** 175.07*** 173.58*** 
  Intra-equation 48.89*** 129.81*** 41.13*** 119.18*** 45.90*** 127.30*** 47.69*** 122.82*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  see Table V.1 for definition of tests.  
 
For hours of work, the results are also in line with the linkage hypothesis: working more hours in 
the informal (formal) sector is associated with ‘more informal (formal)’ purchasing baskets. This 
result holds under the four specifications used in this application. However, some changes should 
be noted. First, the parameters associated with informal labour options in both the formal and the 
informal equations are stronger under this second definition, while the parameters associated with 
formal labour options are weaker. Therefore, using a stricter notion of informal and formal 
markets reveals higher linkages (positive and negative) for informal workers to (informal and 
formal) consumption.  
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Secondly, in line with previous results under the five-market definition, the effects of Hrs_ff 
(formal wage-earners in formal firms) on consumption vanish. In fact, the only detectable effect 
in this case is the positive linkage that working in the formal self-employment sector has on formal 
consumption. This result has interesting implications in that it reveals the differences already 
discussed on the reasons for the linkages between the two formal sectors. Beyond the 
informational advantages, the formal self-employed could have additional reasons for increasing 
their households’ formal consumption as they would thus obtain a fiscal advantage. This result is 
probably behind the reason for the robustness of the positive linkage of this sector when compared 
with other formal options.  
 
Thirdly, additional effects appear: the positive correlation of both Hrs_ii and Hrs_if with informal 
shares and the negative ones of both Hrs_si and Hrs_if with formal shares. However, under this 
second definition, the positive linkage of Hrs_si with informal shares is still higher than the effect 
computed for Hrs_ii, while the negative effect of Hrs_ii on formal shares is still greater than that 
computed for Hrs_si.47 Therefore, as detected in the case of the three-market definition is valid to 
conclude that  positive effects of informal labour supply on informal consumption mainly comes 
through the self-employment sector, while negative linkages through the wage-earning 
counterpart.     
 
In sum, changing the definition of informal markets does not alter the main conclusions 
concerning the positive and negative linkage effects. However, it does provide additional 
information on the robustness of some particular results. Three effects are robust to changes in 
the definition of informal/formal consumption: the positive linkage of working more hours in the 
informal self-employment sector on informal consumption, the positive linkage of formal self-
employment on formal consumption, and the negative linkage between working in the informal 
wage-earning sector and formal consumption.  
 
Second empirical exercise: taking endogeneity into account 
 
The previous empirical exercise was executed under the assumption of exogenous expenditure 
and labour supply. As discussed previously, this could be considered a strong assumption as long 
                                                 
47 Chi-squared results for Hrs_ii vs Hrs_si (informal equation): (1) 11.10***; (2) 10.24***; (3) 11.11***; 
(4) 8.75***. Chi-squared results for Hrs_ii vs Hrs_si (formal equation): (1) 15.94***; (2) 12.90***; (3) 
15.95***; (4) 15.16***. Chi-squared results for equality of parameters Hrs_if vs Hrs_ii (informal equation): 
(1) 3.72*; (2) 4.39**; (3) 4.09**; (4) 4.05**. Chi-squared results for equality of parameters Hrs_if vs Hrs_ii 
(formal equation): (1) 1.42; (2) 1.26; (3) 1.49; (4) 1.65. Chi-squared results for equality of parameters Hrs_if 
vs Hrs_si (informal equation): (1) 0.02; (2) 0.13; (3) 0.07; (4) 0.16. Chi-squared results for equality of 
parameters Hrs_if vs Hrs_si (formal equation): (1) 0.49; (2) 0.31; (3) 0.44; (4) 0.31. 
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as there are valid reasons to believe that both sets of variables not only influence consumption, 
but could also be influenced by family preferences. This simultaneity could lead to endogeneity 
bias in the results and obscure previous conclusions around the hypothesis testing. Therefore, 
procedures that deal explicitly with this problem must be developed in order to again compute the 
results of main interest of the research: expenditure effects and the linkage effect. In this sub-
section, a standard IV procedure is proposed in order to deal with the problem. However, as stated 
previously, although several experiments with the data were explored, the proposal to deal with 
several potential endogenous variables was discarded. Reducing the dimension of the problem 
via the imposition of additional assumptions and data restrictions was preferred. In fact, only three 
variables will be studied explicitly: total expenditure and overall formal and informal hours of 
work. Before beginning the application, it would be useful to firstly revise the independent OLS 
results in the new estimation context proposed.48 
 
In Table V.6 these estimates are presented for the main variables of interest and under the same 
specifications used in the previous empirical exercise. It is important to note that the sample size 
used in this application is lower than previous ones, given the data restrictions already explained 
as well as the additional missing values on the instruments to be implemented in this application. 
However, beyond the possible consequences on the statistical precision of the estimates, given 
this data reduction, the total number of 4,874 observations (above the 50% of the original sample) 
is still considered adequate for estimation purposes. The table has two parts: in the top part, the 
hours of work are aggregated into formal and informal categories (considering the extended 
definition of informality explained in Chapter 4) and, in the bottom half, the results for the five 
labour options discussed in the previous exercise are replicated. In general, overall and individual 
goodness-of-fit measures are comparable to previous ones, with similar interpretation in terms of 
the low R2 values, mainly on the informal equations.  
 
The information provided by the estimates is still in line with previous conclusions. Increasing 
total expenditure generates a reduction in informal shares and increases formal counterparts. From 
the point estimates, as will be seen later, it is again possible to infer that both formal and informal 
consumption are classified as normal (necessity and luxury, respectively) so inferiority is still 
rejected. For the estimates of hours of work, the evidence is also in favour of the linkage 
hypothesis: working more hours in the formal sector tends to bias consumption towards ‘more 
formal’ purchasing baskets and informal hours of work towards ‘more informal’ ones. However, 
it should be noted that, in the aggregate version of hours of work, the positive effects of informal 
                                                 
48 The estimator for comparison purposes is an equation by equation OLS as long as this is the way that the 
IV application proposed is done. Considering Greene’s (2003) arguments, the estimators of independent 
OLS estimates are numerically similar to SUR when similar covariates are used in estimation. 
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hours of work are not well-determined at conventional values of significance. This is possibly 
because the new definition of informal labour supply is not completely capturing the effects of 
the informal self-employment sector, which is again consistently significant across all the 
specifications used. However, a possible downward bias on the estimation results (as will be 
concluded later) cannot be disregarded.   
 
Table V.6: OLS estimates of total expenditure and hours of work (different specifications 
and definitions of labour supply) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.02398*** 0.08261*** -0.03223*** 0.08006*** -0.02213*** 0.08166*** -0.02292*** 0.08063*** 
  (0.00548) (0.00526) (0.00561) (0.00521) (0.00547) (0.00530) (0.00547) (0.00524) 
Hrs_formal -0.00022** 0.00017* -0.00024** 0.00018* -0.00023** 0.00017* -0.00024** 0.00018* 
  (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) 
Hrs_informal 0.00004 -0.00015*** 0.00001 -0.00012** 0.00002 -0.00014*** 0.00004 -0.00014*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
Goodness of fit                 
R-squared 0.103 0.283 0.131 0.293 0.110 0.284 0.110 0.290 
Pseudo LogL 1612.358 2355.668 1691.885 2387.230 1633.263 2359.278 1631.223 2378.663 
F (overall) 38.24*** 106.11*** 36.28***  85.31*** 34.92*** 90.85*** 34.68*** 89.05*** 
F (hours) 2.56* 5.85*** 2.72* 4.63*** 2.43* 5.52*** 2.86* 5.90*** 
L(expenditure) -0.02408*** 0.08342*** -0.03199*** 0.08093*** -0.02231*** 0.08250*** -0.02302*** 0.08144*** 
  (0.00549) (0.00531) (0.00563) (0.00526) (0.00549) (0.00534) (0.00548) (0.00528) 
Hrs_ff -0.00030*** 0.00023** -0.00031*** 0.00022** -0.00030** 0.00022** -0.00033*** 0.00024** 
  (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) 
Hrs_if 0.00004 0.00031 0.00002 0.00032 0.00005 0.00030 0.00003 0.00033* 
  (0.00024) (0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00020) (0.00025) (0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00020) 
Hrs_ii -0.00008 -0.00036*** -0.00009 -0.00032*** -0.00010 -0.00036*** -0.00008 -0.00036*** 
  (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00011) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008) 
Hrs_sf 0.00007 0.00031 0.00000 0.00035 0.00004 0.00032 0.00009 0.00029 
  (0.00030) (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00032) 
Hrs_si 0.00027** -0.00003 0.00022** -0.00001 0.00025** -0.00003 0.00027** -0.00003 
  (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
Goodness of fit                 
R-squared 0.107 0.287 0.135 0.296 0.115 0.288 0.114 0.294 
Pseudo LogL 1624.738 2367.680 1701.972 2398.588 1644.940 2371.271 1644.318 2392.309 
F (overall) 28.87*** 77.83*** 29.10*** 68.21*** 27.51*** 69.71*** 27.82*** 69.45*** 
F (hours) 2.85** 6.53*** 2.48** 5.32*** 2.66** 6.28*** 3.04*** 6.55*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Turning our attention to the exercises proposed in this sub-section, the objective now is to re-
estimate the parameters of total expenditure and overall formal and informal hours of work under 
standard IV procedures. Two exercises are developed for this purpose. The first deals with the 
endogeneity of expenditure solely under the assumption of exogenous labour supply. The second 
deals with hours of work, assuming that total expenditure is exogenous. In each case, the sub-set 
of the available instruments already described in previous sections was used. However, the 
inclusion of instruments in the final specification of each of the particular exercises developed 
here was undertaken basically using statistical procedures: maximization of the global F-statistic 
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in order to pass relevance tests and minimization of the J-Sargan statistic in order to pass 
orthogonality tests.49 These objectives were fulfilled with different levels of success in each case.  
 
In the first exercise, the instruments were the logarithm of the value of the assets owned by the 
household and five measures of exogenous shock: if a member loses his/her job, the bankruptcy 
of the family business, the abandonment of the family by the household head, a family experience 
of robbery or other crimes against it and the family’s experience of a natural disaster. In the second 
exercise the instruments were the logarithm of the value of the assets owned by the household 
and its square, the logarithm of wage rates in the formal and formal sector, a measure of non-
labour income, a dummy that identifies the inadequate physical condition of the house and one 
measure of risk: if the family has experienced robbery or other crime against it.    
 
In Table V.7, the diagnostic tests for the first IV exercise are presented. As explained above, the 
interest is in handling the endogeneity of total expenditure under the assumption of exogenous 
labour supply of the family. As shown, both relevance and orthogonality conditions are met. 
Similarly, when the C-test is done for suspicious included exogenous variables, the procedure 
reveals that the assumption of exogeneity of labour supply will not alter the results. Finally, the 
C-test for the potential endogenous variable reveals that total expenditure is correlated with the 
error terms, at least in the formal equation, so the IV application is justified. In Appendix 3 the 
first-stage regression results are displayed. The additional instruments display the expected signs. 
For example, the logarithm of the value of total assets has a strong and positive effect on 
expenditure and most of the shocks, when significant, show a negative correlation with this 
variable. These results are stable and robust to the inclusion of additional exogenous variables in 
the main equation.    
 
Table V.7: Diagnosis tests for IV application under one endogenous variable (expenditure 
with exogenous labour supply), different specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Underidentification Test 685.668*** 675.361*** 675.922***  682.408*** 
F-value (1stage) 181.227*** 176.460*** 177.465***  178.933*** 
Hansen J test 6.972 4.584 3.908 3.077 6.622 4.617 7.424 4.662 
C (participation and hours) 6.563 4.525 3.646 3.072 6.345 4.585 6.716 4.618 
C (expenditure) 2.151 30.668*** 2.528 30.915*** 1.525 30.051*** 1.704 29.913*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests are performed under a 2SLS specification with small sample correction and robust standard 
errors. The underidentification test is the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, F-value is computed as the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
and compared with the critical value of 19.28 (5% of maximal IV relative bias) and 11.12 (10% of maximal IV relative bias) computed 
in Stock-Yogo (2005) as the minimum tolerable levels, the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions is computed under the null that 
instruments are valid and exclusion restrictions adequate, C-test for controversial included instruments tests the exogeneity of the 
variables implemented under the null of instrument validity, C-test for endogenous regressors tests exogeneity under the null that suspect 
variables can be treated as exogenous.  
                                                 
49 Using just a sub-set and not the long list of instruments is also in order to avoid the finite sample problems 
as commented on in Wooldridge (2002).  
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In Table V.8, the 2SLS results are presented only for the variable of main interest. The goodness-
of-fit measure still reveals adequate global adjustment of the models. The estimations are run 
under correction for small sample size and with robust standard errors considering possible loss 
of precision. The estimates confirm previous conclusions around the marginal effects of this 
particular regressor: total expenditure reveals a negative effect on informal consumption shares 
and a positive effect on formal ones. Therefore, it is still possible to confirm the differences in the 
effect of total consumption on resource allocation, with families increasing their participation in 
informal consumption as long as their total expenditure decreases and reducing it for income 
expansion. This result, already encountered in previous exercises under the assumption of 
exogeneity, holds when this assumption is dropped. Also, the point estimates presented here 
reveal that coefficients are slightly larger (in absolute terms) under the IV estimation when 
compared with OLS or SUR estimates. A 10% increase in annual expenditure will reduce informal 
shares by between 0.3 and 0.5 of one percentage point and will increase formal ones by around 
1.3 percentage points. Therefore, the evidence suggests a downward bias of estimates when the 
exogeneity of total expenditure is not explicitly handled but, as will be shown later, it is also still 
possible to conclude that informal consumption can be classified as a normal necessity and formal 
consumption as a normal luxury. Inferiority is again rejected.  
 
Table V.8: Regression results for the IV model under one endogenous variable 
(expenditure with exogenous labour supply), different specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.03660*** 0.12819*** -0.04655*** 0.12788*** -0.03289*** 0.12799*** -0.03406*** 0.12567*** 
  (0.00968) (0.00860) (0.01007) (0.00899) (0.00985) (0.00880) (0.00967) (0.00859) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 1608.341 2285.586 1686.809 2313.037 1630.370 2288.043 1628.093 2310.029 
F-value (overall) 37.20*** 110.16***  34.58*** 86.67*** 34.19*** 93.67*** 33.82***  91.35*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Regression with small sample corrections.  
 
In Table V.9 the diagnostic tests for the second IV exercise are presented – i.e. the estimations 
that explicitly handle the endogeneity of hours of work under the assumption of exogenous total 
expenditure (and participation dummies). The first-stage results are again displayed in Appendix 
3, where the logarithm of assets displays a non-linear relationship with both formal and informal 
labour supply; in the first case, first decreasing and then increasing; and in the second case first 
increasing and then decreasing. However, in both cases, inflexion points occur below percentile 
30 (27 for formal hours of work and 18 for informal ones), so it is possible to infer that the positive 
relationship dominates in the case of formal hours of work and the negative relation in the 
informal one. This is verified when the sign of the marginal effect is inspected at the mean value 
of assets. The result possibly reveals the positive impact of long-term wealth on the capacity to 
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engage in formal labour options. A similar result is encountered for the dummy variable that 
identifies inadequate household conditions on formal hours of work. In the case of own wages, 
they reveal a negative correlation with hours of work so, for the sample used here, it seems that 
income effects tend to dominate over substitution effects. However, in the case of informal hours 
of work, a negative cross effect is also displayed, something that could argue in favour of 
desincentives (incentives) to work informally given higher (lower) formal wages. Finally, the 
measure for non-labour income displays the standard result reducing hours of work, mainly in the 
informal sector. These results are stable and robust to the inclusion of additional exogenous 
variables in the main equation.     
 
Table V.9: Diagnosis tests for IV application under two endogenous variables (hours of 
work with exogenous expenditure and participation dummies), different specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Underidentification Test 52.738*** 47.029*** 50.738***  53.435*** 
F-value (1stage, Hrs_formal)  7.71*** 8.22*** 8.22***   7.32*** 
F-value (1stage, Hrs_informal)  6.32*** 6.92*** 6.40*** 6.25*** 
F-value (1 stage, joint) 6.400 6.225 6.362 6.291 
Hansen J test 5.695 7.051 3.505 6.842 5.789 6.742 6.985 6.286 
C (participation and expenditure) 3.856 5.185 2.603 5.39 4.072 4.718 5.557 4.397 
C (hours) 42.116*** 63.311*** 42.452*** 58.655*** 41.435*** 64.400*** 38.718*** 58.700*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests are performed under a 2SLS specification with small sample correction and robust standard 
errors. Individual F-statistics must be compared with the rule of thumb of 10 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), Joint F statistics are compared 
with the critical value of 16.88 (5% of maximal IV relative bias) and 9.92 (10% of maximal IV relative bias) computed in Stock-Yogo (2005) 
as the minimum tolerable levels. See footnote in Table V.7 for other details in the tests.  
 
Although, these correlations seem intuitive, from the diagnosis presented here it is possible to 
conclude that instruments are orthogonal (non-significant Hansen test), but they are weak (F- 
statistic below critical values). Therefore, considering the discussion in Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005), it is expected that the results will suffer from finite sample biases. This means that, 
although estimators could be asymptotically consistent, for finite samples they will be biased in 
the direction of the (inconsistent) OLS estimates. Also, the loss of precision normally attributable 
to IV estimators (Wooldridge, 2002) could be even greater in the presence of weak instruments 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). To partially control for these problems, additional estimators to the 
standard 2SLS are computed and compared. As discussed in Stock and Yogo (2005), Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005) and Flores-Lagunes (2007), some of the IV procedures that are more robust 
to the presence of weak instruments are the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). These two additional estimators and the 2SLS 
are estimated with small sample corrections and standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.   
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Table V.10: Regression results for the IV model under two endogenous variables (hours of 
work with exogenous expenditure and participation dummies), different specifications 
(1) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_formal -0.00519*** 0.00307* -0.00584*** 0.00357 -0.00518*** 0.00322* 
  (0.00165) (0.00174) (0.00198) (0.00225) (0.00164) (0.00173) 
Hrs_informal 0.00334*** -0.00547*** 0.00389*** -0.00654*** 0.00342*** -0.00520*** 
  (0.00100) (0.00106) (0.00124) (0.00142) (0.00099) (0.00105) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 107.852 -268.526 -234.179 -881.185 74.277 -137.136 
F-value (overall) 22.25*** 46.04***  19.38*** 37.44*** 22.28*** 46.90*** 
(2) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_formal -0.00269* 0.00278* -0.00294* 0.00335 -0.00282* 0.00286* 
  (0.00158) (0.00167) (0.00176) (0.00213) (0.00157) (0.00166) 
Hrs_informal 0.00443*** -0.00540*** 0.00483*** -0.00638*** 0.00434*** -0.00516*** 
  (0.00095) (0.00103) (0.00108) (0.00135) (0.00094) (0.00102) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL -11.446 -193.969 -234.354 -778.704 21.735 -72.473 
F-value (overall)  20.24***  35.42*** 18.54*** 28.95*** 20.26***  35.99*** 
(3) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_formal -0.00518*** 0.00315* -0.00583*** 0.00367* -0.00517*** 0.00326* 
  (0.00162) (0.00172) (0.00193) (0.00219) (0.00161) (0.00171) 
Hrs_informal 0.00330*** -0.00550*** 0.00385*** -0.00651*** 0.00338*** -0.00525*** 
  (0.00099) (0.00106) (0.00123) (0.00140) (0.00098) (0.00105) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 129.851 -290.423 -215.719 -877.996 99.654 -166.906 
F-value (overall) 20.32***  38.54*** 17.66*** 31.53*** 20.29*** 39.24*** 
(4) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_formal -0.00590*** 0.00391** -0.00677*** 0.00446** -0.00584*** 0.00395** 
  (0.00165) (0.00167) (0.00204) (0.00210) (0.00165) (0.00166) 
Hrs_informal 0.00255*** -0.00461*** 0.00304** -0.00541*** 0.00270*** -0.00447*** 
  (0.00098) (0.00098) (0.00127) (0.00127) (0.00098) (0.00097) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 272.774 109.448 -82.385 -393.124 236.391 179.196 
F-value (overall) 21.18*** 41.56*** 18.30*** 35.12***  21.07*** 42.72*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Regression with small sample corrections. The numbers 
on the left correspond to the specification used. See Table V.1 for additional variables included in each specification. 
 
In Table V.10 the regression results are presented for the different estimation methods and the 
specifications used across the application.50 As shown, in general a positive marginal effect of 
informal hours of work on informal budget shares is verified, with negatives ones in the case of 
                                                 
50 Diagnosis tests were re-calculated under each of these new estimators, without changes to those already 
presented in Table V.9. 
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its formal counterparts. Similarly, we find that working more hours in the formal sector has a 
negative impact on informal consumption shares and a positive impact on the formal ones. These 
results are robust to the specification used and the different IV methods implemented so it could 
be considered strong evidence in favour of the linkage hypothesis. Only in two estimated 
equations is it found that the parameter associated with formal hours of work on formal 
consumption is not well determined: specification (1) and (2) under the LIML method. However, 
they do not deviate from the maintained conclusion of the application.  
 
The point value estimates reveal that hours’ effects are above OLS regressions results in absolute 
terms. In fact, on average and ceteris paribus, one additional hour of work during a representative 
week in the informal sector will increase (reduce) informal (formal) shares by between 0.3 and 
0.5 (0.5 and 0.7) of one percentage. By contrast, one additional weekly hour of work will increase 
(reduce) formal (informal) shares by between 0.3 and 0.5 (0.3 and 0.7) of one percentage. 
Therefore, as in the case of total expenditure, we can confirm that the evidence in favour of the 
linkage hypothesis is stronger when IV methods are used.  
 
Table V.11: Hypothesis testing under weak instruments 
(1) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
K (Ho: equal to zero) 45.97*** 78.01*** 45.97***  78.01*** 45.97*** 78.01*** 
K (Ho: equal to parameter) 0.30 0.85 0.30 0.09 0.25 0.83 
(2) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
K (Ho: equal to zero) 47.62*** 74.43*** 47.62*** 74.43*** 47.62*** 74.43*** 
K (Ho: equal to parameter) 0.09 0.43 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.74 
(3) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
K (Ho: equal to zero) 45.31*** 78.83*** 45.31*** 78.83*** 45.31*** 78.83*** 
K (Ho: equal to parameter) 0.33 0.41 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.73 
(4) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
K (Ho: equal to zero) 41.39*** 67.38*** 41.39*** 67.38*** 41.39*** 67.38*** 
K (Ho: equal to parameter) 0.46 0.33 0.06 0.05 0.33 0.51 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Regression with small sample corrections. The tests 
correspond to each of the estimations presented in Table V.10.   
 
An additional problem with weak instruments, as discussed by Nelson and Starz (1990), is that 
the normal approximation of the t-statistic under IV performs poorly if it is not based on strong 
instruments (see Mikusheva and Poi, 2006). Therefore, hypothesis testing will be distorted. For 
this reason, even in the case of the additional estimators (like LIML or GMM) which will be 
robust to finite sample biases, it is problematic to rely on t-tests. To control for this issue, 
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alternative procedures must be developed. A survey of methods available are discussed in 
Andrews and Stock (2005) and Stock et al. (2002). In this application, the Magnusson (2010) 
minimum-distance (MD) versions of the weak identification robust tests introduced by 
Kleibergen (2002) and Moreira (2003) are used. These are implemented using the K-statistics 
programmed in Finlay et al. (2013) for the joint hypothesis that both parameters are equal to zero 
and both take the exact values estimated previously. This statistic is based on a Lagrange 
Multiplier (score) valid in the presence of potentially weak instruments. The results are presented 
in Table V.11 under the two null hypotheses. As shown, rejection in the first case and non-
rejection in the second one gives adequate confidence in previous estimates and helps to conclude 
that they are well determined and significant at conventional levels.  
 
A final check is to use the Conditional Likelihood Ratio test (CLR) developed in Moreira (2003). 
The motivation for using this additional procedure is based on the observation of Finlay and 
Magnuson (2009), who states that K-statistics suffer from a spurious decline of power in some 
regions of the parameter space. By contrast, as discussed in Andrews et al. (2007), the CLR is 
nearly optimal in a class of invariant similar tests (Mikusheva and Poi, 2006). However, it has 
two drawbacks. First, it assumes homoscedasticity (which is not the case for the LM test presented 
previously). Second, as programmed by Mikusheva and Poi (2006), it is only possible to 
implement for one endogenous regressor. For this reason, in this exercise the formulation of the 
demand equation is changed, replacing hours of work in the formal and informal sector by the 
difference between them. Therefore, the exercise implies the assumption that the parameters 
accompanying formal and informal hours of work in the original formulation of the demand 
equations are equal in absolute terms.51  
 
Table V.12: Diagnosis tests for IV application under one endogenous variable (difference 
between hours of work with exogenous expenditure and participation dummies) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Underidentification Test  43.642*** 42.387*** 43.152*** 43.966*** 
F-value (1stage) 6.940 6.742 6.861 7.018 
Hansen J test 3.89 5.376 3.700 4.844 4.086 5.349 3.137 6.237 
C (expenditure and participation) 2.121 3.767 1.768 4.005 2.405 3.724 2.008 4.300 
C (hours difference) 43.138*** 55.216*** 38.000*** 49.788*** 42.643***  55.644*** 39.649*** 52.408*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests are performed under a 2SLS specification with small sample correction and robust standard errors. 
F statistics are compared with the critical value of 19.28 (5% of maximal IV relative bias) and 11.12 (10% of maximal IV relative bias) 
computed in Stock-Yogo (2005) as the minimum tolerable levels. See footnote in Table No. V.7 for other details of the tests.  
 
To render them comparable with previous estimates, the instruments considered in this exercise 
are similar to those used in the case of two endogenous variables (formal and informal hours of 
                                                 
51 This assumption was tested using Wald and K tests in the previous exercise and it was found that equality 
of the parameters in absolute terms exists for some ranges of possible values. 
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work). The only difference is that the logarithms of the wage rates of formal and informal earning 
opportunities now enter as the difference between them. The diagnosis tests are presented in Table 
V.12. As shown, similar conclusions to those already obtained still hold: orthogonality of the 
instruments is achieved, but relevance tests reveal that they are only weakly correlated to the 
endogenous regressor.  
 
Table V.13: Regression results for the C-IV model under one endogenous variable 
(difference in hours of work with exogenous expenditure and participation dummies) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_formal-Hrs_informal -0.00447*** 0.00521*** -0.00427*** 0.00494*** -0.00447*** 0.00525*** -0.00415*** 0.00503*** 
  (0.00098) (0.00102) (0.00097) (0.00100) (0.00099) (0.00104) (0.00093) (0.00101) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
Wald (overall) 276.63*** 643.60*** 368.83*** 712.37*** 295.75*** 638.65*** 316.49*** 690.22*** 
CLR Test  45.4011*** 81.4034*** 41.0309*** 71.5148*** 45.0235*** 81.7393*** 40.6478*** 75.6476*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Regression with small sample corrections. See Table V.1 for additional 
variables included in each specification. 
 
The estimations results are presented in Table V.13. The results are still in line with the linkage 
hypothesis, given the way that the new variable has been defined. As shown, increasing weekly 
hours of work in the formal or reducing them in the informal sector decreases informal budget 
shares and increases their formal counterparts. Point value estimates reveal that the size of the 
effects is around -0.4 and 0.5 of one percentage point, respectively. These coefficients are well 
determined and, in general, lie between previous coefficient values (in absolute terms). The CLR 
test for the significance of the parameter of interest is presented at the bottom of the estimations. 
The results of the test confirm the significance of the results presented here and provide additional 
evidence in favour of the linkage effect.   
 
V.4. Computed elasticities and policy implications 
 
In this section the regression results are used to derive the main elasticities of interest in the 
chapter, so they can easily be interpreted for public policy purposes. The focus is put on total 
expenditure and hours of work as defined in expressions (V.2) to (V.4). The computation of 
elasticities done here uses the average sample means for all the variables so, strictly speaking, the 
exercise proposed for hours of work is something like a projection over any participation regime; 
i.e., an approximation of unconditional averages. In Table V.14 the expenditure elasticities are 
displayed for the different estimation methods presented in this application: SUR–GLS results for 
both three- and five-market definitions and the IV estimation. In this last case, only those 
estimations that explicitly handle the endogeneity of total expenditure are presented. Also, the 
results are supplemented by the point elasticities computed for the sub-populations in order to 
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assess differentiated effects. In each case, taking into account the relative stability of the marginal 
effects across the specifications used, the results are presented for specification (1).   
 
Table V.14: Expenditure elasticities 
 
Note: Elasticities are computed considering sample means. Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for 
between vce in the case of quintiles and cities. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The statistical tests are for the null hypothesis ‘different 
from one’. IV estimation corresponds to the 2SLS for the empirical exercise that explicitly handles endogeneity in this variable. The 
results revealed by sub-groups use SUR–GLS estimates for the three-market definition. All estimations presented here corresponds to 
specification (1).   
 
A first important result to note is that, as mentioned earlier, inferiority of informal consumption 
is rejected in all estimation methods, even for the most informal markets and the richest 
individuals in the sample. As also mentioned earlier, informal consumption with elasticities below 
1 can be classified as necessities and formal consumption with elasticities above 1 as luxuries. 
One additional Nuevo Sol in the pocket of a Peruvian consumer will increase both formal and 
informal expenditure. However, the increase in the former will be greater than in the latter, so in 
terms of the purchasing basket, as long as the family becomes richer, it will be more biased in 
favour of formal expenditure. In terms of the point value estimates, for the whole sample a 10% 
increase in annual expenditure is consistent with increases of between 8.9% and 9.5% in informal 
consumption and between 12.8% and 14.4% in the case of its formal counterparts, depending on 
SUR-GLS          
(3 market)
SUR-GLS          
(5 market)
IV-2SLS
Informal 0.932*** 0.893*** 0.951***
(0.01051) (0.01740) (0.00788)
Formal 1.290*** 1.323*** 1.437***
(0.01319) (0.01804) (0.02934)
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Informal 1.107*** 0.995 1.017 0.804** 0.663***
(0.03347) (0.09502) (0.10118) (0.08556) (0.03079)
Formal 1.038 1.364*** 1.577*** 1.320*** 1.238***
(0.07014) (0.13191) (0.14160) (0.09805) (0.02786)
Metropolitan 
areas
Intermediate 
cities
Minor        
cities
Informal 0.824*** 0.932*** 0.992
(0.02045) (0.01769) (0.01649)
Formal 1.338*** 1.308*** 1.236***
(0.02059) (0.02053) (0.02352)
D(Hrs_ff) D(Hrs_if) D(Hrs_ii) D(Hrs_sf) D(Hrs_si)
Informal 0.793*** 0.938 0.985 0.902*** 0.953**
(0.02234) (0.05541) (0.03030) (0.03263) (0.01869)
Formal 1.315*** 1.441*** 1.217*** 1.236*** 1.283***
(0.02055) (0.06307) (0.06847) (0.02775) (0.02556)
Whole sample results
Quintiles
City types
Labour sector
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the estimation method used. Using the sample means of formal and informal consumption,52 this 
means that any additional S/.10 that Peruvian families have will be distributed S/.3.5 at informal 
markets and S/.4.6 at formal ones (the rest in semi-formal markets).      
 
This is an important result since it reveals a distinctive feature in highly informal developing 
countries when compared to developed ones. For example, Fortin et al. (2000) found zero or even 
negative elasticities in their application for Canada. The inferiority of informal goods may be 
reasonable in a developed economy with a small informal sector, where informal purchases are 
basically a tax-avoiding strategy. By contrast, in a developing economy with a very big informal 
sector (like that of Peru), households buy from informal markets not only to avoid regulation, but 
also to satisfy needs. In this context, it is reasonable to expect an elasticity of less than 1, but still 
positive income elasticities for informal consumption.  
 
This evidence is in line with findings in other developing countries, like the estimates for Serbia 
by Reilly et al. (2006) and Böhme and Thiele’s estimates (2012b) for Africa, although point 
values differ across them. The results presented for Peru in this application show income 
elasticities that range between 0.89 and 0.95. The results computed by Reilly et al. (2006) for 
Serbia are on the high side of this range, with point value estimates of 0.94. By contrast, results 
presented by Böhme and Thiele (2012b) for Africa range from 0.68 to 0.73 among the countries 
considered in the application.53 A possible ordering emerges, with transitional European countries 
at the top of the distribution, Latin American countries in the middle but close to the first ones, 
and African countries way down at the bottom. A possible explanation for this behaviour is related 
to the development or income levels of the economies under analysis – clearly higher for Serbia 
and Peru than for Africa.54 However, this is entirely speculative, given the limited evidence 
around this issue and the methodological differences between papers. An interpretation like this 
also contradicts the results encountered in this application on city types, where less-developed 
cities show stronger informal income elasticities. Therefore, as long as other explanations are still 
possible (maybe country-specific), more research will be needed on this issue to reach to any 
empirical regularity.               
 
                                                 
52 Annual means for the sample of 8,007 observations (SUR–GLS model): Informal consumption: (S/. 
5,725), Formal consumption (S/. 5,191), Total expenditure (S/. 15,319).  Annual means for the sample of 
4,874 observations (IV model): Informal consumption: (S/. 5,496), Formal consumption (S/. 5,049), Total 
expenditure (S/. 14,792). 
53 These results are for informal channels of commercialization in order to make them comparable with the 
results presented here. To obtain a unique number, weighted averages for formal goods, informal goods, 
imported goods and services are computed.   
54 Results from the World Bank (www.worldbank.org) show that per capita Gross National Income (GNI) 
in PPP values for the period 2010–2014 are US$ 12,480 (Serbia); US$ 11,160 (Peru), and between US$ 
890 and US$ 2,210 (for the African countries considered by Böhme and Thiele, 2012b).   
102 
 
 
 
In any case, the results for income elasticities presented thus far are consistent with three stylized 
facts: the protective attitudes of families (increasing their exposure to informal markets) as 
incomes are reduced, quality differences as long as families prefer to change their purchasing 
basket composition when income increases, and positive effects of economic growth on the 
formalization of the country from a consumption perspective. This formalization process is 
explored in detail in Figure V.1, using the predicted budget shares for changes in total 
expenditure, holding everything else constant at their sample means. The results are shown for 
the most aggregated definition of informality (three-market) and considering both SUR–GLS 
(Panel A) and IV (Panel B) methods for comparison purposes.  
 
Figure V.1: Predicted budget shares (formal vs informal) for different realizations of total 
expenditure and considering different estimation methods 
 
Note: The vertical axis displays the budget shares and the horizontal the annual per capita expenditure in thousands of new soles. 
Specification (1) is used.  
 
As shown, income growth will effectively generate more formal baskets, but this is a process with 
limits. Informal consumption shares will dominate even for income levels equal to those of the 
richest households. In fact, it seems that, for the Peruvian economy, the intersection between 
formal and informal shares will happen around the percentiles 82 and 89 and there is a 
convergence of around 30% beyond that point. Moreover from the estimations presented here, 
informal shares are less responsive (in absolute terms) to income if compared with formal ones. 
Formal shares go from 0–10% (poorest families) to around 45–50% (richest families) and 
informal shares from around 40–50% (poorest families) to around 30% (richest families). 
Therefore, the formalization process described in Cermeño (1987), where poor households are 
exclusively informal consumers and the richest ones exclusively formal, with middle-class 
consumers purchasing from both sectors, needs to be revised. In fact, the results suggest that 
Peruvian consumers are, in one way or another, informal and it is their formal consumption e that 
is accommodated depending on their income.         
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A second important result to note is that income elasticities are not equally distributed for all the 
distributional range or for the different sub-population groups in society. This conclusion is 
reached using the SUR–GLS estimates for the different sub-samples proposed. As shown and 
discussed previously, among the poorest individuals in the sample (Q1), a positive shock on 
expenditure will generate ‘more informal’ consumption baskets with informal purchases growing 
faster than their formal counterparts. This result changes for individuals in the upper quintiles (Q2 
to Q5), but even there it is still possible to conclude that income growth will be more effective on 
the right of the income distribution. The results are more or less confirmed by the other groups 
considered during the estimation. For example, income elasticities prove to be stronger for 
families living in metropolitan areas than those living in intermediate or minor cities. Similarly, 
the gaps encountered for income elasticities are higher for those households with workers in the 
most modern sector (formal wage-earners) than for any other working group. In consequence, an 
interesting result of the application is that targeted income transferences promoted by 
governments in developing countries could come with the short-term cost of increasing 
informality or at least reducing the effectiveness of any formalization policy. Also, pro-poor 
growth promoted by governments in developing countries needs to be strong enough to 
dramatically change the living conditions of households in order to achieve positive side-effects 
in the formal/informal structure of consumption.       
 
In Table V.15, the results for the hours’ marginal effects (in consumption levels) and elasticities 
are presented. To preserve the generality of the discussion, here the focus is placed on the whole 
sample estimates for the different estimation methods. Again, the computed elasticities presented 
here correspond to specification (1) to save space and in the case of the IV method only 2SLS 
estimates are displayed. The results reveal that supply-side policies oriented to a reduction in the 
hours of work a household allocates to informal sectors will reduce the consumption shares 
allocated to informal markets. Just looking at the (more robust) IV estimates, point value estimates 
reveal that reducing by 10% the hours that a family works in informal sectors will cause an annual 
reduction of almost 4% in informal consumption and an increase of almost 9% in formal 
expenditure. In terms of the marginal effects computed, one less weekly hour allocated in the 
informal sector reduces annual informal expenditure by S/.49 and increases formal ones by S/.81. 
By contrast, a shock that increases formal working hours by 10% will cause a reallocation in 
favour of formal purchases of almost 3% and reduce informal ones by practically the same 
magnitude. In terms of the additional weekly hour, this means a reduction of S/.77 in informal 
and of S/.45 in formal consumption.   
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Table V.15: Hours-of-work elasticities (pure labour effect), 
different estimation methods 
 
Note: Elasticities are computed considering sample means. Robust standard errors in parenthesis,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV 
estimation corresponds to the 2SLS for the empirical exercise that explicitly handles the endogeneity in these variables. Marginal 
effects are computed as the parameter of the share equation multiplied by the total expenditure.  
 
Interestingly enough, these results are in the lower limit when compared with those reported by 
developed countries. Using Fortin, et.al. (2000), estimates for Canada reveal elasticities between 
working and purchasing at informal markets that range between 0.38 and 0.73 (the authors don´t 
provide results for the formal sector). Barring methodological differences, the results are possibly 
saying that linkage effects are generally lower for developing countries. Again, this is a reasonable 
result if tax avoidance is the main motivation of informal consumption in the developed world, 
so more strategic behaviours are expected. However, in contrast to Böhme and Thiele’s (2012b) 
findings, linkages are still detectable, which makes the results more comparable to those of Reilly 
et al. (2006), although the authors compute elasticities to make a quantitative assessment.        
 
Moreover, in this application we can see that linkage effects are not equally applicable for all 
formal and informal working opportunities. Using the (possibly downwardly biased) SUR–GLS 
estimates for the different earning options, and considering the two definitions of informal 
consumption implemented, specific channels of linkage hypothesis could be suggested. The 
Informal Formal Informal Formal
Hrs_for  -76.82*** 45.35*  -0.353*** 0.278*
(24.39716) (25.78811) (0.11219) (0.15781)
Hrs_inf 49.38***  -80.94*** 0.397***  -0.866***
(14.73745) (15.70852) (0.11846) (0.16802)
Hrs_ff  -4.10*** 3.34***  -0.014*** 0.016***
(1.35955) (1.28653) (0.00478) (0.00611)
Hrs_if 2.65 1.61 0.002 0.002
(2.95395) (2.31150) (0.00272) (0.00288)
Hrs_ii -1.82  -4.95*** -0.006  -0.021***
(1.27239) (0.95259) (0.00394) (0.00398)
Hrs_sf 0.86 8.23*** 0.001 0.015***
(2.64241) (2.75986) (0.00351) (0.00495)
Hrs_si 4.41*** 0.89 0.021*** 0.006
(1.05516) (0.88307) (0.00499) (0.00564)
Hrs_ff 0.55 -1.24 0.004 -0.009
(0.95955) (1.08857) (0.00750) (0.00783)
Hrs_if 7.82***  -3.72* 0.016***  -0.007*
(2.09422) (2.01566) (0.00429) (0.00380)
Hrs_ii 3.50***  -6.25*** 0.024***  -0.040***
(0.90589) (0.77645) (0.00623) (0.00491)
Hrs_sf 1.32 6.08*** 0.004 0.017***
(1.98717) (2.15312) (0.00587) (0.00585)
Hrs_si 7.52***  -2.23*** 0.079***  -0.022***
(0.85194) (0.70598) (0.00895) (0.00682)
SUR-GLS (5 market)
SUR-GLS (3 market)
IV (3 market)
Marginal effects 
(consumption levels)
Elasticities 
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robust results encountered in the application are highlighted. They suggest that the positive 
linkage with informal consumption comes basically in the form of informal self-employment 
while the positive linkage with formal consumption takes the form of formal self-employment. 
Therefore, we could argue that, if supply-side policies are used to reduce (increase) informality 
(formality) on the consumption side, the focus must be put on the self-employment sector.  
 
Given this set of results, expenditure and hours’ elasticities can be used to compute the full hours' 
effects as defined in equation (V.4) and produce policy simulations. For that purpose, a supply-
side formalization policy is simulated via the reduction of informal hours of work of the family 
and a consequent increase in the formal ones (so total labour supply remains unaltered). This is 
possible, for example, if we consider a reduction in labour costs for the formal sector (work taxes 
or labour regulations) or a better enforcement capacity for the government. This policy will 
produce two effects. First, a negative effect on informal consumption and a positive effect on 
formal consumption, given the linkage effects already modelled. Second, a positive effect on both 
the formal and informal sector given the income increase of the family, larger in the former than 
in the latter. This last result comes from the substitution of low-salary informal jobs with high-
salary formal ones.  
 
Figure V.2: Policy simulations (formalization policy on the supply-side) 
 
Note: To save space, the results are presented only for specification (1) in each case. The vertical axis displays the expected growth 
of expenditure in each sector and the vertical axis the decrease in hours worked in the informal sector (policy result).  
 
The simulations are presented in Figure V.2. In Panel (A) the results for the SUR–GLS are 
displayed. In Panel (B) the results for the IV method are shown. In both cases, the three-market 
definition is used. To read the results, in each case, the percentage decrease of hours worked in 
the informal sector is displayed on the horizontal axis. In the case of the SUR–GLS estimations, 
as long as there are five labour options then the reduction (in percentages) is assumed to be equal 
in the informal self–employment sector (Hrs_si) and the informal wage sector (Hrs_ii). These 
hours are assumed to be completely absorbed by the formal sector in the following way: the 
number of hours reduced in the informal self-employment sector are absorbed by the formal self-
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employment sector (Hrs_sf) and the number of hours reduced in the informal wage sector are 
absorbed by the formal wage-earning sector (Hrs_ff). In this exercise, the intermediate category 
of wage-earners (Hrs_if) is not considered. In the case of the IV, as long as there are only two 
labour options then simulation is easier. The reduction in overall informal hours (Hrs_inf) of work 
in this case is completely absorbed by the formal sector (Hrs_for). On the vertical axis, the result 
of the policy for the different reductions is displayed in terms of the percentage change in the 
consumption level of informal and formal markets.  
 
As shown, a policy like this generates a formalization process on the demand-side of the economy. 
However, the differences between the estimation methods should be noted. For the SUR–GLS 
estimations, formalization occurs when formal consumption grows more than its informal 
counterpart. This mainly happens because, in this estimate, the income elasticities dominate the 
linkage effects. As stated previously, linkage effects, computed under the assumption of 
exogenous labour supply, are weaker when compared with estimates where this assumption is 
dropped. By contrast, under the IV methods, the policy seems to be much more effective, with 
formal consumption growing faster and informal consumption even decreasing. In this last 
situation, estimated linkage effects dominate expenditure elasticities. This type of result has been 
used in previous studies to justify the existence of the second-round effects of formalization 
policies on the labour market as long as they also generate formalization on the demand side. This 
application found evidence in favour of these second-round effects in the case of Peru; this 
constitutes an important policy implication of the study.  
 
V.5. Concluding remarks 
 
The results presented in this chapter help to draw two clear conclusions about informal 
consumption. First, in the case of total expenditure, increasing the total available resources of the 
family increases formal shares and reduces informal ones. However, inferiority of informal 
consumption was rejected, even for the richest individuals in the sample, and for the most informal 
markets. This means that both informal and formal consumption are normal: necessity in the first 
case and luxury in the second. This result is robust to the different specifications used, the 
definitions of informality implemented and under the assumption of exogenous and endogenous 
total expenditure. In fact, once endogeneity is explicitly taken into account in the estimation, the 
marginal effects proved to be stronger (in absolute terms) than under alternative methods of 
estimation. Using this more robust result, we can see that any 10% increase in total expenditure 
will cause a 9.5% increase in informal consumption and a 14.4% in its formal counterpart. The 
evidence is consistent with the differentiated income effects across the various channels of 
commercialization and quality differentials. Families are then interested in increasing their 
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consumption from the better outlets as long as they become richer, or in replacing them with 
lesser-quality ones as they become poorer.  
 
In terms of the policy analysis developed here, the results suggest that informal purchases are 
used to smooth consumption (as a protective strategy for families) and reveal the positive effects 
of economic growth on the formalization of the country from a consumption point of view. 
However, we should acknowledge that, in a highly informal country like Peru, this is a process 
that comes with limitations. From the simulations presented here, it was possible to verify that 
informal consumption shares were kept to around 30% even for income levels similar to those of 
the richest individuals in the sample.     
 
Once heterogeneity across sub-populations was allowed for, it was also possible to verify that the 
effects of total expenditure were, in fact, different. In general, the re-composition of the 
consumption basket between formal and informal sources was greater for households located to 
the right of the expenditure distribution, those who live in the most developed cities and families 
composed of members working in the modern sector of the economy. In general, here, the gaps 
between the marginal effects of total expenditure on formal and informal allocation were higher 
for other households in the sample. Furthermore, in the case of the poorest individuals in the 
sample, it was possible to verify that small positive shocks to their income will cause a 
reallocation of resources in favour of informal channels of commercialization. Preferences and 
limited access to formal options, could be behind this result. The policy consequences of this 
piece of evidence are the short-term costs of targeted income policies in the form of the higher 
informal transactions promoted. Also, the evidence suggests that pro-poor growth policies need 
to be strong enough to change the market allocation of the most deprived.   
 
Second, the linkage between working in and purchasing from informal markets is a strong result 
for a developing country like Peru. Therefore, we can argue that working more hours in the 
informal sector has a positive effect on informal and a negative effect on formal consumption. 
The converse is also applicable (although the evidence was weaker): working more hours in the 
formal sector has a positive effect on formal and a negative effect on informal consumption. These 
results were robust to the different specifications used and the definitions of informal markets and 
under the assumption of exogenous and endogenous total expenditure. As seen for expenditure, 
the marginal effects computed once endogeneity is explicitly handled during estimation prove to 
be higher (in absolute terms), making clearer the evidence in favour of the linkage hypothesis. 
The intuition behind the linkage hypothesis is that previous experience in a sector (as a worker) 
helps the consumer to reduce transactional costs (network effect) or reveals a preference by the 
worker to stay there as a consumer (preference or non-separability effect). Point value estimates 
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of the IV application revealed that a 10% increase in weekly informal hours of work increase 
(reduce) annual informal (formal) consumption by 4% (9%) respectively. In contrast, a 10% 
increase in formal hours causes both a reduction and an increase of 3% on informal and formal 
consumption, respectively.  
 
However, we should note that a strong result also encountered in the application is that not all 
formal or informal hours of work have the same effects on consumption. In fact, the evidence 
suggests that the main channels for the positive linkage of informal hours of work with informal 
consumption occur through the informal self-employment sector. At the same time, the positive 
linkage of formal hours of work with formal consumption occurs through the formal self-
employment sector. These effects were accompanied by the negative linkage of the informal 
wage-earning sector with formal consumption.  
 
This last set of results, overall, suggests that policy-makers are possibly underestimating the 
effects of their supply-side public policies against informality. For example, reducing hours of 
work in the informal sector and increasing them in formal jobs will have second-round effects 
through the expected re-composition of formal and informal demand. Similarly, it is possible to 
infer that the effectiveness of a policy like this could be greater if the focus of the formalization 
policy on the supply-side acts mainly through the self-employment segment.  
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VI. ESTIMATION OF THE DISAGGREGATED MODEL   
 
VI.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the second empirical application of the theoretical model described in Chapter 3 
is presented. This corresponds to the estimation of the disaggregated version of the model, which 
means that the household no longer allocates total expenditure directly to markets. On the 
contrary, they will first decide on their consumption of particular goods and then decide where 
these goods will be purchased. To implement this empirically, two household decisions must be 
estimated, the first related to the consumption of particular goods and the second related to the 
allocation decision across markets, conditional on goods’ expenditure. In the remainder of the 
chapter, the first decision is referred as the first stage and the second decision as the second stage 
of the allocation process.    
 
Given the data availability already described on Chapter 4, this model is implemented according 
to consumption groups, so some aggregation is implicitly still present in the estimation to be 
discussed here. Although the results could cause some theoretical difficulties concerning the 
assumptions about the budgeting process discussed, they are considered a good first 
approximation for the purposes of this research. Specifically, they provide an adequate framework 
within which to investigate both income and hours effects, but for particular consumption 
categories, in order to provide a deeper exploration of the results and identify the type of 
consumption where the linkage hypothesis is more reliable.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the empirical specification and econometric 
issues are discussed. In Section 3, the estimation results and the computed elasticities for the two-
stage Engel curves are presented. In Section 4, the main findings are summarized in the form of 
concluding remarks.   
 
VI.2. Empirical specification and econometric issues 
 
In order to estimate the disaggregated version of the model, seven consumption groups were 
constructed where sufficient data on purchasing markets existed to identify them. The 
consumption groups included are food consumed in the household (Fon), food consumed out of 
the household (Foff), clothes and personal care (CC), health goods and services (HEA), transport 
and communication (TC), education and culture (ED) and other or non-classified goods (OT). 
Therefore, following (III.16) and (III.22), in empirical terms the objective is to estimate a demand 
system composed of seven consumption groups and seven demand sub-systems made up of three 
markets (formal, semi-formal and informal) within each consumption group.    
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The empirical specification of the model follows the AIDS demand structure already explained 
in Chapter 3. However, expression (III.32a)-(III.32b) needs to be slightly modified in order to fit 
with the two-stage model to be estimated here. Using the demand equation (III.16), the 
normalization of prices already explained in the previous chapter and considering ],[ ZhA r , 
the Working–Leser Engel curve to be estimated for each of the k consumption groups in the first 
stage is  
 
  kk
r
rkrkkk eZhMw   )(log*        (VI.1) 
 
Based on the estimation of (VI.1), the elasticities of interest to be computed for the first stage of 
the allocation process can be derived. The expressions take the following form:   
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where (VI.2) represents the income elasticity and (VI.3) the hours’ (quantity) effect elasticity for 
consumption group k . For the second stage, using (III.22) and a similar algebraic manipulation 
as that used in Chapter 5 to derive the empirical specification (V.1), but considering that  km  
replaces M and ],[ rhA  , once prices are normalized to unity, the Working–Leser Engel 
curve to be estimated for each of the j  markets inside each of the k consumption groups is  
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Again, based on the estimation of (VI.4) and following a similar procedure, the elasticities of 
interest to be computed for the second stage of the allocation process take the form:  
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where (VI.5) is the income elasticity and (VI.6) the hours’ (quantity) effect elasticity for market 
j conditional on expenditure on group k  (this is the reason for the superscript C ). To find the 
unconditional elasticities, Carpentier and Guyomard’s (2001) procedure is used, so the final 
expressions take the form:   
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where (VI.7) and (VI.8) are unconditional expressions of (VI.5) and (VI.6), respectively identified 
by the superscript (U ). Using both expressions it is possible to derive (VI.9), which is the total 
effect of hours once total expenditure ( M ) is allowed to change, giving the increase in labour 
incomes produced by the hours’ effect. The unconditional elasticities are of particular interest in 
the application since they will help to compare the disaggregated and aggregated versions of the 
model and to conclude whether formalization policies have a higher or a lower influence on 
particular consumption groups. As in Chapter 5, all these expressions are computable using 
sample means. However, considering that, in empirical terms, hours are introduced in weekly 
terms and expenditure in annual terms, as done previously the term rr sh ˆˆ  in (VI.9) needs to be 
multiplied by 48.           
 
In estimating this model, some econometric issues emerge. Most – cross-equation correlations, 
heteroskedasticity and simultaneity – have already been explained in Chapter 5. To handle the 
first two, in the previous chapter a SUR–GLS model was proposed and, for the third, IV strategies 
were developed. However, beyond these problems, in the particular case of the disaggregated 
model the relatively high importance of zero-expenditures identified in Chapter 4 for most of the 
consumption categories to be modelled generates good reasons to consider the emergence of 
112 
 
 
 
censored bias. To solve this, different techniques are available: Tobit estimators (see Tobin, 1958; 
Amemiya, 1984) and Heckman (1979) two-step procedures. As pointed out by Niimi (2007) in a 
similar context, using a Tobit model will imply two restrictive assumptions (see also Lamb, 1989; 
Gould, 1992; Blisard and Blaylock, 1993). First, as discussed in Greene (2003), it assumes that 
the decision-making processes of choosing to purchase or not to purchase the good and deciding 
the consumption level are the same. Second, Tobit models will only take into account ‘true corner 
solutions’, i.e., those emerging only because of economic factors (if prices are too high or incomes 
too low). When these assumptions were tested (see Greene, 2003), evidence against the Tobit 
model was found, so the Heckman procedures prove to be better.55  
 
However, a standard Heckman procedure for separate equations is not an adequate solution for 
systems with different levels of censoring on the equations within them. Therefore, more general 
methods using the whole sample are needed. The solution adopted here is the two-step estimation 
method of Shonkwiller and Yen (1999), previously used in Monge (2007). Here, as in the 
Heckman procedure, the first stage is a Probit model, estimated for the decision to purchase or 
not to purchase. A general and simplified expression for it is  
  
)()0( 10QwP            (VI.10) 
 
where 1Q  represents the different covariates assumed to influence the purchasing decision and 
0  the set of parameters associated with them. Once the estimation of the first stage is complete, 
the probability density function )( 10Q  and the cumulative density function )( 10Q  are 
computed. Using these expressions, the corrected second-stage equation will take the form  
 
uQQGQw  )()()( 1022110        (VI.11) 
 
where )( 21QG  represents the deterministic part, with 2Q defining the covariates influencing the 
purchasing levels and 1  the set of parameters associated with them; 2  is a coefficient; and u
is disturbance with ),0(~
2Nu . Expression (VI.11) is the unconditional mean expression and 
can be estimated consistently by a standard SUR technique with all the sample values (zero and 
positive).  
 
                                                 
55 Chi-squared results obtained for the different regression models used here were between 200 and 4,500 
above the critical value of 40.11.  
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This procedure is used for both the first and the second stages of the decision process to be 
estimated here so, in empirical terms, the estimation is composed of the following expressions:  
 
)()0( 0 kkk QwP          (VI.12) 
  kkkkk
r
rkrkkkkk QZhMQw  



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
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where (VI.12) is a PROBIT model used to estimate the decision to purchase or not to purchase 
for a particular consumption group; (VI.13) is a SUR–GLS model used to estimate the share 
purchased of each consumption group; (VI.14) is, again, a PROBIT model used to estimate the 
decision to purchase or not to purchase from formal or informal markets once the household has 
decided to purchase a particular consumption group; and (VI.15) is, again, a SUR–GLS model 
used to estimate how much of a particular consumption group is allocated to formal or informal 
markets.     
 
This method is subsequently referred to as the S&Y and its estimation needs to be undertaken 
with caution, bearing in mind three complications that arise. First, the introduction of correctional 
terms in the system modifies the basic insights of the SUR specification mentioned in Chapter 5. 
Basically, the matrix of the variables included on the right-hand side of the regression models is 
no longer the same, so efficiency losses of not estimating (VI.13) and (VI.15) as systems will be 
greater and parameter estimates will no longer be similar to independent OLS estimations. 
Second, although dropping a category is still the correct way to accommodate the model for 
adding-up (as in Yen et al., 2003; Yen and Lin, 2006), if we consider the arguments of Yen and 
Chen (2002), Chen and Chen (2002) and Caillavet (2005), the results will not be invariant to the 
category dropped so interpretation of results must be undertaken with caution and must take into 
account the fact that they are conditional on the deletion decision adopted. In this application, the 
first stage drops the ‘others’ category (OT) and the second the semi-formal market. Third, as in 
the Heckman procedure, the standard errors will be heteroskedastic and the covariance matrix 
may be incorrect given the introduction of predicted terms, so robust techniques need to be 
implemented. In this application56 the Probit and SUR parts of the model are estimated 
                                                 
56 Other solutions explored were using the Murphy and Topel (1985) variance–covariance matrix or 
bootstrapping standard errors for the second stage. The results were no different to those to be presented 
here, but they impede to recover estimates of the first stage and implement Weesie’s (1999) method for 
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considering the White/Huber correction and the between-model covariance matrices are estimated 
using Weesie’s (1999) procedure.    
 
To derive marginal effects when the S&Y method is estimated, both the first part (Probit results) 
and second part (SUR results) must be taken into account. The procedure is explained in Su and 
Yen (2000). Using (VI.11) as the general form of the model, the correct formulae take the form:   
 
)]()([ 10221,0,1 QQG
x
w
xx  


     (VI.16a) 
 
or  
 
 )]()()[/( 10221,1,0,1,1 QQG
x
w
xxxx  


   (VI.16b) 
 
This means that, for the elasticities of interest in this application, previous expressions are 
modified multiplying by  each of the parameters of interest.  Note that each of the terms can be 
recovered from previous estimations or set at the sample means, so they are fully identifiable. 
However, we should also note that, for unconditional elasticities, the results for both the first stage 
(consumption groups) and second stage (markets inside groups) need to be combined. This is 
done via the non-linear combination of paramenter; the joint vce is computed using the Delta 
method. 
 
In sum, the models to be estimated in this chapter follow the S&Y procedure that takes into 
account most of the econometric problems described previously, except for the endogeneity of 
total expenditure and labour supply. Therefore, more than causal effects, in this chapter the 
interpretation of results is undertaken in terms of the correlations, with parameter estimates that 
may be downward-biased, as discussed in Chapter 5. For this reason, for comparative purposes 
between the aggregate and disaggregated models, this chapter will rely on the first empirical 
exercise of the previous chapter, which shares similar methodological issues. More robust 
methods of estimation, like the implementation of IV models using S&Y procedures, are 
consigned to further research.       
 
                                                 
joint vce of the two parts of the model so, following this, a general White/Huber correction method was 
considered to be a good solution for inference purposes.  
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The specification of the demand equations to be estimated here is the same as that used in the 
previous chapter. This means that the definition of income used is the natural logarithm of annual 
per capita expenditure (for the first-stage model) and the natural logarithm of annual per capita 
expenditure on each consumption group (for the second-stage model). The hours of work of the 
seven earning opportunities and their participation dummies are also included in the models of 
each stage. The other variables included follow specification (1) of the previous chapter. This 
specification57 is maintained at both the first stage (decision on goods) and the second stage 
(decision on markets). The exact definition of the variables used in this application and the basic 
tabulations employing the fully usable estimating sample are presented in Appendix 4.   
 
The Probit models that supplement the SUR models include the same variables as before, plus 
additional identifying covariates assumed to be related to the probability of purchasing, but not 
with the amount allocated. In general, the additional variables for the first stage (consumption 
groups) were proxies for the supply conditions measured at the district level and proxies of 
consumption adequacy at the household level. The identifying variables were different for each 
of the consumption groups58 modelled. In the second stage (markets), each of previous variables 
was used for its relevant sub-system plus an additional set of variables (common to all the sub-
systems) oriented to identify the decision on market participation. The variables were 
characteristic of the district where the household lives (considering that more vulnerable districts 
have a higher probability of favoring the emergence of informal outlets), of the access conditions 
(like distance and quality of roads), of some subjective well-being indicators (as a crude proxy of 
stigma considering that those households which consider themselves as poor are more prone to 
purchasing informal goods), and some indicators of confidence in the government (as a crude 
proxy of tax morale).  
 
In general, global adjustment of the PROBIT models, Wald tests of global significance for the 
identification covariates, individual significance and the correctness of the signs in most cases 
give support to the adequacy of the correctional terms. Estimates were also performed for different 
                                                 
57 Specifications (2) to (4) were also explored but, since the results show minimal changes to those presented 
here, they are omitted to save space.  
58 Fon (proxies of consumption adequacy on buying food are used as well as proxies of the incidence of the 
agricultural, fishery and livestock sectors in the district), Foff (existence and number of restaurants or other 
places that sell food and the incidence of the restaurant sector in the economy of the district), CC 
(consumption adequacy for clothing and the incidence of the commercial sector in the district), HEA 
(consumption adequacy for health, proxies of the health condition of the family, the existence and number 
of health-service providers and the incidence of the health sector in the district), TC (consumption adequacy 
for transport, existence and number of transport and communication providers in the district, proxies of 
transport facilities as well as infrastructure and the incidence of the transport and communication sector in 
the district), ED (proxies of consumption adequacy on the consumption of education, proxies of number 
and incidence of education providers and the incidence of the educational sector in the district).  
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combinations of the identification variables used here as well as other candidates, without any 
material changes to the conclusions presented later.59 Therefore, it was possible to conclude that 
the results were not sensitive to the identification assumptions made. As a result, without 
theoretical guidance on the identification variables that must be used and with a lack of better data 
(for example to construct better proxies of stigma, tax morale or perceived risk), the exercises 
performed give enough confidence in the strategy, at least for the purely correctional perspective 
followed here.    
 
VI.3. The results 
 
In this section the influence of income and hours of work is presented and discussed for each part 
of the decision process of the individual: the decision on which goods to purchase (first stage) 
and on where these good will be bought (second stage). Similarly, the joint estimates (first and 
second stage) for unconditional elasticities are derived and compared with the aggregate model. 
 
First stage: the decision on which goods to purchase 
 
In Table VI.1, the PROBIT and the SUR coefficients of the S&Y estimator applied on 
consumption groups are presented, with an estimation sample of 7,253 observations (once the 
dataset is cleaned of missing values). To save space, the focus is put only on the results for 
expenditure and hours of work. The full set of regression coefficients are presented in Appendix 
5. Although the PROBIT and SUR results are not of particular interest (they are just intermediate 
estimates used to derive marginal effects), it is important to note, for the selected parameters, that 
the coefficients are, in general, well-determined (significant and with the correct signs) in both 
cases. We can also see that the Probit estimates shown here follow, in general, the same direction 
as the SUR estimates, with the exception of food in the household and food out of the household 
estimates. In these two cases, income increases the probability of purchasing these goods, but 
reduces the latent budget shares. Finally, the selection term indicates, in general, that the 
unobservables in the model have a positive influence on consumption with the exception of food 
consumed outside the house and of health.     
 
In Table VI.2 the marginal effects and elasticities are presented. As in the previous chapter, the 
marginal effects are computed for the budget shares and elasticities for the consumption level. In 
terms of total expenditure, we can see that additional resources enjoyed by the family reduce the 
share of food in the household (Fon), have no effect on food consumed outside the house (Foff) 
                                                 
59 These preliminary results are not presented in order to save space.     
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and increase clothing and personal care (CC), health goods and services (HEA), transport and 
communication (TC) and education and culture expenditure (ED). Thus, in terms of the elasticities 
computed and considering Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980a) discussion, Fon could be classified 
as a normal necessity (elasticity below 1), Foff as unitary (elasticity not significantly different to 
1) and the other consumption groups as luxuries (elasticities above 1). This is a standard result in 
the literature on demand estimation in developing countries and particularly in Peru (see Monge, 
2007). Point estimates reveal that a 10% increase in total expenditure will have the lowest effect 
on food to be consumed in the house (7.7% expansion) and the highest on education and culture 
(almost 14%).       
 
Table VI.1: Probit and SUR coefficients, decision on consumption groups 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (PROBIT and SUR) vce.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
In the case of hours of work, differentiated effects are also found. It is therefore better to organize 
the discussion for each consumption group. In the case of Fon, all the hours of work considered 
in the estimation reduce consumption and, when formally tested, the point estimates prove to be 
Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED
L(expenditure) 0.52061*** 0.69847*** 0.90564*** 0.52624*** 0.89699*** 0.44086***
(0.08090) (0.04344) (0.11204) (0.03819) (0.06636) (0.04926)
Hrs_ff -0.00468 0.00394** 0.00623 -0.00089 -0.00215 -0.00451**
(0.00295) (0.00173) (0.00774) (0.00122) (0.00489) (0.00201)
Hrs_if -0.01237*** 0.01248*** n.a. -0.00174 -0.00368 -0.00834***
(0.00314) (0.00351) (n.a.) (0.00203) (0.00354) (0.00244)
Hrs_ii -0.00456*** 0.00513*** 0.00604 -0.00140 0.00393* -0.00177
(0.00160) (0.00146) (0.00478) (0.00102) (0.00218) (0.00124)
Hrs_sf -0.00667 -0.00223 -0.01281*** -0.00195 -0.00538 0.00157
(0.00497) (0.00221) (0.00420) (0.00201) (0.00335) (0.00262)
Hrs_si -0.00422** 0.00549*** -0.00174 0.00121 0.00456*** -0.00191*
(0.00198) (0.00102) (0.00301) (0.00076) (0.00137) (0.00102)
Observations 7,253 7,253 7,253 7,253 7,253 7,253
Pseudo LogL -404.675 -2220.828 -211.496 -2807.751 -764.385 -1400.052
Chi2 (hours) 29.04*** 56.08*** 11.76** 6.54 18.35*** 22.51***
Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED
L(expenditure) -0.08205*** -0.02567*** 0.00796*** 0.00515* 0.03033*** 0.02868***
(0.00434) (0.00416) (0.00170) (0.00303) (0.00277) (0.00235)
Hrs_ff -0.00052*** 0.00069*** 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00013** -0.00017***
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00006)
Hrs_if -0.00077*** 0.00093*** 0.00009 -0.00005 0.00017* -0.00019*
(0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00010)
Hrs_ii -0.00064*** 0.00100*** 0.00005 0.00002 0.00010** -0.00035***
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Hrs_sf -0.00068*** 0.00011 -0.00005 0.00015 0.00013 -0.00001
(0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010)
Hrs_si -0.00061*** 0.00057*** 0.00014*** -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00009***
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003)
PHI 0.20134*** -0.03038* 0.10260*** -0.03036*** 0.03529** 0.01777*
(0.05094) (0.01556) (0.02660) (0.01102) (0.01550) (0.01014)
Observations
Pseudo LogL
Chi2 (hours) 249.16*** 374.61*** 27.46*** 4.14 14.99** 121.84***
Chi2 (hours), system
7,253
48858.641
Probit estimates
SUR estimates
662.36***
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similar.60 In Pollak’s (1969) terms, this means that labour and Fon consumption can be classified 
as quasi-substitutes. Therefore, despite the sector to which the household allocates its labour, 
hours of work have a negative influence on food consumption, possibly revealing the negative 
association between working and purchasing activities. One additional hour spent by the family 
will generate a decrease of between 0.05 and 0.07 of a percentage point in the budget share. 
Similar results are shown for ED. This result can be interpreted again in terms of the substitution 
between working and purchasing activities, mainly if these activities must be done during free-
time. The average point estimate reveals that one additional working hour reduces ED 
consumption by 0.08 of one percentage point, with all the earning opportunities with statistically 
similar effects61 except for Hrs_ii.  
 
Table VI.2: Marginal effects and elasticities, decision on consumption groups 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (PROBIT and SUR) vce.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of expenditure elasticities, significance tests are of the form: different to 1. 
 
The situation of CC and HEA is different. These two consumption groups seem to be less sensitive 
to the hours the family spend at work. Despite the positive effect of Hrs_si on CC in all other 
cases, hours of work have no influence on demand patterns. Again using Pollak’s (1969) quantity 
                                                 
60 Chi-squared results: 1.87 (ff vs if), 1.50 (ff vs ii), 0.78 (ff vs sf), 1.11 (ff vs si), 0.36 (if vs ii), 0.07 (if vs 
sf), 0.56 (if vs si), 0.04 (ii vs sf), 0.06 (ii vs si), 0.11 (sf vs si). 
61 Chi-squared results: 0.11 (ff vs if), 6.66*** (ff vs ii), 1.96 (ff vs si), 1.78 (if vs ii), 1.56 (if vs si), 34.47*** 
(ii vs si). 
Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED
L(expenditure)  -0.08360*** -0.00014 0.00436*** 0.01603*** 0.03159*** 0.02755***
(0.00444) (0.00365) (0.00161) (0.00245) (0.00250) (0.00197)
Hrs_ff  -0.00049*** 0.00072*** -0.00002 -0.00003 0.00012**  -0.00017***
(0.00007) (0.00009) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Hrs_if  -0.00069*** 0.00120*** 0.00009 -0.00008 0.00016*  -0.00020**
(0.00014) (0.00017) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009)
Hrs_ii  -0.00060*** 0.00103*** 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00011**  -0.00032***
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Hrs_sf  -0.00064*** 0.00003 0.00000 0.00008 0.00011 0.00000
(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00009)
Hrs_si  -0.00058*** 0.00066*** 0.00015*** 0.00000 0.00002  -0.00009***
(0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED
Expenditure 0.770*** 0.999 1.049*** 1.309*** 1.231*** 1.408***
(0.01222) (0.03041) (0.01820) (0.04734) (0.01833) (0.02911)
Hrs_ff  -0.028*** 0.125*** -0.004 -0.012 0.018**  -0.051***
(0.00412) (0.01571) (0.01138) (0.02096) (0.00828) (0.01653)
Hrs_if  -0.010*** 0.054*** 0.006 -0.008 0.006*  -0.016**
(0.00206) (0.00785) (0.00540) (0.00918) (0.00374) (0.00702)
Hrs_ii  -0.031*** 0.159*** 0.005 -0.006 0.015**  -0.088***
(0.00339) (0.01312) (0.00775) (0.01646) (0.00578) (0.00824)
Hrs_sf  -0.014*** 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.006 0.000
(0.00340) (0.01037) (0.00695) (0.01573) (0.00620) (0.01047)
Hrs_si  -0.047*** 0.162*** 0.049*** -0.003 0.004  -0.037***
(0.00478) (0.01683) (0.01007) (0.02034) (0.00770) (0.01193)
Marginal effect
Elasticities
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effects interpretation, it seems that clothing and personal care, and health goods and services can 
be classified as neutral with respect to leisure. The result for CC is difficult to interpret but, for 
HEA, it is pretty natural to assume that the health condition of the family and not necessarily 
working more or less hours will be correlated with the propensity to spend on health.       
 
At the other extreme, Foff and TC seem to be quantity-complements with labour supply. When 
significant, hours of work are positively correlated to demand allocation in these two groups. This 
is, again, an intuitive result considering the close relation of these types of good on the working 
activities of the family: meals at work in the case of Foff and travel to the workplace in the case 
of TC. However, differences between earning opportunities should be noted. For example, for 
Foff, when formally tested, the effects are dissimilar between the earning opportunities62. The 
results suggest, in general, that effects of the wage-earning sector are higher than those of the self-
employment sector. One additional working hour in the wage-earning sector will increase Foff’s 
budget share by on average about 0.10 of one percentage point and one additional working hour 
in the self-employment sector will increase Foff’s budget share on average by around 0.03 of one 
percentage point. This result is revealing higher pronpensity to buy food near their workplaces 
for wage-earners. Some possible explanations could be less-flexible work schedules for these 
types of worker or better facilities of this type of consumption in modern firms (in the case of 
Hrs_ff). By contrast, the self-employed, with more-flexible schedules or working near their 
homes, are more likely to return home to eat.  
 
Among the wage-earners, informal workers show higher values than formal ones. One additional 
hour as a formal wage-earner will increase Foff’s budget share by 0.07 of one percentage point 
while one additional hour as an informal wage-earner increases budget shares by 0.10 of one 
percentage point. This result is probably associated with even more inflexible schedules for 
informal wage-earners. A similar situation is observed with the self-employed, where the informal 
segment shows a marginal effect not only higher than its formal counterpart, but also statistically 
equal to zero.  
 
The results for TC show a similar pattern. In this case, we find that working more hours in the 
wage-earning sector increases the consumption of transportation, but working more hours in the 
self-employment sector does not. These results can again be interpreted in terms of the less-
flexible work schedules of wage-earners or their location decisions. For example, as long as 
people working in the wage-earning sector need to travel to their jobs and the self-employed do 
                                                 
62 Chi-squared results: 6.22** (ff vs if), 6.18** (ff vs ii), 14.99*** (ff vs sf), 0.29 (ff vs si), 0.87 (if vs ii), 
24.23*** (if vs sf), 8.51*** (if vs si), 31.25*** (ii vs sf), 11.46*** (ii vs si), 13.61*** (sf vs si). 
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not (maybe because they work closer to home), then one additional hour spent in the first case 
(maybe because of an additional member also working there) will increase transport expenditure, 
though this is not necessarily so for the second case. In terms of the point estimates, there are no 
differences between the formal and the informal segments of the wage-earning sector.63     
 
In sum, the first-stage results help us to arrive at three preliminary conclusions. First, consumption 
groups can be classified in three types: necessities (Fon), unitary (Foff) and luxuries (CC, HEA, 
TC and ED). Second, the estimations also permit an ordering between those groups which are 
quantity-neutral for leisure (CC and HEA), quantity-complements (Fon and ED) and quantity-
substitutes (Foff and TC). Third, differentiated effects of labour supply are found only in those 
consumption groups classified as substitutes for leisure. In this case, working an additional hour 
in the wage-earning sector generally has a greater effect than working it in the self-employment 
sector.  
 
Second stage: the decision on where the goods will be bought 
 
Here the results of the second stage of the model are presented and discussed. The interest here is 
to analyse, once the individual has decided to purchase a particular group of goods, where these 
goods are going to be bought (on informal or formal markets). The analysis is conditional on the 
decisions made at the first stage, so demand responses identified are derived using group 
expenditure. In Tables VI.3 and VI.4, the PROBIT and SUR results, respectively, are presented. 
To save space, the focus is again only on the results for expenditure and hours of work, with the 
full set of regression results presented in Appendix 5.  
 
As already mentioned, the PROBIT and SUR coefficients are just intermediate results used to 
construct the marginal effects; however, the PROBIT model could provide interesting information 
about the differentiated behaviour of the linkage hypothesis at the zero-consumption limit. In 
contrast to what occurred at the previous stage, here parameters seem to differ (both in 
significance and in sign) in both parts of the estimation. As expected, the SUR coefficients are 
generally in line with the marginal effects constructed, with PROBIT estimates showing major 
differences mainly in terms of the labour supply variables. Therefore, it should be acknowledged 
that the validity of the linkage hypothesis will be different not only between consumption groups, 
but also in terms of the choice decisions about a particular good. The subsequent analysis will 
concentrate on the marginal effects computed in Table VI.5 and the elasticities reported in Table 
VI.6; however, these differences will be reported when relevant. Also, it is worth noting that, in 
                                                 
63 Chi-squared results: 0.16 (ff vs if), 0.01 (ff vs ii), 0.23 (if vs ii). 
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contrast to the previous stage, the correctional terms are not always significant, but when 
significant, they yield the expected positive sign in four out of eight cases.   
 
In terms of group expenditure, the marginal effect on Fon is positive and statistically similar64 for 
both informal and formal shares. Therefore we could argue, for Peruvian consumers, that, when 
the family decides to purchase a greater amount of food, they obtain it through both formal and 
informal markets. However, once elasticities are computed, it is possible to verify that formal 
markets will grow faster65 than informal ones. This is an intuitive result considering the discussion 
of the previous chapter, where higher total expenditure was correlated with more formal 
purchasing baskets. Similar results are shown for Foff, TC and ED, but with different point 
estimates. For Foff, increasing the allocation of resources in this consumption group reduces both 
formal and informal market shares, but the decline observed in the informal market is greater.66 
With this result, although the elasticities are below 1, it is possible to verify that formal markets 
are still growing faster67 than informal ones. In TC and ED, the results are clearer and similar to 
those from the aggregate model. In both cases, marginal effects on informal consumption are 
negative with positive effects on its formal counterpart. Therefore, in terms of elasticities, a higher 
allocation of resources in these groups will generate increases that are more than proportional in 
formal and less than proportional in informal options.  
 
The case for CC and HEA is different. In the latter, group expenditure has a positive effect only 
on formal shares, with informal ones being practically invariant. This result may be in line with 
previous ones but, when elasticities are computed, they prove to be statistically similar,68 so it is 
preferable to conclude that, in the case of HEA, both formal and informal markets grow at the 
same speed for any increase in group expenditure. A similar outcome applies for CC. Here group 
expenditure increases only informal shares but, once the elasticities are computed, they are not 
statistically different.69   
                                                 
64 Chi-squared results: 0.72 
65 Chi-squared results: 14.26*** 
66 Chi-squared results: 22.80*** 
67 Chi-squared results: 51.57*** 
68 Chi-squared results: 0.05 
69 Chi-squared results: 1.37 
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Table VI.3: Probit coefficients, second-stage estimations 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure)  0.57678*** 0.54711*** 0.03803** 0.19543*** 0.40686*** 0.36147*** 0.21079*** 0.50681*** 0.37532*** 0.77407*** 0.04890*** 0.73460*** 
  (0.04131) (0.03205) (0.01529) (0.01682) (0.02279) (0.02160) (0.01452) (0.02024) (0.02412) (0.02813) (0.01629) (0.03922) 
Hrs_ff 0.00065 0.00221** 0.00217** 0.00363*** -0.00157 0.00147 -0.00003 -0.00114 0.00154 0.00017 -0.00020 -0.00491** 
  (0.00249) (0.00094) (0.00096) (0.00132) (0.00111) (0.00090) (0.00102) (0.00155) (0.00156) (0.00176) (0.00101) (0.00237) 
Hrs_if -0.00296 -0.00152 0.00129 0.00065 -0.00294 -0.00130 -0.00075 0.00138 -0.00075 -0.00083 0.00329* -0.00673** 
  (0.00322) (0.00167) (0.00177) (0.00184) (0.00199) (0.00186) (0.00191) (0.00235) (0.00250) (0.00226) (0.00174) (0.00295) 
Hrs_ii -0.00076 -0.00140* 0.00132* -0.00176** -0.00015 -0.00069 0.00015 0.00083 0.00263** -0.00211** -0.00098 -0.00348** 
  (0.00164) (0.00073) (0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00097) (0.00077) (0.00084) (0.00122) (0.00102) (0.00090) (0.00079) (0.00147) 
Hrs_sf 0.00472 0.00164 -0.00041 0.00176 -0.00303* -0.00103 -0.00147 0.00505* -0.00536*** 0.00102 0.00371** 0.00253 
  (0.00487) (0.00159) (0.00166) (0.00201) (0.00173) (0.00157) (0.00167) (0.00270) (0.00194) (0.00255) (0.00180) (0.00316) 
Hrs_si 0.00174 0.00104* 0.00338*** -0.00116* 0.00043 -0.00044 0.00054 0.00047 -0.00170** -0.00012 0.00284*** -0.00318*** 
  (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00067) (0.00063) (0.00078) (0.00062) (0.00067) (0.00094) (0.00082) (0.00078) (0.00067) (0.00115) 
Observations 7,145 7,145 6,272 6,272 7,181 7,181 6,021 6,021 6,967 6,967 6,570 6,570 
Pseudo LogL -626.346 -4082.925 -3843.844 -2999.566 -2800.179 -3659.533 -2753.117 -1480.547 -1895.040 -1964.155 -3378.221 -897.204 
Chi2 (hours) 3.57 14.43** 31.06*** 18.17*** 7.57 5.15 1.65 5.40 19.57*** 5.79 27.41*** 20.69*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (PROBIT and SUR) vce.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. L(expenditure) corresponds to group expenditure in each 
case. 
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Table VI.4: SUR coefficients, second-stage estimations 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.01111 0.01161 -0.13601*** -0.07062*** -0.08257*** -0.11007*** -0.07617*** 0.00938 -0.07099*** 0.13331*** -0.14352*** 0.14999*** 
  (0.00720) (0.01386) (0.00659) (0.00701) (0.00656) (0.01116) (0.01278) (0.00610) (0.00679) (0.00652) (0.00426) (0.00352) 
Hrs_ff 0.00025 0.00002 0.00016 -0.00009 -0.00018 0.00016 -0.00033 -0.00017 0.00045** -0.00033* 0.00054*** -0.00022 
  (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00032) (0.00027) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00049) (0.00023) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) 
Hrs_if 0.00047 0.00056* 0.00088 -0.00091* 0.00012 -0.00031 0.00051 0.00026 0.00079** -0.00073** 0.00039 -0.00039 
  (0.00033) (0.00029) (0.00055) (0.00051) (0.00047) (0.00054) (0.00081) (0.00041) (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00037) (0.00034) 
Hrs_ii -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00036 -0.00151*** -0.00021 -0.00006 -0.00054 0.00026 0.00089*** -0.00080*** 0.00050** -0.00048*** 
  (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00018) (0.00023) (0.00037) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00020) (0.00015) 
Hrs_sf 0.00165*** 0.00004 0.00022 0.00095* 0.00001 0.00005 0.00020 0.00034 -0.00095*** 0.00058* 0.00040 0.00014 
  (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00063) (0.00049) (0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00090) (0.00035) (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00029) 
Hrs_si 0.00044*** -0.00011 0.00113*** -0.00009 0.00004 -0.00009 0.00004 0.00001 0.00014 -0.00012 0.00051*** -0.00060*** 
  (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00033) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00012) 
PHI -0.22651*** -0.04543* -0.04389 -0.05292 -0.41433*** -0.07401** 0.04710 0.16085*** 0.44836*** 0.56496*** -0.00381 0.39844*** 
  (0.06863) (0.02421) (0.04509) (0.05273) (0.03763) (0.03021) (0.05461) (0.06201) (0.02923) (0.02370) (0.03288) (0.03602) 
Observations 7,145 6,272 7,181 6,021 6,967 6,570 
Pseudo LogL 4043.816 -3196.704 2225.751 309.848 2056.629 29.746 
Chi2 (hours) 48.29*** 4.63 31.92*** 38.77*** 2.09 0.98 3.27 4.42 50.90*** 35.99***  28.79*** 37.18*** 
Chi2 (hours), system 61.38*** 92.75*** 2.87 10.12 56.21***  50.32*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (PROBIT and SUR) vce.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. L(expenditure) corresponds to group expenditure in each 
case.  
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Table VI.5: Marginal effects, second-stage estimations 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) 0.02057*** 0.03076***  -0.07314***  -0.01488** 0.02697*** -0.00261 0.00556 0.04824***  -0.07576*** 0.05882***  -0.10224*** 0.10779*** 
  (0.00774) (0.00729) (0.00603) (0.00737) (0.00857) (0.00563) (0.00509) (0.00529) (0.00568) (0.00617) (0.00440) (0.00422) 
Hrs_ff 0.00028 0.00011 0.00048 0.00066 -0.00052 0.00017 -0.00007 -0.00024 0.00035**  -0.00029* 0.00039* -0.00004 
  (0.00023) (0.00010) (0.00031) (0.00041) (0.00039) (0.00013) (0.00017) (0.00029) (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00021) (0.00015) 
Hrs_if 0.00030 0.00019 0.00075 -0.00057 -0.00059 -0.00020 0.00003 0.00034 0.00073**  -0.00056** 0.00066 -0.00012 
  (0.00040) (0.00018) (0.00056) (0.00066) (0.00072) (0.00027) (0.00032) (0.00050) (0.00028) (0.00025) (0.00041) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ii -0.00005 -0.00007 0.00045*  -0.00151*** -0.00021 -0.00008 -0.00009 0.00030 0.00070***  -0.00053*** 0.00026  -0.00031** 
  (0.00018) (0.00009) (0.00024) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00012) (0.00014) (0.00023) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00021) (0.00012) 
Hrs_sf 0.00186*** 0.00010 0.00006 0.00108 -0.00070 -0.00007 -0.00010 0.00070  -0.00066** 0.00042 0.00071* 0.00004 
  (0.00047) (0.00019) (0.00059) (0.00071) (0.00065) (0.00023) (0.00031) (0.00046) (0.00028) (0.00026) (0.00038) (0.00025) 
Hrs_si 0.00052*** 0.00000 0.00126*** -0.00030 0.00014 -0.00006 0.00006 0.00004 0.00018 -0.00009 0.00070***  -0.00042*** 
  (0.00016) (0.00007) (0.00021) (0.00026) (0.00027) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00018) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00010) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (PROBIT and SUR) vce.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. L(expenditure) corresponds to group expenditure in each 
case.  
125 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI.6: Elasticities, second-stage estimations 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Expenditure 1.034*** 1.474*** 0.738*** 0.972** 1.065*** 0.962 1.079 1.062*** 0.834*** 1.132*** 0.633*** 1.227*** 
  (0.01282) (0.11249) (0.02164) (0.01404) (0.02054) (0.08251) (0.07205) (0.00682) (0.01247) (0.01386) (0.01580) (0.00889) 
Hrs_ff 0.010 0.037 0.039 0.029 -0.026 0.053 -0.021 -0.007 0.017**  -0.014* 0.031* -0.002 
  (0.00797) (0.03352) (0.02545) (0.01777) (0.01954) (0.03884) (0.05328) (0.00832) (0.00723) (0.00781) (0.01657) (0.00701) 
Hrs_if 0.003 0.016 0.016 -0.006 -0.008 -0.016 0.002 0.003 0.009**  -0.007** 0.013 -0.001 
  (0.00356) (0.01513) (0.01178) (0.00739) (0.00942) (0.02138) (0.02618) (0.00376) (0.00340) (0.00311) (0.00835) (0.00331) 
Hrs_ii -0.002 -0.020 0.032*  -0.058*** -0.009 -0.021 -0.026 0.008 0.029***  -0.022*** 0.018  -0.012** 
  (0.00570) (0.02473) (0.01713) (0.01193) (0.01421) (0.03214) (0.03837) (0.00585) (0.00542) (0.00550) (0.01452) (0.00498) 
Hrs_sf 0.024*** 0.012 0.002 0.016 -0.013 -0.008 -0.012 0.008  -0.012** 0.007 0.021* 0.001 
  (0.00616) (0.02336) (0.01661) (0.01069) (0.01239) (0.02644) (0.03624) (0.00489) (0.00488) (0.00468) (0.01103) (0.00427) 
Hrs_si 0.025*** 0.000 0.139*** -0.018 0.010 -0.028 0.027 0.002 0.012 -0.006 0.075***  -0.027*** 
  (0.00757) (0.02998) (0.02283) (0.01495) (0.01865) (0.04169) (0.05055) (0.00707) (0.00799) (0.00724) (0.01699) (0.00639) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (PROBIT and SUR) vce.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the case of expenditure elasticities, significance tests are 
of the form: different to 1. Expenditure corresponds to group expenditure in each case. 
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The results for Fon and TC are comparable to those of Böhme and Thiele (2011, 2012b). Using 
their aggregate results for the African countries modelled, the computed conditional elasticities 
are qualitatively similar to those presented here: informal channels of commercialization 
generally show lower elasticities than formal channels for both types of good. However, 
quantitatively, the contrasts are greater. For food consumption, the authors found both formal and 
informal elasticities below 1, with average gaps lower than those presented here. In the case of 
transport and communication, the results are more comparable: elasticities for formal 
consumption are above 1 and informal ones in general below 1, with gaps slightly wider than 
those presented here.      
 
Turning our attention to labour supply variables, again differences between goods are to be found. 
For Fon, the effects seem to be concentrated only on the informal equation, where working more 
hours in the self-employment sector has a positive effect on informal Fon purchases. This is an 
interesting finding since it reveals that, although working more hours (in general) has a negative 
effect on food consumption, once the household has decided to purchase food, working more 
hours in the self-employment sector will increase food bought from informal markets. By contrast, 
working more hours in the wage-earning sector has no influence on either formal or informal 
consumption. The result reveals a particular association between working in the self-employment 
sector and buying food from informal outlets and could be interpreted in favour of the linkage 
hypothesis considering the close relation between formal and informal self-employment. As 
mentioned, using anecdotal evidence it is possible to infer that most formal self-employment has 
an informal past, so consumption patterns could be similar considering that informational 
advantages gained during the informal period and networks developed may well be strong enough 
to prevail during the formal period. However, for a shortrun model where working transitions are 
not being explicitly analysed, it is better to interpret this evidence as not being in line with the 
proposed hypothesis.  
 
The results are clearer in the case of Foff. The statistically significant marginal effects detected 
are very close to those encountered in the aggregate version of the model: informal hours of work 
in both the wage-earning (Hrs_ii) and the self-employment (Hrs_si) sectors increase informal 
consumption shares, with the latter effect greater, but the former also reducing formal shares.70 
Therefore, compared with previous estimates, these results are more clearly in line with the 
linkage hypothesis: any additional working hour has a positive effect on Foff purchases, but when 
this hour comes from the informal sector it will not only increase Foff consumption, but will also 
                                                 
70 Chi-squared results: 7.50*** 
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skew it in favour of informal-market purchases. This is an expected outcome considering that 
informational advantages and other reasons supporting the linkage hypothesis are probably better 
grounded for meals at work. For example, food vendors are normally located close to workplaces 
and they tend to share most of the characteristics of their clients (including their formal or informal 
condition), thus reducing true access costs within sectors. Also, repeated consumption helps to 
develop confidence links between market participants with potential influence on searching costs.  
 
Weaker evidence, but still in line with the linkage hypothesis, is provided by TC and ED. In the 
first case (TC), it seems that wage-earning opportunities (both formal and informal) increase the 
consumption of informal and reduce that of formal transportation. The first effect is comparable 
to the evidence encountered previously for group consumption, where a positive correlation with 
the wage-earning sector was detected. This result is possibly explained by the characteristics of 
the transportation market in Peruvian cities, highly dominated by informal providers. Therefore, 
it is understandable that the greater number of trips to work generated by increasing the hours 
worked in the wage-earning sector (the less flexible one) will result in informal consumption. By 
contrast, although formal providers do not dominate any segment of the market, they are more 
common for longer trips or weekend taxi services, a type of consumption possibly used out of 
working time or during the vacation. Also private transportation (mainly formal) could be behind 
this result.      
 
When formally tested, the marginal effects between formal and informal wage-earners are not 
significantly different, either in the formal or in the formal equation, so no evidence in favour of 
the linkage hypothesis is found for this labour opportunity.71 Different is the case of the self-
employment sector. Here, the only detectable effect is the negative linkage of Hrs_sf with 
informal consumption – a result that could be interpreted in terms of this hypothesis. Interestingly 
enough, when the SUR model is analysed separately, the evidence in favour of the linkage 
hypothesis is stronger. The results in this case go in the same direction as previous ones but, when 
the coefficients are tested, the effects of informal wage-earners on informal and formal 
consumption seem to be stronger72 (in absolute terms). Similarly, the negative effect of Hrs_sf on 
informal TC consumption is still detected in the SUR model, but is accompanied by its positive 
effect on formal TC.    
 
                                                 
71 Chi-squared results. Informal equation: 1.43 (ff vs if), 3.26* (ff vs ii), 0.01 (if vs ii). Formal equation: 
0.83 (ff vs if), 1.38 (ff vs ii), 0.01 (if vs ii).   
72 Chi-squared results. Informal equation: 0.84 (ff vs if), 3.60* (ff vs ii); Formal equation: 1.32 (ff vs if), 
4.29** (ff vs ii).  
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In the second case (ED), both formal and informal earning opportunities (Hrs_ff, Hrs_sf and 
Hrs_si) show a positive and statistically similar73 effect on informal ED consumption, but only 
informal labour supply (Hrs_ii and Hrs_si) reduces its formal counterpart. These results are 
mainly driven by SUR estimates, since the PROBIT models reveal similar effects74 across all the 
earning opportunities in both formal and informal markets. Therefore, in this case, the weak 
evidence in favour of the linkage hypothesis comes in the form of informal labour opportunities 
(in both the waged and the self-employment sectors) reducing formal allocations.      
 
In terms of CC and HEA, something very similar to the first-stage results is observed, since hours 
of work have no effect not only on the amount of CC and HEA, but also on the decision as to 
where these goods will be purchased. In consequence, it is not possible to arrive at any 
conclusions in terms of the linkage hypothesis in these last two cases.  
 
In sum, the second stage of the model reveals that formalization of the consumption baskets, given 
higher group expenditure, is not equally applicable across all consumption groups. The evidence 
of computed elasticities reveals formal markets growing faster than informal ones for four out of 
six goods: Fon, Foff, TC and ED. Similarly, evidence in favor of the linkage hypothesis is not 
equally applicable to all goods considered in this estimation. Considering the results of marginal 
effects, only in one group (Foff) is strong evidence found, with similar patterns to those described 
in the aggregated version of the model. Weaker evidence, but still in line with the linkage 
hypothesis, was found in the case of TC and ED, with different patterns of effects. In the first 
case, this is mainly through the negative effect of formal self-employment on informal 
consumption and, in the second case, it is driven by the negative effect of informal labor supply 
(in both the wage-earning and the self-employment sectors) on formal consumption. Interestingly 
enough, two of the three cases where the hypothesis was validated (Foff and TC) were previously 
identified as quantity-substitutes for leisure.    
 
First and second stages together for policy simulations 
 
Now that the results for the first and second stages of the model have been established, it is 
possible to compute the unconditional elasticities merging them, using the formulas already 
presented in the previous section. The objective is to render comparable the disaggregated version 
of the model with the aggregated one in order to compare both results and assess how the public 
policy suggestions obtained in Chapter 5 behave by consumption group. For the next exercises, 
                                                 
73 Chi-squared results: Informal equation: 0.57 (ff vs sf), 1.48 (ff vs si), 0.00 (sf vs si).  
74 Chi-squared results: Informal equation: 0.03 (if vs sf), 0.06 (if vs si), 0.20 (sf vs si). Formal equation: 
0.24 (ff vs if), 0.28 (ff vs ii), 0.46 (ff vs si), 1.02 (if vs ii), 1.27 (if vs si), 0.03 (ii vs si).  
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the results for the aggregated version of the model correspond to the SUR–GLS estimates in 
earlier chapters, considering the three-market definition and under specification (1). This version 
of the model is the one that shares most of the characteristics of the disaggregated estimations 
presented here. The comparison must take into account that both SUR–GLS and S&Y are possibly 
downwardly biased but, in general, it is expected that the bias will be in the same direction and 
of highly comparable size across the models. Therefore, the conclusion driven by the comparison 
will be still accurate.        
 
Figure VI.1: Unconditional income elasticities vs aggregated model elasticities 
 
Note: Implied marginal effects are computed using the full sample means: 8,007 observations for the aggregated model and 7,253 
observations for the disaggregated model. When computed elasticities are not significantly different to 1, this value is used. Aggregate 
results used for comparison purposes are SUR–GLS estimates under specification (1) and using the three-market definition. In the top 
graphs the blue dots correspond to elasticities computed for each consumption group and the red lines to elasticities computed for the 
whole formal or informal market. In the lower graphs, the blue lines are the marginal effects (for a S/.10 increase in income in 
consumption levels) for consumption groups; the red lines stand for the marginal effects for the whole formal or informal markets.     
 
In Figure VI.1, the expenditure effects are compared. In the top panels, the results for elasticities 
are presented. The red line corresponds to the expenditure elasticity for formal and informal 
markets computed for the aggregated model in Chapter 5.75 The blue dots correspond to the 
unconditional elasticities computed for market allocation within each of the consumption groups 
using the formula (VI.7). The vertical axis in this case is measured in percentage changes (%). In 
the panels at the bottom of the graph these elasticities are used to compute the implied marginal 
effects in terms of consumption levels for a S/.10 increase in total expenditure. The red bar 
                                                 
75 It is worth noting that the results in Chapter 5 are broadly comparable to the implied weighted average 
values for formal and informal markets computed using the seven commodities in this chapter. In fact the 
weighted elasticity for formal markets is around 1.19 (very close to the 1.29 of Chapter 5) and the weighted 
elasticity for informal markets is around 0.89 (very close to the 0.93 of Chapter 5). The weighted results 
are computed using the adding-up property for the ‘others’ group (OT) and weights are computed from 
those presented in Appendix 4.   
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Foff Fon ED TC CC HEA
Informal markets
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Foff CC Fon HEA TC ED
Formal markets
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Total Fon TC CC Foff ED HEA
Informal markets
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Total TC ED HEA Foff Fon CC
Formal markets
130 
 
 
 
corresponds to the estimate for the aggregated model and the blue bars to consumption groups. 
The vertical axis in this case is measured in New Soles (S/.). 
 
One first, important, result to note is that the value of total expenditure elasticities is always higher 
than zero. Therefore, again, the inferiority of informal goods is discarded, even for particular 
consumption groups. In general, formal goods are always either classified as unitary (with income 
elasticities equal to 1) or as luxuries (with income elasticities greater than 1). This is an expected 
result. However, although informal consumption was previously classified as a necessity 
(elasticity lower than 1), not all of the informal goods show this same result. Some of the 
consumption groups included (Fon, Foff and ED) replicate it, but others (TC, CC and HEA) show 
unconditional elasticities greater than 1. Therefore, some consumption groups included in the 
analysis, even if they are bought at informal markets, keep their status as luxuries (as in the first 
stage).  
 
However, note that, despite this classification, as identified for the aggregate model, informal 
elasticities are generally lower than formal ones, revealing similar patterns to those in the previous 
chapter – which means that income growth is associated with the formalization of the 
consumption basket even for particular goods. The only exceptions found in this application are 
CC, where informal elasticity is higher, and HEA, where formal and informal elasticities are very 
similar. In consequence, income growth formalizes the consumption basket for Peruvian 
households (result in Chapter 5), but its impact will be different across consumption groups. In 
this application, formalization occurs mainly in four out of the six groups (Fon, Foff, TC and ED) 
where positive gaps76 between formal and informal unconditional elasticities are identified. 
Interestingly enough, this gap seems to be wider when the consumption groups under analysis are 
luxuries (ED and TC) than when they are necessities or unitary (Foff and Fon), maybe because of 
the greater differences between formal and informal options for more complex goods.   
 
Using the results from the lower panel, the re-allocation of expenditures for a S/.10 increase in 
total expenditure can be examined. As mentioned in the previous chapter, these additional 
resources will be allocated in the following way: S/.4.5 on formal consumption and S/.3.5 on 
informal markets. Considering formal allocation, of the additional S/.4.5 purchased, around 65% 
is explained by education and cultural expenditure, transport and communication and health 
expenditure (27, 25 and 16%, respectively). In the case of the additional S/.3.5 expenditure on 
informal consumption, around 65% is explained by food consumption and transport and 
                                                 
76 Chi-squared results for equality in elasticities: 21.29*** (Fon), 67.71*** (Foff), 2.12 (C), 0.06 (HEA), 
244.21*** (TC), 1011.78*** (ED).   
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communication (47 and 17%, respectively). This information could be used to infer the main 
channels of engagement (in terms of consumption groups) of the family with the formal and 
informal economy respectively.    
  
The unconditional elasticities for hours of work computed using formula (VI.8) are presented 
in Table VI.7. These results are compared with the aggregated version of the model in order 
to analyse whether the predicted responses on aggregate consumption for different changes in 
labour supply are more or less replicated across consumption groups. To facilitate the analysis, 
the comparable results are highlighted. First, in the case of Hrs_ff, the aggregate model found 
that the consumption basket becomes more formal as the allocation of time to this earning 
opportunity increases. The results obtained showed a positive association between Hrs_ff and 
formal markets and a negative association with informal ones. In the disaggregate model, a 
formalization of the consumption basket similar to this effect is identified only for Fon. In this 
case a positive association of Hrs_ff with formal consumption is identified, with informal 
purchases kept almost invariant. In the case of Foff, some evidence along these lines is also 
identified, with formal markets increasing more than informal ones but, when formally 
tested,77 the elasticities are not statistically different. The other consumption groups show 
contrary or neutral results.    
   
Second, in the case of Hrs_ii, the aggregate model shows that working more hours in this 
earning opportunity generates an informalization of the consumption basket via the reduction 
of formal purchases, with informal ones practically invariant. A similar effect is detected in 
ED. In this case, Hrs_ii reduces consumption at formal and informal markets, but with greater 
reductions78 found in the former. In the case of Foff and TC, we can argue for an 
informalization of the budgets driven by Hrs_ii but, in this case, because of the greater 
elasticities of informal consumption when compared with its formal counterpart. For TC, 
Hrs_ii increases informal consumption, with formal counterparts practically invariant and for 
Foff, although both effects (at formal and informal markets) are positive, the results for 
informal goods are statistically79 higher.  In the case of Fon, some evidence along these lines 
is also identified, with formal markets decreasing more than informal ones; however, when 
formally tested,80 the elasticities are not statistically different. Other groups also show neutral 
effects.   
                                                 
77 Chi-squared results: 0.34  
78 Chi-squared results: 27.22*** 
79 Chi-squared results: 6.71*** 
80 Chi-squared results: 1.62  
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Table VI.7: Hours’ unconditional elasticities (pure effect) vs aggregated model results 
  AGGREGATED Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_ff  -0.014*** 0.016***  -0.019** -0.005 0.132*** 0.150*** -0.030 0.050 -0.034 -0.019 0.031*** 0.006 -0.002  -0.065*** 
  (0.00478) (0.00611) (0.00821) (0.03149) (0.02491) (0.01816) (0.01964) (0.03528) (0.05524) (0.01793) (0.00899) (0.01037) (0.01850) (0.01968) 
Hrs_if 0.002 0.002  -0.008** 0.001 0.056*** 0.046*** -0.002 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 0.014*** 0.000 0.003  -0.021** 
  (0.00272) (0.00288) (0.00330) (0.01236) (0.01153) (0.00764) (0.00883) (0.01922) (0.02394) (0.00840) (0.00362) (0.00442) (0.00806) (0.00851) 
Hrs_ii -0.006  -0.021***  -0.033***  -0.065*** 0.149*** 0.096*** -0.004 -0.016 -0.032 0.002 0.041*** -0.006  -0.038***  -0.120*** 
  (0.00394) (0.00398) (0.00557) (0.02352) (0.01597) (0.01247) (0.01471) (0.02879) (0.03760) (0.01391) (0.00626) (0.00760) (0.01333) (0.01036) 
Hrs_sf 0.001 0.015*** 0.010 -0.009 0.003 0.018 -0.014 -0.009 0.001 0.020* -0.006 0.015** 0.021* 0.000 
  (0.00351) (0.00495) (0.00648) (0.02052) (0.01545) (0.01263) (0.01163) (0.02288) (0.03570) (0.01149) (0.00549) (0.00666) (0.01085) (0.01232) 
Hrs_si 0.021*** 0.006  -0.023***  -0.069*** 0.259*** 0.140*** 0.061*** 0.019 0.024 -0.001 0.015* -0.001 0.052***  -0.072*** 
  (0.00499) (0.00564) (0.00773) (0.02649) (0.02263) (0.01776) (0.01951) (0.03867) (0.04845) (0.01619) (0.00898) (0.00939) (0.01668) (0.01393) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with Weesie (1999) corrections for between-model (first- and second-stage) vce.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Aggregate results used for comparison purposes are 
SUR–GLS estimates under specification (1) and using the three-market definition.   
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Third, in the case of Hrs_sf, the aggregate model showed that, ceteris paribus, working more 
hours in this sector will increase formal consumption, with informal consumption practically 
invariant. Similar effects are detected for HEA and TC. In both cases, formal consumption 
increases with hours worked in this sector, with informal consumption practically invariant (as in 
the aggregate case). In the other consumption groups, neutral (Fon, Foff, CC) or contrary results 
(ED) are found. 
 
Fourth, in the case of Hrs_si, the aggregate model shows that working more hours as an informal 
self-employer is associated with an informalization of the consumption basket. On average and 
ceteris paribus, Hrs_si increases consumption from informal markets, with formal consumption 
practically invariant. A similar result is encountered in CC and TC. Results in the same direction 
are also found for ED, where the positive influence on informal consumption is also accompanied 
by a negative influence on formal consumption. Similarly, for Foff, although both formal and 
informal consumption increases, the results are statistically higher81  in the latter. In the case of 
Fon, point estimates show that informal consumption decreases less than does its formal 
counterpart, but the differences are statistically82 insignificant. In the other cases (HEA), neutral 
results are also found. 
 
 
With these results, the overall formalization effect is simulated. For this purpose, full-effect hours’ 
elasticities are computed using expression (VI.9) and used to estimate market responses to the 
supply-side policy already explained in Chapter 5. The results are presented in Figure VI.2. In the 
panels at the top, the policy responses in percentage changes of formal and informal consumption 
(horizontal axis) are presented according to the reduction in percentage terms of hours worked in 
the informal sector (vertical axis). In the panels at the bottom, the percentage gaps are presented. 
The results in blue correspond to the aggregate model (benchmark) and in red to the simulation 
for the particular consumption group modelled. The evidence suggests that there are two 
consumption groups where the formalization policy is more effective than the aggregate 
benchmark (ED and Foff); one consumption group where the policy is more or less equally 
effective (TC); and three groups where the policy is less effective (Fon, CC and HEA). As 
expected, the consumption groups where the formalization policy is more or equally effective are 
those where the income elasticity gaps are wider or the linkage effect clearer. 
                                                 
81 Chi-squared results: 15.94*** 
82 Chi-squared results: 2.61 
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. Figure VI.2: Policy simulations (formalization policy on the supply-side) 
 
Note: Average hours of work are computed the maximum sample available for estimation in this chapter (7,253 observations). In all cases, the aggregated results are those presented in Chapter 5: SUR–GLS 
under specification (1) for the three-market definition. The vertical axis displays the expected growth of expenditure in each sector and the vertical axis the decrease in hours worked in the informal sector (policy 
result).    
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VI.4. Concluding remarks 
 
The estimations in this chapter have resulted in four additional conclusions on consumption 
allocation between formal and informal markets. First, for the first-stage results, consumption 
groups can be classified in three types: necessities (Fon), unitary (Foff) and luxuries (CC, HEA, 
TC and ED). The estimation also permits an ordering between those groups which are quantity-
neutral for leisure (CC and HEA), quantity-complements (Fon and ED) and quantity-substitutes 
(Foff and TC). Interestingly enough, the differentiate effects of labour supply are found only on 
those consumption groups classified as substitutes for leisure. In these cases, working an 
additional hour in the wage-earning sector has a generally greater effect than it would in the self-
employment sector.  
 
Second, as far as the second-stage results are concerned, although the linkage hypothesis is 
supported for aggregate formal and informal consumption, when particular consumption groups 
are modelled, the evidence is found only for some of them. In this application, in three out of the 
six consumption groups, correlations between working and purchasing in the informal (or formal) 
sector are detected. The strongest evidence is found in food to be consumed outside the house 
(Foff), an intuitive result considering that this consumption group is mainly composed of 
workplace meals – a type of consumption where informational advantages are probably better 
grounded and the location decisions of vendors could generate stronger linkages between market 
participants. At the same time, the hypothesis is verified in its weaker version in the case of 
transport and communication (TC) and education and culture (ED). In the other consumption 
groups no conclusive evidence was found. Interestingly enough, two out of the three cases where 
the hypothesis was validated (Foff and TC) correspond to consumption groups previously 
classified as quantity-substitutes for leisure.  
 
Also, it should be acknowledged that the way in which this hypothesis is verified differs according 
to the consumption groups considered. In the case of Foff, the pattern of results is highly 
comparable with the aggregated model: positive linkages of informal workers (in both  the wage-
earning and the self-employment sectors) with informal markets and negative linkages of informal 
wage-earners with formal consumption. For ED, this last result was identified though also 
accompanied by the negative effect for the informal self-employed. In the case of TC, the linkage 
comes mainly in the form of the formal self-employed purchasing less-informal goods.   
 
Third, inferiority of informal goods is again not supported by the data and, in this case, even for 
particular consumption groups. Group expenditure increases consumption for both formal and 
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informal market allocation, with higher effects detected for the former than for the latter. This 
evidence was found in four out of six consumption groups (Fon, Foff, TC and ED). In the rest 
(CC and HEA), group expenditure elasticities for formal and informal markets were found to be 
similar. Once these results were expressed in unconditional terms in order to compute total 
expenditure elasticities, formal expenditure was always classified as unitary or luxuries. By 
contrast, informal markets were classified as necessities in three cases (Fon, Foff and ED) and 
luxuries in three cases (TC, CC and HEA). Therefore, for some consumption groups included in 
the analysis, even if bought at informal markets, they keep their condition of luxuries (as in the 
first stage). However, it should be noted that, despite this classification, as identified for the 
aggregate model and in the first-stage results, unconditional elasticities for informal markets are 
still lower than formal ones. This result has been interpreted previously as the formalization effect 
on the consumption basket produced by increasing family incomes. This formalization effect is 
found to be higher in the cases of ED and TC and lower in the cases of CC and HEA.  
 
Also, due to the unconditional income effects, it was possible to detect the main channels of 
engagement with informal and formal markets for a given increase in total expenditure. In the 
case of informal markets, as expected, the main channel identified is food in household 
consumption (Fon) with transport and communication (TC) and clothing and personal care (CC) 
having secondary importance. In the case of the formal market, the main channels detected were 
education and cultural expenditure (ED) and transport and communication (TC), with health 
goods and services (HEA) having secondary importance. These results more or less confirm 
similar commentaries done in the descriptive analysis in Chapter 4.    
 
Fourth, where the policy simulations are concerned, we can see that, in all the groups, the results 
are similar to those of the aggregate version of the model: replacing informal hours of work by 
formal options generates more formal consumption baskets. However, there are two groups (Foff  
and ED) where the policy seems to be more effective, one group (TC) where it is equally effective 
and three groups (Fon, CC and HEA) where it is less effective when compared to aggregate 
estimates. The three groups where policy seems to be equally or more effective are those where 
evidence of the linkage hypothesis is found or where the income gaps are wider. 
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VII. ESTIMATION OF PRICE ELASTICITIES   
 
VII.1. Introduction 
 
Until now, the estimation procedures presented here have been based on Engel curves where, for 
simplicity (and lack of information), prices were assumed constant and equal to 1 across all 
consumers. Although, as suggested in Deaton (1997), this procedure is adequate for estimating 
expenditure elasticities and the marginal effects of additional demand shifters (as hours worked), 
it will impede the modelling of complete consumer behaviour. In fact, the lack of own-price and 
cross-price elasticities is an important gap in the literature when the demand-side of the informal 
economy is studied (Reilly et al., 2006). In this chapter, this weakness is partially addressed. The 
objective is to test the assumption of imperfect substitution between markets and to reveal which 
sectors are either more or less responsive to price changes. This last result is particularly important 
since it will be informative for policy purposes as long as it helps to infer the effectiveness of 
using demand-side policies (like price changes) in order to reduce (or increase) informal (or 
formal) expenditure. Similarly, based on the computed compensated elasticities, the chapter 
produces welfare effects associated with these policies, for which purpose compensated variations 
are calculated.   
 
The estimation follows a linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, given the available data the application is undertaken only for food 
consumption (specifically, food to be consumed within the household), which is the category 
where data on prices (or unit values) were obtainable for the different markets identified in the 
sample. Therefore, the results presented here are conditional to this group under standard weak 
separability assumptions. Focusing only on food is adequate for two reasons as far as this exercise 
is concerned. First, because this is the main expenditure group for Peruvian urban families, and 
explains almost 33% of total purchases. Second, using only a particular commodity group like 
food makes interpretation of the results more transparent since the goods supplied by formal and 
informal outlets can be assumed to be more homogenous.       
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the empirical strategy is discussed. In Section 
3, the econometric results for the different estimations of own-price and cross-price elasticities 
are presented. Section 4 then implements these results in a set of policy simulations for different 
price changes and the compensated variations associated with them are computed and discussed. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings in the form of concluding remarks.       
 
VII.2. Empirical specification and econometric issues 
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The empirical specification used in this chapter follows the AIDS demand function already 
presented in (III.32a)-(III.32b). Allowing for some modification in terms of the notation that will 
be used in this chapter, the final empirical expression to be estimated here is 
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jw  or gw  is the budget share of formal, semi-formal or informal food consumption, gp are the 
corresponding prices, m  is food expenditure in per-capita terms, A  is a set of additional 
covariates (including labour supply), je  is the error term, with ),0(~
2

 ej Ne  and j , jg , j  
and j  are the parameters to be estimated. As stated in Chapter 3, expression (VII.1b) is the stone 
price index used by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) in the derivation of the linear approximation 
of the AIDS. However, for reasons given in Moschini (1995), stone price indexes may actually 
be inadequate, given that they are not invariant to units of measurement. The practical solutions 
given by Moschini consider the log-linear approximation of the Laspeyres index which, in turn, 
is just the stone price index with constant weights. Although Moschini’s (1995) arguments are 
placed more in a time-series context (while this study is placed in a cross-section framework), 
sample means (constant across the cross-section) are used in this application, as in some of the 
examples mentioned in Deaton (1997).   
 
Based on (VII.1a) and (VII.1b), income elasticities are derived, as in the previous chapters, with 
Marshallian own-price and cross-price elasticities following Chalfant’s (1987) approximation 
(see Green and Alston, 1990) for the linear version of the AIDS. Finally, using the Slutsky identity 
(Gravelle and Rees, 2004), Hicksian elasticities are computed. The expressions reached are:  
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Expression (VII.2) is the expenditure elasticity, (VII.3) is the ordinary price elasticity derived 
considering that gg wpP  )log(/*)log(  (expenditure shares are constant) and (VII.4) is the 
Hicksian price elasticity. Note that jg  is the Kronecker delta where 1jg  when gj   and 
0jg  when gj  .  
 
Using expression (VII.4) it is also possible to compute welfare effects from price changes in the 
form of compensating variations (CV). As defined in Gravelle and Rees (2004), the CV is defined 
as the amount of money which must be taken from the consumer in the final situation (post-price 
change, labelled as 1) in order to make him or her as well off as in the initial situation (pre-price 
change, labelled as 0). Therefore, using the notation of the authors, the CV can be defined as  
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In terms of the expenditure or cost function ( c ) with u , p  and M used to defined the utility 
level, prices and total expenditure (or incomes), respectively. The computation of the CV in this 
application follows Niimi’s (2007) suggestion based on the second-order Taylor expansion of the 
minimum expenditure function which, in terms of the budget share specification used here, takes 
the form (see also Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002):  
 
  
j j g
gj
H
jgjjj ppwpwc )log()log(
2
1
)log()log(     (VII.7) 
 
As commented in Niimi (2007), this formulation has the property to incorporate household 
behavioural responses to price changes and could be considered superior when compared with 
the first-order approximation explained in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b).   
 
All these expressions are identifiable provided that the variables included in the estimation can 
be set at the sample means and standard errors calculated using the Delta method. However, 
considering the discussion in Chapter 6, it is important to note that all these expressions are 
conditional on group expenditure. Without knowledge of prices in the other groups, unconditional 
elasticities cannot be computed, so the analysis in this chapter will be carried out only at this level.   
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The specification of demand function (VII.1a)-(VII.1b) is similar to the Working–Leser Engel 
curves already estimated in Chapters 5 and 6 in terms of the variables included. This means that 
the definition of m  is total expenditure on food to be consumed within the household (Fon) 
expressed in annual per-capita terms; estimations are done under the four specifications already 
explained in Chapter 5 for the control variables included in A . However, in this case prices are 
explicitly included in the model. For this purpose, unit values computed as district means are used 
in the estimation. Following Niimi’s (2007) conclusions on the different correctional procedures 
for unit values, in the absence of market prices this formulation could be considered a second-
best option.  
  
Details of the computation of prices have been already explained in Chapter 4. As mentioned 
there, the computation is based on the available data on the values and volumes of 49 food 
products purchased at three different types of market (formal, semi-formal and informal, 
according to the classification of the outlet proposed), so it was possible to construct 147 
individual unit values at the household level. These data were then used to compute district means 
and, at this level, to aggregate them (using geometric indexes) in terms of overall formal, semi-
formal and informal food unit values. A standard imputation technique was used for the missing 
values that appear during computation (5% at the last stage of aggregation) in order to construct 
a complete vector of these three prices for each district in the sample and perform the estimations 
proposed here. However, considering the arbitrary decisions made in terms of the weighting 
factors used during unit values’ computation and following Niimi (2007), who shows that results 
can be sensitive to weight choices, three versions are presented. A base version (UV-1) with 
weights defined at the district level and two robust checks: (UV-2) with weights at the 
departmental level and (UV-3) with weights at the national level. The decision on the base also 
follows Niimi (2007), who demonstrated that the first version outperforms in reducing quality 
biases.   
 
As in Chapter 6, the main econometric issue to handle during estimation is the censoring bias that 
will emerge given the high importance of zero-level consumption. The solution proposed is to 
again rely on the S&Y estimation procedure. This means that the final specification of the model 
is, in fact, a two-equation procedure with a first-stage PROBIT model for the decision to purchase 
or not from formal and informal markets and a second-stage SUR–GLS model for the amounts 
allocated in each. Using previous notation, the estimable equations take the form:  
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where (VI.8) is the PROBIT model and (VI.9) is the SUR–GLS model. Therefore, to derive 
marginal effects, again the Su and Yen (2000) procedure needs to be implemented, so the 
corrected formulas for (VII.2) and (VII.3), once the two stages are taken into account, become:  
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with (VII.10) and (VII.11) used to find the adjusted version of expression (VII.4) and  
)]())[(/( 10221,1,0 QQxx    as defined in Chapter 6. Note also that, as 
explained there, the estimation must be made with caution, mainly in terms of the theoretical 
restrictions to be imposed in the model, like adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry. In the first 
case, dropping one of the consumption categories, as in Yen et al. (2003) and Yen and Lin (2006), 
is still considered an adequate solution (provided that the interpretation of the results is 
conditional on the decision adopted). In this chapter, to maintain coherence with previous ones, 
the semi-formal category is still used as the residual equation. In the second and third cases, as in 
Yen et al. (2003), Yen and Lin (2006), Alviola et al. (2010), Tafere et al. (2010), Boysen (2012) 
and Akaichi and Revoredo (2013), restrictions are imposed jointly83 during estimation as 
parameter restrictions in the second stage of the S&Y estimator. However, as noted by Dong et 
al. (2004) and Barslund (2011), this procedure implies that demand restrictions will be accounted 
for only on the latent, and not on the observed shares.  
 
To partially handle this issue, an alternative (possibly raw) procedure is implemented here, 
imposing restrictions on the marginal effects. This has no consequences on the homogeneity 
property as long it is an intra-equation restriction but, for symmetry (inter-equation restriction), it 
takes the form gjgjgj    in the second stage of the S&Y estimator, using the sample means 
of  . To keep coherence in the derivation of marginal effects in this case,   must be fixed, so 
                                                 
83 Semi-formal prices are included in each regression, but not reported here.  
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when this type of restriction is imposed, prices are dropped from the PROBIT equation (Yen et 
al., 2003; Yen and Lin, 2006; Barslund, 2011 also drop prices in their first-stage equations) and 
expenditure is included in nominal terms (as in Yen et al., 2003).84 Under this assumption, 
expenditure elasticity is still (VII.10), but the corrected Marshallian elasticity takes the form:  
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with the corresponding adjustment in Hicksian elasticities. For comparison purposes, this version 
of the model is also estimated with restrictions imposed on the latent shares (as in Yen et al., 
2003). Note that expression (VII.7) must consider the new definitions of Hicksian price elasticities 
when computing CV.  
 
VII.3. Estimation results and computed elasticities 
 
In Table VII.1 the regression results and marginal effects for the food demand system using price 
vector UV-1 and specification (1) are presented. It is important to note that the sample sizes used 
in the estimation have changed when compared with those in Chapter 6 since, in this case, 
dropping some missing values for additional covariates in order to identify others groups’ 
PROBIT models was not necessary. Basic tabulations of the covariates used in this chapter with 
this new sample size are presented in Appendix 6. Only the estimations for the main variables of 
interest are shown here in order to conserve space. Full estimates for both the PROBIT and the 
SUR stages are presented in Appendix 7. In general, the performance of the PROBIT models in 
this new estimation context is highly comparable to previous S&Y exercises, with adequate global 
adjustment, joint significance of the additional instruments included, individual significance and 
correctness of the signs on most of the additional variables included. In the case of the SUR 
estimates, most of the results for the additional variables are comparable to the effects (in sign 
and significance) already detected on the Engel curve in the last chapter (for example hours of 
work), so the robustness of the inclusion of prices could be claimed.     
 
The results are organized into three methods of imposing the demand restrictions: restriction 1 
means a correctly specified PROBIT (with prices) and restrictions imposed in the latent shares, 
restriction 2 means allowing a misspecification of the PROBIT (dropping prices) and restrictions 
                                                 
84 Yen et al. (2003) use nominal incomes and, like Yen and Lin (2006) and Barslund (2011), also drop total 
expenditure from their PROBIT equation. This last procedure was also implemented, but since it could 
generate severe misspecification problems in the PROBIT, this model was discarded during estimation. 
However, results for the elasticities to be presented show minor changes when compared with this 
alternative procedure.   
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still imposed in the latent share, and restriction 3 means a misspecified PROBIT (without prices) 
and restrictions imposed in the marginal effects. Without more guidance about the correct way to 
impose restrictions within the S&Y framework, it is better to hold the different ways of imposing 
the restriction throughout the application for comparative purposes. The results presented in the 
PROBIT and SUR models are of no particular interest since they are just intermediate regressions 
in order to derive marginal effects; however, in general, they show the expected results in the core 
variables.  
 
Table VII.1: Regression results and marginal effects for price vector UV-1 under different 
methods of imposing demand restrictions, specification (1) 
    Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
    Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Probit 
              
L(expend_Fon) 0.57087*** 0.56310*** 0.56693*** 0.55184*** 0.56693*** 0.55184*** 
  (0.03863) (0.03096) (0.03851) (0.03062) (0.03851) (0.03062) 
L(P_informal) -0.35757 0.38637** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  (0.26768) (0.17089)     
L(P_formal) 0.10512 -0.46372*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  (0.11170) (0.06111)     
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
Pseudo LogL -692.833 -4228.773 -697.076 -4266.134 -697.076 -4266.134 
SUR 
        
L(expend_Fon) -0.00596 -0.00366 -0.00675 -0.00268 -0.00704 0.00207 
  (0.00720) (0.01331) (0.00718) (0.01300) (0.00716) (0.01300) 
L(P_informal) -0.14533*** 0.07775*** -0.17200*** 0.07993*** -0.19317*** 0.16278*** 
  (0.02502) (0.00910) (0.02398) (0.00909) (0.02442) (0.01843) 
L(P_formal) 0.07775*** -0.01935* 0.07993*** -0.06040*** 0.07944*** -0.06631*** 
  (0.00910) (0.01113) (0.00909) (0.00951) (0.00900) (0.00933) 
PHI -0.13311** -0.05838** -0.14399** -0.05859*** -0.14704** -0.04373* 
  (0.06728) (0.02300) (0.06633) (0.02224) (0.06627) (0.02237) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
Pseudo LogL 4124.244 4134.204 4152.785 
Marginal 
Effects 
        
L(expend_Fon) 0.02034*** 0.02648*** 0.02026*** 0.02655*** 0.02019*** 0.02688*** 
  (0.00723) (0.00708) (0.00726) (0.00690) (0.00727) (0.00686) 
L(P_informal) -0.15693*** 0.05604*** -0.16639*** 0.03773*** -0.18686*** 0.07684*** 
  (0.02851) (0.00987) (0.02319) (0.00429) (0.02362) (0.00870) 
L(P_formal) 0.08002*** -0.03235*** 0.07732*** -0.02852*** 0.07684*** -0.03130*** 
  (0.01075) (0.00685) (0.00879) (0.00449) (0.00870) (0.00440) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with within-model adjustment using Weesie (1999).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Prices 
used here correspond to O1_uv in Appendix 6 with restriction 1 using the correspondent adjusted version of L(expend_Fon). 
   
In the case of total Fon expenditure, this increases the probability of buying both formal and 
informal goods at highly comparable levels, but is not significant in the SUR, revealing less 
influence in the latent dependant variable. When computed, the marginal effects, as expected, 
144 
 
 
 
show no noticeable differences between the various methods of imposing restrictions, with point 
estimates around 0.020 (informal equation) and 0.027 (formal equation). This result was already 
obtained in the Engel curve model (Chapter 4). The conclusions obtained there hold once prices 
are included in the estimation: increasing the allocation of goods on food consumption tends to 
increase both formal and informal shares in highly comparable proportions: differences in the 
marginal effect are still non-significant.85  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, this does not mean that income elasticities are similar. As 
we will see later, elasticities are still in the order of 1.04 (informal equation) and 1.40 (formal 
equation). The results are not discussed in depth here, but it is important to remember their 
implications: as found earlier, formal consumption will increase faster than informal for any 
percentage change in household food consumption. However, this does not necessarily imply that 
formal and informal goods are both luxuries. As in Chapter 6, we can see that, once corrected by 
total expenditure, it is possible to demonstrate that informal food consumption shows an elasticity 
below 1 (necessity) and formal food consumption an elasticity above 1 (luxury) with values 
around 0.8 and 1.2, respectively. It is important to bear these results in mind, given their influence 
when Marshallian price elasticities are derived.  
 
For prices, the results are again as expected in terms of the signs displayed. Own-price effects are 
negative on both the probability of purchasing and the latent estimates. This is confirmed by the 
estimation of marginal effects. Therefore, increasing the prices in each sector will reduce the 
probability that a household buys goods there and will lead to reductions in the shares they bought. 
It should also be noted that own-price marginal effects are generally higher86 in the informal than 
in the formal equation. This possibly reveals that informal markets tend to be more sensitive to 
own-price shocks than formal ones. However, a result like this does not necessarily relate to what 
happens in elasticity terms as long as marginal effects need to be corrected by consumption shares 
which are also higher for informal markets. In the case of cross-price effects, results reveal the 
expected positive coefficients on both PROBIT and SUR models, revealing substitution between 
sectors. This is confirmed when marginal effects are computed. Effects on the informal equation 
are again slightly higher,87 but it is still preferable to wait until proper elasticities are computed to 
conclude on the relative responsiveness of formal and informal consumption to price shocks.     
 
An additional issue to consider is the differences in the point estimates across methods associated 
with prices. As expected, they are more notorious than those mentioned for group expenditure, 
                                                 
85 Chi squared results: 0.29 (R1), 0.31 (R2), 0.35 (R3). 
86 Chi-squared results: 17.91*** (R1),  33.89***  (R2), 42.13*** (R3).  
87 Chi-squared results: 4.85** (R1), 77.34*** (R2), 0.00 (R3) 
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mainly in terms of the cross-price effects in the formal equation. Focusing just on the marginal 
effects for own-price parameters, we find informal equation values of between -0.157 and -0.187 
and formal ones of between -0.029 and -0.031. By contrast, the cross-price effects range between 
0.077 and 0.080 (informal equation) and between 0.038 and 0.077 (formal equation). Although, 
as discussed in Deaton and Muelbauer (1980b), marginal effects not are necessarily directly 
related to elasticities (compensated or uncompensated), it is expected that point estimates will 
differ between the methods of imposing the restriction; however, it is possible to tentatively 
conclude that, in this application, differences will be small.          
 
Table VII.2: Elasticities for price vector UV-1 under different methods of imposing 
demand restrictions, specification (1) 
  Expenditure Elasticities Hicksian Elasticities Marshallian Elasticities 
  Informal 
consumption 
Formal 
consumption 
Informal consumption Formal consumption Informal consumption Formal consumption 
  Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price 
Restriction 1 1.034*** 1.392***  -0.661*** 0.201***  -1.411*** 1.430***  -1.282*** 0.131***  -1.505*** 0.594*** 
  (0.01205) (0.10472) (0.04749) (0.01791) (0.10133) (0.14606) (0.04761) (0.01791) (0.10389) (0.15641) 
Restriction 2 1.034*** 1.393***  -0.650*** 0.199***  -1.327***   1.406***  -1.271*** 0.130***  -1.421*** 0.570*** 
  (0.01209) (0.10208) (0.04028) (0.01458) (0.06639) (0.06550) (0.04008) (0.01460) (0.06775) (0.07891) 
Restriction 3 1.034*** 1.400***  -0.684*** 0.199***  -1.370*** 1.968***  -1.305*** 0.129***  -1.464*** 1.129*** 
  (0.01210) (0.10150) (0.04105) (0.01444) (0.06510) (0.13022) (0.04077) (0.01447) (0.06665) (0.13101) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests for expenditure elasticities are of the form ‘different from 1’. See footnote in 
Table VII.1 for additional details.  
 
In Table VII.2 Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities are estimated for the different methods used 
in this application. A general inspection of the overall results is that they reveal higher elasticities 
(own-price and cross-price) when compared with other studies using the same methodology (see    
Yen et al., 2003; Yen and Lin, 2006; Alviola et al., 2010; Tafere et al., 2010; Boysen, 2012; 
Akaichi and Revoredo, 2013). One explanation behind it is that, in contrast, to previous studies 
that model price effects across different food consumption groups in this application the model is 
done for food purchased in different markets. Therefore, high price responses is an expected result 
as long as substitution possibilities are higher for one good purchased in different markets than 
for two different goods purchased even in the same market (see Restrepo-Echavarría, 2011; 
Charlot et al., 2013 for similar explanations).  Other possibility is that the results might be driven 
by quality effects on unit values, which are used instead of market prices. Following Deaton’s 
(1997) discussion, with quality shading it is possible to verify an overestimation of price responses 
when unit values are used. Although this application uses district means which, in turn, will 
reduce the size of the bias to a greater extent than alternative procedures (Niimi, 2007), some 
influence could be still present. However, without better available data, this issue should be taken 
into account in the interpretation of results.   
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The results confirm the normality of both formal and informal consumption, with positive income 
effects and negative compensated own-price effects. The demand observed displays a negative 
relationship with prices for both formal and informal goods. In this context, as expected, Hicksian 
estimates are lower in absolute terms given the influence of income elasticities on the Marshallian 
computation, with higher effects on informal markets than on their formal counterparts. Although 
expenditure and uncompensated elasticities are lower in the former case, the proportion of the 
informal consumption share (higher than formal) compensates for this difference (60% vs 7%, 
see Chapter 4). As a result, own-price Marshallian elasticities are closer between sectors than the 
differences displayed in pure substitution terms.  
 
Point estimates show that, for a 1% increase of own-price, the consumption of food bought from 
informal markets decreases by around 0.665% (Hicksian) and around 1.286% (Marshallian); 
consumption bought from formal markets will decrease by about 1.369% (Hicksian) and around 
1.463% (Marshallian), considering the mean of the different estimation methods. When tested, 
Marshallian elasticities for both markets are statistically higher than 1 (in absolute terms) 88, with 
formal values higher than informal ones.89 The implication of the finding is interesting as it reveals 
elastic observed demand curves. Although a segmentation hypothesis is not being properly tested, 
a result of high own-price elasticities (possibly driven by high substitution possibilities across 
both markets) casts doubts on its validity. Similarly, the results define a formal sector more 
responsive to own-price effects, a result possibly driven by better substitution possibilities for the 
formal sector in informal markets than the converse.  
 
In order to characterize demand patterns, it is better to focus on compensated demands. In this 
case, Hicksian own-price elasticities for the formal equation are still greater than 1, but informal 
elasticities are below 1 (in absolute terms).90 Therefore, in utility constant terms, the evidence 
supports the notion that informal goods are price-inelastic while formal ones are still price-elastic, 
or, similarly, that the gaps for the pure substitution effects encountered are higher than the gross 
own-price effects. In terms of the compensated cross-price elasticities, imperfect substitution 
between formal and informal markets is supported by the data at least for food to be consumed 
within the household. Point estimates (on average across methods) reveal that, for 1% increase in 
formal prices, informal consumption will increase by 0.200%. In the case of formal consumption, 
                                                 
88 Chi-squared results for the Marshallian demand (informal consumption): 35.03*** (R1), 45.60*** (R2), 
55.78*** (R3). Chi-squared results for the Marshallian demand (formal consumption): 23.65** (R1), 
38.56** (R2), 48.50*** (R3).  
89 Chi-squared tests for equality of own-price Marshallian elasticities: 3.76* (R1), 3.57* (R2), 4.21** (R3). 
90 Chi-squared results for the Hicksian demand (informal consumption): 50.93*** (R1), 75.46*** (R2), 
59.28*** (R3). Chi-squared results for the Hicksian demand (formal consumption): 16.47*** (R1), 
24.20*** (R2), 32.25** (R3). Chi-squared tests for the equality of own-price Hicksian elasticities: 
44.31*** (R1), 75.26*** (R2), 80.58*** (R3). 
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a similar shock in informal prices will generate an increase of 1.601%. Interestingly enough, 
compensated cross-price elasticities for formal consumption are statistically higher91 when 
compared to informal ones. Therefore, we can also argue that, considering utility constant demand 
functions, households’ adjustment of formal consumption to informal prices changes will be 
higher (in percentage terms) than the converse for a similar price shock. The data also support the 
find that compensated own-price elasticities are higher than cross-price effects for informal 
consumption, but not necessarily for formal.92 In the latter, similar own-price and cross-price 
elasticities are detected at least in two out of three methods. The results for the uncompensated 
Marshallian elasticities are along the same lines: gross substitution between markets with formal 
consumption being more responsive.93  
 
Table VII.3: Marginal effects for price vectors UV-2 and UV-3 under different methods of 
imposing demand restrictions, specification (1) 
    Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
    Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
UV-2 
L(expend_Fon) 0.01921*** 0.02862*** 0.01964*** 0.02876*** 0.01984*** 0.02891*** 
  (0.00739) (0.00730) (0.00745) (0.00713) (0.00744) (0.00712) 
L(P_informal)  -0.11429*** 0.03409**  -0.10418*** 0.03259***  -0.12387*** 0.06781*** 
  (0.03896) (0.01344) (0.02958) (0.00433) (0.03017) (0.00853) 
L(P_formal) 0.07713*** -0.00921 0.06678*** -0.00784 0.06781***  -0.01081** 
  (0.01203) (0.00752) (0.00888) (0.00532) (0.00853) (0.00500) 
UV-3 
L(expend_Fon) 0.02244*** 0.02717*** 0.02277*** 0.02784*** 0.02306*** 0.02778*** 
  (0.00727) (0.00728) (0.00738) (0.00716) (0.00736) (0.00714) 
L(P_informal)  -0.32094*** 0.06879***  -0.31208*** 0.02226***  -0.33374*** 0.05805*** 
  (0.05416) (0.01713) (0.04445) (0.00559) (0.04501) (0.01134) 
L(P_formal) 0.04593*** -0.01283 0.04561***  -0.01683** 0.05805***  -0.02076*** 
  (0.01371) (0.00874) (0.01145) (0.00677) (0.01134) (0.00629) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See footnote in Table VII.1 for additional details. Prices 
used here correspond to O2_uv and O3_uv in Appendix 6, with restriction 1 using the correspondent adjusted version of L(expend_Fon).  
 
In order to check the robustness of the results in Table VII.3, the estimations for the alternative 
price definitions are presented. Note that only marginal effects are included to conserve space. 
Full estimation results (PROBIT and SUR) are presented in Appendix 7. In general, the marginal 
effects of income are highly comparable across the three definitions of prices, so the previous 
conclusions still hold. Similarly, the price effect (own- and cross- in both equations) is 
qualitatively similar between definitions, although we can see that own-price effects for formal 
                                                 
91 Chi-squared tests for the  equality of cross-price Hicksian elasticities: 78.12*** (R1), 551.66*** (R2), 
233.03*** (R3). 
92 Chi-squared test of own vs cross (informal): 91.29***(R1), 120.87*** (R2), 145.17*** (R3). Chi-
squared test of own vs cross (formal): 0.01 (R1), 0.89 (R2), 20.17*** (R3). 
93 Chi-squared tests for the equality of cross-price Marshallian elasticities: 9.46*** (R1), 40.43*** (R2), 
71.67*** (R3). 
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consumption are not well determined in two out of three cases under UV-2 and in one out of three 
for UV-3. Also, point value estimates differ. In general, UV-2 reveals lower effects in absolute 
terms across all the estimates presented and UV-3 higher effects related to informal prices and 
lower effects related to formal ones. The highest mean average differences are encountered in the 
own-price effects displayed, similar to that found in Niimi (2007) related to changing the 
weighting factors associated with price construction. As also found there, the mean differences 
encountered are not necessarily all positive or all negative for own-price and cross-price 
elasticities, so is not possible to provide concrete arguments about the direction of the quality 
biases. In the absence of market-price data, we cannot explore these gaps in any depth.  
 
Table VII.4: Own-price and cross-price elasticities for price vectors UV-2 and UV-3 under 
different methods of imposing demand restrictions, specification (1) 
    Expenditure Elasticities Hicksian Elasticities Marshallian Elasticities 
    
Informal  Formal  
Informal consumption Formal consumption Informal consumption Formal consumption 
    Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price 
UV-2 
R.1 1.032*** 1.424***  -0.590*** 0.196***  -1.069*** 1.105***  -1.210*** 0.126***  -1.165*** 0.250 
  (0.01232) (0.10807) (0.06491) (0.02004) (0.11130) (0.19888) (0.06524) (0.02002) (0.11353) (0.20777) 
R.2 1.033*** 1.426***  -0.545*** 0.182***  -1.021*** 1.324***  -1.162*** 0.113***  -1.118*** 0.468*** 
  (0.01240) (0.10552) (0.05060) (0.01475) (0.07866) (0.06597) (0.05056) (0.01475) (0.07996) (0.08153) 
R.3 1.033*** 1.428***  -0.575*** 0.184***  -1.067*** 1.827***  -1.196*** 0.114***  -1.164*** 0.970*** 
  (0.01239) (0.10534) (0.05161) (0.01417) (0.07398) (0.12758) (0.05152) (0.01419) (0.07554) (0.12876) 
UV-3 
R.1 1.037*** 1.402***  -0.934*** 0.144***  -1.122*** 1.618***  -1.557*** 0.074***  -1.217*** 0.777*** 
  (0.01211) (0.10772) (0.09022) (0.02283) (0.12940) (0.25356) (0.09071) (0.02284) (0.13095) (0.26149) 
R.2 1.038*** 1.412***  -0.890*** 0.147***  -1.153*** 1.183***  -1.513*** 0.077***  -1.248*** 0.335*** 
  (0.01229) (0.10595) (0.07496) (0.01900) (0.10016) (0.08432) (0.07504) (0.01902) (0.10080) (0.09803) 
R.3 1.038*** 1.411***  -0.927*** 0.168***  -1.212*** 1.705***  -1.550*** 0.097***  -1.307*** 0.858*** 
  (0.01225) (0.10559) (0.07596) (0.01883) (0.09297) (0.16904) (0.07601) (0.01885) (0.09378) (0.17181) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests for expenditure elasticities are in the form ‘different to 1’. See footnote in 
Table VII.3 for additional details.  
 
In Table VII.4, the computation of Hicksian and Marshallian price elasticities are presented for 
the two new definitions of prices. In all cases the expected signs emerge: negative compensated 
and uncompensated own-price elasticities and positive compensated and uncompensated cross-
price ones. Therefore, imperfect substitution between channels of commercialization is a result 
robust to the changes in the definition of unit values used here. Also, in general, the main 
characterization of demand patterns for the formal and informal sector still holds, with price-
elastic Marshallian demand curves for both formal and informal consumption and price-elastic 
Hicksian demands only for the formal sector. Informal consumption again prove to be price-
inelastic in utility constant terms.    
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However, in line with the marginal effects constructed previously, the point estimates differ. The 
most important changes in terms of the qualitative conclusions displayed earlier relate to the 
differences between uncompensated own-price elasticities. Considering the new definitions of 
prices, it is not possible to argue that formal own-price effects are higher than their informal 
counterparts. In fact, under UV-3, although both own-price elasticities are still greater than 1, now 
the price elasticities for informal consumption are statistically higher.94 In the case of UV-2, the 
elasticities for formal consumption are not statistically different to 1, with informal ones still 
higher than unity.95 In this last case, it is strange that, when the point values of both elasticities 
are compared, they are statistically similar – a result possibly driven by the lowest precision of 
the estimates of own-price effects on the formal equation mentioned earlier. The other conclusions 
hold, despite the differences in point value estimates displayed.  
 
In Tables VII.5 and VII.6, additional robust checks are presented, varying the specification of the 
demand equations. As in Chapter 5, specification (2) refers to the inclusion of controls for location 
proxies, specification (3) to ethnic and cultural backgrounds and specification (4) to enforcement. 
The estimations are carried out using the base-price vector (UV-1) under the different 
methodologies of imposing demand restrictions. Only the marginal effects and elasticities are 
presented. Full versions of the PROBIT and SUR models are presented in Appendix 7. The 
general information that this new robust check provides is that previous results are not sensitive 
to the specification used and only minor differences in the point value estimates are observed. 
The only important change observed is the reduction in the total food expenditure marginal effect 
under specification (2), but without the material consequences of the calculations of price 
elasticities. The other results are still roughly the same as before, with negative own-price and 
positive cross-price effects on both formal and informal shares.   
 
As a result, when Marshallian elasticities are computed, uncompensated elastic demands are still 
found for formal and informal consumption, with higher values in the former than in the latter 
(this last result is less clear under specification 4). Similarly, inelastic compensated demand 
curves are found for informal consumption while formal ones are still elastic. Cross-price 
elasticities still show imperfect substitution across markets, with formal consumption more 
responsive to informal price shocks than the reverse. This result is also observed in Marshallian 
demands.   
                                                 
94 Chi-squared results. Different to 1 (informal): 37.71*** (R1), 46.76*** (R2), 52.34*** (R3); Different 
to 1 (formal): 2.75* (R1), 6.07** (R2), 10.74*** (R3); Different informal vs formal: 4.33** (R1), 4.26** 
(R2), 3.84* (R3).  
95 Chi-squared results. Different to 1 (informal): 10.32*** (R1), 10.32*** (R2), 14.39*** (R3);  
Different to 1 (formal): 2.11 (R1), 2.16 (R2), 4.70** (R3); Different informal vs formal: 0.11 (R1), 0.21 
(R2), 0.11 (R3). 
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Table VII.5: Marginal effects for price vector UV-1 under different methods of imposing 
demand restrictions and specifications 
    Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
    Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Specification (2) 
              
L(expend_Fon) 0.01232* 0.02734*** 0.01252* 0.02718*** 0.01272* 0.02725*** 
  (0.00683) (0.00690) (0.00684) (0.00660) (0.00683) (0.00656) 
L(P_informal) -0.15018*** 0.04598*** -0.15561*** 0.03383*** -0.17616*** 0.07363*** 
  (0.02396) (0.00705) (0.02126) (0.00429) (0.02170) (0.00856) 
L(P_formal) 0.07126*** -0.04044*** 0.06932*** -0.03818*** 0.07363*** -0.04151*** 
  (0.00971) (0.00698) (0.00878) (0.00471) (0.00856) (0.00460) 
Specification (3) 
              
L(expend_Fon) 0.02099*** 0.02638*** 0.02085*** 0.02642*** 0.02072*** 0.02672*** 
  (0.00727) (0.00708) (0.00730) (0.00701) (0.00730) (0.00697) 
L(P_informal) -0.14852*** 0.05075*** -0.15840*** 0.03496*** -0.17888*** 0.07283*** 
  (0.02917) (0.00958) (0.02352) (0.00461) (0.02409) (0.00922) 
L(P_formal) 0.07399*** -0.03026*** 0.07161*** -0.02804*** 0.07283*** -0.03112*** 
  (0.01154) (0.00670) (0.00944) (0.00468) (0.00922) (0.00462) 
Specification (4) 
        
L(expend_Fon) 0.02051*** 0.02688*** 0.02067*** 0.02680*** 0.02051*** 0.02698*** 
  (0.00727) (0.00710) (0.00728) (0.00692) (0.00729) (0.00690) 
L(P_informal) -0.15913*** 0.04230*** -0.16980*** 0.03218*** -0.18503*** 0.06174*** 
  (0.02895) (0.00862) (0.02340) (0.00425) (0.02383) (0.00857) 
L(P_formal) 0.06673*** -0.02606*** 0.06594*** -0.02398*** 0.06174*** -0.02566*** 
  (0.01065) (0.00639) (0.00871) (0.00437) (0.00857) (0.00424) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See footnote in Table VII.1 for additional details. Prices 
used here correspond to O1_uv in Appendix 6, with restriction 1, using the correspondent adjusted version of L(expend_Fon). 
 
In sum, the general balance of evidence presented here reveals interesting patterns in 
characterizing formal and informal consumption in terms of their demand properties. First, 
purchases on both formal and informal markets show behaviour coherent with demand theory, 
with negative own-price elasticities for both Marshallian and Hicksian versions. Second, the 
results suggest that both markets are elastic in uncompensated terms: own-price elasticities around 
or greater than 1, with formal markets more responsive than informal ones, although this last 
result is not robust when the definition of prices changes. The evidence in utility constant terms 
is clearer. It was found that, in compensated terms, formal markets are more sensitive to own-
price shocks than informal ones for all specifications and exercises presented here. In fact, it was 
verified that compensated demand curves for informal markets are price-inelastic, with their 
formal counterparts being price-elastic. Third, imperfect substitution across markets is supported 
by the data, but the computed effects are not equal. It was verified that formal markets are more 
sensitive to informal price shocks than the other way around. This conclusion holds for both 
compensated and uncompensated demands.   
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Table VII.6: Marginal effects for price vector UV-1 under different methods of imposing 
demand restrictions and specifications 
    Expenditure Elasticities Hicksian Elasticities Marshallian Elasticities 
    
Informal  Formal  
Informal consumption Formal consumption Informal consumption Formal consumption 
    Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price Own-price Cross-Price 
Spec. (2) 
R.1 1.021* 1.405***  -0.650*** 0.186***  -1.531*** 1.281***  -1.263*** 0.117***  -1.626*** 0.438*** 
  (0.01138) (0.10205) (0.03992) (0.01618) (0.10323) (0.10426) (0.04021) (0.01617) (0.10663) (0.11690) 
R.2 1.021* 1.402***  -0.642*** 0.185***  -1.480*** 1.258***  -1.255*** 0.116***  -1.575*** 0.416*** 
  (0.01140) (0.09767) (0.03675) (0.01460) (0.06958) (0.06453) (0.03672) (0.01460) (0.07139) (0.07862) 
R.3 1.021* 1.403***  -0.677*** 0.192***  -1.532*** 1.823***  -1.290*** 0.123***  -1.626*** 0.981*** 
  (0.01139) (0.09706) (0.03750) (0.01423) (0.06794) (0.12756) (0.03741) (0.01425) (0.06987) (0.12938) 
Spec. (3) 
R.1 1.035*** 1.390***  -0.647*** 0.191***  -1.380*** 1.351***  -1.268*** 0.121***  -1.474*** 0.517*** 
  (0.01211) (0.10479) (0.04860) (0.01922) (0.09910) (0.14182) (0.04860) (0.01925) (0.10145) (0.15252) 
R.2 1.035*** 1.391***  -0.636*** 0.190***  -1.321*** 1.356***  -1.257*** 0.120***  -1.415*** 0.521*** 
  (0.01215) (0.10371) (0.04072) (0.01566) (0.06918) (0.07008) (0.04040) (0.01570) (0.07011) (0.08314) 
R.3 1.035*** 1.395***  -0.670*** 0.192***  -1.367*** 1.904***  -1.291*** 0.122***  -1.462*** 1.067*** 
  (0.01216) (0.10316) (0.04171) (0.01531) (0.06829) (0.13785) (0.04129) (0.01536) (0.06940) (0.13893) 
Spec. (4) 
R.1 1.034*** 1.398***  -0.665*** 0.179***  -1.318*** 1.226***  -1.286*** 0.109***  -1.413*** 0.387*** 
  (0.01211) (0.10512) (0.04822) (0.01775) (0.09460) (0.12762) (0.04835) (0.01775) (0.09735) (0.13931) 
R.2 1.034*** 1.397***  -0.656*** 0.180***  -1.265*** 1.275***  -1.277*** 0.111***  -1.359*** 0.437*** 
  (0.01213) (0.10237) (0.04046) (0.01445) (0.06456) (0.06425) (0.04031) (0.01446) (0.06589) (0.08002) 
R.3 1.034*** 1.399***  -0.681*** 0.173***  -1.291*** 1.702***  -1.302*** 0.104***  -1.385*** 0.862*** 
  (0.01214) (0.10210) (0.04122) (0.01422) (0.06272) (0.12789) (0.04101) (0.01424) (0.06426) (0.13055) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests for expenditure elasticities are in the form ‘different to 1’. See footnote in Table 
VII.5 for additional details.  
 
Therefore, we can argue that formal markets, in contrast to informal ones, are generally more 
sensitive to price shocks, at least for food consumption and under the assumptions made here. 
This is an expected result considering the higher importance of informal expenditure compared 
to formal. It is also an intuitive result, given the stylized facts that support the idea that informal 
consumption is a better substitute for formal purchases than the other way around. This can be 
explained if the variety of goods sold on informal markets is greater or if the purchasing 
possibilities offered there are more flexible, in order to better take into account consumers’ needs. 
Some evidence on these lines is presented by de Soto (1986), Dasgupta (1992) and Böhme and 
Thiele (2012b).  Similarly, if there are confidence links between market participants in the 
informal sector that better explain consumption, limited formal supply and relatively high price 
gaps compared to the formal sector then the differences in demand responses, as found here, are 
a reasonable result.  
 
VII.4. Policy simulations and welfare analysis 
 
The objective of this section is to analyse the welfare effects of certain government policy 
alternatives in order to formalize the economy using the relative price channel. To do this, the 
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predicted changes in formal and informal consumption for the different policy scenarios are 
presented, as well as the welfare effects associated with them, in the form of compensated 
variations (CV). Predicted consumption is obtained from Marshallian elasticities and 
compensated variations from Hicksian elasticities for an arbitrary range of simulation of +/- 20% 
change on formal and informal prices. The analysis is restricted to the base-price vector (UV-1) 
using the base specification (1) and considering the three methods of imposing restrictions.  
  
Two scenarios are constructed. The first (Policy 1) refers to an increase in informal prices, holding 
constant formal ones. A scenario like this could be understood in the context of local goverment 
enforcement activities designed to increase the detection risks and operational costs of informal 
sellers in both sidewalk commerce and city markets. Using anecdotal evidence and local news 
reports, we can argue that public policies like this are very common in Peruvian cities and are 
generally welcomed by the neighbours within the parameters of public ornament, safety and 
health considerations. Using the results presented here, it will be possible to measure the other 
side of this formalization policy: the negative welfare effect, given the price increase.  
 
The second policy (Policy 2) refers to a price reduction in formal markets, holding constant 
informal prices.96 A result like this could be a consequence of more competition in the 
supermarket segment, using policies to promote investments in the modern sector. Some 
alternatives (also discussed in de Soto, 1986) refer to the reduction of public barriers of entry in 
the form of less complicated and more predictable bureaucratic procedures, lower registration 
fees and quicker processing of licence requests. Also, as noted in Arellano and Burgos (2010), 
recent economic growth and household income expansion are helping the increase of the formal 
retail food market. Anecdotal evidence and market reports show that the supermarket sector has 
been one of the more dynamic ones, with a pattern of increase of 19 new outlets every year from 
2005 (47 supermarkets) to 2014 (220 supermarkets).97 This change has been faster in Lima than 
in other cities and it is probable that it will be faster in bigger cities than in smaller ones. If we 
consider similar market reports, we can see that this pattern will not stop in the short term, 
generating additional competition in this segment and the consequent price reduction. Using the 
results presented here it is possible to inspect the possible welfare effects of this development of 
the market.   
                                                 
96 It is important to recognize that a scenario like the second one also implies some enforcement activities 
done by the government as long as it is expected that informal sellers could react to lower formal prices. 
The reaction function is not modelled here, so a result like this could not be explored properly. However, 
in preliminary exercises this possibility was (roughly) taken into account holding constant relative prices. 
This simulation is not presented here for the sake of brevity, but the results showed that allowing informal 
sellers to react could almost entirely offset the purposes of the policy.         
97 The figures presented here only consider the ‘big name’ supermarkets in the segment (Wong, Plaza Vea, 
Metro and Tottus).  
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Figure VII.1: Predicted consumption levels for formal and informal consumption for 
different scenarios of price changes (Policies 1 and 2) 
 
Note: The horizontal axis refers to price changes and the vertical axis to predicted consumption levels normalized to 1 for the actual 
sample mean.  
 
In Figure VII.1, the results of both policies are presented in terms of their formalization 
effectiveness. The panels on the left show the results of Policy 1 and those on the right the results 
for Policy 2. Note, also, that the figure is divided into three parts enabling consideration of the 
predictions under the different methods of imposing restrictions. The horizontal axis always refers 
to the different percentage changes in prices calculated from the actual mean values (formal or 
informal). The vertical axis is the predicted consumption levels, normalized to 1 for the sample 
mean value, which is used as the origin of the policy simulation.  
 
As expected, policies that work through own-price mechanisms are more effective in reducing (or 
increasing) own consumption. For example, a 20% reduction in informal prices will lead to an 
almost 30% decrease on informal consumption. Similarly, a reduction of 20% in formal prices 
Restriction 1
Restriction 2
Restriction 3
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
0
.0
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
0
.1
1
0
.1
2
0
.1
3
0
.1
4
0
.1
5
0
.1
6
0
.1
7
0
.1
8
0
.1
9
0
.2
0
Informal FormalPolicy 1
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
.0
0
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
3
-0
.1
4
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
7
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
Informal FormalPolicy 2
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
0
.0
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
0
.1
1
0
.1
2
0
.1
3
0
.1
4
0
.1
5
0
.1
6
0
.1
7
0
.1
8
0
.1
9
0
.2
0
Informal FormalPolicy 1
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
.0
0
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
3
-0
.1
4
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
7
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
Informal FormalPolicy 2
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
5
0
.0
6
0
.0
7
0
.0
8
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
0
.1
1
0
.1
2
0
.1
3
0
.1
4
0
.1
5
0
.1
6
0
.1
7
0
.1
8
0
.1
9
0
.2
0
Informal FormalPolicy 1
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
0
.0
0
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
3
-0
.1
4
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
7
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
Informal FormalPolicy 2
154 
 
 
 
will generate an increase in formal consumption of a similar percentage. A result like this follows 
on from the previous discussion on Marshallian own-price elasticities: similar to and greater than 
1 in both sectors. However, the side-effect generated by each policy is in fact different, in line 
with the differences encountered in cross-price effects. For example, the 20% shock on informal 
prices could generate increases in formal consumption of between 10% (under restrictions 1 and 
2) and 20% (under restriction 3). These results are higher than the side-effects generated by formal 
prices, where informal consumption remains practically unchanged in all the estimations. 
Therefore, if the objective of the government is to promote formal and reduce informal 
consumption, when only one price instrument is used, the results fall in favour of policies that 
work through informal prices (policy 1).  
 
Table VII.7: Computed compensating variations for Policy 1 and Policy 2 
  Results from the formula As a % of total expenditure 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 1 Policy 2 
5% 0.029 -0.004 0.029 -0.004 0.029 -0.004 1.0% -0.1% 1.0% -0.1% 1.0% -0.1% 
10% 0.055 -0.008 0.055 -0.008 0.055 -0.008 1.9% -0.3% 1.9% -0.2% 1.9% -0.3% 
15% 0.080 -0.012 0.080 -0.012 0.080 -0.012 2.7% -0.4% 2.7% -0.4% 2.7% -0.4% 
20% 0.103 -0.017 0.103 -0.017 0.103 -0.017 3.6% -0.6% 3.6% -0.6% 3.6% -0.6% 
Decile 1 0.093 -0.006 0.093 -0.006 0.092 -0.006 4.5% -0.3% 4.5% -0.3% 4.5% -0.3% 
Decile 2 0.097 -0.007 0.097 -0.007 0.096 -0.007 4.6% -0.3% 4.6% -0.3% 4.5% -0.3% 
Decile 3 0.103 -0.008 0.103 -0.008 0.102 -0.008 4.5% -0.3% 4.5% -0.3% 4.5% -0.3% 
Decile 4 0.105 -0.010 0.105 -0.010 0.104 -0.010 4.4% -0.4% 4.4% -0.4% 4.3% -0.4% 
Decile 5 0.107 -0.011 0.107 -0.011 0.106 -0.011 4.2% -0.4% 4.2% -0.4% 4.2% -0.4% 
Decile 6 0.112 -0.013 0.112 -0.013 0.112 -0.013 4.3% -0.5% 4.3% -0.5% 4.2% -0.5% 
Decile 7 0.111 -0.014 0.111 -0.014 0.111 -0.014 4.1% -0.5% 4.1% -0.5% 4.1% -0.5% 
Decile 8 0.112 -0.021 0.112 -0.020 0.112 -0.020 3.9% -0.7% 3.9% -0.7% 3.9% -0.7% 
Decile 9 0.103 -0.029 0.103 -0.028 0.103 -0.028 3.1% -0.8% 3.1% -0.8% 3.0% -0.8% 
Decile 10 0.087 -0.057 0.087 -0.056 0.087 -0.057 2.0% -1.2% 2.0% -1.2% 2.0% -1.2% 
 
However, as long as a policy like this is based on price increases, we can expect there to be 
negative welfare effects. In Table VII.7, the results for the compensating variation estimation are 
presented. Following the definition of CV used here (the amount of money that needs to be 
transferred to a household in order for the latter to be indifferent to the shock experienced), 
positive values refer to negative welfare effects and negative values to positive ones. The 
calculations are done for four critical price changes (5%, 10%, 15% and 20%) for the whole 
sample; then the price change of 20% is used to inspect the distributional impacts. The CV is thus 
computed for the different deciles of total per-capita expenditure using the estimated elasticities 
and changing the budget shares. The first six columns of the table are the results of applying the 
formula (VII.7) and the final six are the income changes expressed as a percentage of total 
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expenditure. As shown, the different restrictions imposed reveal no material differences in the 
computation of CVs.    
 
For interpretational purposes it is better to focus on the last six columns. In the top panel the 
results for the whole sample are considered. Under Policy 1, welfare losses are expected. For a 
price increase of 20%, on average the amount of money to be transferred to the households in 
order to offset their welfare loss is around 3.6% of total expenditure. By contrast, under Policy 2, 
as long as it is based on price reductions, welfare gains can be expected. The average savings for 
households in this case are around 0.6% of total expenditure. Interestingly enough, although the 
policies are based on similar price shocks, the welfare gains and losses are not equal: welfare 
gains for formal price reductions are lower in absolute terms than welfare losses when informal 
prices increase. This suggests that the welfare effects of informal prices are greater (in any 
direction) when compared to those produced by formal prices. This is an expected result because, 
although compensated price effects are greater for formal consumption, household consumption 
is biased in favour of informal markets.    
 
At the bottom of the panel the distributional impacts are shown. The results suggest that the two 
policies will be unevenly distributed, with greater negative (positive) impacts in the case of Policy 
1 (Policy 2) on the poorest (richest) individuals in the sample. A result like this is explained by 
the different sizes of informal consumption shares across the distribution; as stated in Chapter 5, 
they are highly correlated with poverty levels. Therefore, those households with high initial 
informal consumption (mostly the poor) will be more affected by a policy that increases informal 
prices and those households with higher formal consumption (mostly the rich) will benefit more 
from a policy that reduces formal prices. A result like this demonstrates the negative welfare 
consequences of using an increase in informal prices as a formalization policy.   
 
However, it is obvious that a government could obtain better results than Policies 1 and 2. From 
average welfare gains in the case of Policy 2 and average welfare losses in the case of Policy 1, it 
is possible to imagine a wide range of intermediate situations that combine both policies in order 
to minimize the welfare impacts of formalization. From simulations displayed previously on the 
effect on total consumption, combined policies will also have a greater effect on both increasing 
and reducing formal and informal purchases, respectively. To construct these alternative 
scenarios, expression VII.7 is fixed at zero, and solved for price changes in the formal and 
informal sector. The result generates multiple possibilities; here only the two extremes are 
outlined. The first extreme is Policy 3, where price changes in the informal sector are set as before 
and price changes in the formal sector are found in order to make average household welfare 
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invariant. The second extreme is Policy 4, which solves the problem the other way around: the 
formal price change is set as before and informal price adjustments are found.  
 
The different combinations are shown in Figure VII.2. The panel on the left shows the results for 
Policy 3 and the panel on the right the results for Policy 4. In both cases the vertical axis is the 
fixed-price change. This means that, under Policy 3, the increases are between 1% and 20% in 
informal prices and, under Policy 4, the reductions are between 1% and 20% of formal ones. In 
the horizontal axis the compensating price changes are shown. Policy 3 shows the minimum 
reduction that needs to be implemented on formal prices to keep welfare unchanged. Policy 4 
gives the maximum tolerable increases that could be implemented on informal prices without 
affecting welfare levels. In line with the differences in compensated own-price and cross-price 
elasticities between formal and informal, the price combinations will be different in these two 
scenarios.  
 
Figure VII.2: Combination of formal and informal changes that keep CV=0 
         
Note: price-change combinations found setting equation (VII.6) to zero. Results found using the non-linear GRG (Generalized 
Reduction Gradient) algorithm. For Policy 3, the horizontal axis refers to changes in formal prices and the vertical axis to changes in 
informal ones. For Policy 4, the horizontal axis refers to changes in informal prices and the vertical axis to changes in formal ones.    
 
The information provided is useful for policy design. For example, if the government designs a 
policy that allows a price increase in the informal sector of 10%, a reduction of almost 40% in 
formal prices is needed to keep household welfare (on average) unaltered. If the policy generates 
a 20% increase, the compensated reduction in formal prices climbs to almost 60%. By contrast, 
if new economic conditions (like increasing competence) or direct policies help to reduce formal 
prices in the economy by around 10%, this gives the government some space to increase informal 
prices via enforcement policies of around 1.5% and, if the price reduction is about 20%, the 
compensating price change climbs to 3%. The implications of the results are interesting since they 
reveal that even small changes in informal prices need higher changes in formal prices to keep 
welfare unaltered; conversely, even a strong reduction on formal prices will give a small space in 
which to increase informal prices. This is just another way to see the differentiated welfare effects 
produced by changing formal and informal prices.    
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Figure VII.3: Predicted consumption levels for formal and informal consumption for 
different scenarios of price changes (Policies 3 and 4) 
 
Note: The horizontal axis refers to price changes and the vertical axis to predicted consumption levels normalized to 1 for the actual 
sample mean.  
 
In Figure VII.3, both policies are used to simulate their effectiveness in the formalization of 
household consumption. It is obvious that, given the higher price change, the reductions on 
informal consumption and increase on its formal counterpart will be higher under Policy 3 when 
compared with any alternative. However, under Policy 4, the formalization of consumption also 
outperforms previous alternatives. Therefore, the results could be used to suggest the existence of 
a range of policies that work on moving both prices and that will not only produce lower welfare 
impacts, but will also improve the formalization objectives of the government. However, these 
policies are not free of costs. In Table VII.8, the distributional welfare effects are computed. As 
shown there, although the compensated variation is set to zero for the whole sample mean 
estimate, when the information is opened by deciles, we must acknowledge the existence of 
winners and losers under Policies 3 and 4.  
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Table VII.8: Computed compensating variations for Policy 3 and Policy 4 
  Results from the formula As a % of total expenditure 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 3 Policy 4 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Decile 1 0.054 0.010 0.054 0.010 0.054 0.010 2.6% 0.5% 2.6% 0.5% 2.6% 0.5% 
Decile 2 0.052 0.010 0.052 0.010 0.052 0.010 2.4% 0.4% 2.4% 0.4% 2.4% 0.5% 
Decile 3 0.049 0.009 0.048 0.009 0.049 0.009 2.1% 0.4% 2.1% 0.4% 2.1% 0.4% 
Decile 4 0.043 0.008 0.043 0.008 0.043 0.008 1.7% 0.3% 1.7% 0.3% 1.7% 0.3% 
Decile 5 0.039 0.007 0.039 0.007 0.039 0.007 1.5% 0.3% 1.5% 0.3% 1.5% 0.3% 
Decile 6 0.033 0.006 0.033 0.006 0.033 0.006 1.2% 0.2% 1.2% 0.2% 1.2% 0.2% 
Decile 7 0.023 0.004 0.023 0.004 0.023 0.004 0.8% 0.2% 0.8% 0.1% 0.8% 0.2% 
Decile 8 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.3% -0.1% -0.3% 0.0% -0.3% -0.1% 
Decile 9 -0.060 -0.011 -0.059 -0.011 -0.060 -0.011 -1.6% -0.3% -1.6% -0.3% -1.6% -0.3% 
Decile 10 -0.227 -0.043 -0.224 -0.041 -0.226 -0.043 -4.3% -0.9% -4.3% -0.9% -4.3% -0.9% 
Note: Computed for price changes of 20% with the corresponding adjustment.  
 
As expected, the winners are those households located at the top end of the distribution, where 
welfare gains are concentrated; the losers are those located at the bottom, with positive values for 
CV. In fact, in the two first deciles (the poorest individuals), a 20% increase in informal prices 
and a reduction in formal ones of between 50% and 60% (Policy 3) will generate welfare loses of 
around 2.5% of total expenditure. By contrast, at the top end of the distribution (decile 10), the 
income gains are around 4.3% of total expenditure. Similarly, using Policy 4, a 20% reduction in 
formal prices, accompanied by the compensation of a 3% increase in informal prices, generates 
negative welfare effects for the poorest individuals (deciles 1 and 2) of around 0.5%, with welfare 
gains in decile 10 closer to 1% of total expenditure. Therefore, although Policies 3 and 4 improve 
the formalization objectives of the government, without average welfare effects they are unable 
to avoid the negative distributional effects of the formalization policy.      
 
Moreover, even if the government use income transferences to reduce the negative distributional 
impacts, as analysed in Chapter 5, this could partially offset the original intention of the policy 
(reduce informality and increase formality). Therefore, although it is possible to suggest the 
existence of space for optimal policies that combine price and income mechanisms in order to 
fulfil formalization objectives without distributional consequences, the results of Chapters 5 and 
7 suggest that this space is narrow so its design needs to be extremely carefully thought out. In 
the general case, it is better to keep in mind that formalization policies will cause negative welfare 
effects concentrated mainly on the poor.    
 
VII.5. Concluding remarks 
 
The inclusion of prices in the analysis helps us to reach two additional conclusions on informal 
consumption in developing countries. First, the results are coherent with expected demand 
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patterns: negative compensated and uncompensated own-price elasticities and positive income 
ones. In general, we can clearly see own-price elastic observed demand curves for both formal 
and informal channels of commercialization, with point estimates around or above 1, something 
that could be used as preliminary evidence of high substitution possibilities across sectors. 
Considering utility constant demand curves, only formal markets prove to be own-price elastic, 
with informal ones being own-price inelastic. Compensated cross-price elasticities also confirm 
that formal and informal consumption can be treated as imperfect substitutes, with higher 
substitution effects in the case of formal consumption than of informal ones.  
 
This last result is interesting since the data in general support the notion that formal markets are 
more sensitive to price shocks than informal ones. This is an intuitive result, if we think that 
informal channels of commercialization could be considered more flexible and diverse; so 
informal to formal substitution possibilities could be greater than the other way around. And with 
the presence of confidence links between market participants in the informal sector explaining at 
least part of the consumption patterns there, it seems obvious to expect such a result.    
 
Second, in terms of the policy simulations undertaken here, policies that combine informal price 
increases with formal price reductions will naturally be the most effective in terms of 
formalization and will help to minimize the welfare impacts. In principle, informal price increases 
will help to reduce informal and to slightly increase formal consumption, while a formal price 
reduction will reinforce formal consumption promotion. At the same time, price-change 
combinations could be designed to maintain almost unaltered welfare effects, with price 
reductions in formal markets compensating increases on informal price. However, these policies, 
even when they are carefully designed, are not free of costs. In the cases presented in this 
application, the main cost is the unequal distribution effects that they will cause, with welfare 
losses for the poorest individuals in the sample and welfare gains for the richest. Such a result is 
explained by the uneven distribution of informal consumption shares across the income 
distribution – higher for poorer households.  
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VIII. INTRA-HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING AND INFORMAL 
CONSUMPTION 
 
VIII.1. Introduction 
 
The first three empirical models of informal consumption estimated in this research have been 
constructed on the assumption of the unitary utility maximization process. In this chapter this 
assumption is relaxed via the inclusion of bargaining structures in the demand analysis proposed 
up to now. The objective is to analyse whether it is possible to identify differentials in the 
preferences of the different household members in terms of resource allocation between formal 
(better quality) and informal (lesser quality) markets. It is reasonable to assume that it will be 
possible. For example, a common result in this literature (as shown in Thomas and Chen, 1994; 
Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Thomas, 1997; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Quisumbing and de la 
Brière, 2000; Quisumbing and Malucccio, 2000) is that some family members’ (wives) 
expenditure is more pro-welfare than the expenditure of other members (husbands). This result 
has already been suggested by anthropological tradition (see, for example, Ortner, 1974; Rosaldo, 
1974) where the role of the woman in the family (mother: closer to domestic activities and 
household needs) allows us to infer ex-ante this type of preference ordering. If this is true, a 
natural extension of the argument is that females’ influence on resource allocation will not only 
be in the form of ‘more’ pro-welfare goods, but also of trying to improve the ‘quality’ of the 
purchasing basket of the family (i.e. reducing the share of products obtained from informal outlets, 
for example). This is the kind of hypothesis that will be investigated here.    
 
The chapter uses an AIDS specification (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a) where a cooperative 
bargaining structure is imposed in the form of a sharing rule (Chiappori, 1988, 1992; Bourguignon 
et al., 1993; Chiappori, 1997; Browning and Chiappori, 1998) in order to test the effects of 
member income shares on the allocation of consumption across formal and informal markets. 
Three complementary empirical exercises are proposed.  
  
The first exercise follows on from previous work by Lancaster et al. (2006) and Monge (2007), 
who derive theoretical household demands from individual demands leading to non-linear 
specifications of Working–Leser Engel functions. As discussed in Basu (2006) and Lancaster et 
al. (2006), it is plausible to assume that the effects of bargaining, indeed any bargaining, will 
depend on the relative level of power enjoyed by individuals. For example, as the above authors 
explain, the effects of bargaining on resource allocation will be different in a situation where 
power is balanced or when it is biased against one of the members. Linear approximations 
overlook this possibility and lose much of the information that this specification could provide. 
However, this approach makes any important econometric problems that might emerge less 
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tractable – basically, endogeneity in the measure of power. This is the starting point for the second 
exercise, which uses a linear approximation of the Engel curve, as in Hoddinott and Haddad 
(1995). Here the authors simply extend the empirical household demand function, including a 
measure of bargaining power inside the family. The effects of bargaining can then be studied 
simply by checking the sign and significance of this additional variable. The third exercise refers 
to the disaggregated version of the model (similar to that presented in Chapter 6, but for collective 
models). As long as the previous two exercises are done for aggregated market consumption, an 
in-depth exploration inside consumption groups is needed in order to check whether bargaining 
on market allocation is more relevant for some goods than for others. This model is again 
estimated using a non-linear approximation.   
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical background for collective models 
is presented in order to justify the inclusion of measures of bargaining power in a household’s 
demand. Section 3 discusses the data used and the calculation of the main variables. In Section 4, 
the empirical specification and the econometric issues around the estimation strategy are 
presented in order to derive the effect of income distribution between family members on budget 
allocation. The estimation results are also discussed and then, in Section 5, the main conclusions 
of the application are summarized.     
 
VIII.2. Theoretical background98 
 
As discussed in the surveys presented in Haddad et al. (1997), Xu (2007) and Doss (2011) from 
both a theoretical and empirical point of view, unitary models seem to be less accurate when 
analysing the consumption decision process of a family if compared, for example, with collective 
approaches. In the former, the household is assumed to act as a unique and homogenous decision-
making agent while, in the latter, it is recognized as a complex organization of individuals who 
eventually need to bargain in order to reach common decision choices (Alderman et al., 1995).  
 
The simplest version of the collective models is the sharing rule approach. The framework is 
based on the notion of cooperation, used in a game theory sense, and the idea that, in such a 
decision-making process, interaction will produce Pareto-efficient results. The basic assumption 
of the model is then that households will never adopt decisions that are Pareto-dominated 
(Chiappori, 1997). However, instead of being explicitly modelled, household behaviour is 
assumed to be in the form of an optimal distribution of total income between family members that 
                                                 
98 The theoretical discussion is based on my MA thesis (University of Sussex), included in the references 
as Monge (2007). This article was partially published after completion of my MA in Revista Apuntes No. 
55, second semester of 2004 (Universidad del Pacífico), given calendar delays in the review. Supporting 
documentation of this is available on request.    
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will produce the expected outcomes. As originally proposed by Chiappori (1988 and 1992), 
Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), Chiappori (1997) and Browning and Chiappori 
(1998), the model departs from a household composed by k  members, a set of goods ( ix ), a set 
of prices ( ip ) and individual determinants like j . Then preferences will be represented by: 
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In order to allow for interaction between members, the maximization problem within this 
framework is solved in a two-step procedure (Lancaster et al., 2003). In the first step, the overall 
household income ( 


k
j
jYM
1
) is pooled and distributed between the members. The amounts 
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*
qjj pppMFY   received by each member are known as the sharing rule, which 
depends on total income and prices. These amounts are set according to the Pareto efficiency 
property (each member agrees upon the amount he or she is permitted to spend). In the second 
stage, once the sharing rule is identified, each individual solves his own maximization problem 
in the form 
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which is a caring or non-paternalistic representation of preferences for each individual. As shown 
by Bourguignon et al. (1993) and Browning and Chiappori (1998), this maximization problem 
within an assumption of efficiency can be simplified by  
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where j  are scalars that lie between 0 and 1 and are set arbitrarily by the household depending 
on the kind of cooperative agreement reached. A particular point on the Pareto frontier represents 
specific values for j  which correspond to the weight of given to each member for the welfare of 
the household in this particular situation. Under such conditions and considering k  household 
members, a possible sharing rule will take the form ))((
* MY jj  . In substituting and solving 
the maximization problem, the household demand functions achieved take the form:  
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The basic distinction between functions (VIII.4) and those presented in Chapter 3 is the 
introduction of the sharing rule as an additional argument; this is simply the way in which the 
distributional effects are recognized by the model. In fact, the term j  in a standard game theory 
framework can be considered as the true measure of the bargaining power of a particular member 
or the individual’s ability to impose his/her decisions on the house. As noted by Sen (1985), 
Mencher (1988), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Riley (1997), Basu (2006) and Lancaster et al. 
(2006), this ability will depend on the actual contribution of each member to the family budget. 
Therefore, as will be seen later, in empirical terms j  can be interpreted as the income share of 
each of the j  household members.  
 
The marriage-market or divorce-threat approach extends the sharing rule model in order to give 
an economic rationale to the agreement reached and to explicitly model the behavioural 
characteristics of the household bargaining process.99 According to Manser and Brown (1980) 
and McElroy and Horney (1981), individuals can either reach a binding agreement between 
different options or they can disagree. In the former case, each member cooperates and allocates 
the resources in a way that maximizes their collective utility function. In the latter case, a threat 
point is characterized by the payoffs associated with disagreement (divorce situation). As a result, 
using standard game-theory solutions, the bargaining power will be determined by the threat-
point shifters or, in the words of McElroy (1997), the extra-household environmental conditions 
(EEP). Therefore, in the context of the sharing rule approach, this means that )( jjj   with 
                                                 
99 A good discussion of the determinants of the equilibrium in marriage markets is provided in Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993, 1996) and McElroy (1997).       
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j  being the EEPs (Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori, 1997); i.e., the distribution of power 
depends on the general conditions faced by individuals on the marriage and re-marriage market.  
 
In an alternative variant to these types of cooperative equilibrium, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) 
suggest that cooperative solutions need credible threats and for a day-by-day negotiation a divorce 
or decision to leave the household could be a non-credible threat. For this reason, in their separate 
spheres’ model, the authors specify a non-cooperative Pareto-inefficient solution (with the 
inefficient provision of public goods) as the relevant threat point. Making the threat point internal 
to the household has important empirical implications, as it will generate demand functions that, 
in some circumstances, depend not on who receive an income after a household’s dissolution, but 
on who actually receives an income within the family (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). In such 
circumstances, j could be supplemented by actual or observable characteristics of individuals 
beyond EEPs.   
 
The non-cooperative solution is the starting point of Ulph’s (1988) proposal. One implication of 
this model is that control over money in the household does not happen in a ‘sharing rule’ context; 
by contrast, individual budgeting as a reaction to other household members’ decisions is a more 
accurate notion. At the same time, the idea of a collective utility function no longer applies, but 
the idea of power (i.e. the ability of a member to impose preferences) is still relevant. In the 
original derivation of the model, Ulph (1988) proposed the share of income that belongs to a 
particular member as a true measure of bargaining power. Using this definition, Ulph (1988) and 
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) point out three interesting features of the model. First, if the income 
is skewed toward a specific member, we can see that the Nash equilibrium reached will show that 
individual’s preferred allocation of resources. Second, as the income share of an individual rises, 
the goods preferred by that individual will rise, that of the other individual will fall and that of 
public goods will fall or increase depending on which individual more greatly dislikes the 
preferred goods of the other member. Third, if members strongly disagree on purchasing, they 
can make strategic purchases to pre-commit the household to a minimum level of consumption.  
 
In sum, the demand analysis proposed by collective models in any of their variants recognizes 
that not only does total income influence demand, but also that whoever controls the money within 
the household can actually modify the resource allocation. This is possible, given the introduction 
of bargaining processes in the analysis of household expenditure, which provides several new 
insights into the nature of the utility maximization problem of the family. The theoretical basis 
for such collective models is built in contrast to the unsatisfactory answers given by the unitary 
models and thanks to the analytical tools derived from game theory. As a result, from a public 
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policy perspective, several new options for demand-side policies are opened via, for example, 
targeted subsidies to particular family members, who presumably show preferences for socially 
desirable goods.  
 
Formalization policies could exploit these distributional effects on demand if it were possible to 
demonstrate that family members bargain not only between goods, but also on the allocation of 
resources between different markets (less-informal or more-formal). The objective now is to 
investigate this issue. To do so, our previous discussion needs to be slightly modified, basically 
so that we start thinking of collective models not in terms of goods, but of markets. Therefore, the 
term jix  used in this discussion is no longer the good i  purchased by member j ; instead it is the 
budget that member j  allocates to market i  ( i formal, informal). This is the way that the model 
will be empirically estimated.   
 
VIII.3. The Data 
 
The database considered in this chapter is similar to that already used in the estimations of 
previous models (Chapters 5 to 7) and explained in detail in Chapter 4. As stated there, the total 
sample size for urban households is 10,808 observations. However, in order to fit with the 
theoretical discussion presented above, the size has been restricted in several ways. The 
restrictions imposed are similar to those used in Bourguignon et al. (1993), Hoddinott and Haddad 
(1995), Phipps and Burton (1998), Lancaster et al. (2006) and Monge (2007). Here, the selected 
families are those where the two parents (mother and father) are present and live together (married 
or unmarried), with each aged between 18 (adult) and 65 (retirement) years old and at least one 
having a positive income. Other members (sons, daughters, etc.) may or may not exist, but they 
cannot be income-earners. Therefore, in terms of the theoretical models presented above, in 
empirical terms a two-member-family decision-making structure is assumed.  
 
The data restrictions introduced imply a reduction in the sample size to 3,159 observations, so it 
would seem reasonable here to record possible changes in the dependent variables: consumption 
on goods and markets. In Table VIII.1, total expenditure (purchasing) by consumption group for 
the unrestricted and restricted samples is presented. As shown, there are no important differences 
in terms of the mean value of total expenditure or of the distribution between groups. In Table 
VIII.2 we have similar comparisons, but the definitions of the markets used are presented. With 
the three- and five-market definitions, again the figures seem to be highly comparable, with a 
small redistribution away from informal and formal markets and in favour of the semi-formal 
category. However, budget shares still reveal that the major allocation is to informal markets when 
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compared with formal ones. Similarly, levels of censoring in this case (aggregate markets) can 
still be neglected as long as they are below 1% in all cases. 
 
Table VIII.1: Total expenditure (purchasing) by consumption group 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table VIII.2: Total expenditure (purchasing) by markets (different definitions) 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
In Table VIII.3, the information on expenditure across markets within each of the consumption 
groups is presented. As a consequence of the data restrictions imposed, the sample sizes for the 
disaggregated models have also fallen but note that, again, the sample means of consumption are 
highly comparable between the restricted and the unrestricted samples. Some other important 
changes to note are the growth in the consumption levels of Fon, CC and OT and a reduction in 
Total expenditure (purchasing) by group
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0 Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Fon 4,856         32.7           0.362 97.2           5,086         34.9           0.399 98.2           
(3348.43) (0.17) (2990.04) (0.16)
Foff 1,790         12.0           0.130 85.4           1,389         9.5             0.099 84.6           
(2109.29) (0.14) (1744.48) (0.11)
CC 1,221         8.2             0.083 96.3           1,302         8.9             0.090 98.5           
(1391.87) (0.06) (1388.13) (0.06)
HEA 887            6.0             0.053 82.1           771            5.3             0.048 81.9           
(1761.88) (0.08) (1732.53) (0.07)
TC 2,316         15.6           0.136 94.5           2,142         14.7           0.121 94.8           
(4449.06) (0.1) (6875.47) (0.09)
ED 1,304         8.8             0.066 86.7           1,258         8.6             0.067 91.2           
(2721.7) (0.08) (2581.86) (0.08)
OT 2,494         16.8           0.172 99.6           2,611         17.9           0.176 99.9           
(3146.76) (0.1) (3492.58) (0.1)
Total (purch.) 14,868        100.0         100.0         14,558        100.0         100.0         
(12172.17) (13275.37)
Number obs. 
Unrestricted sample
10,808
Restricted sample
3,159
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0 Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Informal 5,496         37.0           0.390 99.4 5,367         36.9           0.401 99.8
(4221.03) (0.18) (3804.19) (0.18)
Semi-formal 4,213         28.3           0.318 99.8 4,396         30.2           0.335 100.0
(3930.) (0.19) (4004.54) (0.19)
Formal 5,158         34.7           0.292 99.1 4,795         32.9           0.264 99.9
(7734.17) (0.18) (9762.17) (0.17)
Total (purch.) 14,868        100.0         14,558        100.0         
(12172.17) (13275.37)
Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0 Mean Prop. (%) Bud. Share % > 0
Market 1 2,398         16.1           0.174 98.4 2,286         15.7           0.171 98.9
(2323.02) (0.13) (2207.32) (0.13)
Market 2 3,098         20.8           0.216 90.4 3,081         21.2           0.230 92.8
(3014.57) (0.17) (2773.35) (0.18)
Market 3 4,213         28.3           0.318 99.8 4,396         30.2           0.335 100.0
(3930.) (0.19) (4004.54) (0.19)
Market 4 1,584         10.7           0.101 88.8 1,386         9.5             0.087 88.4
(2115.82) (0.11) (2008.18) (0.09)
Market 5 3,575         24.0           0.191 98.0 3,410         23.4           0.177 99.5
(6692.99) (0.15) (8967.76) (0.14)
Total (purch.) 14,868        100.0         14,558        100.0         
(12172.17) (13275.37)
Number obs. 
Restricted sample
Three-market approach
Five-market approach
3,15910,808
Three-market approach
Five-market approach
Unrestricted sample
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those of the other categories. And in terms of the markets within each consumption group, Fon, 
Foff and TC show a re-composition away from informal consumption, and ED away from formal 
consumption. Other consumption categories maintain their distribution between formal and 
informal markets almost unaltered. Similarly, we should note that censoring at this level of 
analysis is still an important issue that must be considered during estimation.  
 
Table VIII.3: Purchasing markets by expenditure group 
 
Note: expenditure in annual S/. (Nuevos Soles). (>0) means that calculations are restricted to positive expenditure in the particular 
group. 
 
A second important issue to consider for the empirical strategy in this chapter is the construction 
of individual incomes. As discussed in the previous section, the specification of the demand 
equation will exploit the notion of bargaining power interpreted as the control over household 
resources that each decision-making member of the family has. In this application, control over 
money is defined as the share of income of the husband (or father). Since the database used here 
identifies individual incomes, this variable was computed with minimal assumptions and 
following the National Statistics Institute methodology (INEI, in Spanish). To do this, the income 
module of the survey was used, whereby the different sources of income are recorded for each 
member.  
 
Sources of income were classified as either assignable or non-assignable. The assignable income 
identified was labour income (monetary and non-monetary) from different labour options (wage-
earners and self-employment) and from primary and secondary (moonlighting) activities. 
Remittances (national and foreign) received by each member from other households or from 
Fon (>0) 4,998             100.0            5,180         100.0         
Informal 3,153             63.1              0.600 96.6       3,124         60.3           0.597 97.9           
Semi-formal 1,388             27.8              0.329 92.9       1,578         30.5           0.337 93.6           
Formal 457               9.1               0.071 47.3       477            9.2             0.066 48.6           
Foff (>0) 2,097             100.0            1,642         100.0         
Informal 396               18.9              0.264 57.0       289            17.6           0.277 53.4           
Semi-formal 607               29.0              0.212 31.8       436            26.5           0.182 25.0           
Formal 1,093             52.1              0.524 76.6       918            55.9           0.542 73.3           
CC (>0) 1,267             100.0            1,322         100.0         
Informal 502               39.6              0.416 80.5       539            40.8           0.444 84.5           
Semi-formal 661               52.2              0.510 93.7       677            51.2           0.486 94.2           
Formal 104               8.2               0.073 29.8       106            8.0             0.070 31.7           
HEA (>0) 1,080             100.0            942            100.0         
Informal 70                 6.5               0.065 18.7       60              6.3             0.067 17.2           
Semi-formal 83                 7.7               0.154 38.1       74              7.9             0.157 37.0           
Formal 927               85.8              0.781 89.4       808            85.8           0.776 89.2           
TC (>0) 2,449             100.0            2,258         100.0         
Informal 943               38.5              0.467 89.0       799            35.4           0.472 87.5           
Semi-formal 157               6.4               0.095 62.5       107            4.8             0.073 54.7           
Formal 1,350             55.1              0.438 82.9       1,351         59.8           0.455 82.1           
ED (>0) 1,504             100.0            1,380         100.0         
Informal 152               10.1              0.288 73.0       166            12.0           0.280 74.2           
Semi-formal 232               15.4              0.241 68.7       229            16.6           0.274 72.7           
Formal 1,119             74.5              0.471 85.6       985            71.4           0.446 91.1           
OT (>0) 2,503             100.0            2,614         100.0         
Informal 532               21.3              0.199 85.2       567            21.7           0.205 87.6           
Semi-formal 1,296             51.8              0.495 98.7       1,441         55.1           0.523 99.3           
Formal 675               27.0              0.306 92.4       606            23.2           0.272 93.7           
8,878
10,218
9,374
10,770
% > 0 Sample
10,501
9,226
10,412
Unrestricted sample Restricted sample
Mean Prop. (%) B. Share % > 0 SampleMean B. ShareProp. (%)
3,155
3,102
2,671
3,112
2,586
2,996
2,880
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institutions (including the government) were also individually recorded, as were extraordinary 
incomes such as individual property rents or lottery gains, insurance, heritages, etc. However, as 
the definition of consumption used here is purchasing, only monetary incomes were used in the 
calculation of power. Non-monetary sources identified were payments or transfers in kind, and 
own-consumption, already excluded from consumption measures as they cannot be classified in 
terms of formal and informal consumption. Non-assignable sources of income identified were the 
imputed consumption of the household, imputed property rents and other government transfers in 
kind not recorded individually. The low level of importance of these sources to total income 
determines that their exclusion in the computation of power has little effect on the results.     
 
Table VIII.4: Total household income by source 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
In Table VIII.4, the values for each source of income identified in the sample are presented for 
both the unrestricted and the restricted sample. As shown, in the unrestricted sample, total annual 
incomes are almost S/. 22,000, 85% of which could be assigned between members. From the total 
assignable income, 93% is monetary (source of the computation of bargaining power) so, in 
general terms, around 80% of total income was included in the estimation proposed. For 
household members, the major proportion of monetary-assignable income comes from the father 
(or husband), who accounts for almost 50% of this source. Lower values are identified for the 
other members: mother (23%), son/daughter (19%) and others (8%). Once the restrictions are 
imposed, total income falls to around S/. 20,000. As expected, there is also a re-composition of 
the structure of the income. Although, assignable income is still around 85% and monetary 
S/., annual % structure S/., annual % structure
Total income 22,320        19,918        
(21704.200) (20458.990)
Assignable 18,743        84.0           17,001        85.4           
(19525.710) (18223.980)
  Monetary 17,354        92.6           15,935        93.7           
(19125.010) (17917.520)
     Father 8,726         50.3           12,104        76.0           
(14292.110) (14741.740)
     Mother 3,965         22.8           3,832         24.0           
(7602.009) (7436.498)
     Son/Daughter 3,246         18.7           - -
(7651.893)
     Other 1,418         8.2             - -
(5121.533)
  Non-monetary 1,389         7.4             1,066         6.3             
(2205.097) (2039.443)
Non-assignable 3,577         16.0           2,917         14.6           
(4943.170) (4668.033)
Number obs.
Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample
10,808 3,159
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income is above 90%, control over money in the household changes in favour of the father. Now 
the monetary-assignable income of this member accounts for 75%, with that of mothers around 
25%. Interestingly enough, these figures are similar to those of Monge (2007), who uses a 
different data sample and includes both monetary and non-monetary assignable income for the 
urban and rural areas in his calculation.       
 
Figure VIII.1: Kernel density function for bargaining power and basic statistics 
 
Note: calculations based on the 3,159 observations of the restricted sample. 
 
As mentioned, the variable of bargaining power is defined as the monetary-assignable income of 
the husband as a proportion of total monetary-assignable income. The basic statistics of this new 
variable introduced in the research are presented in Figure VIII.1, where the kernel density 
function and the normal approximation are also displayed. As shown, although some 
concentration of values is identified at around 0.0 and 0.5, the bargaining power used in the 
sample is highly skewed to the right, with an important concentration of values around 1 (almost 
40% of the sample). This result is to be expected given that, in a developing country like Peru, 
the main earners in the household are typically men with better salaried jobs. By contrast, the 
labour inactivity of women determines, in most cases a monetary income very close to zero. The 
mean of the variable at the household level is around 0.78 and the median around 0.89. A similar 
distribution of power is identified in Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) for Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
When this variable is correlated with total expenditure and other possible measures of power (like 
age, education and hours of work), the results which emerge are as expected. In Figure VIII.2, the 
results plot the average value of the bargaining power defined earlier for each of the quintiles 
defined for the variables of interest. As shown, as the family becomes richer, control over the 
Mean 0.775
Median 0.894
Mode 1.000
Min 0.000
Max 1.000
S.D. 0.277
Variance 0.770
Skewness -1.242
Kurtosis 3.739
P10% 0.382
P25% 0.612
P50% 0.894
P75% 1.000
P90% 1.000
Basic statistics
0
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2
3
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = .05
Kernel density estimate
170 
 
 
 
father’s resources is lower. There is also a positive correlation of the measure of power with the 
age and education gaps, although the relationship displayed in these cases is less clear. However, 
it should be noted that the differences across quintiles are small. For example, for the poorest 
households, the husband’s share of the income is around 80% and for the richest the value is 
around 73%. Similarly, for those households with the highest age or education gaps, the extent of 
the change in the bargaining power variable goes from 75% to 82% and from 73% to 83%, 
respectively. However, it is different for hours of work where, as expected, both the positive 
correlation and the range of values are greater.     
 
Figure VIII.2: Correlations of bargaining power with expenditure, age, education and 
hours of work 
 
Note: the vertical axis refers to the bargaining power of the husband (in %) and the horizontal axis the quintiles for each variable 
considered.  
 
VIII.4. Empirical specification and econometric issues 
 
The empirical strategy used in this application derives from conclusions arrived at in Monge 
(2007), where the demand analysis presented by the author shows evidence in favour of a 
cooperative equilibrium for Peruvian households: income is not pooled between family members 
and the implied bargaining process attains Pareto-efficient outcomes. Under such circumstances, 
as explained in Lancaster et al. (2006), it is justifiable to use a sharing rule model in order to 
investigate the distributional effects on demand.  As a result, the demand equation for market 
i  will be (VIII.4). The objective now is to find a suitable specification for it. In order to do so 
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and to maintain coherence in the specifications used thus far, Working–Leser Engel curves100 will 
be used. In its most basic version, this specification takes the form:  
 
  bbbb
aaaa
Mw
Mw




)1(ln
)ln(
                   (VIII.5) 
 
for household members a  and b  (husbands and wives, respectively) where 
*/ aaa YCw   and 
*/ bbb YCw  , with MYa 
*
and MYb )1(
*  being the shared expenditures for aC  and bC
being the formal or informal consumption levels for each member. In this setting, M  is total 
expenditure,   the measure of bargaining power and baba  ,,,  the set of estimable 
parameters. However, as individual consumption is not observed, the expression for household 
formal or informal consumption shares ( w ) is obtained, as in Lancaster et al. (2006) and Monge 
(2007), with the identity ba www )1(   . It is therefore possible to express it as:  
 
 




21...
...)1(ln)1()ln()(
z
MMw babab
   (VIII.6) 
 
which is the estimable equation used in this chapter for the non-linear model, where 
fm  )1(   and some household controls ( z ) and individual characteristics ( ) are 
already included in the pragmatic form suggested for the general case in Deaton (1997). The 
additional variables included in the estimation are similar to those already used in earlier chapters, 
but with some modifications in order to recognize individual characteristics and household 
controls. The base model includes demographics such as education, age, chronic illness and hours 
of work (and participation dummies). Four different specifications are then used: (1) the base 
model, (2) the base model with location variables, (3) the base model with cultural backgrounds 
and (4) the base model with enforcement variables. However, some difference with previous 
specifications should be noted. First, in terms of demographics, the dummy variable that identifies 
the existence of the spouse is dropped from the sample selection, as explained in the previous 
section. Second, both the education and the age of the head of the household are dropped since 
they are introduced as individual characteristics. Third, hours of work and participation dummies 
previously defined for seven different earning opportunities are now aggregated and included 
                                                 
100 As in Chapter 5, the Engel curves used here are derived from the AIDS demand model, but neglecting 
the influence of prices. This means that the assumption that all households face the same price vectors is 
maintained. However, in contrast to those models, here total instead of per-capita expenditure is used, as it 
is less obvious how to impose distribution in a per-capita specification.  
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separately for both the father and the mother for the same reason. Fourth, as in Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995) and Lancaster et al. (2006), the demographic structure of the household in terms 
of cohort proportions is introduced. The description of the variables and their basic tabulation 
(means and standard deviations) for the fully usable sample are shown in Appendix 8.  
 
Beyond the general specification of the model, in order to estimate (VIII.6), a functional form for 
  is needed. As mentioned, one proxy proposed in the literature is the observed control over 
resources computed as the ratio of the husband’s income with total income (see Hayashi, 1995; 
Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Lancaster et al., 2006). Therefore, in line with earlier discussions, 
in this case   takes the form )/( baa YYY  , i.e. a function of observed incomes. Thus, the basic 
empirical equation to be estimated shows that bargaining power has a direct effect on demand 
allocation and an indirect effect via the sharing rule imposed. This issue is extensively discussed 
in Basu (2006) and Lancaster et al. (2006) and takes into account the fact that the effects of 
bargaining (or any bargaining at all) will depend on the distribution of power within the 
household. 
 
However, this issue makes interpretation of the coefficients less transparent, so further 
computation is needed to reach to an adequate characterization of member-specific demand 
behaviour. The exercises proposed in Lancaster et al. (2006) are used to compute the marginal 
effect of   on the budget share ( w ). This expression will take the form:  
 
 ))1(ln1())ln(1()( MMw baba 




    (VIII.7) 
 
with 0/  w  used as evidence that giving more power to the husband will result in household 
budgets being biased in favour of w and  0/  w  to conclude that giving more power to the 
wife will result in household budgets being biased in favour of w . The previous expression is 
computed as a non-linear combination of parameters and standard deviations, computed using the 
Delta method. However, hypothesis-testing might be complicated since it is data-dependant; it is 
therefore necessary to compute it for different realizations of  . These results are supplemented 
by the calculation of predicted budget shares from (VIII.6), where all values are set to the sample 
means, except for  .  
 
The econometric issues that emerge during estimation are similar to those already discussed in 
earlier chapters. Therefore, for the estimation of the non-linear version of the aggregated model 
(the first exercise), Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with robust standard errors is used. 
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Therefore, the base estimator used in the application is the SUR-GLS already used in Chapter 5. 
For the disaggregated model (the third exercise), in light of the incidence of zero-consumption 
for different endogenous variables, the S&Y estimator is used.    
 
However, some differences from earlier estimations should be considered. Although the groups 
used are similar to those in Chapter 6 and all the consumption categories are estimated as a system 
(SUR) in the second stage of the model, the first stage and the correction covariates are calculated 
only for the problematic categories (those with censoring above 5%). In contrast to the estimations 
in Chapter 6, the lowest sample size considered here prevents us from fitting PROBIT estimations 
when the censoring level is low. In these cases, the implied assumption is that the correction terms 
1  and  0  (see Wooldridge, 2002). With the final sample size used in the estimation, the 
problematic cases detected (where censoring needs to be corrected) are, for the model of 
consumption groups, food outside the house (with censoring around 15%) and health goods and 
services (with censoring around 18%). In the models of markets within groups, the only 
unproblematic categories were informal food consumption within the house (with censoring 
below 1%) and formal education and culture (with censoring around 5%).  
 
In the second exercise, the endogeneity of total expenditure and bargaining power is explicitly 
handled, so IV techniques are used. In the case of total expenditure, the way that simultaneity bias 
emerges in this demand framework is the same as in Chapter 5, so similar reasons for 
instrumenting it in the present context are taken into account. The case for bargaining power is 
less obvious. In the original sharing rule model presented in Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning 
et al. (1994) and Browning and Chappori (1998), the authors justify how the sharing rule 
composed by total incomes is exogenous. This line of thinking permits von Braun (1988), García 
(1990), Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), Hayashi (1995) and Phipps and Burton 
(1998) to run cooperative bargaining models under the assumption of the exogeneity of individual 
incomes. However, this argument is criticized by Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and, more 
explicitly, by Basu (2006). These authors recognize that, as long the power variable (in most 
applications) is composed of labour income, similar arguments to those used to justify 
simultaneity in labour supply applies here. Moreover, even beyond this argument, the notion of 
power will be simultaneously determined in the household as long as it is plausible to assume 
some feedback between choices undertaken and the ability to impose one’s own decisions.   
 
However, implementing this in the non-linear setting of specification (VIII.6) is not an easy task. 
For this reason, the strategy followed was to estimate a linear version of the model using the 
simplified specification proposed by Hoddinott and Haddad (1995). According to the authors a 
suitable specification for investigating bargaining is just to use the Working–Leser Engel curve 
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extended by the term j  and additional household covariates ( z ) as demand shifters (to control 
for family preferences). As a result, the specification proposed by the authors takes the form: 
 
iijiiii zMw   321 )ln(      (VIII.8) 
 
The less theoretical specification of Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) also facilitates the empirical 
work for three reasons. First, because it imposes from the assumption that individual 
characteristics only influence demand through the sharing rule. Therefore, Hoddinott and Haddad 
(1995) and Lancaster et al., 2006 in a similar application exploits individual characteristics such 
as differences in education as potential instruments. In this application a similar strategy is used, 
but the set of potential instruments is supplemented by those already used in Chapter 5 (value of 
the assets in the household, external shocks experienced by the family and housing conditions). 
However, since some of these exclusion restrictions seem to be controversial (basically in terms 
of the individual characteristics), the assumptions imposed are adequately tested for orthogonality 
and for relevance in a similar way to Chapter 5. Exogeneity for potentially endogenous regressors 
is still tested using the C-test. 
 
Second, the author assumes the separability of labour supply and consumption in order to avoid 
dealing with several endogenous regressors. As these variables are not of particular interest in this 
chapter, this assumption is also undertaken during estimation. Similar restrictions have been 
imposed by Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998) 
and Lancaster et al. (2006). As discussed by Bourguignon et al. (1993), this not means that labour 
supply has no effect on demand. On the contrary, it only recognizes that its effect occurs mainly 
through the sharing rule. However, in order to be consistent with the discussion in previous 
chapters, and to control for direct influence of the labour supply, additional results are provided 
here using total household hours of work and its participation dummy as additional controls in 
the main equation101 (as in Hayashi, 1995). When included, the exogeneity of labour supply is 
assumed.  
 
Third, it makes hypothesis-testing and the interpretation of paramemters more transparent. 
Avoiding the non-linear nature of the theoretical model generates a simple test for bargaining just 
by verifying whether 02 i . If rejected, then it is possible to conclude that household allocation 
will be affected not only by total income, but also by control over money by particular members. 
                                                 
101 Several exercises were done to treat the six endogenous regressors (including hours of work), but similar 
problems to those already mentioned in Chapter 5 arise in terms of weak and non-orthogonal instruments.  
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At the same time, the sign of i2 will be informative, since it will reveal which type of allocation 
(formal or informal) increases or decreases as the bargaining power (or control over money) of 
member j  does. This last result is compared with 0/  w in order to analyse departures from 
the main conclusions.  
 
VIII.5. The results 
 
First empirical exercise: a non-linear model under the assumption of exogeneity 
 
In Table VIII.5, the SUR–GLS estimations for equation (VIII.6) under the different specifications 
used in the application are presented. One important thing to note is that the fully usable sample 
(once the missing values of additional covariates are dropped) is 2,222 observations. The basic 
statistics of the variables included in the application and their definition using this final sample 
are presented in Appendix 8. In terms of the regressions presented, measures of global adjustment 
seem adequate, at least in terms of the discussion presented in Chapter 5. No interpretation of 
results for the covariates included is undertaken here, as these results are not of particular interest 
for the application. In contrast, the focus is on the bargaining structure imposed. Full regression 
results are presented in Appendix 9. However some individual characteristics deserve a comment, 
considering that they are controlling for possible measures of power not captured by incomes. 
 
For example, age differentials seem to have no influence on market allocation. Neither male nor 
female age has an influence on informal consumption shares and both have a positive and 
statistically similar102 impact on formal consumption. The case for human capital variables is 
different. Although improving education levels for both wives and husbands increase formal 
purchases with statistically similar values,103 only the higher education of females reduces 
informal consumption. Similarly, in the case of labour supply, households with mothers working 
more hours increase their formal purchases. In contrast, the results for health variables (chronic 
diseases) go in a different direction. However, it is possible that these covariates are just revealing 
the consumption of a particular item (health, biased in favour of formal consumption).        
 
Turning our attention to the parameters of main interest in the application, the effect of bargaining 
power on consumption (  /w ), computed for different values of   with total expenditure held 
constant at the sample mean, is presented at the bottom of the table. The results show that the 
bargaining structure imposed is jointly significant at conventional levels for all the specifications 
used. Also, it is important to note that  /w is also significant at conventional levels for most 
                                                 
102 Chi-squared results: 0.02 (1), 0.00 (2), 0.03 (3), 0.00 (4). 
103 Chi-squared results: 0.88 (1), 1.44 (2), 0.95 (3), 1.14 (4). 
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values of  . This is considered evidence in favour of the collective model and basically the 
influence of bargaining power on demand allocation. This effect differs depending on the relative 
value of power enjoyed by each member.  
 
Table VIII.5: SUR–GLS regression results of the bargaining model (three-market 
definition and different specifications) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.18973 -0.07715 -0.04667 -0.08721 -0.16462 -0.07486 -0.18738 -0.07391 
  (0.18485) (0.15310) (0.17807) (0.14998) (0.18372) (0.15417) (0.18469) (0.15166) 
)ln( M  -0.03248*** 0.07278*** -0.04710*** 0.07239*** -0.03290*** 0.07235*** -0.03169*** 0.07152*** 
  (0.00906) (0.00791) (0.00894) (0.00777) (0.00904) (0.00796) (0.00906) (0.00789) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.05555*** 0.06595*** -0.05635*** 0.06484*** -0.05353*** 0.06577*** -0.05444*** 0.06507*** 
  (0.01569) (0.01313) (0.01506) (0.01299) (0.01563) (0.01320) (0.01564) (0.01299) 
  /w  
  
                
              
 0.1 0.12409***  -0.16532*** 0.15396***  -0.16686*** 0.12447***  -0.16468*** 0.12138***  -0.16321*** 
  (0.02654) (0.02482) (0.02613) (0.02468) (0.02656) (0.02490) (0.02634) (0.02464) 
 0.2 0.09503***  -0.10711*** 0.11467***  -0.10904*** 0.09536***  -0.10678*** 0.09300***  -0.10597*** 
  (0.02376) (0.02255) (0.02330) (0.02244) (0.02376) (0.02261) (0.02358) (0.02237) 
 0.3 0.07445***  -0.06879*** 0.08805***  -0.07103*** 0.07487***  -0.06866*** 0.07288***  -0.06828*** 
  (0.02209) (0.02112) (0.02164) (0.02101) (0.02209) (0.02116) (0.02195) (0.02094) 
 0.4 0.05654***  -0.03769* 0.06581***  -0.04021** 0.05716***  -0.03771* 0.05537***  -0.03767* 
  (0.02070) (0.01983) (0.02025) (0.01972) (0.02070) (0.01986) (0.02058) (0.01967) 
 0.5 0.03917** -0.00942 0.04503** -0.01224 0.04006** -0.00957 0.03838** -0.00985 
  (0.01939) (0.01851) (0.01897) (0.01840) (0.01939) (0.01853) (0.01930) (0.01837) 
 0.6 0.02085 0.01856 0.0238673 0.01543 0.02212 0.01830 0.02045 0.01771 
  (0.01821) (0.01713) (0.01779) (0.01703) (0.01821) (0.01714) (0.01815) (0.01702) 
 0.7 -0.00014 0.04876*** 0.00040 0.04524*** 0.00165 0.04837*** -0.00010 0.04745*** 
  (0.01744) (0.01581) (0.01700) (0.01571) (0.01744) (0.01582) (0.01741) (0.01574) 
 0.8 -0.02700 0.08522*** -0.0287391 0.08120*** -0.02445 0.08470*** -0.02640 0.08339*** 
  (0.01803) (0.01513) (0.01748) (0.01504) (0.01803) (0.01515) (0.01802) (0.01511) 
 0.9  -0.06933*** 0.13950***  -0.07334*** 0.13467***  -0.06543*** 0.13881***  -0.06787*** 0.13691*** 
  (0.02309) (0.01765) (0.02218) (0.01752) (0.02305) (0.01772) (0.02308) (0.01763) 
Observations 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
LogL 2348.952 2429.140 2360.635 2359.235 
Chi-sq (overall) 1346.179*** 1554.114*** 1373.301*** 1405.538*** 
Chi-sq (bargain structure) 31.62*** 135.93*** 51.29***  133.95***  31.08***  133.19***  30.49*** 131.50*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
To gain a more adequate interpretation of the direction of the results, it is better to construct the 
predicted budget shares for a different realization of  . In Figure VIII.3, these results are 
displayed for specification (1) for both informal and formal consumption shares and the semi-
formal category, computed using the adding-up property. The horizontal axis corresponds to the 
male’s power and the vertical to the consumption shares. At the bottom of each graph, the 
computed value of the marginal effect is presented, again for each realization of  ; however, to 
facilitate interpretation, only those significant (at least at 10%) are displayed.  
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Figure VIII.3: Predicted budget shares and male bargaining power (three-market 
definition and base specification) 
 
Note: Bigger graphs refer to predicted budget shares (vertical axis: consumption share; horizontal axis: realization of  ); the bottom 
graphs refer to computed marginal effects (vertical axis: marginal effect; horizontal axis: realization of  ). Marginal effects for each 
realization of    are multiplied by 0.1 to render them comparable to predicted shares.  
 
It is possible to verify a non-linear, but positive, relation between male bargaining power and 
informal consumption: households with more-empowered women will have lower informal 
consumption shares than the reverse. Therefore, moving from the left to the right or increasing 
male bargaining power will increase participation of informal consumption in family baskets, but 
up to a maximum level. From the point estimates shown, this level is reached between  =0.6 
and  =0.8. Thus, as the husband increases his control over money, he will move the resource 
allocation in favour of informal goods until he reaches a dominant situation in the house. From 
there, he will commit household consumption to a maximum level of informality and any 
additional effect of the distribution of power seems to vanish on the allocation of this particular 
market.  
 
However, the graphs can produce much richer information. Following Basu (2006) and Lancaster 
et al. (2006), as the effect of power on household consumption depends on the relative power 
enjoyed by each family member, it is possible to define three situations. First, there will be a 
perfectly balanced household (at  =0.5) when either of the two members has enough power to 
impose his or her preferences. The resultant allocation of resources defined at this level will be 
the status quo. Second, to the right of  =0.5 is consistent with households with powerful 
husbands. Third, to the left of  =0.5 is consistent with households with powerful wives. As 
explained by Basu (2006) and Lancaster et al. (2006, the effects of the bargaining power of each 
member will be different whether or not they are in a dominant situation.  
 
Departing from the perfectly balanced situation (or status quo) and moving to the left (increasing 
the female’s power when the female dominates) will be clearly associated with less-informal 
consumption baskets. The marginal effects estimates are also positive and significant at 
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conventional levels, with point estimates higher,104 as the mother increases her power within the 
house. For example, at around  =0.5, holding everything else constant, an increase of 0.1 
percentage points (pp.) in female power is consistent with informal shares between 0.004 and 
0.005 pp. lower (depending on the specification) and around  =0.1; an increase of 0.1 pp. in 
female power is consistent with informal shares between 0.012 and 0.015 pp. lower (three times 
larger). Alternatively, when the father dominates (to the right of the perfectly balanced situation), 
as explained, the relationship vanishes. As a result, it is true that increasing the female’s 
bargaining power will reduce informal consumption shares. However, this is not true for all the 
distributional range. The effects of bargaining on informal consumption are only clear in 
households where the female enjoys enough power.  
 
The estimated results for formal consumption are different. A non-linear relationship between 
male bargaining power and formal consumption share is again verified but, instead of the expected 
negative relationship, an almost perfect U is displayed. Therefore, from this perfect balanced 
situation ( =0.5), increasing both the mother´s and the father´s power is consistent with higher 
formal shares. From the point value estimates, we can see that the average slopes on the left (when 
the bargaining power of the mother is higher) are slightly bigger than those on the right (when the 
bargaining power of the father is higher) but, when formally tested, they are not significantly 
different (in absolute terms).105 As a result, it is better to conclude that both parents will increase 
their allocation to formal markets as their bargaining power increases and they are in a dominant 
situation.    
 
To interpret this relationship it is necessary to remember the nature of formal goods: better quality, 
but more expensive. It is then reasonable to expect that each member will prefer (individually) to 
purchase high-quality goods, but if this is likely to cause financial difficulties for the family, he 
or she also needs to enjoy enough power to mould family preferences to his or her preferred 
allocation. In consequence, when the mother has a dominant position in the house, she will use 
her power to increase formal allocation (the slope of   will be negative). Similarly, when the 
father has a dominant position, the slope of   will be positive, revealing that he will also use his 
power to increase formal consumption. However, when the power is balanced, they will be 
committed to a minimum allocation for these goods. Interestingly, in both cases the computed 
                                                 
104 When significant, chi-squared results show differences in computed marginal effects (base 
specification):  =0.1 vs  =0.2 (21.91***),  =0.1 vs  =0.3 (24.63***),  =0.1 vs  =0.4 (27.06***), 
 =0.1 vs  =0.5 (29.09***),  =0.2 vs  =0.3 (28.19***),  =0.2 vs  =0.4 (30.04***),  =0.2 vs 
=0.5 (31.00***),  =0.3 vs  =0.4 (31.08***),  =0.3 vs  =0.5 (30.91***),  =0.4 vs  =0.5 
(29.78***).  
105 Chi-squared for testing equality in marginal effects (in absolute terms) on both sides of the graph (base 
specification): 0.74, 0.44, 0.32, 0.27, 0.26.  
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marginal effects are greater as the power of each member increases. A similar relationship is 
found by Lancaster et al. (2006) for luxuries.  
 
To reconcile this and earlier evidence and provide a general interpretation for resource allocation, 
the estimates for the semi-formal category need to be considered. The perfect balanced situation 
is consistent with a minimum allocation on formal goods and (around) the maximum allocation 
on informal and semi-formal ones. Empowering either of the two members outperforms and 
increases formal consumption in the house. However, the composition of the consumption bundle 
in terms of informal markets will be different depending on the member empowered. In the case 
of husbands, higher formal consumption comes out with lower semi-formal purchases holding 
constant (at their maximum) informal shares. In the case of wives, higher formal consumption 
comes out with lower informal purchases holding constant (at their maximum) semi-formal 
shares. Therefore, both members in their dominant position will use their power to increase formal 
shares, but show a differentiated attitude towards informal consumption: only females will reduce 
informal shares, revealing a much more aggressive position towards low-quality goods when 
compared with husbands in a similar position.  
 
The results of this exercise suggest that it is possible to think of some family members (possibly 
husbands) as being much more worried about the financial stability of the house. Thus, although 
they would prefer to increase quality (via formal consumption), their attitude will be more 
conservative in terms of informal goods in order to maintain a balanced budget. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that other members (possibly wives) may be relatively less worried about 
the financial stability of the house, but much more worried about quality. Thus, their higher formal 
consumption comes with a more aggressive position towards informality. This result is used as 
evidence to conclude in favour of the hypothesis mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: that 
increasing female power is correlated to less-informal consumption baskets. Unfortunately, this 
is true only for households where women are in a dominant situation, which is rare in developing 
countries. There, income within the household is normally biased in favour of the men. For 
example, in the Peruvian case, as discussed earlier, the mean value of   is around 0.77. Thus, in 
order to fully exploit the effectiveness of distributional policies in terms of formalization, these 
need to be circumscribed to households where the female is empowered enough or sufficiently 
aggressive to pass the 0.5 barrier. If not, small changes in power distribution in favour of the 
female in households where the husband dominates will not produce the desirable outcome.    
 
From expression (VIII.7) we can see that  /w  depends not only on the value of  , but also 
on that of M (total expenditure). In Figure VIII.4, the previous results are replicated for different 
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points of the distribution of M  in order to assess the validity of the results in terms of the general 
living conditions of the households under analysis. As the absolute level of informal and formal 
consumption shares will vary depending on the absolute level of expenditure enjoyed by the 
family (richer families purchase more formal goods and less informal ones), consumption shares 
are normalized at 1 at the point  =0.1 in order to make the analysis more transparent. As shown, 
once the predicted shares and the marginal effects of   are computed for the different expenditure 
levels at percentiles 25, 50 and 75, the story behind the bargaining does not change dramatically. 
However, it does reveal that the influence of total expenditure on the results is crucial. In fact, as 
the family becomes richer, the effects of   on informal consumption become stronger and the U 
relationship for formal consumption becomes steeper. These results might be indicating that 
women in richer families will be more aggressive towards informality, though financial concerns, 
as discussed earlier, may well then be less important.    
 
Figure VIII.4: Predicted budget shares and male bargaining power for different income 
values (three-market definition and base specification) 
 
Note: See footnote in Figure VIII.3 for details.    
 
The conclusions are robust to changes in the definitions of informal and formal markets. The 
regression results for the five-market definition are presented in Table VIII.6 and the estimated 
budget shares are displayed in Figure VIII.5, again for different realizations of   for the formal, 
semi-formal and informal categories, but only for specification (1). We can again observe a 
positive, but non-linear, relation between male power and informal consumption and a quasi-
perfect U relationship in the case of formal shares. However, it is worth noting that point estimates 
for the computed marginal effects of   under the five-market definition are lower (in absolute 
terms) than in the previous case. This defines a plainer relationship. As a result, the bargaining 
space (the range where  /w  is significant) is slightly smaller and the relationship for formal 
consumption is much more centred. Therefore, the results are robust to the change in the definition 
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of informality used here, but when the definition is stricter, the average effect of the bargaining 
power on the consumption allocation seems to be lower. 
 
Table VIII.6: SUR–GLS regression results of the bargaining model (five-market definition 
and different specifications) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.13513 -0.04445 0.14510 -0.04415 0.13882 -0.04584 0.13908 -0.04199 
  (0.14335) (0.12500) (0.14196) (0.12352) (0.13834) (0.12589) (0.14265) (0.12414) 
)ln( M  -0.02651*** 0.05196*** -0.02738*** 0.05013*** -0.02357*** 0.05168*** -0.02836*** 0.05069*** 
  (0.00663) (0.00630) (0.00656) (0.00629) (0.00643) (0.00639) (0.00659) (0.00630) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.01534 0.04750*** -0.01519 0.04591*** -0.01229 0.04706*** -0.01677 0.04652*** 
  (0.01265) (0.01114) (0.01236) (0.01097) (0.01219) (0.01120) (0.01263) (0.01106) 
Observations 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
LogL 3270.640 3364.251 3311.910 3308.613 
Chi-sq (overall) 1090.769*** 1295.196*** 1165.259*** 1192.609*** 
Chi-sq (bargain structure)  21.17*** 104.71***  23.51***   97.01***  19.15*** 101.12***   24.28*** 99.43*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The specifications used are those of Table VIII.5.    
 
 
Figure VIII.5: Predicted budget shares and male bargaining power (five-market definition 
and base specification) 
 
Note: See footnote in Figure VIII.3 for details.    
 
Second empirical exercise: taking endogeneity into account  
 
Although previous estimates seem intuitive, they are calculated under the (possibly) 
unsatisfactory assumption of the exogeneity of total expenditure and bargaining power. This 
second exercise drops this assumption and calculates the results using an instrumental variable 
approximation. As explained above, to do this, the specification has been changed in order to 
avoid non-linearities in the endogenous variables that complicate the application of an IV. For 
this reason the linear approximation proposed in Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) is used here. The 
full set of potential instruments is used in the application – the ratio of educational attainment 
between the male and the female, the ratio of age between the male and the female, the linear and 
quadratic of education and age for each member, the dummy variables that identify chronic illness 
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for the male and the female, the logarithm of the value of assets of the household, the 
characteristics of the house (a dummy variable for inadequate housing and a dummy variable that 
identifies overcrowded houses) and variables for external shocks experienced by the family in the 
last year (job loss, bankruptcy of the family business, the serious illness, accident or death of a 
member of the household, the abandonment of the family by the household head, and the family’s 
experience of a fire in the house, a robbery or other crime, or a natural disaster).  
 
As mentioned previously, the application is not free of problems. First, because the list of potential 
instruments is long and could cause finite sample problems, as suggested in Wooldridge (2002). 
Second, exclusion restrictions for some of the instruments used are controversial. The case for the 
value of assets, characteristics of the house and shocks experienced by the family is easier, as 
these are assumed proxies (or determinants) of permanent income or investment decisions of the 
household which, in line with the two-stage budgeting approach, could be conveniently assumed 
to be uncorrelated with short-term decisions on consumption (see Chapter 5). The case of 
individual characteristics is harder. We could argue that individual characteristics will affect the 
distribution of power within the household, as better-educated, older or healthy members will 
generally be associated with having a higher say in household decision-making. However, they 
could be also correlated with preferences.  
 
The correct procedure for adequately handling the problems discussed here was to find better 
instruments, something that, as stated, was not possible with the datasets explored in this 
application. For this reason, the approximate solution proposed here is based on very rigorous 
statistical procedures for instrument selection based on their validity and relevance. Thus, at least 
in these terms, the econometric exercise used here can be considered adequate. The final set of 
instruments introduced comprised the logarithm of the value of assets, the ratio of male to female 
education, the educational attainment of the female and its square, one shock (if the family has 
experienced robbery or another crime against it) and one house characteristic106 (the dummy 
variable that identifies overcrowded houses).      
 
Before the IV results are presented, it is better to start revising the OLS approximation of the 
estimates. Although this is not the preferred estimation, it will help to more adequately assess the 
nature and the direction of the bias that IV procedures try to handle. In Table VIII.7 these 
estimates are displayed for the two variables of interest:   and the logarithm of total expenditure. 
As mentioned previously, two versions of the model are presented – the first includes variables 
for the labour supply of the family as additional regressors and the second assumes separability 
                                                 
106 The dummy variable of house characteristics is only used for the exercise under the second assumption 
of labour supply: separability.  
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between consumption and labour supply. In each case, the four specifications already explained 
are used for comparative purposes. Note that the sample size has been reduced to take into account 
the additional missing values introduced by the instrumental variables proposed in the application. 
Beyond that, the models show adequate goodness-of fit-measures (at least comparable with 
previous models, where prevailing noise in explaining informal consumption was already 
discussed).   
 
Table VIII.7: OLS estimates for the linear approximation of the bargaining model (three-
market definition and different specifications) 
With labour supply  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.00113 -0.00432 0.00618 -0.00462 0.00147 -0.00399 0.00141 -0.00420 
  (0.01376) (0.01072) (0.01334) (0.01066) (0.01381) (0.01071) (0.01375) (0.01068) 
L(expenditure) -0.05396*** 0.10977*** -0.06624*** 0.10511*** -0.04996*** 0.10907*** -0.05356*** 0.10860*** 
  (0.00632) (0.00567) (0.00626) (0.00572) (0.00643) (0.00576) (0.00633) (0.00566) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
R-squared 0.091 0.267 0.143 0.285 0.101 0.268 0.094 0.272 
LogL 758.621 1275.637 822.280 1301.578 770.401 1276.560 762.252 1282.255 
F (overall) 13.22*** 36.61*** 15.84*** 31.98*** 13.08***  31.55*** 11.37*** 31.63*** 
Without labour supply  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.00061 -0.00925 0.00482 -0.01018 0.00040 -0.00907 -0.00010 -0.00936 
  (0.01342) (0.01051) (0.01300) (0.01047) (0.01346) (0.01050) (0.01340) (0.01047) 
L(expenditure) -0.05365*** 0.11065*** -0.06604*** 0.10618*** -0.04978*** 0.11004*** -0.05326*** 0.10958*** 
  (0.00630) (0.00558) (0.00621) (0.00562) (0.00641) (0.00567) (0.00632) (0.00558) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
R-squared 0.091 0.265 0.143 0.282 0.101 0.266 0.094 0.269 
LogL 758.034 1272.613 821.929 1298.135 769.942 1273.392 761.685 1279.041 
F (overall) 14.72*** 38.98*** 17.27*** 32.57*** 14.35*** 32.91*** 12.40*** 32.90*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The specifications presented also include the following 
covariates: (1): L(fam_size), D(mem_son), D(mem_oth), P(men), D(gender_head), D(Lima), household composition in proportions; (2): 
(1) + L(pop_urb_dist), L(pop_urb_dist)-sq, pop_den_distx1000, D(not_slum), D(mid_city), D(border); (3): (1) + D(tongue), D(migrant), 
D(social); (4): (1) + Station_distx1000, Muni_persx1000, L(budget_dist_pc), D(sdp_dist). Labour supply (participation dummy and hours 
of work for the household) is included in all specifications when indicated.    
 
The results for total expenditure seem to be well determined, statistically significant and with 
correct signs, though they are different for  . The results show a possibly downward bias for this 
variable. Although in six of the eight regression models presented here the correct sign is shown 
(positive effect on informal consumption shares and negative on formal ones), it seems not to be 
well determined as it is not significant at conventional levels. Therefore, using standard statistical 
procedures it is difficult to assess the real direction of its effect. This is the departure point for the 
IV procedure proposed.    
 
The diagnostic tests for the IV models are presented in Table VIII.8 for both of the assumptions 
made about labour supply and the different specifications used in the application. As shown, 
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relevance (for a maximum relative bias of 10%) and orthogonality conditions are met for both 
assumptions about labour supply (with better results when hours of work are included). Also in 
both cases C-statistics found evidence of endogeneity in the instrumented variables, revealing the 
need to develop the IV procedure proposed here. The first-stage estimations are presented in 
Appendix 9. The additional instruments display the expected signs. For example, the effect of 
asset values has a strong and positive effect on total expenditure, as well as on the educational 
gap between males and females (possibly related to the return-to-education gap). Similarly, when 
the parameters associated with female education are inspected, they show the expected positive 
(and convex) effect on total expenditure. The bargaining power variable shows a negative 
correlation with total assets, revealing that the power in wealthier families is more evenly 
distributed. The education gap between males and females has a positive effect on male income 
shares. Interestingly, when the parameters of female education are inspected, they reveal a 
positive, but concave, relationship with power. This is possibly revealing of the access difficulties 
of, or wage discrimination against, women with low educational attainment (below secondary 
education), something that is possibly solved once higher education is reached. Finally, the 
variable attached to external shocks predicts a rebalance of power in favour of husbands.          
 
Table VIII.8: Relevance and orthogonality tests of the IV application (three-market 
definition and different specifications) 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests are performed under a 2SLS specification with small sample correction and robust 
standard errors. Individual F-statistics must be compared with the rule of thumb of 10 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), Joint F-statistics 
are compared with the critical value of 13.97  and 15.72 (5% of maximal IV relative bias) computed in Stock and Yogo (2005) and 
8.78 and 9.48 (10% of maximal IV relative bias) as the minimum tolerable levels with and without labour supply, respectively. See 
footnote in Table V.7 for other details in the tests.  
 
 
The IV regression results are presented in Table VIII.9 (including labour supply) and in Table 
VIII.10 (under the assumption of separability between consumption and labour). The estimations 
have been done in each case allowing for small sample adjustments and standard errors that are 
robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The standard 2SLS estimates are also 
compared with other estimators such as the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal
Under-identification Test
F-value (1stage, theta)
F-value (1stage, expend)
F-value (1 stage, joint)
Hansen J test 5.252 1.925 5.847 0.963 2.524 2.121 5.355 2.188
C (labour) 3.581 1.728 3.844 0.882 1.245 1.956 3.655 1.952
C (theta,expend) 20.467*** 87.735*** 14.067*** 73.256*** 16.793***   88.573*** 21.084***   85.255***
Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal
Under-identification Test
F-value (1stage, theta)
F-value (1stage, expend)
F-value (1 stage, joint)
Hansen J test 6.400 3.786 7.529 2.622 3.360 3.994 6.690 4.227
C (theta,expend) 19.951*** 84.547*** 13.240*** 71.032*** 16.300*** 85.573*** 20.324*** 81.955***
With labour supply 
343.20***
15.58
70.53*** 67.980*** 70.280***
23.93*** 26.46***  25.45***
309.79***
(1) (2) (3) (4)
70.394***
25.61***
58.748*** 58.737*** 56.709*** 58.869***
332.12*** 341.91***
15.595 14.967 15.495
Without labour supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10.769 10.761 10.362 10.76
288.18 *** 260.45*** 278.40***
20.51*** 19.18*** 21.64*** 20.58***
287.30***
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and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators.107 Although instruments are not weak 
under standard tests, as some relative bias is still present in the application,108 it is useful to 
compare 2SLS (biased in the direction of OLS) with other methods (LIML and GMM) that are 
intended to correct this problem and are more robust to the presence of weak instruments (see 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
 
Table VIII.9: IV regression results of the bargaining model including labour supply as 
additional regressor (three-market definition, different specifications and estimation 
methods) 
(1) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.22711*** -0.08066 0.24249*** -0.08205 0.23632*** -0.07939 
  (0.06979) (0.05300) (0.07523) (0.05419) (0.06928) (0.05293) 
L(expenditure) -0.04847*** 0.15254*** -0.04713*** 0.15250*** -0.04810*** 0.15334*** 
  (0.01184) (0.00861) (0.01225) (0.00868) (0.01181) (0.00859) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 631.231 1207.603 614.453 1206.746 621.252 1206.879 
F-value (overall) 11.73*** 39.77*** 11.51*** 39.71***  11.75***  40.32*** 
(2) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.18594*** -0.05413 0.19895*** -0.05451 0.19682*** -0.05441 
  (0.06579) (0.05193) (0.07104) (0.05251) (0.06542) (0.05186) 
L(expenditure) -0.06364*** 0.15344*** -0.06250*** 0.15346*** -0.06265*** 0.15393*** 
  (0.01166) (0.00886) (0.01203) (0.00889) (0.01164) (0.00884) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 735.605 1242.857 723.181 1242.653 725.228 1241.792 
F-value (overall) 13.00*** 34.61*** 12.83***  34.59***  13.10***  34.96*** 
(3) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.22732*** -0.08037 0.23442*** -0.08189 0.23618*** -0.07959 
  (0.07109) (0.05410) (0.07362) (0.05546) (0.07052) (0.05404) 
L(expenditure) -0.03895*** 0.15310*** -0.03827*** 0.15306*** -0.03819*** 0.15404*** 
  (0.01238) (0.00904) (0.01259) (0.00913) (0.01236) (0.00901) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 642.179 1207.132 634.453 1206.201 632.501 1205.832 
F-value (overall) 10.87*** 34.29*** 10.78*** 34.24*** 10.87*** 34.86*** 
(4) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.23379*** -0.07844 0.24971*** -0.07999 0.24415*** -0.07797 
  (0.06983) (0.05258) (0.07536) (0.05394) (0.06935) (0.05251) 
L(expenditure) -0.04681*** 0.15153*** -0.04541*** 0.15149*** -0.04641*** 0.15225*** 
  (0.01194) (0.00858) (0.01236) (0.00866) (0.01192) (0.00855) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 627.711 1215.471 609.902 1214.526 616.202 1214.369 
F-value (overall) 10.24*** 34.65***  10.05*** 34.59*** 10.25*** 35.09*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note that the table is divided into four parts according to each of 
the specifications used in the present application.   
 
                                                 
107 Diagnostic tests were re-calculated under each of these new estimators without changes to those already 
presented in Table VIII.8.  
108 Joint F-tests are below or just above the 5% relative bias critical value.  
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Table VIII.10: IV regression results of the bargaining model under the assumption of 
separability between labour supply and consumption decisions (three-market definition, 
different specifications and estimation methods) 
(1) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.23606*** -0.06858 0.26042*** -0.07107 0.25454*** -0.06999 
  (0.07738) (0.05767) (0.08667) (0.06081) (0.07656) (0.05755) 
L(expenditure) -0.04523*** 0.15363*** -0.04291*** 0.15355*** -0.04392*** 0.15470*** 
  (0.01267) (0.00897) (0.01345) (0.00918) (0.01262) (0.00894) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 613.243 1212.338 584.279 1211.043 591.452 1209.391 
F-value (overall)  12.79***  44.17*** 12.40*** 44.06*** 12.96*** 45.06*** 
(2) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.18782*** -0.04190 0.20890** -0.04248 0.20587*** -0.04363 
  (0.07235) (0.05661) (0.08163) (0.05860) (0.07178) (0.05648) 
L(expenditure) -0.06123*** 0.15486*** -0.05919*** 0.15493*** -0.05934*** 0.15572*** 
  (0.01233) (0.00921) (0.01308) (0.00935) (0.01230) (0.00919) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 728.290 1244.112 706.645 1243.777 709.843 1241.785 
F-value (overall) 14.03*** 36.88*** 13.72*** 36.84*** 14.22*** 37.60*** 
(3) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.23761*** -0.06932 0.24991*** -0.07200 0.25472*** -0.07094 
  (0.07875) (0.05878) (0.08345) (0.06223) (0.07789) (0.05866) 
L(expenditure) -0.03541*** 0.15416*** -0.03413** 0.15407*** -0.03362** 0.15546*** 
  (0.01334) (0.00948) (0.01376) (0.00974) (0.01328) (0.00944) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 623.415 1211.342 608.869 1209.948 603.014 1207.808 
F-value (overall) 11.69*** 37.42***  11.50*** 37.32*** 11.76*** 38.30*** 
(4) 2SLS LIML GMM 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.24084*** -0.06518 0.26640*** -0.06775 0.26086*** -0.06806 
  (0.07719) (0.05718) (0.08680) (0.06064) (0.07641) (0.05702) 
L(expenditure) -0.04355*** 0.15277*** -0.04110*** 0.15271*** -0.04215*** 0.15364*** 
  (0.01278) (0.00894) (0.01359) (0.00918) (0.01273) (0.00891) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 611.654 1220.488 580.740 1219.187 587.616 1217.148 
F-value (overall) 10.92*** 37.56***  10.58*** 37.47*** 11.05*** 38.23*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note that the table is divided into four parts according to each of the 
specifications used in the present application.  
 
In general, the regression results show adequate global adjustment and, individually, the core 
covariates are well determined (intuitive and significant at conventional levels). To save space, 
only the parameters of interest to the present application are displayed under the different 
specifications used throughout the chapter. In the case of total expenditure, the estimates are in 
line with previous results on this variable: a positive effect on formal consumption shares and 
negative effects on their informal counterparts. Also, the IV coefficients (under both assumptions 
of labour supply) are highly comparable with the OLS procedure presented above for the informal 
equation. In both cases, increasing the total expenditure of the family by 10% will generate a 
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reduction of 0.5 of one percentage (using the mean of all specifications). For the formal equation, 
IV estimates are higher than OLS ones. In the first case, a similar shock will increase formal 
consumption by 1.5 pp. and, in the second, the estimated growth would be 1.1 pp.  
 
Table VIII.11: Total expenditure elasticities for different regression models 
  
Unitary Model Collective Model 
  
OLS  
(3-market) 
1/ 
SUR  
(3-market) 
2/ 
SUR  
(5-market) 
3/ 
IV- 2SLS 
(3-market) 
4/ 
Linear OLS 
(3-market) 
5/ 
NL-SUR 
(3-market) 
6/ 
NL-SUR 
(5-market) 
7/ 
Linear IV 2SLS 
(3-market) 
8/ 
Informal 0.939*** 0.932*** 0.893*** 0.951*** 0.866*** 0.908*** 0.868*** 0.880*** 
  (0.01405) (0.01051) (0.01740) (0.00788) (0.01570) (0.01780) (0.03092) (0.02940) 
Formal 1.282*** 1.290*** 1.323*** 1.437*** 1.418*** 1.278*** 1.292*** 1.580*** 
  (0.01796) (0.01319) (0.01804) (0.02934) (0.02156) (0.02415) (0.02914) (0.03277) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hypothesis-testing is presented for the null ‘different to 1’. 
1/ see Table V.9 specification (1); 2/ see Table V.1 specification (1); 3/ see Table  V.5 specification (1); 4/ see Table V.13 specification 
(1); 5/ see Table VIII.7 specification (1) with labour supply; 6/ see Table VIII.5 specification (1); 7/ see Table  VIII.6 specification (1); 8/ 
see Table VIII.9 specification (1).  
 
Interestingly, and beyond point value differences attributable to marginal effects, with this set of 
results it is possible to argue that the different estimates for expenditure throughout the thesis do 
not necessarily produce a different story in terms of elasticities. In Table VIII.11, the different 
sets of expenditure elasticities are shown. Here the expenditure elasticities for the three-market 
definition already presented in Chapter 5 are replicated and compared with the implied values 
computed under the linear and non-linear approximations of the bargaining model. In each case, 
specification (1) is used for comparative purposes and, in the case of IV models, the most general 
2SLS approximation is displayed. The other results, as discussed each time, are highly 
comparable and omitted for the sake of brevity. It is worth noting that the computation of total 
expenditure elasticities differs between linear and non-linear approximations. For the first, as 
already explained, this value is computed using: 1/1  ii w  whereas, for the second, using 
expression (VIII.6), the correct formula becomes:  
 
1
)1(





wC
M
M
C ba          (VIII.9)  
 
The results define a very clear situation already discussed in previous chapters: inferiority for 
informal consumption is rejected. In fact, both informal and formal purchases increase with 
expenditure and can be classified as normal goods, necessities in the case of informal and luxuries 
in the case of formal consumption. As a result, the impact of income will be greater for the former, 
which is in line with the formalization of consumption baskets as income growth or protection 
strategies developed by families (increasing informal consumption) as income decreases. Using 
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the theoretical models in this chapter, we can argue that this conclusion is valid for both unitary 
and collective models, under the different regression methods used and definitions of informality.  
 
For bargaining power effects, the estimates for   are generally in line with the main conclusions 
of the present application: positive and significant for the informal equation and negative but non-
significant for its formal counterpart. Therefore, we can conclude that family members actually 
negotiate when they decide on which markets they will purchase their goods and the relative 
bargaining power enjoyed by each member is a critical determinant of consumption allocation. 
However, considering the IV estimation presented here, this observation is better applied to the 
decision to purchase at informal markets than at formal ones. In the first case, increasing the 
bargaining power of the husband (or decreasing the bargaining power of the wife) will produce 
higher informal shares in the household. Thus, we can argue that a positive sloped line is a correct 
linear approximation of the mean for the relationship between   and informal budget shares. This 
reveals no more than the differences in preferences between family members discussed earlier, 
with wives in a much stronger position against purchasing from informal markets when compared 
with husbands. For formal markets, the IV results reveal that bargaining power is less relevant in 
household decisions and it is total income that matters. Therefore, adjustment of family 
consumtion is done using semi-formal consumption.    
   
When labour supply is included, the point estimates reveal that increasing the income share of the 
mother in the house by 0.10 pp. will produce a reduction in informal shares of around 0.023 pp. 
(using the mean of the estimations). These results are greater than those presented in the OLS 
version of the model and the average marginal effects computed using the non-linear SUR–GLS. 
On the assumption of separability between labour and consumption, the point estimates are 
slightly higher. A similar shock will produce a reduction in informal shares of around 0.024 pp. 
(using the mean of all the estimations). However, it is worth noting that estimates are generally 
lower under specification (2). In this case, the marginal effects reveal that, for a 0.10 pp. reduction 
in the income share, informal shares increase by around 0.019 pp. (on the first assumption of 
labour supply) and 0.020 pp. (on the second assumption of labour supply).  
 
Although the results for   seem, up to now, to be going in the same direction in the two exercises 
proposed in this chapter (at least for informal consumption), it is still difficult to compare the two 
estimates. To partially overcome this problem, the exercise proposed in Hoddinott and Haddad 
(1995) is also used here. As explained by the authors in one of their consistency checks, it is 
possible to estimate reduced forms where the potential endogenous variables are replaced directly 
by their instruments. This avoid the imposition (and testing) of exclusion restrictions in the non-
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linear model, but at the cost of theoretical difficulties in terms of the AIDS specification used here 
(mainly in terms of the property of aggregation).  
 
Table VIII.12: SUR–GLS estimates using reduced form specification, three-market 
definition and specification (1) 
  Original specification 1/ Reduced form specification 2/ 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.25790 -0.05320 0.11724 0.09298 
  (0.19113) (0.16360) (0.19766) (0.14304) 
)ln( M  -0.03052*** 0.07280*** -0.01505 0.03006*** 
  (0.00928) (0.00821) (0.01276) (0.00958) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.06037*** 0.06799*** -0.01318 0.04715*** 
  (0.01596) (0.01389) (0.01388) (0.01048) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 
LogL 2295.909 2173.723 
Chi-sq (overall) 1280.475*** 939.345*** 
Chi-sq (bargain structure) 32.18*** 132.88*** 37.29*** 324.30*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1/   is defined as the income share and 
total expenditure is used as M ;  2/   is defined as the educational share, total value of assets is used as M and 
individual education levels are excluded from the regression.   
 
Figure VIII.6: Predicted budget shares and male bargaining power (three-market 
definition and base specificaction), original model vs reduced form 
 
Note: See footnote in Figure VIII.3 for details.    
 
To try to preserve the basic insights of the non-linear model, specification (VIII.6) is changed in 
the following way: bargaining power ( ), defined as the income share of the husband, is replaced 
by the education share: number of years of education of the husband over the sum of the number 
of years of education of the husband and wife. The logarithm total expenditure is then replaced 
by the logarithm of the value of the assets owned by the household. Finally, educational 
attainment for both members, included as additional covariates, is dropped from the main 
specification. In Table VIII. 12, the regression results are presented for specification (1), where 
the original estimates of the non-linear model (but changing the estimation sample) are included 
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for comparison purposes. In Figure VIII.6 the two results are compared in terms of the marginal 
effects and predicted shares.  
 
As shown, changing the definition of power and total expenditure reveals that the positive, but 
non-linear, association between bargaining power and informal consumption shares is replaced 
by an almost linear approximation. However, it is worth noting that, although marginal effects 
have increased, they are still below the IV approximation. In any case, the general impression is 
that the results provide additional evidence in favour of the hypothesis maintained in this chapter: 
that empowering women in the household has a negative effect on informal shares. Similarly, it 
is still possible to verify that these effects are higher when the mother dominates than when father 
does.109 In fact, increasing mothers’ power by 0.1 pp. in the range  =0.1 to  =0.4 generates an 
increase in informal shares of between 0.013 pp. and 0.011 pp. higher than for similar effects in 
the range  =0.6 to  =0.9, where the estimated results yield impacts of between 0.010 pp. and 
0.000 pp. (for mothers with very little power).  
 
The results for formal consumption are also clearer using these new definitions of power and 
expenditure. Although point value estimates are highly comparable with the original estimation, 
the perfect U relationship could be replaced by a non-linear, but negative, relationship between 
male bargaining power and formal shares. Moreover, the results are well determined only when 
the mother dominates. This means that using education as the variable of power and asset values 
as expenditure, quantity substitution between formal and informal shares is still detected for 
sufficiently empowered women. In contrast, empowered husbands use their power only to 
increase informal consumption, maintaining formal purchases at their minimum.    
 
Third empirical exercise: the disaggregated version of the model 
 
A final exercise proposed is to explore what happens in a disaggregated version of the model in 
order to analyse possible departures from the hypothesis maintained when the estimations are 
restricted to particular expenditure groups. The rationale of this new version of the model was 
explained in Chapter 3. For the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to formalize it in terms of 
                                                 
109 The computed marginal effects at different values of   (when significant) where statistically different 
from zero. Chi-squared results:   =0.1 vs  =0.2 (2.64),  =0.1 vs  =0.3 (3.32*),  =0.1 vs  =0.4 
(4.26**),  =0.1 vs  =0.5 (5.68**),  =0.1 vs  =0.6 (8.08***),  =0.1 vs  =0.7 (12.63**),   =0.2 vs 
 =0.3 (4.92**),  =0.2 vs  =0.4 (6.94**),  =0.2 vs  =0.5 (10.30***),  =0.2 vs  =0.6 (16.22***), 
 =0.2 vs  =0.7 (25.33***),  =0.3 vs  =0.4 (11.28***),  =0.3 vs  =0.5 (17.89***),  =0.3 vs 
=0.6 (26.49***),  =0.3 vs  =0.7 (27.41***),  =0.4 vs  =0.5 (26.89***),  =0.4 vs  =0.6 
(27.41***),  =0.4 vs  =0.7 (18.21***),  =0.5 vs  =0.6 (18.74***),  =0.5 vs  =0.7 (11.05***), 
=0.6 vs  =0.7 (7.00***). 
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the bargaining structure imposed. In empirical terms, a disaggregated version of the model implies 
that the effects of bargaining on informal consumption will be different within each particular 
commodity group. To take this into account, the correct procedure is to estimate the first stage of 
the problem (the decision to purchase consumption groups) and the second stage (the decision to 
do so at formal or informal markets within them) using (VIII.6). Under the assumptions in Chapter 
3 of weak separability, the specification becomes 
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for the broad group allocation, where kw  is the consumption share for group k  and   
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for the allocation of markets inside each broad group allocation, where kjw  is the consumption 
share for market j  inside consumption group k  and km  is the total outlay of consumption group 
k . However, note that (VIII.11) imposes the assumption k  . Given the limited data availability, 
it was not possible to identify control over resources for each particular consumption group, so 
income shares are used as a proxy. Using a similar reasoning to that of Hayashi (1995), as formal 
and informal consumption are normal goods (as demonstrated here and in previous chapters)   
and k  will at least be positively correlated, so an empirical exercise like (VIII.11) will still 
provide useful information.     
 
To estimate the disaggregated model, given the levels of censoring commented on in the previous 
section, the estimator is no longer the SUR–GLS, but the S&Y of Chapters 6 and 7. The 
assumptions imposed in the choice model in order to identify the first stage (PROBIT) of the S&Y 
procedure are similar to those implemented in Monge (2007).  
 
First, bargaining has no effect on the probability of purchasing; it only influences the quantity 
consumed. This means that PROBIT estimates are specified according to overall household 
conditions: the bargaining structure is replaced by the logarithm of total expenditure, education 
and age are replaced by the mean value of the male and the female, individual hours of work by 
the sum of the male and the female (with a unique participation dummy) and dummies for chronic 
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illness by the combined result of the male and the female. In contrast, the specification of the 
second stage (the continuous part of the model) is similar to the SUR–GLS model already 
discussed, i.e., where the bargaining structure is imposed. This assumption could be controversial, 
as household members could also bargain over the decision to purchase or not to purchase an 
item. However, given that the focus of the research is mainly on the continuous part (where the 
sharing rule model and the AIDS specification are better suited) and PROBIT estimates are used 
only for correctional purposes, this assumption is considered adequate for the purposes of this 
analysis. At the same time, it helps to avoid non-linearities in the PROBIT (a model already non-
linear) and facilitates the computation (and interpretation) of the marginal effects for the different 
values of  .  
 
Second, additional covariates are also introduced for identification purposes. The aim is to include 
on the PROBIT specification a number of variables that only influence the probability of 
purchasing a good (or a market, conditional on group expenditure), but not its quantity. These 
covariates are similar to those already used in Chapter 6 but, as already explained, only for the 
problematic categories. However, we should recognize that the performance of the identification 
strategy under this new framework is lower than results presented earlier.110 The results for the 
first stage PROBIT estimates are shown in Appendix 9. 
 
Under the structure imposed, the approximation of McDonald and Moffit (1980) – holding 
constant   and – is justified for the computation of marginal effects. Therefore, for non-
problematic categories, the marginal effect of   on w  is still (VIII.7), considering only the 
notational change introduced in (VIII.10) and (VIII.11). However, for the problematic categories, 
the results have to take the first-step PROBIT estimates into account. Using a similar reasoning 
as in Chapter 6, the marginal effects now take the form for broad groups:   
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and for markets inside each group:   
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110 Similar experimentation on the identifying matrix was performed, as in Chapter 6, without improving 
the results or changing the basic conclusions presented here.  
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where 1Q  represents the different covariates assumed to influence the purchasing decision, 0 is 
the set of parameters associated with them and )( 10Q  the cumulative distribution function.  
 
Table VIII.13: Regression results of the bargaining model (consumption groups – base 
model) 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  0.34594** -0.03839 -0.08762 -0.03271 -0.17543** 0.00913 
  (0.16393) (0.13432) (0.07560) (0.11351) (0.08073) (0.07233) 
)ln( M  -0.06746*** -0.03438*** 0.00788** 0.00232 0.03183*** 0.01645*** 
  (0.00773) (0.00788) (0.00328) (0.00492) (0.00461) (0.00351) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.02930** -0.04369*** -0.00127 0.00001 0.01221* 0.01945*** 
  (0.01388) (0.01143) (0.00663) (0.01015) (0.00738) (0.00699) 
    -0.08764***  -0.02098**    
    (0.02438)  (0.00890)    
  /w  
  
        
        
 0.1 0.09353*** 0.11498*** -0.00893 -0.01118  -0.03945***  -0.05847*** 
  (0.02304) (0.01895) (0.01013) (0.01533) (0.01409) (0.01322) 
 0.2 0.04332** 0.090278*** -0.00362 -0.00986 -0.01595  -0.04478*** 
  (0.02026) (0.01581) (0.00905) (0.01379) (0.01250) (0.01229) 
 0.3 0.01205 0.07342*** -0.00060 -0.00909 -0.00142  -0.03552*** 
  (0.01857) (0.01399) (0.00835) (0.01271) (0.01157) (0.01159) 
 0.4 -0.01187 0.05925*** 0.00147 -0.00854 0.00962  -0.02778** 
  (0.01717) (0.01262) (0.00774) (0.01173) (0.01081) (0.01089) 
 0.5  -0.03226** 0.04592*** 0.00300 -0.00811 0.01895*  -0.02056** 
  (0.01592) (0.01148) (0.00716) (0.01076) (0.01013) (0.01014) 
 0.6  -0.05110*** 0.03226*** 0.00415 -0.00776 0.02748*** -0.01322 
  (0.01484) (0.01057) (0.00665) (0.00980) (0.00952) (0.00931) 
 0.7  -0.06993*** 0.01703* 0.00500 -0.00747 0.03590*** -0.00509 
  (0.01427) (0.01009) (0.00639) (0.00899) (0.00908) (0.00847) 
 0.8  -0.09081*** -0.00198 0.00554 -0.00721 0.04510*** 0.00499 
  (0.01516) (0.01072) (0.00687) (0.00884) (0.00922) (0.00789) 
 0.9  -0.11907***  -0.03125** 0.00559 -0.00698 0.05732*** 0.02041** 
  (0.02032) (0.01442) (0.00946) (0.01118) (0.01130) (0.00895) 
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 
LogL 15183.850 
Chi-sq (overall) 6832.853*** 
Chi-sq (bargain structure) 104.43*** 38.61*** 5.89 0.96 53.93*** 35.05*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
The SUR–GLS results for the allocation process among consumption groups are presented in 
Table VIII.13, using specification (1). Remember that the groups considered are Fon (Food to be 
consumed within the house), Foff (Food to be consumed outside the house), CC (clothing and 
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personal care), HEA111 (health goods and services), TC (transport and communication) and ED 
(education and culture). It is important to note that the sample size in this application is lower 
than the broad market application, as more missing values appear for the additional covariates 
used in the first stage PROBIT estimates. At the bottom of the table, the marginal effects, 
computed using the corrected formulas, are also provided for the different realizations of  .   
 
The bargaining structure imposed is significant in four out of six consumption groups: Fon, Foff, 
TC and ED. On both CC and HEA, joint significant tests are weak enough to cast doubt about the 
adequacy of the collective approach to these goods. The results for these commodities also reveal 
that the marginal effects of   are not well determined for the different values computed. 
Therefore, it is better to conclude that the relationship between   and these groups’ allocation is 
a horizontal line – meaning there is no influence of bargaining in these cases. This is a normal 
result since, in most revised applications, it is usual to find that households bargain in some groups 
and not in others (see Monge, 2007). Although, Monge (2007) finds similar evidence for of health 
expenditure (not bargaining), the result is striking for CC given that the group is mainly made up 
of individual expenditure. The aggregation of the personal expenditure of both males and females 
in a unique group is probably obscuring the identification of negotiation patterns (in Monge, 2007 
they are separated into child and adult expenditure). However, this further disaggregation of the 
group is not possible in this application since it will reduce the ability to identify markets. 
 
The analysis for the other groups is more interesting, as most of the marginal effects are significant 
at conventional levels. To facilitate interpretation, the predicted shares for the different values of 
  are presented in Figure VIII.7. The results are similar to those in the literature that argue in 
favour of women (or mothers) being closer to consumption on pro-household goods (or 
consumption groups) than men. For example, increasing the father’s bargaining power in the 
house has, in general, a negative relation with the expenditure shares of food to be consumed in 
the house, and education and culture, while having a positive relation with food to be consumed 
outside the house, and transport and communication. Therefore, while the mother is more 
interested in using her power to spend on family goods (like food or education), the father will be 
more interested in using it for expenditure outside the house (like meals at work and 
transportation) which are possibly closer to his income-generating activities.  
 
                                                 
111 For health expenditure, since chronic illness is implemented as an individual variable in the bargaining 
model, this variable has been replaced in the PROBIT model by the number of household members with an 
eventual health episode that needs attention, such as an accident or serious illness. This is the only difference 
with the specification in Chapter 6.   
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Figure VIII.7: Predicted budget shares and male bargaining power on broad groups 
 
Note: See footnote in Figure VIII.3 for details.    
 
The studies of Guyer (1980), Guyer and Peters (1987) and Bruce (1989) quoted in Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995) are generally along these lines: gender roles in the household typically define 
mothers as responsible for household activities like acquiring and preparing food, while personal 
expenditure is more in the fathers’ sphere. The survey by Garavito (1997) also suggests similar 
patterns for the Peruvian case, with women closer to ‘within the household’ activities while men 
are closer to ‘outside the house’ ones. This type of result is also encountered in Thomas and Chen 
(1994) for Taiwan, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Duflo and Udry (2004) for the Côte d’ 
Ivoire, Phipps and Burton (1998) for Canada, Thomas (1997) for Brazil, and Quisumbing and de 
la Brière (2000) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) for various African countries. 
 
However, it is important to stress two areas here which differ from previous applications. First, 
in terms of the interpretation of results, it is not necessarily true that fathers prefer less pro-welfare 
goods than mothers. Given the limited availability of the data used here, it is only possible to 
conclude that the two family members have different approximations to household welfare. On 
the one hand, the mother is interested in the children’s consumption and, on the other, the father 
concentrates on income-generating activities. This is closer to the conclusions of Iguiñiz (1996), 
where gender roles are understood using the notion of time allocation in the house, with females 
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responsible for activities related to the provision of capabilities and men responsible for 
production activities.        
 
Second, as already discussed in the model for broad markets, this literature has overlooked non-
linearities in the relationship between power and consumption and the differentiated influence 
they have when members are in a dominant position. For example, increasing the wife’s control 
over money (moving from the right to the left) will increase food consumption within the 
household, but this is true only until she reaches a dominant position in the household. A 
maximum level of food allocation is reached at around )1(  =0.6 or )1(  =0.7, after which 
it will start to decrease for sufficiently empowered women. The implication is that reinforcing 
female power in the house in order to increase food consumption is a reasonable but limited 
policy. In contrast, when the female dominates, increasing her power will lead to clearer effects 
on the budget shares of education and culture. This result is reasonable if a change in preferences 
between short-term consumption and human capital investment is allowed for females once they 
are sufficiently empowered and have already committed the household to a relatively high food 
allocation.   
 
Similar results are found for the father’s response to bargaining power. Increasing his power will 
lead to increases in meals at work until he has enough power. At this point, he will keep this 
consumption at this maximum level and, instead, will use his power to increase consumption on 
transport and communication. The evidence seems reasonable considering that, from the 
estimates of the expenditure elasticities computed in Chapter 6, transport and communication, in 
contrast to food outside the house, is classified as a luxury. Therefore, it would be relatively easy 
for the man to increase his workplace meals when he is not sufficiently empowered, but more 
difficult if he wants to purchase a luxury – he would need more power to do this.  
 
Once the first stage is solved, it is possible to estimate the second stage: the allocation across 
markets conditional on the total outlay of consumption groups. The results – only for the base 
specification (1) – are presented in Table VIII.14. The exercises carried out for the other 
specifications reveal minimal departures from the estimates presented here and are omitted for 
the sake of brevity. Note that samples sizes differ between the estimated equations, as each is 
estimated just for the subsample where broad group expenditure is positive. The global adjustment 
seems adequate in each regression, but the joint test for the bargaining structure and significance 
of the marginal effect of   on w  is not achieved in all cases. From the results that the effect of 
bargaining power on market allocation is dubious in the case of Foff and HEA. On the other hand, 
the results for Fon, CC, TC and ED are better determined.  
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Table VIII.14: Regression results of the bargaining model (markets within each consumption group – base model) 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.81048*** 0.46787 0.20671 0.45732* 0.34401 -0.00971 0.24175 -0.13556 0.04227 -0.08267 0.05886 0.10023 
  (0.27644) (0.54355) (0.27672) (0.23479) (0.21437) (0.27672) (0.54383) (0.17860) (0.23010) (0.24588) (0.14459) (0.10630) 
)ln( M  0.01511 0.00988 -0.15215*** -0.07700*** -0.07074*** -0.06351*** -0.07523*** 0.01480 -0.07286*** 0.12045*** -0.10708*** 0.11529*** 
  (0.01402) (0.02599) (0.01686) (0.01520) (0.01292) (0.01909) (0.02808) (0.01120) (0.01553) (0.01583) (0.00997) (0.00801) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.09206*** 0.06727 -0.12480*** -0.01675 -0.03765 -0.07855** -0.03100 -0.01219 -0.06602*** 0.10945*** -0.10556*** 0.13507*** 
  (0.02689) (0.05189) (0.03224) (0.02698) (0.02520) (0.03243) (0.06548) (0.02212) (0.02514) (0.02573) (0.01634) (0.01245) 
    -0.03192 0.05354 0.05364 -0.36065*** -0.00037 0.21562*** 0.20992** 0.50701*** 0.50485*** -0.00341   
    (0.03285) (0.08386) (0.08351) (0.06138) (0.05201) (0.06948) (0.08770) (0.03797) (0.03435) (0.05390)   
  /w                          
 0.1 0.17078*** -0.04738 0.17380*** 0.09591* 0.19663*** 0.08164*** 0.01242 0.03629 0.12621***  -0.20873*** 0.21312***  -0.31388*** 
  (0.04462) (0.03413) (0.05110) (0.05266) (0.04260) (0.02100) (0.02341) (0.04266) (0.04491) (0.04088) (0.02839) (0.03178) 
 0.2 0.17041*** -0.04017 0.10766** 0.05521 0.15091*** 0.0644*** 0.00168 0.04410 0.07501*  -0.12918*** 0.14758***  -0.21806*** 
  (0.04124) (0.03007) (0.05019) (0.05110) (0.03977) (0.01783) (0.02195) (0.04068) (0.04107) (0.03711) (0.02672) (0.03107) 
 0.3 0.16424*** -0.03383 0.06453 0.03061 0.12209*** 0.05267*** -0.00499 0.04798 0.04131  -0.07681** 0.10408***  -0.15328*** 
  (0.03897) (0.02721) (0.04932) (0.04995) (0.03792) (0.01594) (0.02106) (0.03933) (0.03875) (0.03491) (0.02589) (0.03061) 
 0.4 0.15440*** -0.02738 0.02985 0.01242 0.09973*** 0.04284*** -0.01008 0.05008 0.01395 -0.03429 0.06847***  -0.09929*** 
  (0.03679) (0.02441) (0.04830) (0.04874) (0.03625) (0.01454) (0.02039) (0.03808) (0.03677) (0.03307) (0.02532) (0.03010) 
 0.5 0.14099*** -0.02032 -0.00137 -0.00246 0.08036** 0.03362** -0.01440 0.05104 -0.01090 0.00436 0.03584  -0.04894* 
  (0.03453) (0.02141) (0.04706) (0.04736) (0.03463) (0.01346) (0.01987) (0.03681) (0.03484) (0.03134) (0.02489) (0.02947) 
 0.6 0.12320*** -0.01211 -0.03196 -0.01553 0.06215* 0.02420* -0.01837 0.05102 -0.03552 0.04264 0.00326 0.00222 
  (0.03224) (0.01824) (0.04559) (0.04581) (0.03308) (0.01273) (0.01959) (0.03556) (0.03293) (0.02969) (0.02462) (0.02873) 
 0.7 0.09905*** -0.00192 -0.06463 -0.02780 0.0436 0.01372 -0.02233 0.04993  -0.06207** 0.08395*** -0.03220 0.05885** 
  (0.03035) (0.01564) (0.04391) (0.04413) (0.03190) (0.01261) (0.01979) (0.03453) (0.03126) (0.02841) (0.02467) (0.02791) 
 0.8 0.06374** 0.01203  -0.10367** -0.04036 0.0224 0.00067 -0.02668 0.04730  -0.09414*** 0.13385***  -0.07539*** 0.12901*** 
  (0.03036) (0.01655) (0.04218) (0.04264) (0.03200) (0.01377) (0.02110) (0.03438) (0.03068) (0.02845) (0.02547) (0.02722) 
 0.9 0.00171 0.03536  -0.16114*** -0.05557 -0.0070 -0.01937 -0.03252 0.04136  -0.14188*** 0.20817***  -0.14027*** 0.23621*** 
  (0.03770) (0.02781) (0.04157) (0.04306) (0.03693) (0.01813) (0.02558) (0.03784) (0.03489) (0.03356) (0.02871) (0.02774) 
Observations 2,090 1,794 2,097 1,732 2,011 1,997 
LogL 1251.457 -1059.761 921.617 21.343 803.544 151.769 
Chi-sq (overall) 1009.947*** 22722.731*** 6878.425*** 28690.601*** 307233.119*** 3672.620*** 
Chi-sq (bargain structure) 18.53*** 2.33  129.20*** 29.20*** 41.29*** 17.42*** 9.22** 3.18  34.41*** 95.51*** 171.11*** 46.40*** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. M refers to group expenditure, different in each subsystem. See footnote in Table VIII.7 for other details. 
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However, the most interesting case is food within the household (Fon). The predicted budget 
shares for formal and informal purchases within this consumption group are presented in Figure 
VIII.8. As shown, the bargaining power of the male is positively related with informal food 
consumption and describes an almost linear relationship. Therefore, the estimates show that 
increasing the mother’s power in the house will reduce the family’s informal food consumption 
whether or not her position is dominant. 
 
Figure VIII.8: Predicted budget shares and male bargaining power on market allocation 
(formal and informal) within Fon (food consumed within the household) 
 
Note: See footnote in Figure VIII.3 for details.    
 
Point estimates reveal that, as the female’s control over money increases, the marginal effects112 
are greater. When she is in a dominant position (  is between 0.1 and 0.4), increasing her income 
share by 0.1 pp. will lead (on average) to a reduction of 0.002 in informal allocation. By contrast, 
when she is not in a dominant position (  is between 0.6 and 0.9), a similar increase leads to a 
reduction of around 0.0007 pp. in the informal consumption of food within the house. The case is 
different for formal consumption, where bargaining power has no effect on resource allocation. 
Although the relationship between formal food shares and male bargaining power depicts a 
                                                 
112 Chi-squared results:   =0.1 vs  =0.2 (0.00),  =0.1 vs  =0.3 (0.18),  =0.1 vs  =0.4 (0.68),  =0.1 
vs  =0.5 (1.51),  =0.1 vs  =0.6 (2.69),  =0.1 vs  =0.7 (4.19**),  =0.1 vs  =0.8 (5.98**),  =0.1 
vs  =0.9 (8.02***),  =0.2 vs  =0.3 (1.07),  =0.2 vs  =0.4 (2.17),  =0.2 vs  =0.5 (3.51*),  =0.2 
vs  =0.6 (4.99**),  =0.2 vs  =0.7 (6.52**),  =0.2 vs  =0.8 (8.02***),  =0.2 vs  =0.9 (9.48***),  
 =0.3 vs  =0.4 (3.82*),  =0.3 vs  =0.5 (5.31**),  =0.3 vs  =0.6 (6.73***),  =0.3 vs  =0.7 
(8.02***),  =0.3 vs  =0.8 (9.18***),  =0.3 vs  =0.9 (10.21***),   =0.4 vs  =0.5 (6.81***),  =0.4 
vs  =0.6 (8.02***),  =0.4 vs  =0.7 (9.05***),  =0.4 vs  =0.8 (9.92***),  =0.4 vs  =0.9 
(10.67***),  =0.5 vs  =0.6 (9.00***),  =0.5 vs  =0.7 (9.79***),  =0.5 vs  =0.8 (10.43***),  =0.5 
vs  =0.9 (10.97***),  =0.6 vs  =0.7 (10.34***),  =0.6 vs  =0.8 (10.80***),  =0.6 vs  =0.9 
(11.19***)   =0.7 vs  =0.8 (11.08***),  =0.7 vs  =0.9 (11.35***),  =0.8 vs  =0.9 (11.48***).  
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negative correlation, and considering the hypothesis-testing for the marginal effects at different 
levels of   (where significance is not achieved for any value), it is better to think in terms of a 
horizontal line around the mean. Therefore, it seems that, on average, the family is committed to 
a fixed level of formal food consumption and neither of the parents will use their power to deviate 
from that situation.  
 
In sum, estimates for overall group consumption reveal that increasing the power of the mother 
within the house will result in an increase in the allocation of resources in favour of food to be 
consumed within the household up to a maximum level reached when the mother has enough 
power. This result is in line with the anthropological tradition of the greater pro-welfare or pro-
household expenditure of mothers. At the same time, the results for market allocation within this 
consumption group reveal that increasing the mother’s bargaining power will also cause a 
reallocation of food purchases away from informal markets, increasing the average quality of this 
particular item. This result is again in line with the anthropological tradition of the greater pro-
welfare expenditure of mothers, but goes one step further since it reveals that it is not only the 
quantity of pro-household items which increases, but also the quality.  
 
Interestingly, we can also see that the quantity substitution of informal food promoted by the 
mother in the house is clearer with semi-formal categories than formal ones. These last seem to 
be less affected by the bargaining power of the mother and much more affected by the average 
level of income of the household. This pattern of results is different to that found for overall 
market consumption, where quantity substitution promoted by the mother was between informal 
and formal markets. The difference can be explained if we consider the characteristics of food 
consumption: perishable, with higher purchasing frequencies. Under these conditions, access to 
the markets will be crucial for substitution possibilities in the short term. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, access to formal outlets can be complicated if there are supply limitations, as 
noted in Arellano and Burgos (2010). Thus, if this is not true for semi-formal outlets (and we 
presume that it is not), it will be easier for the mother to change an informal commercialization 
channel for a semi-formal than for a formal one. This last substitution will possibly require a 
higher investment (in time and money) so the effect of power (holding constant total income) 
should reasonably be lower.  
 
We can therefore conclude that, although increasing the bargaining power of the mother will 
generate less-informal consumption bundles, the effect is not equal across all consumption 
groups. It is more reliable, for example, for food within the household than for other categories. 
This is a reasonable result if, as stated previously, obtaining and preparing food is within the 
mother’s sphere, as she will be much more interested in preserving the quality of this type of 
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consumption than of others. This evidence is in line with anthropological tradition and 
comparable with results obtained in Thomas (1997), where the positive effects of women’s 
bargaining power on the nutritional status of children are found (see also Xu, 2007 for other 
examples). Among other positive decisions that more-empowered mothers can make (like better 
health-care practice) in order to improve nutrition, the results presented here suggest the existence 
of at least one additional channel: a better-quality source of food.  
 
Given the relevance of this result, a final exercise proposed is to inspect the effect of bargaining 
power on informal food consumption shares, conditional on total food expenditure explicitly 
handling the endogeneity of expenditure and bargaining power. Considering the low level of 
censoring of this purchasing category, the IV strategy proposed earlier can be replicated in this 
new context in order to inspect the robustness of the conclusions arrived at. In Table VIII.15, the 
diagnosis tests are presented. The information provided by these tests is similar to that found 
previously: the instruments included pass both the relevance and the orthogonality tests, and the 
exogeneity tests of potential endogenous variables reveal the need to instrument them. The results 
also perform better under a specification that includes labour supply in terms of the correlation 
between excluded instruments and endogenous variables. Similarly, as we are able to identify 
some relative bias in the estimates, it is better to perform the regression results under different IV 
techniques. The first-stage results are presented in Appendix 9 and most of the additional 
instruments display similar results to earlier ones.  
 
Table VIII.15: Relevance and orthogonality tests of the IV application (informal food 
shares) 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Tests are performed under a 2SLS specification with small sample correction and robust 
standard errors. Individual F-statistics must be compared with the rule of thumb of 10 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), Joint F-statistics 
are compared with the critical value of 13.97 and 15.72 (5% of maximal IV relative bias) computed in Stock and Yogo (2005) and 
8.78 and 9.48 (10% of maximal IV relative bias) as the minimum tolerable levels with and without labour supply, respectively. See 
footnote in Table V.7 for other details in the tests.  
 
In Table VIII.16, these results are presented for the OLS version, the standard 2SLS and the 
additional LIML and GMM under the different specifications. Note that the sample size has 
change compared to Table VIII.8, since the missing values for additional regressors included to 
identify PROBIT models on other consumption categories are not dropped, and the missing values 
for instruments are taken into account. The results are in line with previous conclusions. First, in 
terms of the group expenditure covariate, this has a positive effect on informal shares – a result 
already found in previous chapters and not deeply explored here. Second, the bargaining power 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Under-identification Test 71.238*** 70.693***  68.882*** 71.444*** 55.201*** 53.924*** 53.203***  55.467***
F-value (1stage, theta) 26.02*** 24.24*** 26.73***  25.86*** 20.62*** 19.24*** 21.66*** 20.69***
F-value (1stage, expend) 79.50*** 61.05*** 77.81*** 78.79*** 64.12*** 47.87*** 62.65*** 63.35***
F-value (1 stage, joint) 16.021 15.911 15.416 16.03 10.244 10.017 9.860 10.280
Hansen J test 1.791 2.394 0.774 1.641 2.197 3.752 1.127 2.137
C (labour) 0.731 1.627 0.064 0.569 . . . .
C (theta,expend) 15.704*** 9.804*** 18.391*** 16.918*** 18.484*** 11.467*** 21.247*** 19.661***
With labour supply Without labour supply 
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variable shows a positive effect on informal consumption once endogeneity is taken into account. 
This result confirms the negative impact on informal food consumption of increasing the 
bargaining power of the mother and the possible downward bias of OLS estimates.     
 
Table VIII.16: IV results of the bargaining model for informal food consumption share 
(three-market definition, different specifications and estimation methods) 
  With labour supply Without labour supply 
(1) OLS 2SLS LIML GMM OLS 2SLS LIML GMM 
  0.00786 0.26964** 0.27536** 0.27767** -0.00658 0.32146*** 0.33365*** 0.33881*** 
  (0.02245) (0.10839) (0.11060) (0.10804) (0.02192) (0.12323) (0.12776) (0.12227) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.00900 0.11017*** 0.11136*** 0.11088*** 0.00628 0.12870*** 0.13131*** 0.13052*** 
  (0.01141) (0.02952) (0.02986) (0.02951) (0.01145) (0.03305) (0.03384) (0.03294) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -273.311 -391.546 -395.423 -396.032 -278.260 -461.121 -471.408 -473.564 
F-value (overall) 8.65*** 8.42*** 8.39*** 8.40***  8.90*** 8.40*** 8.33*** 8.45*** 
(2) OLS 2SLS LIML GMM OLS 2SLS LIML GMM 
  0.01928 0.26080** 0.26812** 0.27026*** 0.00640 0.29603** 0.31477** 0.31355*** 
  (0.02183) (0.10449) (0.10747) (0.10428) (0.02138) (0.11722) (0.12467) (0.11672) 
L(expend_Fon) -0.01245 0.06604** 0.06760** 0.06687** -0.01500 0.08324** 0.08753** 0.08537** 
  (0.01138) (0.03096) (0.03146) (0.03095) (0.01141) (0.03443) (0.03586) (0.03435) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -210.055 -302.536 -307.291 -307.731 -214.005 -355.022 -370.356 -367.416 
F-value (overall) 12.47*** 11.36*** 11.30*** 11.38*** 12.99*** 11.05*** 10.89*** 11.16*** 
(3) OLS 2SLS LIML GMM OLS 2SLS LIML GMM 
  0.00724 0.25840** 0.26097** 0.25814** -0.00667 0.31028** 0.31653** 0.31574** 
  (0.02245) (0.11021) (0.11122) (0.10971) (0.02190) (0.12534) (0.12769) (0.12415) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.01151 0.12884*** 0.12944*** 0.12875*** 0.00892 0.14936*** 0.15083*** 0.14964*** 
  (0.01148) (0.03084) (0.03100) (0.03080) (0.01151) (0.03488) (0.03532) (0.03471) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -263.974 -394.581 -396.401 -394.368 -268.538 -467.245 -472.691 -470.667 
F-value (overall)  8.40*** 8.09*** 8.07*** 8.08*** 8.72*** 8.04***  8.00*** 8.05*** 
(4) OLS 2SLS LIML GMM OLS 2SLS LIML GMM 
  0.00941 0.26260** 0.26770** 0.26993** -0.00472 0.31076** 0.32224** 0.32661*** 
  (0.02227) (0.10729) (0.10928) (0.10697) (0.02177) (0.12163) (0.12594) (0.12067) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.00991 0.11542*** 0.11651*** 0.11604*** 0.00730 0.13386*** 0.13638*** 0.13544*** 
  (0.01128) (0.02938) (0.02969) (0.02937) (0.01132) (0.03292) (0.03368) (0.03280) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -264.031 -383.647 -387.124 -387.652 -268.742 -450.639 -460.325 -461.713 
F-value (overall) 8.73*** 8.83*** 8.81*** 8.83***  9.00*** 8.77*** 8.69*** 8.81*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note that the table is divided into four parts according to 
each of the specifications used in the present application.    
 
VIII.6. Concluding remarks 
 
The empirical application presented in this chapter results in four additional conclusions regarding 
informal consumption. First, family members in Peruvian households bargain and they do it both 
to decide which goods they will purchase and where these goods will be bought (formal or 
informal markets). Therefore, demand-side incentives that reinforce the control over money (or 
the bargaining power) of particular household members can be exploited not only to achieve 
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particular (socially desirable) consumption allocations, but also as formalization policies. This 
conclusion is robust for the different assumptions of preference formation or budgeting 
approaches, the specifications of the demand equations implemented, and the definitions of 
informality and once the endogeneity of income shares and total expenditure is taken into account 
in the models. 
 
Second, the direction of the effects of bargaining on consumption is in line with the 
anthropological tradition that emphasizes that households with more-empowered wives achieve 
greater pro-welfare consumption. This type of result is found in this application in the form of 
less-informal (i.e. better-quality) consumption baskets associated with the mother’s higher 
income shares. According to the results for broad markets, the models predict that informal 
consumption shares are higher when the husbands are in a dominant position and minimized when 
the wife is in a similar situation. This result was also confirmed using the IV model under the 
linear approximation of the bargaining structure, revealing that a 0.10 pp. increase in the mother’s 
income share is associated with reductions between 0.025 pp. and 0.027 pp. on informal budget 
shares. However, according to more theoretical models, the relationship is far from linear. In fact, 
the effect of bargaining power on consumption critically depends on the relative level of power 
enjoyed by each household member and on whether or not they are in a dominant position. In this 
application, it was found that the effect of the mother’’ power is stronger when she are in a 
dominant position. Interestingly, under alternative definitions of power (like the education share) 
the results were stronger (in terms of point estimates) and clearer (in terms of significance at 
conventional levels).  
 
Third, the results for formal consumption are less clear. On the one hand, the linear models that 
control for endogeneity reveal that household members do not bargain in terms of formal 
consumption and only the absolute level of income is relevant for increasing or decreasing this 
consumption. On the other hand, non-linear models reveal that, when each member is adequately 
empowered, increasing his or her power will lead to higher formal consumption, with the marginal 
effects statistically equal. As a result, an almost perfect U-shaped relationship between bargaining 
power and formal budget shares was depicted. Therefore, in these models, bargaining cannot be 
rejected, but it was not possible to draw conclusions on the existence of differentiated preferences. 
In fact, it is better to say that each member will be interested in using his or her power to increase 
formal consumption within the household. This evidence was reconciled with previous evidence 
using the predicted behaviour of semi-formal markets. As a result, the models predict that the two 
family members in a dominant position will increase formal consumption as their power increase, 
but only the mothers will do so via a reduction in informal consumption. The husbands will keep 
informality at its maximum level and will adjust semi-formal consumption.         
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Fourth, once the models were disaggregated in terms of consumption groups, we were able to 
verify that the negative correlation between the female’s bargaining power and informal 
consumption was more plausible for some goods than for others. This is an intuitive result, since 
it is natural to think that the effects of bargaining will be different across goods and mothers will 
be much more interested in preserving the quality only of some types. In this application, the 
clearer evidence in favour of this hypothesis was for food within the house. This is an 
understandable result given that food is a typical type of consumption in the mother’s sphere. In 
fact, when the models were solved for particular consumption groups, a positive correlation 
between the mother´s bargaining power and food shares was found. Therefore, as a result it is 
possible to argue that increasing wives’ control over money will not only result in higher food 
consumption, but also in better-quality sources (less-informal) for these goods. This result was 
also confirmed when IV models were used for estimation. From a public-policy perspective, this 
evidence suggests the possibility of exploiting targeted income transfers to the mother in order to 
attain better nutritional outcomes for the children.    
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The thesis presented here is one of the first attempts to study informality from a demand side 
perspective. In the past this issue has received scant scholarly attention, limiting our 
understanding of informality as an economic phenomenon, the public policies available to reduce 
it in developing countries and the possible consequences of those policies. For this reason the 
approach taken was to investigate the main demand properties of informal consumption in order 
to test specific hypotheses on its responses to income, prices, labour supply and the bargaining 
power of household members. The main database used in the research was the Peruvian National 
Household Survey (ENAHO, in Spanish) conducted by the National Office of Statistics (INEI, in 
Spanish) during 2006, and restricted to urban households. The attractive property of this survey 
is that it permits identification of where households make their purchases, the working conditions 
of household members, the unit values at the district level for food consumption and individual 
labour and non-labour earnings for household members in order to obtain detailed bargaining-
power measures.  
 
The main specification used in the research was the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), given 
its desirable theoretical and empirical properties. However, several econometric problems arose 
during estimation: heteroskedasticity, cross-equation correlations, endogeneity and censoring 
bias. To partially control for these issues, different econometric techniques were implemented: 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression methods with robust standard errors (SUR–GLS), Instrumental 
Variables estimations (IV) with enough caution when weak instruments were present and 
Shonkwiller and Yen’s (1999) procedures with within- and between-regression robust standard 
errors (S&Y).  
 
In general, the conclusions of the application can be organized in four groups. First, in the case 
of total expenditure, increasing the total available resources of the family increases formal shares 
and reduces informal ones. This result is consistent with the quality differentials attached to each 
market. The results also allow us to argue in favour of the existence of family protective attitudes, 
since families will bias their consumption baskets towards informal outlets as income diminishes, 
or, similarly, in favour of the formalization power of economic growth, as long as it will generate 
more-formal purchasing baskets at the household level. However, the inferiority of informal 
consumption was decisively rejected, even for the richest individuals in the sample, for the most 
informal markets and for every consumption group where the hypothesis was tested. This means 
that both informal and formal consumption are normal, with the former classified as necessity and 
the latter as luxury. Therefore, increasing the expenditure levels of the family in highly informal 
countries will increase both formal and informal consumption, but the former at a higher speed 
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than the latter. Using the disaggregated version of the model, this result is replicated in four out 
of six consumption groups:  food to be consumed within the household, food to be consumed 
outside the household, transport and communication, and education and culture. In the other two 
groups – clothing and personal care, and health goods and services – total expenditure seems to 
have the same influence on both formal and informal segments of the market.  
 
Second, the linkage between working and purchasing from informal markets under different 
estimation methods, specifications and definitions of informal markets is a strong result for a 
developing country like Peru. Therefore, working more hours in the informal (formal) sector is 
highly correlated with buying more goods in informal (formal) markets. The intuition behind the 
linkage hypothesis is that previous experience in a sector (as a worker) helps the consumer to 
reduce transactional costs (network linkage) and reveals the worker’s preference to remain there 
as a consumer (preference linkage or non-separability effect). However, a strong result also found 
in the application is that not all formal or informal hours of work have the same effect on 
consumption. In fact, the evidence suggests that the main channel for the positive linkage with 
informal consumption occurs through the informal self-employment sector. This is an intuitive 
result, since it was expected that stylized facts that support linkages (like informational 
advantages or the preference to keep hidden) are stronger for those informal workers who are also 
producers. At the same time, the positive linkage with formal consumption occurs mainly through 
the formal self-employment sector. This is also an intuitive result, considering that only those in 
this formal labour segment will receive tax advantages if they bias household consumption 
through formal markets. These results were accompanied by the negative linkage of the informal 
wage-earning sector on formal consumption, possibly driven by greater difficulties acceding to 
formal markets by this segmented or refugee labour option.      
 
Using the disaggregated version of the model, when particular consumption groups are modelled 
the evidence in favour of linkages is found in only three out of six consumption groups. The 
strongest evidence is found in food to be consumed outside the household – an intuitive result 
considering that this group is mainly composed of workplace meals, a type of consumption where 
informational advantages are probably better grounded and the location decisions of vendors 
could generate stronger linkages between market participants. At the same time, the hypothesis is 
verified in its weaker version for the two consumption groups transport and communication, and 
education and culture. In the other consumption groups no conclusive evidence was found. 
Interestingly enough, two out of the three cases where the linkage hypothesis is verified (meals 
and travel to work) correspond to consumption groups previously defined as quantity substitutes 
for leisure, so we could at least suggest that, for in this type of goods, the linkage hypothesis 
seems to be more plausible.  
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Third, the inclusion of prices in the analysis confirms the expected demand patterns for formal 
and imformal markets: negative compensated and uncompensated own-price elasticities and 
positive income effects. It was also possible to generally confirm elastic observed demand curves 
for both types of consumption. Point value estimates for uncompensated own-price elasticities 
are around or greater than 1, which is probably evidence of high substitution possibilities between 
sectors. Thus, it is possible at least to suggest some degree of integration of formal and informal 
food markets in highly informal countries. Cross-price elasticities also confirm that formal and 
informal consumption can be treated as imperfect substitutes, with higher substitution effects in 
the case of formal consumption than for informal. In fact, when compensated elasticities are 
analysed, the data support formal markets being more sensitive to price shocks (both own- and 
cross-) than informal ones. This is an intuitive result, which considers that informal channels of 
commercialization could be more flexible (in terms of adaptive strategies to consumers) and 
diverse (in the type and presentation of products sold there), so informal to formal substitution 
possibilities could be greater than the other way around.  Also, if confidence links between market 
participants in the informal sector explains at least some of consumption patterns there, it seems 
obvious to presume that informal markets are less responsive to demand shocks.     
 
Fourth, family members in Peruvian households bargain, and they do so both when deciding 
which goods they will purchase and where these goods will be bought (formal or informal 
markets). The direction of the effects of bargaining on consumption is also clear and in line with 
the anthropological tradition that emphasizes that households with more-empowered wives reach 
more pro-household consumption levels than they would otherwise. This effect is detected in this 
application both in the form of higher proportion of “family goods” associated with more 
empowered wifes and less less-informal (better quality) consumption baskets. However, the 
relationship is not necessarily linear. We can see that the effects of bargaining power on 
consumption critically depends on the relative level of power enjoyed by each member and 
whether or not they are in a dominant position. Stronger results against informal consumption are 
found when the mother is in a dominant position. The results for formal consumption are less 
clear. Using non-linear models, although bargaining cannot be rejected, it was not possible to 
conclude that differentiated preferences across household members exist. Using linear models, it 
seems that income shares have no effect on formal consumption and only the absolute level of 
income matters.  
 
Once collective models were disaggregated in terms of consumption groups, it was possible to 
verify that the negative correlation between wives’ bargaining power and informal consumption 
was more plausible in the case of food consumption in the house. This is an understandable result 
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given that food is a typical type of consumption in the mothers’ sphere and she will be more 
interested in preserving quality here than in other items.  
 
With this evidence, several policy suggestions emerge. First, economic growth will have a 
positive effect on formalizing the economy from the demand side, but this a slow process that 
will occur with limitations. In fact, the evidence presented here is consistent with informal 
markets being less responsive to income than formal ones, with high levels of informal 
consumption (around 30% and 15% of their budget allocated there), even for the richest 
individuals in the sample. At the same time, additional experimentation with the data reveals that 
income effects differ across households. Formalization driven by positive income shcks tend to 
be higher for the richest households, those living in the more developed cities of the country and 
those working in the modern sector of the economy. For the poorest households, small targeted 
income transferences to the poor could come even with the short-term cost of increasing 
informality. Therefore, any pro-poor growth policies promoted by governments need to be strong 
enough to bring about structural changes in the living conditions of the most deprived and also to 
procure structural changes in their market allocation. Most of these policies are closer to 
development plans that reinforce income-generating capacity (for example, through asset access 
or human capital investments) or improve access to better-quality jobs.       
 
Second, as long as working and purchasing from the informal sector are linked activities, policy-
makers are possibly underestimating the effects of their public policies on informality in the 
supply side of the shadow economy. For example, policies that reduce hours of work in the 
informal sector and increase those for formal jobs will have second-round effects through the 
expected re-composition of formal and informal demand (in favour of more formal consumption 
baskets). The highest effectiveness of a supply-side policy such as this is presumed to occur if the 
focus is on the self-employment sector. At the same time, higher recompesition effects are 
expected in consumption groups such as meals at work, travel to work and educational 
expenditure. A lower level of effectiveness is presumed on food within the household, clothing 
and personal care and health expenditures.      
 
Third, changing the relative prices could also be exploited to formalize the economy. The 
simulations implemented reveal that combining informal price increases with formal price 
reductions will naturally be the most effective alternative, and such a combination will help to 
minimize the welfare impacts on households. However, these policies are not free of costs. In the 
cases presented in this application, the main cost is the unequal distribution of welfare effects, 
with the winners being at the top of the income distribution chain and the losers at the bottom. A 
natural response for a result like this is to suggest targeted income transferences in order to 
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compensate for differentiated welfares impacts. Nevertheless, considering the differentiated 
effects of income on informal consumption, a decision along these lines could off-set the expected 
formalization results. For this reason, although the application does not deny the existence of an 
optimal combination of price and income policies that would fulfil formalization objectives 
without welfare losses, the results presented here show that the space is narrow and the design of 
these policies needs to be extremely carefully undertaken.       
 
Fourth, targeted income transferences or other policies that reinforce bargaining power in the 
household could be used to deal with formalization from a consumption side. As mentioned 
previously, as long as women control a greater portion of the family budget, the share of 
consumption allocated to informal markets will be smaller. The results suggest that these effects 
are stronger for food consumption (the most important group for Peruvian families). Therefore, if 
this evidence is interpreted as better-quality consumption, the estimations done here also provide 
an explanation of the recurrent positive effects found in the literature of targeted income transfers 
to the mother on better nutritional outcomes for the children. From the perspective followed in 
this application, this could be considered a positive side-effect of formalization policies.    
 
Although the results encountered are intuitive and line with most of the stylized facts of informal 
consumption, the analysis presented here is not free from limitations, which they could be used 
to define a future research agenda to confirm some of the results found or to tease out additional 
results not investigated here.  
 
First, on theoretical grounds, the assumption made here in order to facilitate the empirical 
investigation is to use a two-step demand model with two extreme possibilities. In the first one, 
the household first decides on its allocation across markets (the budget is distributed between 
formal and informal options) and then decides which goods to purchase. In the second one, they 
decide first which goods will be purchased and then where these will be bought. Both extreme 
solutions imply aggregation and weak separability assumptions that could be unsatisfactory on 
theoretical grounds. The consequences (mainly in terms of restrictions on the substitution 
possibilities between goods in different groups) generate the necessity to emphasize that more 
than exact solutions to the consumption problem, these models provide good approximations 
conditional on the assumptions made. The question as to which of these models is superior or 
whether there is a third (possibly intermediate or more general) solution have not been explored 
here and would probably make a good research question to be solved in the future in order to 
obtain adequate representations of preferences. 
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On theoretical grounds, too, the demand equations estimated in this thesis were conditional (on 
labour allocation), as originally proposed by Pollak (1969). As noted by Browning and Meghir 
(1991), although this specification facilitates empirical analysis of the quantity effects, it also 
leaves important research questions aside, such as the substitution possibilities (in terms of price 
effects) between labour and consumption. To produce a result like this, more-structural models 
are needed where the full demand profile (specifying leisure consumption and not assuming it as 
predetermined) is studied. This will certainly complicate the analysis, since most simplifying 
assumptions on labour allocation cannot be implemented, but will produce more general results 
for the effects of formal and informal labour allocation on market consumption. Along the same 
lines, another extension of the model could come from a deeper exploration of the transaction 
cost function that links labour supply and market consumption. This will require a closer analysis 
of such costs which, instead of being implicitly assumed in the model, need to be explicitly 
modelled. One way of advancing future research on this is shown in Gardes and Starzec (2009), 
who use an analysis of price differentials; however, a more formal way to do this will require 
specification of transactional cost functions in the demand setting.  
 
Second, in empirical terms, there are also several improvements that could be implemented. For 
example, in terms of the estimation methods, it would be worthwhile exploring maximum 
likelihood alternatives in order to estimate the complete systems proposed here. Similarly, in the 
case of the price models, more research is needed on the correct way to impose theoretical 
restrictions in censored systems. In terms of the data issues, some additional research is also 
needed. In this application, the construction of formal and informal markets is based on a 
classification of the different outlets where the household acquires consumption. This 
classification has been based on observed characteristics of the outlet, experience in the particular 
context and anecdotal evidence obtained during the research. This would be improved by a more 
in-depth exploration of the outlets in the sample, basically in terms of their registration situation 
with the different authorities (central and municipal). This information was not available in the 
sample used here, but could easily either be incorporated into a joint survey that investigates the 
formality conditions of outlets or could increase the number of questions in the actual survey with 
a module that investigates the purchasing experience of the household. With this intermediate 
solution, it should be possible to check (at least indirectly) whether the transaction made was more 
or less formal in a way similar to how the same survey checks the formality conditions of the 
workplace.  
 
The need for better data will also be important for the information on prices and the set of 
instruments used for identification purposes, in both IV and PROBIT models. In the first case, a 
joint survey focusing on the different outlets where the families purchase their goods could be 
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used to also provide market prices for both formal and informal outlets and thus avoid the 
complication of using unit values. In the second case, the household survey could exploit the 
purchasing experience module proposed previously to inspect attitudinal factors behind formal 
and informal consumption. Issues like stigma, risk perception or tax morale, now absent from the 
survey, could improve identification strategies in the PROBIT models. The case of the IV is more 
complicated, but most of the recent literature on impact evaluation and randomization trials could 
provide additional paths to follow in this case.  
 
Third, it is worth mentioning here the additional research questions that emerged during the 
writing of this thesis. For example, it would be useful to re-test the price effects for particular 
products instead of aggregating expenditure or consumption groups. This would help to place the 
hypothesis within a more homogenous demand context, ruling out the possible influence of 
quality differentials or remaining aggregation problems. It would also be interesting to confirm 
the results for income and hours worked in a different context – for example, comparing recession 
and expansion periods of the economy since they will define different strategies of households in 
terms of their participation in the formal and informal markets both as consumers and as workers.  
Along the same lines of thought, replicating the results in other highly informal countries in Latin 
America and Africa, where the market structure (on both the supply and the demand side) may be 
systematically different, would help to maintain the construction of certain empirical regularities 
around informal consumption.             
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Appendix 1: Mathematical appendix  
 
1. Expressions (III.32a), (V.1), (VI.1), (VI.4) and (VII.1a) 
 
Using the most general theoretical demand (III.3) and a standard AIDS formulation, the demand 
function takes the form: 
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Then if  
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rrha  )1log(  (any log-linear functional form is assumed just to explore how 
the theory works in empirical terms):  
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which is expression (III.36a) with 

  rrr  for the non-separability (first term on 
the right) and network effects (second term on the right). Once prices are set to unity, Engel curves 
can be obtained: 
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which is expression (V.1). A similar procedure can be followed to derive expressions (VI.1) and 
(VI.4), but only changing the notation for each step and considering in (VI.1) that 0gr and in 
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(VI.4) 0jr  to be coherent with the theoretical model. Finally, expression (VII.1a) is the 
expression previous to the price normalization.  
 
2. Expressions (V.2), (V1.2), (VI.5) and (VII.2) 
 
Focusing on (V.2), as the rest of expression will follow the same procedure, we can consider the 
Working–Leser function (V.1):   
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so it is possible to write 
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which, in elasticity form, is 
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3. Expressions (V.3), (VI.3) and (VI.6) 
 
Focusing on (V.3), as the rest of the expression will follow the same procedure, we can consider 
the Working–Leser function (V.1):   
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so, in general, it follows that 
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and in elasticity form  
 









j
r
jr
j
r
j
jr
j
r
r
j
jr
w
h
c
h
p
M
c
h
dh
dc
  
 
4. Expression (V.4) 
 
For the Working–Leser function (V.1):   
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and, taking the partial derivative with respect to rh  as in the previous case, but allowing M to 
change as a result, it follows that 
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As before, the right-hand expression can be  
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which, in elasticity form, becomes: 
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5. Expression (VI.7) 
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Using (III.28), it was established that 
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6. Expression (VI.8) 
 
For expression (III.27) 
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which in elasticity terms is 
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taking partial derivatives with respect to rh  
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7. Expression (VI.9) 
 
Using expression (III.32) 
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and expressed in elasticity terms 
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which is simply 
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8. Expressions (VI.16a) and (VI.16b) 
 
Using expression (V1.11)  
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9. Expression (VII.3) 
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Consider the formulation of the AIDS model (VII.1a) – (VII.1b)  
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Considering that these derivatives are computed from an ordinary demand and using the definition 
of the Kroneker delta 1jg  when gj   and 0jg  when  jg  , both cases (when  jg   
and jg  ) can be adequately summarized in a unique expression by: 
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10. Expression (VIII.9) 
 
Begin with equation (VIII.6) 
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Appendix 2: Definition of variables and basic tabulations (models in Chapter 5)  
 
Variable Definition 
SUR–GLS IV 
8,007 obs. 4,874 obs. 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Dependant variables  
Informal 
Informal consumption as a share of total expenditure 
(purchased), three-market definition (see Chapter 4) 
0.393 0.17873 0.390 0.18351 
Semi-Formal 
Semi-formal consumption as a share of total expenditure 
(purchased), three-market definition (see Chapter 4) 
0.316 0.18033 0.317 0.18356 
Formal 
Formal consumption as a share of total expenditure 
(purchased), three-market definition (see Chapter 4) 
0.291 0.17045 0.293 0.17630 
Market_1 
Consumption done in Market 1 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see Chapter 
4) 
0.177 0.13145   
Market_2 
Consumption done in Market 2 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see Chapter 
4) 
0.216 0.16717   
Market_3 
Consumption done in Market 3 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see Chapter 
4) 
0.316 0.18033   
Market_4 
Consumption done in Market 4 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see Chapter 
4) 
0.099 0.10590   
Market_5 
Consumption done in Market 5 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see Chapter 
4) 
0.192 0.13738   
            
Independent variables 
L(expenditure) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure (purchased) 
in annual new soles 
8.091 0.72461 8.152 0.73187 
L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.295 0.57086 1.187 0.60389 
D(mem_spo) Dummy variable: 1 = household has a spouse, 0 = otherwise 0.645 0.47849 0.585 0.49275 
D(mem_son) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or daughter, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.793 0.40496 0.731 0.44326 
D(mem_oth) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.311 0.46313 0.300 0.45811 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.503 0.24510 0.509 0.26633 
age_head Age of the head of the household (in years) 49.200 14.52858 49.310 15.67740 
age_head-sq Age of the head of the household (in years) squared 2631.725 1532.74500 2677.188 1655.47900 
D(gender_head) Dummy variable: 1 = household head in male, 0 = otherwise 0.739 0.43908 0.716 0.45106 
year_educ_head Number of years of education of the head of the household 10.299 4.84059 10.460 4.83813 
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Hrs_for 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = extended definition of formality (see 
Chapter 4) 
  26.533 37.20317 
Hrs_inf 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = extended definition of informality 
(see Chapter 4) 
  46.379 53.49863 
Hrs_formal-
Hrs_informal 
Difference in hours worked between the formal and informal 
sectors 
  -19.846 73.33665 
Hrs_ff 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = formal workers in formal firms (see 
Chapter 4) 
21.163 34.15949 21.874 34.77438 
Hrs_if 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = informal workers in formal firms 
(see Chapter 4) 
5.546 18.75729 5.901 19.67698 
Hrs_ii 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = informal workers in informal firms 
(see Chapter 4) 
18.628 35.99963 19.087 37.25073 
Hrs_sf 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity,  sector = informal self-employment (see 
Chapter 4) 
7.995 22.11749 4.660 17.03040 
Hrs_si 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = formal self-employment (see 
Chapter 4) 
28.448 40.49600 21.391 35.60842 
Hrs_fam 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = family work (see Chapter 4) 
8.040 22.05925   
Hrs_second 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
secondary activity (see Chapter 4) 
6.294 14.30344   
D(Lima) Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = otherwise 0.168 0.37409 0.202 0.40130 
L(pop_urb_dist) 
Natural logarithm of the population size of the district where 
the household lives 
11.081 1.28319 11.187 1.23384 
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq 
Natural logarithm of the population size of the district where 
the household lives squared 
124.429 27.60059 126.676 26.87404 
pop_den_distx1000 Population density: inhabitants per 1,000 km2  2.946 5.36708 3.351 5.66370 
D(not_slum) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household doesn´t live in a slum, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.470 0.49911 0.488 0.49990 
D(mid_city) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in a departmental 
capital (except Lima), 0 = otherwise 
0.509 0.49996 0.504 0.50003 
D(border) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in a border city 
(Tumbes, Tacna or Puno), 0 = otherwise 
0.113 0.31619 0.102 0.30237 
D(tongue) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the two parents of the household 
has indigenous mother tongue , 0 = otherwise 
0.242 0.42827 0.220 0.41439 
D(migrant) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the two parents of the household 
members is a migrant, 0 = otherwise 
0.645 0.47868 0.649 0.47722 
D(social) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the household members pertain 
to social organizations (unions, social clubs, social 
programs, etc.) , 0 = otherwise 
0.403 0.49051 0.372 0.48349 
Station_distx1000 Number of police stations in the district per 1,000 inhabitants 0.059 0.10642 0.058 0.11427 
Muni_persx1000 
Number of workers in the local government of the district per 
1,000 inhabitants 
3.594 4.74743 3.732 5.56388 
L(budget_dist_pc) 
Natural logarithm of the per-capita budget of the local 
government, in thousands of new soles 
5.117 0.66009 5.127 0.68336 
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D(sdp_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the district has a slum development 
plan, 0 = otherwise 
0.051 0.21915 0.045 0.20763 
D(Hrs_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal 
worker using the extended definition of formality (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
  0.422 0.49387 
D(Hrs_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal 
worker using the extended definition of informality (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
  0.633 0.48194 
D(Hrs_ff) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal 
worker in formal firm in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 
4), 0 = otherwise 
0.347 0.47591 0.352 0.47754 
D(Hrs_if) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal 
worker in formal firm in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 
4), 0 = otherwise 
0.105 0.30662 0.106 0.30823 
D(Hrs_ii) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal 
worker in informal firm in his/her primary activity (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.307 0.46127 0.300 0.45811 
D(Hrs_sf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal self-
employer in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.145 0.35200 0.086 0.28095 
D(Hrs_si) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal self-
employer in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.490 0.49992 0.390 0.48776 
D(Hrs_fam) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is family 
worker in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.199 0.39924   
D(Hrs_second) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member has a second 
job (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.274 0.44623   
Instruments 
L(asset) 
Natural logarithm of the value of assets owned by the 
household 
  7.154 1.53504 
L(asset)-sq 
Natural logarithm of the value of assets owned by the 
household squared 
  53.529 21.34006 
D(risk1) 
Dummy variable 1 = if a member of the family has lost 
his/her job in the last year, 0 = otherwise 
  0.045 0.20808 
D(risk2) 
Dummy variable 1 = if the family has experienced 
bankruptcy of the family business in the last year, 0 = 
otherwise 
  0.009 0.09459 
D(risk5) 
Dummy variable 1 = if the head of the house has abandoned 
the family in the last year, 0 = otherwise 
  0.010 0.10177 
D(risk7) 
Dummy variable 1 = if the family has experienced robbery or 
other crime against it in the last year, 0 = otherwise 
  0.030 0.17161 
D(risk8) 
Dummy variable 1 =  if the family has experienced a natural 
disaster in the last year, 0 = otherwise 
  0.011 0.10275 
L(wage_for) 
Natural logarithm of salaries in the formal sector (district 
mean) 
  1.665 0.40636 
L(wage_inf) 
Natural logarithm of salaries in the informal sector (district 
mean) 
  1.047 0.37472 
D(house) 
Dummy variable 1 = if the family house shows inadequate 
living conditions (INEI, methodology), 0 = otherwise 
  0.067 0.24985 
non_labour 
Non-labour income (income from property rents and 
extraordinary income) 
  841.330 3272.11600 
wage_diff Difference in the logarithm of wages (formal–informal)   0.618 0.45861 
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Appendix 3: Full regression results (Chapter 5) 
 
a) SUR–GLS (three-market definition) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.02679*** 0.08424*** -0.03744*** 0.08121*** -0.02526*** 0.08400*** -0.02597*** 0.08291*** 
  (0.00413) (0.00384) (0.00425) (0.00386) (0.00415) (0.00389) (0.00412) (0.00382) 
Hrs_ff -0.00027*** 0.00022*** -0.00027*** 0.00022*** -0.00027*** 0.00022** -0.00028*** 0.00022*** 
  (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) 
Hrs_if 0.00017 0.00011 0.00013 0.00013 0.00017 0.00010 0.00016 0.00012 
  (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00020) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) 
Hrs_ii -0.00012 -0.00032*** -0.00013 -0.00028*** -0.00013 -0.00032*** -0.00012 -0.00032*** 
  (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00006) 
Hrs_sf 0.00006 0.00054*** -0.00007 0.00056*** 0.00002 0.00054*** 0.00009 0.00053*** 
  (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00018) 
Hrs_si 0.00029*** 0.00006 0.00023*** 0.00007 0.00027*** 0.00006 0.00028*** 0.00006 
  (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) 
Hrs_fam 0.00002 0.00009 0.00004 0.00009 -0.00001 0.00009 0.00002 0.00008 
  (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) 
Hrs_second 0.00022 0.00004 0.00017 0.00005 0.00024 0.00004 0.00023 0.00003 
  (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00015) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.01063 -0.00110 0.01395** -0.00065 0.00893 -0.00057 0.01174* -0.00249 
  (0.00684) (0.00629) (0.00672) (0.00622) (0.00683) (0.00630) (0.00683) (0.00626) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.01265 -0.01452 -0.01211 -0.01483 -0.01214 -0.01433 -0.01315 -0.01468 
  (0.01158) (0.00930) (0.01143) (0.00923) (0.01167) (0.00931) (0.01159) (0.00931) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.00449 -0.00970* 0.00401 -0.01051** 0.00379 -0.00987* 0.00419 -0.00914* 
  (0.00650) (0.00520) (0.00643) (0.00516) (0.00650) (0.00521) (0.00647) (0.00519) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.02336** -0.00404 -0.00658 -0.00657 -0.02294** -0.00378 -0.02578** -0.00320 
  (0.01138) (0.01084) (0.01096) (0.01074) (0.01140) (0.01085) (0.01137) (0.01080) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.01158** -0.00846* 0.01020* -0.00773* 0.01163** -0.00858* 0.01066* -0.00733 
  (0.00563) (0.00472) (0.00555) (0.00469) (0.00561) (0.00471) (0.00561) (0.00471) 
D(Hrs_fam) -0.00595 0.00387 -0.00319 0.00361 -0.00658 0.00395 -0.00577 0.00388 
  (0.00717) (0.00576) (0.00702) (0.00575) (0.00715) (0.00576) (0.00717) (0.00576) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.01374** 0.01084** -0.01154** 0.01121** -0.01345** 0.01112** -0.01387** 0.01138** 
  (0.00596) (0.00493) (0.00588) (0.00491) (0.00593) (0.00494) (0.00595) (0.00493) 
L(fam_size) 0.00833 0.00849 0.00357 0.00720 0.00857 0.00886 0.00850 0.00954 
  (0.00745) (0.00633) (0.00741) (0.00628) (0.00741) (0.00633) (0.00743) (0.00633) 
D(mem_spo) 0.03871*** -0.03319*** 0.03880*** -0.03125*** 0.03757*** -0.03308*** 0.03814*** -0.03234*** 
  (0.00733) (0.00634) (0.00721) (0.00628) (0.00735) (0.00635) (0.00731) (0.00632) 
D(mem_son) 0.01038 -0.01074 0.00695 -0.00985 0.01165 -0.01077 0.00950 -0.01027 
  (0.00783) (0.00671) (0.00770) (0.00665) (0.00781) (0.00671) (0.00781) (0.00670) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00876* 0.00819* 0.01009* 0.00809* 0.01078** 0.00788* 0.00894* 0.00828* 
  (0.00531) (0.00426) (0.00523) (0.00423) (0.00530) (0.00426) (0.00530) (0.00426) 
P(men) -0.02414** 0.00993 -0.02076** 0.01055 -0.02346** 0.01003 -0.02286** 0.00897 
  (0.00962) (0.00847) (0.00947) (0.00843) (0.00960) (0.00847) (0.00961) (0.00846) 
age_head 0.00177** 0.00371*** 0.00194** 0.00370*** 0.00158* 0.00377*** 0.00198** 0.00360*** 
  (0.00088) (0.00078) (0.00086) (0.00077) (0.00088) (0.00078) (0.00088) (0.00078) 
age_head-sq -0.00002* -0.00002** -0.00002** -0.00002*** -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00002** -0.00002** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
D(gender_head) -0.01548** 0.01333** -0.01395* 0.01430** -0.01740** 0.01372** -0.01471* 0.01217* 
  (0.00772) (0.00655) (0.00757) (0.00651) (0.00771) (0.00656) (0.00770) (0.00655) 
year_educ_head -0.00375*** 0.00569*** -0.00380*** 0.00497*** -0.00320*** 0.00569*** -0.00375*** 0.00571*** 
  (0.00053) (0.00044) (0.00053) (0.00045) (0.00054) (0.00045) (0.00053) (0.00044) 
D(Lima) 0.07501*** 0.02212*** 0.06152*** 0.02208*** 0.07249*** 0.02184*** 0.06864*** 0.02401*** 
  (0.00516) (0.00458) (0.00946) (0.00794) (0.00521) (0.00464) (0.00527) (0.00466) 
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L(pop_urb_dist)     0.13562*** 0.00021         
      (0.02253) (0.01966)         
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq     -0.00534*** -0.00014         
      (0.00105) (0.00092)         
pop_den_distx1000     -0.00068 0.00071         
      (0.00049) (0.00043)         
D(not_slum)     -0.00348 0.03371***         
      (0.00401) (0.00357)         
D(mid_city)     -0.01707*** 0.00407         
      (0.00466) (0.00396)         
D(border)     0.05811*** -0.00079         
      (0.00598) (0.00527)         
D(tongue)         0.02744*** -0.00186     
          (0.00473) (0.00403)     
D(migrant)         0.01238*** -0.00157     
          (0.00414) (0.00354)     
D(social)         -0.00134 -0.00432     
          (0.00398) (0.00334)     
Station_distx1000             -0.09539*** 0.02647* 
              (0.01875) (0.01502) 
Muni_persx1000             -0.00108*** 0.00241*** 
              (0.00039) (0.00053) 
L(budget_dist_pc)             0.00192 -0.00133 
              (0.00338) (0.00286) 
D(sdp_dist)             -0.02618*** -0.01483** 
              (0.00832) (0.00730) 
Constant 0.56248*** -0.58452*** -0.18142 -0.55361*** 0.53677*** -0.58185*** 0.55327*** -0.57542*** 
  (0.03870) (0.03486) (0.12129) (0.10958) (0.03883) (0.03526) (0.04208) (0.03744) 
Observations 8,007 8,007 8,007 8,007 
Pseudo LogL 7926.212 8154.336 7955.881 7973.908 
 
b) SUR–GLS (quintiles)  
 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) 0.04337*** 0.00736 -0.00206 0.08551*** 0.00728 0.15719*** -0.07818** 0.10435*** -0.10473*** 0.10236*** 
  (0.01359) (0.01348) (0.04019) (0.03100) (0.04296) (0.03855) (0.03413) (0.03196) (0.00956) (0.01196) 
L(fam_size) 0.03730** -0.00438 0.01311 -0.02046 -0.00238 0.03884*** -0.00825 0.02158 -0.01699 0.02417 
  (0.01616) (0.01189) (0.01651) (0.01343) (0.01635) (0.01462) (0.01581) (0.01400) (0.01528) (0.01770) 
D(mem_spo) 0.00786 -0.02693* 0.04761*** -0.03650** 0.03122** -0.02944** 0.04783*** -0.04258*** 0.04467*** -0.01399 
  (0.02082) (0.01567) (0.01751) (0.01420) (0.01584) (0.01441) (0.01435) (0.01313) (0.01356) (0.01581) 
D(mem_son) 0.00083 -0.01682 0.00709 0.00217 0.01160 -0.02448 0.00653 -0.00175 -0.00158 0.00090 
  (0.02205) (0.01630) (0.01988) (0.01503) (0.01732) (0.01564) (0.01660) (0.01449) (0.01351) (0.01543) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01386 0.00185 0.00974 0.01001 0.01149 0.00812 0.01041 0.00944 0.01139 0.00010 
  (0.01263) (0.00831) (0.01171) (0.00892) (0.01147) (0.00944) (0.01066) (0.00970) (0.01024) (0.01191) 
P(men) -0.03451 -0.01668 0.00022 0.00198 -0.05145** 0.01512 -0.01889 0.00563 -0.02978* 0.05148*** 
  (0.02672) (0.01964) (0.02302) (0.02062) (0.02150) (0.01909) (0.01987) (0.01798) (0.01726) (0.01953) 
age_head 0.00511** 0.00236 0.00096 0.00423** 0.00003 0.00345** 0.00056 0.00602*** 0.00298* 0.00145 
  (0.00224) (0.00171) (0.00216) (0.00178) (0.00189) (0.00166) (0.00185) (0.00170) (0.00157) (0.00180) 
age_head-sq -0.00005** -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00003 0.00000 -0.00002 -0.00000 -0.00004*** -0.00002 0.00000 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.00036 0.01445 -0.03055* 0.01995 -0.00777 0.00719 -0.02011 0.01988 -0.00877 -0.00953 
  (0.02147) (0.01557) (0.01788) (0.01395) (0.01625) (0.01487) (0.01550) (0.01360) (0.01444) (0.01670) 
year_educ_head -0.00369*** 0.00566*** -0.00236* 0.00433*** -0.00322*** 0.00397*** -0.00443*** 0.00515*** -0.00218** 0.00717*** 
  (0.00129) (0.00090) (0.00124) (0.00100) (0.00108) (0.00087) (0.00109) (0.00096) (0.00107) (0.00128) 
Hrs_ff -0.00031 0.00014 -0.00046* 0.00051* 0.00008 -0.00010 -0.00028* 0.00012 -0.00015 0.00012 
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  (0.00036) (0.00028) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00019) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00015) 
Hrs_if 0.00019 0.00016 0.00039 0.00043 -0.00011 0.00008 0.00027 -0.00026 -0.00003 0.00050 
  (0.00040) (0.00026) (0.00051) (0.00043) (0.00033) (0.00023) (0.00047) (0.00036) (0.00043) (0.00036) 
Hrs_ii -0.00029 -0.00011 -0.00035** -0.00012 -0.00015 -0.00022* -0.00005 -0.00059*** 0.00016 -0.00089*** 
  (0.00018) (0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00028) (0.00032) 
Hrs_sf 0.00013 0.00158*** 0.00083* 0.00025 -0.00030 0.00055 -0.00043 0.00099*** -0.00004 -0.00005 
  (0.00063) (0.00054) (0.00049) (0.00042) (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00027) (0.00038) 
Hrs_si 0.00024* 0.00032*** -0.00001 0.00033*** 0.00029** -0.00003 0.00033* -0.00025 0.00063*** -0.00027 
  (0.00014) (0.00011) (0.00014) (0.00011) (0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00023) (0.00022) 
Hrs_fam -0.00015 0.00026 -0.00011 0.00008 0.00023 0.00007 0.00024 -0.00044* -0.00017 0.00050 
  (0.00026) (0.00019) (0.00027) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00018) (0.00027) (0.00025) (0.00033) (0.00035) 
Hrs_second 0.00068* 0.00047* -0.00045 0.00030 0.00001 0.00008 0.00017 -0.00044 0.00087** -0.00064* 
  (0.00038) (0.00025) (0.00048) (0.00032) (0.00039) (0.00036) (0.00042) (0.00039) (0.00035) (0.00036) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.00810 0.00461 0.01823 0.00807 -0.00600 0.00738 0.01120 -0.01050 0.00003 -0.00851 
  (0.02372) (0.01737) (0.01976) (0.01693) (0.01395) (0.01216) (0.01338) (0.01288) (0.01184) (0.01378) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.03404 -0.01617 -0.03723 -0.01610 -0.00091 -0.01264 -0.02889 0.00299 0.01727 -0.02744 
  (0.02954) (0.01746) (0.03087) (0.02472) (0.02178) (0.01573) (0.02563) (0.02145) (0.02243) (0.02239) 
D(Hrs_ii) -0.00527 0.00179 0.00976 0.00083 0.00407 -0.02957*** 0.00087 -0.00019 -0.01267 0.01772 
  (0.01432) (0.00955) (0.01408) (0.01032) (0.01291) (0.01075) (0.01389) (0.01318) (0.01647) (0.01899) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.02382 -0.04841** -0.06731** 0.03711 -0.00528 0.00749 0.01216 -0.03554 -0.01278 -0.00987 
  (0.03327) (0.02348) (0.03122) (0.02760) (0.02338) (0.02339) (0.02350) (0.02307) (0.01760) (0.02473) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.00805 -0.00466 0.01697 -0.00791 0.00658 0.00118 -0.00017 0.01407 -0.01472 -0.01075 
  (0.01375) (0.00942) (0.01262) (0.00978) (0.01162) (0.00997) (0.01147) (0.01095) (0.01267) (0.01397) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.00265 -0.00219 -0.00401 0.00827 -0.00101 -0.01108 -0.01726 0.01497 -0.00424 0.01523 
  (0.01526) (0.00955) (0.01559) (0.01154) (0.01399) (0.01187) (0.01607) (0.01619) (0.01689) (0.01888) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.01077 -0.00237 -0.00988 0.00678 -0.00382 0.01290 -0.01379 0.02500** -0.01202 0.01173 
  (0.01404) (0.00934) (0.01411) (0.01075) (0.01265) (0.01051) (0.01229) (0.01189) (0.01121) (0.01261) 
D(Lima) 0.14794*** 0.01142 0.11700*** 0.01053 0.11371*** -0.00531 0.07311*** 0.01557* 0.01773** 0.04519*** 
  (0.01789) (0.01384) (0.01289) (0.00970) (0.01056) (0.00849) (0.00994) (0.00926) (0.00816) (0.00955) 
Constant -0.04640 0.02941 0.38632 -0.60286** 0.36949 -1.18351*** 1.06495*** -0.81589*** 1.21488*** -0.71429*** 
  (0.11042) (0.10129) (0.31516) (0.23997) (0.34998) (0.31518) (0.29382) (0.27353) (0.09451) (0.11340) 
Observations 1,602 1,601 1,602 1,601 1,601 
LogL 1423.676 1614.402 1811.801 1772.687 1871.271 
 
c) SUR–GLS (cities)  
 
  Metropolitan areas Intermediate cities Minor cities 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.07134*** 0.11111*** -0.02711*** 0.08614*** -0.00290 0.06479*** 
  (0.00826) (0.00677) (0.00706) (0.00575) (0.00625) (0.00646) 
L(fam_size) 0.02615* 0.01457 0.00445 0.01431 0.00075 -0.00333 
  (0.01360) (0.01153) (0.01260) (0.00983) (0.01238) (0.01123) 
D(mem_spo) 0.01697 -0.01200 0.01782 -0.01995* 0.07234*** -0.05896*** 
  (0.01225) (0.01105) (0.01241) (0.01020) (0.01247) (0.01110) 
D(mem_son) -0.01031 0.00383 0.00179 -0.00998 0.03031** -0.01728 
  (0.01331) (0.01208) (0.01352) (0.01095) (0.01330) (0.01166) 
D(mem_oth) -0.00858 0.02122*** 0.00494 0.00567 0.02436*** 0.00138 
  (0.00942) (0.00809) (0.00880) (0.00710) (0.00899) (0.00693) 
P(men) -0.03090* 0.01215 -0.03092* 0.00768 -0.01129 0.00995 
  (0.01735) (0.01546) (0.01606) (0.01352) (0.01603) (0.01439) 
age_head 0.00394** 0.00213 0.00092 0.00292** 0.00072 0.00612*** 
  (0.00164) (0.00150) (0.00155) (0.00126) (0.00139) (0.00123) 
age_head-sq -0.00004*** 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00000 -0.00005*** 
  (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
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D(gender_head) 0.00024 -0.00273 -0.00297 0.00041 -0.03860*** 0.03751*** 
  (0.01284) (0.01172) (0.01289) (0.01035) (0.01329) (0.01154) 
year_educ_head -0.00503*** 0.00629*** -0.00355*** 0.00548*** -0.00289*** 0.00510*** 
  (0.00097) (0.00084) (0.00089) (0.00072) (0.00087) (0.00075) 
Hrs_ff -0.00029* 0.00021 -0.00013 0.00010 -0.00038** 0.00034** 
  (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00016) 
Hrs_if 0.00006 0.00025 -0.00005 0.00013 0.00055 -0.00018 
  (0.00027) (0.00022) (0.00034) (0.00030) (0.00038) (0.00025) 
Hrs_ii -0.00017 -0.00039*** -0.00015 -0.00022* -0.00023 -0.00027** 
  (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00011) 
Hrs_sf -0.00035 0.00063 -0.00007 0.00032 0.00000 0.00076*** 
  (0.00041) (0.00043) (0.00025) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00027) 
Hrs_si 0.00035*** -0.00008 0.00024** 0.00012 0.00022* 0.00013 
  (0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
Hrs_fam -0.00012 0.00045 0.00047*** -0.00002 -0.00030* 0.00015 
  (0.00033) (0.00034) (0.00018) (0.00015) (0.00018) (0.00014) 
Hrs_second 0.00032 0.00023 0.00051 -0.00014 -0.00011 0.00018 
  (0.00040) (0.00035) (0.00032) (0.00022) (0.00028) (0.00024) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.00987 -0.00698 0.01425 -0.00583 0.00582 0.00745 
  (0.01195) (0.01148) (0.01145) (0.01021) (0.01157) (0.01103) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.00710 -0.02788* -0.00660 -0.00945 -0.02930 0.00023 
  (0.01739) (0.01430) (0.02124) (0.01792) (0.02139) (0.01564) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.01085 -0.02074** 0.00576 -0.01078 0.00293 -0.00456 
  (0.01089) (0.00934) (0.01118) (0.00908) (0.01149) (0.00884) 
D(Hrs_sf) 0.00857 -0.02315 -0.01049 0.01078 -0.02381 -0.01228 
  (0.02512) (0.02669) (0.01775) (0.01720) (0.01771) (0.01590) 
D(Hrs_si) -0.00030 -0.00765 0.02293** -0.01230 0.00908 -0.00710 
  (0.00997) (0.00895) (0.00928) (0.00781) (0.00967) (0.00778) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.00493 -0.01379 -0.01092 0.01599* -0.00349 -0.00086 
  (0.01703) (0.01668) (0.01099) (0.00866) (0.01130) (0.00873) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.02232* 0.01976** -0.02206** 0.00916 -0.00127 0.00625 
  (0.01151) (0.01007) (0.01005) (0.00793) (0.00946) (0.00796) 
D(Lima) 0.10057*** -0.00171 n.a. n.a. 0.08524*** 0.01887* 
  (0.00714) (0.00626) n.a. n.a. (0.01274) (0.01135) 
Constant 0.89569*** -0.78849*** 0.61289*** -0.58450*** 0.35247*** -0.45894*** 
  (0.08194) (0.06946) (0.06754) (0.05224) (0.05767) (0.05635) 
Observations 2,140 2,718 3,149 
LogL 2376.565 2880.827 2875.030 
 
d) SUR–GLS (interaction terms)  
 
  Interactions 
  Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.02302 0.12219*** 
  (0.02045) (0.01749) 
D(Ahrs_ff)*L(expenditure) -0.04882** -0.00773 
  (0.02132) (0.01849) 
D(Ahrs_ii)*L(expenditure) 0.01705 -0.07577*** 
  (0.02306) (0.02200) 
D(Ahrs_sf)*L(expenditure) -0.01161 -0.04498** 
  (0.02311) (0.01929) 
D(Ahrs_si)*L(expenditure) 0.00276 -0.04986*** 
  (0.02143) (0.01817) 
L(fam_size) 0.01467 -0.00152 
243 
 
 
 
  (0.01092) (0.00955) 
D(mem_spo) 0.04176*** -0.03551*** 
  (0.01074) (0.00929) 
D(mem_son) -0.00274 -0.00043 
  (0.01131) (0.00935) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00504 0.01737*** 
  (0.00835) (0.00658) 
P(men) -0.02156 0.00843 
  (0.01330) (0.01156) 
age_head 0.00126 0.00370*** 
  (0.00121) (0.00106) 
age_head-sq -0.00001 -0.00002* 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) 
D(gender_head) -0.02473** 0.01964** 
  (0.01129) (0.00951) 
year_educ_head -0.00330*** 0.00567*** 
  (0.00078) (0.00066) 
Hrs_ff -0.00024 0.00017 
  (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_if 0.00002 0.00040 
  (0.00041) (0.00034) 
Hrs_ii -0.00006 -0.00031*** 
  (0.00016) (0.00012) 
Hrs_sf 0.00032 0.00045 
  (0.00027) (0.00029) 
Hrs_si 0.00032*** 0.00011 
  (0.00011) (0.00010) 
Hrs_fam 0.00007 0.00014 
  (0.00016) (0.00013) 
Hrs_second 0.00063** -0.00004 
  (0.00030) (0.00024) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.44060** 0.09055 
  (0.18343) (0.14900) 
D(Hrs_ii) -0.11011 0.61880*** 
  (0.19534) (0.17532) 
D(Hrs_sf) 0.07899 0.39775** 
  (0.19829) (0.15453) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.01685 0.42429*** 
  (0.18318) (0.14524) 
D(Hrs_fam) -0.00999 -0.00116 
  (0.01079) (0.00854) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.01909** 0.00972 
  (0.00921) (0.00788) 
D(Lima) 0.08728*** 0.01524** 
  (0.00737) (0.00660) 
Constant 0.51999*** -0.92893*** 
  (0.17770) (0.14075) 
Observations 4,216 
LogL 3875.475 
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e) SUR–GLS (five-market definition)  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.01895*** 0.06207*** -0.01912*** 0.05936*** -0.01550*** 0.06221*** -0.01952*** 0.06075*** 
  (0.00308) (0.00347) (0.00308) (0.00344) (0.00304) (0.00352) (0.00306) (0.00344) 
L(fam_size) -0.03523*** 0.02962*** -0.03247*** 0.02942*** -0.03494*** 0.02927*** -0.03400*** 0.03125*** 
  (0.00543) (0.00513) (0.00533) (0.00507) (0.00538) (0.00513) (0.00535) (0.00511) 
D(mem_spo) 0.00251 -0.00376 0.00281 -0.00181 0.00295 -0.00354 0.00214 -0.00296 
  (0.00537) (0.00477) (0.00528) (0.00471) (0.00535) (0.00477) (0.00530) (0.00474) 
D(mem_son) -0.00410 -0.00336 -0.00592 -0.00294 -0.00225 -0.00348 -0.00316 -0.00305 
  (0.00574) (0.00535) (0.00560) (0.00531) (0.00571) (0.00535) (0.00566) (0.00534) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00195 0.00225 0.00401 0.00268 0.00475 0.00227 0.00194 0.00242 
  (0.00390) (0.00351) (0.00380) (0.00349) (0.00386) (0.00351) (0.00385) (0.00349) 
P(men) 0.01365* -0.03935*** 0.01579** -0.03836*** 0.01416** -0.03954*** 0.01462** -0.03992*** 
  (0.00710) (0.00686) (0.00698) (0.00681) (0.00704) (0.00686) (0.00703) (0.00685) 
age_head -0.00002 0.00322*** -0.00009 0.00319*** -0.00027 0.00318*** -0.00011 0.00316*** 
  (0.00064) (0.00062) (0.00062) (0.00061) (0.00063) (0.00062) (0.00063) (0.00061) 
age_head-sq -0.00000 -0.00001** -0.00000 -0.00002*** -0.00000 -0.00001** -0.00000 -0.00001** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
D(gender_head) 0.00582 -0.00861* 0.00333 -0.00850* 0.00353 -0.00869* 0.00730 -0.00955* 
  (0.00558) (0.00509) (0.00551) (0.00503) (0.00554) (0.00510) (0.00551) (0.00507) 
year_educ_head -0.00127*** 0.00570*** -0.00087** 0.00511*** -0.00066* 0.00563*** -0.00158*** 0.00568*** 
  (0.00039) (0.00036) (0.00039) (0.00037) (0.00039) (0.00037) (0.00039) (0.00036) 
Hrs_ff 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00001 -0.00009 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00004 -0.00008 
  (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) 
Hrs_if 0.00051*** -0.00024* 0.00049*** -0.00022* 0.00052*** -0.00024* 0.00053*** -0.00023* 
  (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) 
Hrs_ii 0.00023*** -0.00041*** 0.00019*** -0.00038*** 0.00022*** -0.00041*** 0.00024*** -0.00041*** 
  (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) 
Hrs_sf 0.00009 0.00040*** 0.00010 0.00043*** 0.00007 0.00041*** 0.00008 0.00041*** 
  (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00014) 
Hrs_si 0.00049*** -0.00015*** 0.00044*** -0.00014*** 0.00048*** -0.00014*** 0.00048*** -0.00015*** 
  (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) 
Hrs_fam 0.00015 0.00003 0.00012 0.00003 0.00011 0.00004 0.00016* 0.00003 
  (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008) 
Hrs_second 0.00039*** -0.00004 0.00029** -0.00006 0.00044*** -0.00004 0.00037*** -0.00006 
  (0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00013) (0.00012) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.03208*** -0.00043 0.03229*** -0.00003 0.02901*** -0.00074 0.03110*** -0.00186 
  (0.00528) (0.00536) (0.00515) (0.00530) (0.00522) (0.00536) (0.00519) (0.00530) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.01241 -0.01045 -0.01195 -0.01070 -0.01199 -0.01070 -0.01374* -0.01101 
  (0.00795) (0.00803) (0.00777) (0.00802) (0.00803) (0.00803) (0.00782) (0.00802) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.00399 -0.01075** 0.00420 -0.01145*** 0.00319 -0.01051** 0.00427 -0.01011** 
  (0.00493) (0.00421) (0.00482) (0.00417) (0.00489) (0.00421) (0.00488) (0.00418) 
D(Hrs_sf) 0.01234 -0.01326 0.01487* -0.01560* 0.01030 -0.01377* 0.01326 -0.01312 
  (0.00855) (0.00834) (0.00833) (0.00829) (0.00844) (0.00835) (0.00845) (0.00832) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.00425 -0.01281*** 0.00390 -0.01211*** 0.00365 -0.01278*** 0.00492 -0.01166*** 
  (0.00420) (0.00381) (0.00413) (0.00378) (0.00416) (0.00381) (0.00415) (0.00379) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.00677 0.00735 0.00719 0.00695 0.00548 0.00732 0.00597 0.00730 
  (0.00560) (0.00465) (0.00542) (0.00465) (0.00553) (0.00465) (0.00557) (0.00464) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.00652 0.00948** -0.00605 0.00986** -0.00756* 0.00907** -0.00628 0.01020** 
  (0.00450) (0.00417) (0.00441) (0.00415) (0.00445) (0.00417) (0.00446) (0.00416) 
D(Lima) -0.01863*** 0.02765*** 0.00165 0.03195*** -0.01957*** 0.02840*** -0.01424*** 0.02812*** 
  (0.00331) (0.00401) (0.00630) (0.00703) (0.00338) (0.00406) (0.00340) (0.00407) 
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L(pop_urb_dist)    -0.01398 -0.00288       
     (0.01811) (0.01600)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    0.00074 -0.00000       
     (0.00083) (0.00075)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00142*** 0.00036       
     (0.00031) (0.00037)       
D(not_slum)    -0.01554*** 0.02957***       
     (0.00310) (0.00289)       
D(mid_city)    0.00168 0.00164       
     (0.00373) (0.00304)       
D(border)    0.07303*** 0.01892***       
     (0.00557) (0.00427)       
D(tongue)        0.03993*** -0.00143     
         (0.00389) (0.00318)     
D(migrant)        0.00170 -0.00149     
         (0.00308) (0.00287)     
D(social)        0.00276 0.00423     
         (0.00292) (0.00274)     
Station_distx1000          -0.03382*** -0.00263 
           (0.01311) (0.01163) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00024 0.00242*** 
           (0.00038) (0.00045) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.02465*** 0.00295 
           (0.00259) (0.00233) 
D(sdp_dist)          0.03876*** -0.02712*** 
           (0.00748) (0.00510) 
Constant 0.34952*** -0.48084*** 0.40570*** -0.43689*** 0.31077*** -0.48040*** 0.23252*** -0.49226*** 
  (0.02838) (0.03059) (0.09943) (0.09042) (0.02822) (0.03100) (0.03006) (0.03226) 
Observations 8,007 8,007 8,007 8,007 
LogL 11051.017 11286.781 11123.226 11195.208 
 
f) OLS under IV sample (grouped hours of work) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.02398*** 0.08261*** -0.03223*** 0.08006*** -0.02213*** 0.08166*** -0.02292*** 0.08063*** 
  (0.00548) (0.00526) (0.00561) (0.00521) (0.00547) (0.00530) (0.00547) (0.00524) 
Hrs_for -0.00022** 0.00017* -0.00024** 0.00018* -0.00023** 0.00017* -0.00024** 0.00018* 
  (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) 
Hrs_inf 0.00004 -0.00015*** 0.00001 -0.00012** 0.00002 -0.00014*** 0.00004 -0.00014*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.00694 -0.00180 0.01402* -0.00260 0.00424 -0.00036 0.00834 -0.00342 
  (0.00861) (0.00764) (0.00841) (0.00757) (0.00863) (0.00767) (0.00861) (0.00760) 
D(Hrs_inf) 0.01947*** -0.01997*** 0.01898*** -0.01956*** 0.01901*** -0.01983*** 0.01882*** -0.01848*** 
  (0.00702) (0.00615) (0.00696) (0.00612) (0.00699) (0.00615) (0.00700) (0.00612) 
L(fam_size) 0.01167 0.00062 0.00838 0.00021 0.01183 0.00078 0.01243 0.00168 
  (0.00973) (0.00814) (0.00969) (0.00809) (0.00964) (0.00811) (0.00969) (0.00813) 
D(mem_spo) 0.04193*** -0.02657*** 0.04043*** -0.02436*** 0.04020*** -0.02644*** 0.04181*** -0.02548*** 
  (0.00906) (0.00765) (0.00889) (0.00761) (0.00906) (0.00765) (0.00904) (0.00762) 
D(mem_son) 0.00763 -0.00628 0.00434 -0.00561 0.00962 -0.00681 0.00669 -0.00591 
  (0.00983) (0.00827) (0.00968) (0.00821) (0.00979) (0.00827) (0.00980) (0.00824) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01337* 0.01090* 0.01339* 0.01088* 0.01526** 0.01011* 0.01378* 0.01144** 
  (0.00710) (0.00570) (0.00704) (0.00569) (0.00706) (0.00568) (0.00709) (0.00570) 
P(men) -0.02363* 0.01195 -0.02163* 0.01187 -0.02228* 0.01146 -0.02118* 0.01087 
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  (0.01227) (0.01085) (0.01209) (0.01080) (0.01225) (0.01085) (0.01225) (0.01083) 
age_head 0.00144 0.00398*** 0.00163 0.00395*** 0.00128 0.00407*** 0.00168 0.00384*** 
  (0.00107) (0.00094) (0.00105) (0.00094) (0.00107) (0.00094) (0.00107) (0.00094) 
age_head-sq -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00002 -0.00002** -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00002 -0.00002** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
D(gender_head) -0.01878* 0.01366* -0.01707* 0.01418* -0.02164** 0.01475* -0.01852* 0.01215 
  (0.00961) (0.00813) (0.00939) (0.00811) (0.00961) (0.00815) (0.00958) (0.00812) 
year_educ_head -0.00471*** 0.00660*** -0.00469*** 0.00585*** -0.00394*** 0.00640*** -0.00475*** 0.00659*** 
  (0.00070) (0.00058) (0.00069) (0.00059) (0.00072) (0.00059) (0.00070) (0.00058) 
D(Lima) 0.07594*** 0.01887*** 0.06023*** 0.01999** 0.07379*** 0.01887*** 0.06892*** 0.02163*** 
  (0.00634) (0.00557) (0.01206) (0.00999) (0.00639) (0.00563) (0.00647) (0.00566) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.14875*** -0.01625       
    (0.03223) (0.03101)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.00587*** 0.00050       
    (0.00149) (0.00142)       
pop_den_distx1000   -0.00088 0.00093*       
    (0.00062) (0.00054)       
D(not_slum)   -0.00250 0.03277***       
    (0.00533) (0.00488)       
D(mid_city)   -0.02046*** 0.00378       
    (0.00635) (0.00544)       
D(border)   0.05884*** 0.00464       
    (0.00828) (0.00707)       
D(tongue)       0.03389*** -0.01242**     
        (0.00647) (0.00548)     
D(migrant)       0.01424*** -0.00200     
        (0.00543) (0.00471)     
D(social)       0.00213 -0.00439     
        (0.00524) (0.00440)     
Station_distx1000         -0.09906*** 0.03508** 
          (0.01909) (0.01661) 
Muni_persx1000         -0.00118*** 0.00237*** 
          (0.00042) (0.00055) 
L(budget_dist_pc)         0.00652 0.00147 
          (0.00423) (0.00365) 
D(sdp_dist)         -0.04401*** -0.01235 
          (0.01140) (0.01077) 
Constant 0.55185*** -0.57804*** -0.29124* -0.44894** 0.51749*** -0.56565*** 0.51769*** -0.57772*** 
  (0.04974) (0.04633) (0.17506) (0.17632) (0.04971) (0.04688) (0.05382) (0.04952) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
R-squared 0.103 0.283 0.131 0.293 0.110 0.284 0.110 0.290 
LogL 1612.358 2355.668 1691.885 2387.230 1633.263 2359.278 1631.223 2378.663 
  
g) OLS under IV sample (original hours of work) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.02408*** 0.08342*** -0.03199*** 0.08093*** -0.02231*** 0.08250*** -0.02302*** 0.08144*** 
  (0.00549) (0.00531) (0.00563) (0.00526) (0.00549) (0.00534) (0.00548) (0.00528) 
Hrs_ff -0.00030*** 0.00023** -0.00031*** 0.00022** -0.00030** 0.00022** -0.00033*** 0.00024** 
  (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010) 
Hrs_if 0.00004 0.00031 0.00002 0.00032 0.00005 0.00030 0.00003 0.00033* 
  (0.00024) (0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00020) (0.00025) (0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00020) 
Hrs_ii -0.00008 -0.00036*** -0.00009 -0.00032*** -0.00010 -0.00036*** -0.00008 -0.00036*** 
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  (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00011) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008) 
Hrs_sf 0.00007 0.00031 0.00000 0.00035 0.00004 0.00032 0.00009 0.00029 
  (0.00030) (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00032) 
Hrs_si 0.00027** -0.00003 0.00022** -0.00001 0.00025** -0.00003 0.00027** -0.00003 
  (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.01506* -0.00812 0.01925** -0.00774 0.01221 -0.00660 0.01723* -0.01041 
  (0.00903) (0.00807) (0.00887) (0.00798) (0.00905) (0.00809) (0.00905) (0.00799) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.00956 -0.03172** -0.01060 -0.03013** -0.00908 -0.03154** -0.01067 -0.03156** 
  (0.01513) (0.01236) (0.01499) (0.01249) (0.01535) (0.01246) (0.01508) (0.01235) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.00759 -0.01122 0.00654 -0.01240* 0.00666 -0.01119 0.00722 -0.01073 
  (0.00861) (0.00691) (0.00858) (0.00691) (0.00859) (0.00693) (0.00858) (0.00689) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.02411 0.00016 -0.01099 -0.00329 -0.02501 0.00114 -0.02668 0.00288 
  (0.01889) (0.01917) (0.01832) (0.01928) (0.01901) (0.01924) (0.01876) (0.01917) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.01332* -0.00551 0.01319* -0.00507 0.01303* -0.00529 0.01267 -0.00426 
  (0.00781) (0.00655) (0.00773) (0.00652) (0.00775) (0.00653) (0.00777) (0.00654) 
L(fam_size) 0.01361 0.00367 0.01044 0.00317 0.01374 0.00388 0.01428 0.00480 
  (0.00978) (0.00817) (0.00975) (0.00811) (0.00969) (0.00814) (0.00974) (0.00816) 
D(mem_spo) 0.04134*** -0.02768*** 0.03971*** -0.02535*** 0.03972*** -0.02757*** 0.04126*** -0.02655*** 
  (0.00907) (0.00766) (0.00890) (0.00763) (0.00908) (0.00766) (0.00905) (0.00763) 
D(mem_son) 0.00648 -0.00784 0.00362 -0.00715 0.00848 -0.00835 0.00540 -0.00730 
  (0.00982) (0.00826) (0.00967) (0.00820) (0.00978) (0.00826) (0.00978) (0.00823) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01276* 0.01026* 0.01273* 0.01035* 0.01457** 0.00946* 0.01321* 0.01077* 
  (0.00708) (0.00569) (0.00702) (0.00568) (0.00704) (0.00567) (0.00706) (0.00569) 
P(men) -0.02284* 0.01134 -0.02107* 0.01150 -0.02156* 0.01087 -0.02027* 0.01009 
  (0.01225) (0.01085) (0.01208) (0.01080) (0.01224) (0.01085) (0.01223) (0.01083) 
age_head 0.00122 0.00380*** 0.00142 0.00377*** 0.00107 0.00389*** 0.00148 0.00363*** 
  (0.00107) (0.00094) (0.00105) (0.00094) (0.00107) (0.00095) (0.00107) (0.00094) 
age_head-sq -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00001 -0.00002* 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
D(gender_head) -0.01950** 0.01336* -0.01766* 0.01373* -0.02223** 0.01445* -0.01924** 0.01174 
  (0.00960) (0.00811) (0.00939) (0.00809) (0.00961) (0.00813) (0.00957) (0.00810) 
year_educ_head -0.00481*** 0.00673*** -0.00476*** 0.00597*** -0.00405*** 0.00654*** -0.00484*** 0.00673*** 
  (0.00070) (0.00058) (0.00069) (0.00059) (0.00072) (0.00059) (0.00070) (0.00058) 
D(Lima) 0.07702*** 0.01972*** 0.06108*** 0.02306** 0.07474*** 0.01971*** 0.06972*** 0.02264*** 
  (0.00632) (0.00557) (0.01207) (0.00995) (0.00638) (0.00563) (0.00646) (0.00566) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.14830*** -0.01820       
    (0.03229) (0.03112)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.00586*** 0.00059       
    (0.00149) (0.00143)       
pop_den_distx1000   -0.00087 0.00074       
    (0.00062) (0.00054)       
D(not_slum)   -0.00289 0.03270***       
    (0.00532) (0.00489)       
D(mid_city)   -0.02090*** 0.00454       
    (0.00636) (0.00545)       
D(border)   0.05705*** 0.00395       
    (0.00828) (0.00710)       
D(tongue)       0.03376*** -0.01226**     
        (0.00645) (0.00548)     
D(migrant)       0.01355** -0.00195     
        (0.00542) (0.00471)     
D(social)       0.00094 -0.00460     
        (0.00525) (0.00441)     
Station_distx1000         -0.10055*** 0.03795** 
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          (0.01893) (0.01671) 
Muni_persx1000         -0.00119*** 0.00247*** 
          (0.00042) (0.00055) 
L(budget_dist_pc)         0.00562 0.00081 
          (0.00423) (0.00363) 
D(sdp_dist)         -0.04506*** -0.01311 
          (0.01134) (0.01078) 
Constant 0.56224*** -0.58805*** -0.27940 -0.44800** 0.52892*** -0.57588*** 0.53214*** -0.58392*** 
  (0.04940) (0.04632) (0.17522) (0.17721) (0.04939) (0.04685) (0.05346) (0.04935) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
R-squared 0.107 0.287 0.135 0.296 0.115 0.288 0.114 0.294 
LogL 1624.738 2367.680 1701.972 2398.588 1644.940 2371.271 1644.318 2392.309 
 
h) First-stage regressions of IV models (expenditure) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(fam_size)  -0.6975723***  -0.6915396***  -0.6902081***  -0.6924406*** 
  (0.02453) (0.02402) (0.02434) (0.02458) 
D(mem_spo) 0.0449464* 0.0431487* 0.0348157 0.0461381*** 
  (0.02359) (0.02293) (0.02338) (0.02360) 
D(mem_son) 0.1183673*** 0.1074933*** 0.1162343*** 0.1191881*** 
  (0.02726) (0.02667) (0.02717) (0.02727) 
D(mem_oth) 0.0933388*** 0.0862209*** 0.0883539*** 0.0940166*** 
  (0.01941) (0.01908) (0.01938) (0.01937) 
P(men) 0.1234433*** 0.1177695*** 0.1200715*** 0.121575*** 
  (0.03624) (0.03569) (0.03605) (0.03635) 
age_head 0.0191748*** 0.0194592*** 0.0195282*** 0.0188211*** 
  (0.00341) (0.00335) (0.00338) (0.00341) 
age_head-sq  -0.0001123***  -0.0001268***  -0.0001165***  -0.0001101*** 
  (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
D(gender_head)  -0.0660128***  -0.0472274*  -0.0618247**  -0.0681733*** 
  (0.02493) (0.02436) (0.02481) (0.02497) 
year_educ_head 0.0383932*** 0.0339468*** 0.0376297*** 0.0381612*** 
  (0.00202) (0.00201) (0.00205) (0.00202) 
D(Lima) 0.2211205*** 0.1677943*** 0.2089685*** 0.2240728*** 
  (0.01756) (0.03340) (0.01778) (0.01769) 
Hrs_for 0.0030804*** 0.0030164*** 0.002984*** 0.0030786*** 
  (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00032) 
Hrs_inf 0.0016085*** 0.0015957*** 0.0015853*** 0.001599*** 
  (0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00019) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.0696895*** 0.0879349*** 0.083583*** 0.0671219*** 
  (0.02573) (0.02492) (0.02576) (0.02572) 
D(Hrs_inf)  -0.0403507*  -0.0407467*  -0.037664*  -0.0371154* 
  (0.02110) (0.02092) (0.02104) (0.02108) 
L(asset) 
0.1968538*** 0.1892478*** 0.1939483*** 0.1958798*** 
  (0.00601) (0.00585) (0.00598) (0.00602) 
D(risk1) 
 -0.0641129*  -0.0735015**  -0.0662165**  -0.0652723** 
  (0.03313) (0.03264) (0.03306) (0.03319) 
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D(risk2) 
-0.0110809 -0.0337895 -0.0161748 -0.0041375 
  (0.07150) (0.07012) (0.07033) (0.07138) 
D(risk5) 
 -0.10134* -0.0912392 -0.0963034  -0.1040545* 
  (0.06054) (0.06168) (0.06046) (0.06048) 
D(risk7) 
0.0502437 0.0460096 0.0512048 0.0516704 
  (0.03680) (0.03679) (0.03634) (0.03681) 
D(risk8) 
 -0.2534471***  -0.1579162*  -0.2141763**  -0.2495649*** 
  (0.09106) (0.08743) (0.08972) (0.09047) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.579283***    
    (0.10098)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.0247001***    
    (0.00461)    
pop_den_distx1000   0.0045573***    
    (0.00173)    
D(not_slum)   0.0959097***    
    (0.01548)    
D(mid_city)   -0.0092219    
    (0.01820)    
D(border)   0.0716459***    
    (0.02273)    
D(tongue)     -0.0886418***   
     (0.01849)   
D(migrant)    0.0692252***   
     (0.01554)   
D(social)     -0.0352485**   
     (0.01433)   
Station_distx1000     -0.0344683 
      (0.05050) 
Muni_persx1000     0.0052801*** 
      (0.00145) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     0.0081527 
      (0.01095) 
D(sdp_dist)     0.0072878 
      (0.03344) 
Constant 6.169612*** 2.877529*** 6.17717*** 6.124679*** 
  (0.09429) (0.55868) (0.09394) (0.11144) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
R-squared 0.5472 0.5635 0.5515 0.5491 
 
i) First-stage regressions of IV models (hours of work) 
 
  Hrs_for Hrs_inf 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(expenditure) 5.15764*** 5.088257*** 5.018985*** 5.126702*** 9.628624*** 9.688778*** 9.581617*** 9.585205*** 
  (0.61681) (0.62578) (0.62027) (0.61582) (1.14570) (1.16245) (1.15085) (1.14683) 
L(fam_size) 9.552103*** 9.502377*** 9.503541*** 9.501758*** 29.13651*** 28.89112*** 29.02519*** 29.10518*** 
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  (1.37714) (1.37445) (1.38117) (1.37846) (2.48376) (2.47801) (2.48932) (2.48617) 
D(mem_spo) 1.393285 1.377112 1.180662 1.405535 -2.68102 -2.763261 -3.087059 -2.679788 
  (1.14293) (1.14481) (1.14411) (1.14505) (2.11905) (2.11578) (2.11889) (2.11991) 
D(mem_son)  -3.558813***  -3.58792***  -3.537515***  -3.558535***  -7.630036***  -7.713073***  -7.379838***  -7.56945*** 
  (1.23758) (1.23693) (1.23984) (1.23948) (2.09092) (2.08717) (2.09336) (2.09027) 
D(mem_oth) 1.471237 1.461777 1.448791 1.496924 5.622545*** 5.724788*** 5.754224*** 5.645524*** 
  (0.91550) (0.91704) (0.91980) (0.91781) (1.79472) (1.79133) (1.79894) (1.79606) 
P(men) 2.768288** 2.857244** 2.765719** 2.792928** 11.22202*** 11.49028*** 11.32958*** 11.2042*** 
  (1.33954) (1.33989) (1.33953) (1.33960) (2.41391) (2.40757) (2.41005) (2.41202) 
age_head 0.01832 0.0132672 0.0203231 0.0215116 1.376268*** 1.354409*** 1.369708*** 1.371784*** 
  (0.09332) (0.09352) (0.09360) (0.09339) (0.19190) (0.19223) (0.19217) (0.19213) 
age_head-sq -0.0007371 -0.0006746 -0.0007592 -0.0007666  -0.0154087***  -0.014886***  -0.0152942***  -0.0153868*** 
  (0.00090) (0.00091) (0.00090) (0.00090) (0.00184) (0.00185) (0.00184) (0.00184) 
D(gender_head) -1.52107 -1.557888 -1.54355 -1.545931 3.998572* 3.846052* 3.714862* 3.961498* 
  (1.20819) (1.21044) (1.20752) (1.21132) (2.10051) (2.09554) (2.09560) (2.10154) 
year_educ_head  -0.3573299***  -0.3541498***  -0.3533869***  -0.3495436***  -1.141636***  -1.060301***  -1.048528***  -1.137585*** 
  (0.07949) (0.08007) (0.08290) (0.08015) (0.14825) (0.15122) (0.15172) (0.14924) 
D(Lima) 0.996858 0.655516 0.8816171 0.7608007 3.176063** 4.325263 2.760363* 3.35382** 
  (0.76154) (1.28011) (0.76641) (0.78193) (1.46166) (2.66824) (1.45119) (1.51426) 
D(Hrs_for) 57.39319*** 57.45467*** 57.51025*** 57.40119***  -23.29264***  -23.10417***  -23.38378***  -23.32905*** 
  (0.69395) (0.69668) (0.69682) (0.69675) (1.39493) (1.40307) (1.39613) (1.39919) 
D(Hrs_inf)  -5.507792***  -5.543583***  -5.480241***  -5.525333*** 54.63505*** 54.33864*** 54.49805*** 54.64826*** 
  (0.77043) (0.76917) (0.77025) (0.77216) (0.95173) (0.95183) (0.95047) (0.95162) 
L(asset) 
 -5.932318***  -6.12688***  -5.968978***  -6.045492*** 5.20794** 4.737251** 5.354384** 5.270377** 
  (1.25793) (1.25951) (1.25558) (1.25816) (2.14413) (2.14362) (2.13761) (2.14508) 
L(asset)-sq 
0.4709992*** 0.4848168*** 0.4727657*** 0.4792468***  -0.4678609***  -0.4297405***  -0.4732164***  -0.4717131*** 
  (0.09921) (0.09932) (0.09904) (0.09928) (0.15130) (0.15135) (0.15092) (0.15138) 
L(wage_for) 
 -2.736262***  -2.926127***  -2.80308***  -2.546954***  -2.601397*  -2.773144*  -2.817543**  -2.639351* 
  (0.75251) (0.75632) (0.75752) (0.76908) (1.40251) (1.43440) (1.39882) (1.44543) 
L(wage_inf) 
-1.116992 -1.369418 -1.309705 -1.248271  -3.333609**  -4.404078***  -3.540152**  -3.936145** 
  (0.82136) (0.84185) (0.82073) (0.86007) (1.48721) (1.52465) (1.48405) (1.59145) 
D(house) 
 -2.565865***  -2.788906***  -2.743967***  -2.453775*** -1.799317 -3.05862 -1.554497 -1.843209 
  (0.65753) (0.68887) (0.66695) (0.66353) (2.35923) (2.39424) (2.36537) (2.37202) 
D(risk7) 
0.9685094 1.019759 0.9723995 0.9487966 4.062535 4.274697 3.956857 4.131356 
  (1.85312) (1.85304) (1.85193) (1.85193) (2.88844) (2.90277) (2.88698) (2.89331) 
non_labour 
-0.0001618 -0.000159 -0.000155 -0.0001577  -0.0005024***  -0.00048***  -0.0004984***  --0.0005018*** 
  (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   -0.2038506      -2.935724    
    (3.30402)      (5.83049)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   0.0400299      0.195091    
    (0.15566)      (0.27715)    
pop_den_distx1000   -0.0953555      -0.1452668    
    (0.06967)      (0.13243)    
D(not_slum)   0.0483118       -4.17967***    
    (0.65011)      (1.17931)    
D(mid_city)   -0.5530829      1.983565    
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    (0.71896)      (1.32011)    
D(border)   0.8515387      3.945957**    
    (0.94238)      (1.70347)    
D(tongue)    -0.9660547      2.470255*   
     (0.68482)      (1.42868)   
D(migrant)    1.609215**      3.079681***   
     (0.62300)      (1.10092)   
D(social)    -0.2155287      -0.7620457   
     (0.63644)      (1.12408)   
Station_distx1000      -3.893335**     -5.136164 
      (1.77584)     (3.65591) 
Muni_persx1000     0.0475494     0.1416813** 
      (0.05518)     (0.05988) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     -0.4275611     -0.1400681 
      (0.44043)     (0.85976) 
D(sdp_dist)     -0.8743937     2.051915 
      (1.50239)     (2.84038) 
Constant  -18.70041*** -19.00555  -17.76893***  -16.04093***  -113.8754***  -103.2736***  -116.4059*** -112.5584 
  (5.90547) (17.73516) (5.91682) (6.12741) (11.67244) (31.81863) (11.72922) (12.58776) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
R-squared 0.7192 0.7196 0.7196 0.7194 0.5296 0.5329 0.5308 0.5299 
 
j) First-stage regression of IV models (difference in hours of work) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(expenditure) -4.25354*** -4.39362*** -4.34027*** -4.19901*** 
  (1.22575) (1.25233) (1.23760) (1.22879) 
L(fam_size) -19.52928*** -19.37375*** -19.46409*** -19.50684*** 
  (2.94984) (2.94887) (2.95912) (2.95249) 
D(mem_spo) 4.09759* 4.15340* 4.27628* 4.13410* 
  (2.48627) (2.48656) (2.48941) (2.48919) 
D(mem_son) 4.06885 4.09804* 3.84386 4.01706 
  (2.48541) (2.48196) (2.48987) (2.48589) 
D(mem_oth) -4.13778** -4.25365** -4.29315** -4.12101** 
  (2.05107) (2.05059) (2.05782) (2.05381) 
P(men) -8.43078*** -8.60070*** -8.53929*** -8.40054*** 
  (2.82872) (2.82224) (2.82730) (2.82698) 
age_head -1.35720*** -1.33668*** -1.34816*** -1.35164*** 
  (0.21598) (0.21596) (0.21639) (0.21623) 
age_head-sq 0.01468*** 0.01419*** 0.01454*** 0.01465*** 
  (0.00208) (0.00208) (0.00208) (0.00208) 
D(gender_head) -5.58159** -5.44399** -5.32574** -5.61209** 
  (2.48829) (2.48810) (2.48335) (2.49055) 
year_educ_head 0.79105*** 0.71168*** 0.70357*** 0.79618*** 
  (0.17106) (0.17462) (0.17597) (0.17217) 
D(Lima) -1.65281 -2.93396 -1.32927 -1.82328 
  (1.58804) (2.95379) (1.58865) (1.60798) 
D(Hrs_for) 80.56848*** 80.47478*** 80.77729*** 80.55708*** 
  (1.57068) (1.58079) (1.57293) (1.57312) 
D(Hrs_inf) -60.15839*** -59.91292*** -59.99505*** -60.16554*** 
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  (1.21484) (1.21353) (1.21320) (1.21585) 
L(asset) -11.25296*** -11.06583*** -11.44560*** -11.39197*** 
  (2.55243) (2.55794) (2.54756) (2.55468) 
L(asset)-sq 0.94881*** 0.93170*** 0.95675*** 0.95849*** 
 (0.18531) (0.18572) (0.18496) (0.18551) 
wage_diff -1.00984 -1.39179 -0.92498 -1.05220 
 (1.31664) (1.33647) (1.31803) (1.34378) 
D(house) -0.76078 0.27772 -1.19075 -0.60279 
 (2.54671) (2.59608) (2.55569) (2.56238) 
D(risk7) -3.04177 -3.19436 -2.92900 -3.09779 
 (3.62868) (3.63026) (3.64592) (3.63025) 
non_labour 0.00035* 0.00033* 0.00035* 0.00035* 
  (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00019) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   4.83140    
    (6.77642)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.24498    
    (0.32163)    
pop_den_distx1000   0.05073    
    (0.15339)    
D(not_slum)   4.26783***    
    (1.38499)    
D(mid_city)   -2.52719    
    (1.54616)    
D(border)   -2.94033    
    (1.99813)    
D(tongue)    -3.47815**   
     (1.61603)   
D(migrant)    -1.35294   
     (1.29591)   
D(social)    0.49332   
     (1.32991)   
Station_distx1000     1.79953 
      (4.29812) 
Muni_persx1000     -0.05110 
      (0.08639) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     -0.22936 
      (0.98964) 
D(sdp_dist)     -2.94595 
      (3.37837) 
Constant 96.15398*** 74.43575** 99.73086*** 97.38025*** 
  (12.97152) (37.08107) (13.03686) (13.93127) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
R-squared 0.662 0.663 0.662 0.662 
 
k) Second-stage IV estimation (expenditure) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expenditure) -0.03660*** 0.12819*** -0.04655*** 0.12788*** -0.03289*** 0.12799*** -0.03406*** 0.12567*** 
  (0.00968) (0.00860) (0.01007) (0.00899) (0.00985) (0.00880) (0.00967) (0.00859) 
L(fam_size) 0.00330 0.03082*** -0.00103 0.03163*** 0.00479 0.03108*** 0.00512 0.03126*** 
  (0.01089) (0.00927) (0.01099) (0.00942) (0.01085) (0.00930) (0.01084) (0.00926) 
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D(mem_spo) 0.04302*** -0.03050*** 0.04161*** -0.02828*** 0.04097*** -0.02976*** 0.04280*** -0.02946*** 
  (0.00909) (0.00783) (0.00892) (0.00777) (0.00908) (0.00782) (0.00906) (0.00778) 
D(mem_son) 0.01003 -0.01495* 0.00682 -0.01389 0.01159 -0.01529* 0.00881 -0.01450* 
  (0.00993) (0.00852) (0.00979) (0.00847) (0.00987) (0.00851) (0.00989) (0.00848) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01478** 0.00581 0.01484** 0.00603 0.01638** 0.00531 0.01503** 0.00637 
  (0.00717) (0.00588) (0.00711) (0.00587) (0.00712) (0.00586) (0.00715) (0.00587) 
P(men) -0.02220* 0.00677 -0.02008* 0.00668 -0.02111* 0.00644 -0.01997 0.00596 
  (0.01233) (0.01120) (0.01216) (0.01115) (0.01231) (0.01121) (0.01230) (0.01118) 
age_head 0.00168 0.00310*** 0.00191* 0.00301*** 0.00149 0.00316*** 0.00189* 0.00299*** 
  (0.00108) (0.00097) (0.00107) (0.00097) (0.00109) (0.00097) (0.00108) (0.00097) 
age_head-sq -0.00002 -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00001 -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00002 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
D(gender_head) -0.01976** 0.01719** -0.01782* 0.01667** -0.02239** 0.01801** -0.01942** 0.01582* 
  (0.00962) (0.00826) (0.00939) (0.00821) (0.00962) (0.00829) (0.00960) (0.00824) 
year_educ_head -0.00396*** 0.00389*** -0.00394*** 0.00336*** -0.00333*** 0.00376*** -0.00409*** 0.00392*** 
  (0.00084) (0.00075) (0.00081) (0.00074) (0.00084) (0.00076) (0.00084) (0.00075) 
D(Lima) 0.07931*** 0.00671 0.06321*** 0.01003 0.07649*** 0.00724 0.07194*** 0.00939 
  (0.00665) (0.00591) (0.01214) (0.01018) (0.00668) (0.00596) (0.00679) (0.00597) 
Hrs_for -0.00017 -0.00003 -0.00018 -0.00002 -0.00018 -0.00002 -0.00019* -0.00002 
  (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) 
Hrs_inf 0.00007 -0.00023*** 0.00004 -0.00020*** 0.00004 -0.00022*** 0.00006 -0.00022*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.00823 -0.00644 0.01583* -0.00865 0.00556 -0.00607 0.00943 -0.00781 
  (0.00865) (0.00774) (0.00849) (0.00772) (0.00870) (0.00779) (0.00864) (0.00770) 
D(Hrs_inf) 0.01846*** -0.01631*** 0.01787** -0.01585** 0.01821*** -0.01639*** 0.01797** -0.01507** 
  (0.00701) (0.00624) (0.00696) (0.00623) (0.00698) (0.00625) (0.00699) (0.00622) 
L(pop_urb_dist)    0.15939*** -0.05179       
     (0.03319) (0.03336)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.00632*** 0.00201       
     (0.00153) (0.00152)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00083 0.00076       
     (0.00062) (0.00053)       
D(not_slum)    -0.00043 0.02586***       
     (0.00551) (0.00504)       
D(mid_city)    -0.02064*** 0.00437       
     (0.00637) (0.00559)       
D(border)    0.05997*** 0.00086       
     (0.00830) (0.00709)       
D(tongue)        0.03219*** -0.00513     
         (0.00668) (0.00572)     
D(migrant)        0.01525*** -0.00634     
         (0.00549) (0.00484)     
D(social)        0.00181 -0.00302     
         (0.00524) (0.00445)     
Station_distx1000          -0.09871*** 0.03368** 
           (0.01915) (0.01665) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00108*** 0.00199*** 
           (0.00042) (0.00055) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.00642 0.00188 
           (0.00423) (0.00367) 
D(sdp_dist)          -0.04394*** -0.01261 
           (0.01144) (0.01092) 
Constant 0.64220*** -0.90426*** -0.25013 -0.58620*** 0.59457*** -0.89754*** 0.59770*** -0.90128*** 
  (0.07554) (0.06666) (0.17628) (0.18176) (0.07672) (0.06819) (0.07876) (0.06906) 
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Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 1608.341 2285.586 1686.809 2313.037 1630.370 2288.043 1628.093 2310.029 
 
l) Second-stage IV estimation (hours of work under 2SLS) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_for -0.00519*** 0.00307* -0.00269* 0.00278* -0.00518*** 0.00315* -0.00590*** 0.00391** 
  (0.00165) (0.00174) (0.00158) (0.00167) (0.00162) (0.00172) (0.00165) (0.00167) 
Hrs_inf 0.00334*** -0.00547*** 0.00443*** -0.00540*** 0.00330*** -0.00550*** 0.00255*** -0.00461*** 
  (0.00100) (0.00106) (0.00095) (0.00103) (0.00099) (0.00106) (0.00098) (0.00098) 
L(expenditure) -0.02104 0.10513*** -0.05169*** 0.10510*** -0.01990 0.10448*** -0.01068 0.09253*** 
  (0.01286) (0.01369) (0.01236) (0.01295) (0.01249) (0.01342) (0.01289) (0.01312) 
L(fam_size) -0.03171 0.11985*** -0.08943*** 0.12036*** -0.03139 0.12013*** -0.00292 0.08899** 
  (0.03437) (0.03661) (0.03172) (0.03414) (0.03364) (0.03610) (0.03424) (0.03454) 
D(mem_spo) 0.05933*** -0.04715*** 0.05781*** -0.04464*** 0.05782*** -0.04864*** 0.05798*** -0.04485*** 
  (0.01391) (0.01464) (0.01407) (0.01448) (0.01394) (0.01477) (0.01351) (0.01352) 
D(mem_son) 0.01524 -0.03661** 0.02949* -0.03684** 0.01634 -0.03571** 0.00577 -0.02659 
  (0.01664) (0.01753) (0.01629) (0.01693) (0.01634) (0.01738) (0.01632) (0.01638) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00273 0.03615*** -0.00798 0.03696*** 0.00421 0.03612*** 0.00869 0.03050** 
  (0.01207) (0.01324) (0.01237) (0.01297) (0.01201) (0.01331) (0.01172) (0.01215) 
P(men) -0.04821** 0.06526*** -0.06643*** 0.06634*** -0.04703** 0.06547*** -0.03487* 0.05214** 
  (0.02041) (0.02167) (0.02022) (0.02120) (0.02027) (0.02172) (0.02009) (0.02025) 
age_head -0.00277 0.01107*** -0.00415** 0.01087*** -0.00287 0.01114*** -0.00140 0.00970*** 
  (0.00192) (0.00204) (0.00188) (0.00196) (0.00190) (0.00204) (0.00188) (0.00189) 
age_head-sq 0.00003 -0.00010*** 0.00005** -0.00010*** 0.00003 -0.00010*** 0.00002 -0.00008*** 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.03911*** 0.03977*** -0.03804*** 0.03878*** -0.04108*** 0.03972*** -0.03664** 0.03593** 
  (0.01465) (0.01516) (0.01455) (0.01495) (0.01451) (0.01516) (0.01432) (0.01407) 
year_educ_head -0.00233 0.00099 -0.00049 0.00072 -0.00188 0.00128 -0.00354** 0.00233 
  (0.00164) (0.00175) (0.00152) (0.00161) (0.00156) (0.00168) (0.00161) (0.00162) 
D(Lima) 0.07050*** 0.02819*** 0.04987*** 0.03229* 0.06914*** 0.02613*** 0.06385*** 0.02925*** 
  (0.00875) (0.00954) (0.01711) (0.01729) (0.00870) (0.00955) (0.00854) (0.00895) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.37055*** -0.29156*** 0.25649*** -0.27317*** 0.36756*** -0.29650*** 0.39432*** -0.32171*** 
  (0.09800) (0.10389) (0.09530) (0.10125) (0.09709) (0.10374) (0.09740) (0.09888) 
D(Hrs_inf) -0.19013*** 0.29056*** -0.23746*** 0.28521*** -0.18890*** 0.29202*** -0.15163*** 0.24893*** 
  (0.05568) (0.05940) (0.05332) (0.05798) (0.05534) (0.05953) (0.05482) (0.05481) 
L(pop_urb_dist)     0.17338*** -0.04695        
      (0.04132) (0.04473)        
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq     -0.00717*** 0.00212        
      (0.00195) (0.00209)        
pop_den_distx1000     -0.00054 0.00049        
      (0.00088) (0.00089)        
D(not_slum)     0.01709** 0.00940        
      (0.00859) (0.00907)        
D(mid_city)     -0.02982*** 0.01482        
      (0.00911) (0.00941)        
D(border)     0.04436*** 0.02222*        
      (0.01215) (0.01240)        
D(tongue)       0.02071** 0.00486    
        (0.00946) (0.01021)    
D(migrant)       0.01204 0.00874    
        (0.00808) (0.00888)    
D(social)       0.00404 -0.00827    
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        (0.00735) (0.00787)    
Station_distx1000           -0.10534*** 0.01811 
            (0.02501) (0.02957) 
Muni_persx1000           -0.00118** 0.00246*** 
            (0.00055) (0.00068) 
L(budget_dist_pc)           0.00443 0.00175 
            (0.00561) (0.00571) 
D(sdp_dist)           -0.05331*** -0.00210 
            (0.01684) (0.01863) 
Constant 0.61489*** -0.90761*** -0.12201 -0.65989*** 0.59148*** -0.91068*** 0.49314*** -0.79649*** 
  (0.12477) (0.13295) (0.22485) (0.24651) (0.12349) (0.13306) (0.12401) (0.12550) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 107.852 -268.526 -11.446 -193.969 129.851 -290.423 272.774 109.448 
 
m) Second-stage IV estimation (hours of work under LIML) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_for -0.00584*** 0.00357 -0.00294* 0.00335 -0.00583*** 0.00367* -0.00677*** 0.00446** 
  (0.00198) (0.00225) (0.00176) (0.00213) (0.00193) (0.00219) (0.00204) (0.00210) 
Hrs_inf 0.00389*** -0.00654*** 0.00483*** -0.00638*** 0.00385*** -0.00651*** 0.00304** -0.00541*** 
  (0.00124) (0.00142) (0.00108) (0.00135) (0.00123) (0.00140) (0.00127) (0.00127) 
L(expenditure) -0.02150 0.11003*** -0.05330*** 0.10932*** -0.02048 0.10899*** -0.00952 0.09532*** 
  (0.01510) (0.01709) (0.01345) (0.01577) (0.01455) (0.01642) (0.01558) (0.01601) 
L(fam_size) -0.04063 0.14438*** -0.09799*** 0.14199*** -0.04043 0.14306*** -0.00802 0.10586** 
  (0.04151) (0.04725) (0.03517) (0.04285) (0.04044) (0.04579) (0.04264) (0.04339) 
D(mem_spo) 0.06197*** -0.05114*** 0.05942*** -0.04856*** 0.06055*** -0.05280*** 0.06076*** -0.04815*** 
  (0.01521) (0.01697) (0.01488) (0.01669) (0.01527) (0.01703) (0.01489) (0.01531) 
D(mem_son) 0.01713 -0.04293** 0.03166* -0.04238** 0.01812 -0.04130** 0.00639 -0.03074 
  (0.01874) (0.02096) (0.01739) (0.01985) (0.01832) (0.02050) (0.01873) (0.01915) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00069 0.04131*** -0.00987 0.04170*** 0.00206 0.04110*** 0.00735 0.03412** 
  (0.01356) (0.01584) (0.01323) (0.01531) (0.01349) (0.01578) (0.01337) (0.01421) 
P(men) -0.05277** 0.07610*** -0.07039*** 0.07629*** -0.05170** 0.07578*** -0.03811* 0.05990** 
  (0.02303) (0.02595) (0.02164) (0.02500) (0.02282) (0.02574) (0.02305) (0.02367) 
age_head -0.00348 0.01249*** -0.00467** 0.01216*** -0.00358 0.01248*** -0.00201 0.01076*** 
  (0.00221) (0.00250) (0.00203) (0.00237) (0.00219) (0.00247) (0.00222) (0.00226) 
age_head-sq 0.00004 -0.00012*** 0.00005** -0.00011*** 0.00004* -0.00012*** 0.00002 -0.00010*** 
  (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.04225*** 0.04488** -0.03997*** 0.04350** -0.04411*** 0.04439** -0.03983** 0.04004** 
  (0.01604) (0.01757) (0.01538) (0.01721) (0.01587) (0.01744) (0.01582) (0.01592) 
year_educ_head -0.00188 -0.00015 -0.00012 -0.00021 -0.00147 0.00030 -0.00323* 0.00153 
  (0.00194) (0.00222) (0.00166) (0.00198) (0.00183) (0.00209) (0.00196) (0.00200) 
D(Lima) 0.06957*** 0.03006*** 0.04893*** 0.03461* 0.06837*** 0.02750** 0.06293*** 0.03060*** 
  (0.00946) (0.01090) (0.01792) (0.01962) (0.00938) (0.01080) (0.00926) (0.00998) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.42067*** -0.34501** 0.27984*** -0.32879** 0.41807*** -0.35039*** 0.45557*** -0.37181*** 
  (0.11810) (0.13446) (0.10678) (0.13037) (0.11686) (0.13255) (0.12073) (0.12421) 
D(Hrs_inf) -0.22401*** 0.35215*** -0.26070*** 0.34267*** -0.22294*** 0.35081*** -0.18320*** 0.29632*** 
  (0.06938) (0.07928) (0.06060) (0.07618) (0.06896) (0.07845) (0.07045) (0.07078) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.17550*** -0.05237       
    (0.04305) (0.04967)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.00728*** 0.00240       
    (0.00203) (0.00234)       
pop_den_distx1000   -0.00051 0.00042       
    (0.00092) (0.00101)       
256 
 
 
 
D(not_slum)   0.01886** 0.00502       
    (0.00917) (0.01060)       
D(mid_city)   -0.03068*** 0.01693       
    (0.00956) (0.01069)       
D(border)   0.04307*** 0.02544*       
    (0.01279) (0.01418)       
D(tongue)       0.01865* 0.00810     
        (0.01034) (0.01178)     
D(migrant)       0.01141 0.01082     
        (0.00888) (0.01025)     
D(social)       0.00439 -0.00901     
        (0.00792) (0.00892)     
Station_distx1000         -0.10555*** 0.01451 
          (0.02755) (0.03320) 
Muni_persx1000         -0.00119** 0.00248*** 
          (0.00059) (0.00072) 
L(budget_dist_pc)         0.00415 0.00173 
          (0.00603) (0.00633) 
D(sdp_dist)         -0.05488*** -0.00037 
          (0.01844) (0.02081) 
Constant 0.63329*** -0.97678*** -0.10745 -0.69708** 0.61204*** -0.97755*** 0.49777*** -0.84093*** 
  (0.14809) (0.16802) (0.23430) (0.27268) (0.14582) (0.16514) (0.15067) (0.15373) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL -234.179 -881.185 -234.354 -778.704 -215.719 -877.996 -82.385 -393.124 
 
n) Second-stage IV estimation (hours of work under GMM) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_for -0.00518*** 0.00322* -0.00282* 0.00286* -0.00517*** 0.00326* -0.00584*** 0.00395** 
  (0.00164) (0.00173) (0.00157) (0.00166) (0.00161) (0.00171) (0.00165) (0.00166) 
Hrs_inf 0.00342*** -0.00520*** 0.00434*** -0.00516*** 0.00338*** -0.00525*** 0.00270*** -0.00447*** 
  (0.00099) (0.00105) (0.00094) (0.00102) (0.00098) (0.00105) (0.00098) (0.00097) 
L(expenditure) -0.02121* 0.10306*** -0.05024*** 0.10392*** -0.01998 0.10296*** -0.01163 0.09262*** 
  (0.01274) (0.01349) (0.01224) (0.01283) (0.01237) (0.01323) (0.01280) (0.01295) 
L(fam_size) -0.03361 0.11159*** -0.08610*** 0.11415*** -0.03331 0.11291*** -0.00704 0.08581** 
  (0.03398) (0.03601) (0.03125) (0.03370) (0.03326) (0.03561) (0.03398) (0.03413) 
D(mem_spo) 0.05905*** -0.04619*** 0.05800*** -0.04390*** 0.05762*** -0.04753*** 0.05771*** -0.04467*** 
  (0.01390) (0.01462) (0.01406) (0.01446) (0.01393) (0.01475) (0.01350) (0.01350) 
D(mem_son) 0.01549 -0.03424** 0.02817* -0.03513** 0.01647 -0.03373* 0.00682 -0.02600 
  (0.01655) (0.01742) (0.01620) (0.01684) (0.01626) (0.01729) (0.01626) (0.01630) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00207 0.03427*** -0.00684 0.03533*** 0.00352 0.03438*** 0.00738 0.02964** 
  (0.01201) (0.01307) (0.01229) (0.01283) (0.01195) (0.01317) (0.01167) (0.01203) 
P(men) -0.04904** 0.06337*** -0.06491*** 0.06488*** -0.04780** 0.06391*** -0.03652* 0.05204*** 
  (0.02030) (0.02152) (0.02007) (0.02109) (0.02016) (0.02159) (0.02001) (0.02015) 
age_head -0.00294 0.01044*** -0.00411** 0.01032*** -0.00303 0.01055*** -0.00164 0.00932*** 
  (0.00190) (0.00201) (0.00186) (0.00194) (0.00189) (0.00201) (0.00187) (0.00187) 
age_head-sq 0.00003 -0.00009*** 0.00005** -0.00009*** 0.00003* -0.00009*** 0.00002 -0.00008*** 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.03959*** 0.03755** -0.03848*** 0.03701** -0.04158*** 0.03764** -0.03732*** 0.03502** 
  (0.01464) (0.01512) (0.01454) (0.01491) (0.01450) (0.01512) (0.01431) (0.01404) 
year_educ_head -0.00223 0.00141 -0.00062 0.00102 -0.00179 0.00163 -0.00333** 0.00254 
  (0.00162) (0.00173) (0.00150) (0.00160) (0.00155) (0.00167) (0.00160) (0.00161) 
D(Lima) 0.07095*** 0.02854*** 0.04971*** 0.03393** 0.06957*** 0.02675*** 0.06411*** 0.02962*** 
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  (0.00872) (0.00950) (0.01702) (0.01717) (0.00867) (0.00951) (0.00852) (0.00893) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.37199*** -0.29484*** 0.26160*** -0.27336*** 0.36833*** -0.29799*** 0.39396*** -0.32123*** 
  (0.09779) (0.10361) (0.09491) (0.10113) (0.09692) (0.10351) (0.09726) (0.09860) 
D(Hrs_inf) -0.19510*** 0.27651*** -0.23332*** 0.27289*** -0.19344*** 0.27887*** -0.15950*** 0.24133*** 
  (0.05519) (0.05868) (0.05279) (0.05739) (0.05487) (0.05892) (0.05448) (0.05437) 
L(pop_urb_dist)    0.17454*** -0.04500       
     (0.04122) (0.04467)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.00720*** 0.00201       
     (0.00194) (0.00209)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00054 0.00044       
     (0.00087) (0.00089)       
D(not_slum)    0.01678* 0.01047       
     (0.00857) (0.00905)       
D(mid_city)    -0.02999*** 0.01524       
     (0.00910) (0.00940)       
D(border)    0.04536*** 0.02045*       
     (0.01213) (0.01235)       
D(tongue)        0.02066** 0.00509     
         (0.00944) (0.01019)     
D(migrant)        0.01135 0.00696     
         (0.00806) (0.00884)     
D(social)        0.00452 -0.00766     
         (0.00734) (0.00786)     
Station_distx1000          -0.10148*** 0.02065 
           (0.02485) (0.02941) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00122** 0.00244*** 
           (0.00055) (0.00068) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.00446 0.00212 
           (0.00560) (0.00570) 
D(sdp_dist)          -0.05323*** -0.00234 
           (0.01684) (0.01863) 
Constant 0.62046*** -0.87748*** -0.14240 -0.64720*** 0.59656*** -0.88483*** 0.50580*** -0.79153*** 
  (0.12337) (0.13057) (0.22407) (0.24568) (0.12212) (0.13090) (0.12301) (0.12362) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
LogL 74.277 -137.136 21.735 -72.473 99.654 -166.906 236.391 179.196 
 
o) Second-stage IV estimation (difference of hours of work under C-IV) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Hrs_formal-Hrs_informal -0.00447*** 0.00521*** -0.00427*** 0.00494*** -0.00447*** 0.00525*** -0.00415*** 0.00503*** 
  (0.00098) (0.00102) (0.00097) (0.00100) (0.00099) (0.00104) (0.00093) (0.00101) 
L(expenditure) -0.03291*** 0.09189*** -0.04206*** 0.09019*** -0.03191*** 0.09187*** -0.03133*** 0.08959*** 
  (0.00667) (0.00687) (0.00669) (0.00685) (0.00678) (0.00702) (0.00641) (0.00671) 
L(fam_size) -0.06976*** 0.09211*** -0.06979*** 0.08703*** -0.07036*** 0.09336*** -0.06340*** 0.09003*** 
  (0.02232) (0.02319) (0.02182) (0.02249) (0.02248) (0.02347) (0.02120) (0.02269) 
D(mem_spo) 0.06173*** -0.04948*** 0.05967*** -0.04647*** 0.06091*** -0.05050*** 0.06035*** -0.04782*** 
  (0.01398) (0.01439) (0.01361) (0.01393) (0.01409) (0.01459) (0.01341) (0.01407) 
D(mem_son) 0.02636* -0.02709* 0.02272 -0.02578* 0.02740* -0.02655* 0.02404* -0.02586* 
  (0.01473) (0.01517) (0.01432) (0.01465) (0.01469) (0.01520) (0.01412) (0.01479) 
D(mem_oth) -0.00471 0.03132*** -0.00455 0.03092*** -0.00357 0.03145*** -0.00301 0.03110*** 
  (0.01164) (0.01199) (0.01135) (0.01162) (0.01171) (0.01213) (0.01115) (0.01170) 
P(men) -0.06305*** 0.05658*** -0.06021*** 0.05510*** -0.06241*** 0.05707*** -0.05789*** 0.05402*** 
  (0.01963) (0.02024) (0.01916) (0.01964) (0.01971) (0.02044) (0.01879) (0.01978) 
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age_head -0.00434** 0.01059*** -0.00386** 0.01016*** -0.00449** 0.01069*** -0.00369** 0.01021*** 
  (0.00193) (0.00200) (0.00188) (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00201) (0.00184) (0.00196) 
age_head-sq 0.00005** -0.00009*** 0.00004** -0.00009*** 0.00005*** -0.00009*** 0.00004** -0.00009*** 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.04288*** 0.04147*** -0.03962*** 0.04002*** -0.04472*** 0.04155*** -0.04104*** 0.03921*** 
  (0.01494) (0.01539) (0.01450) (0.01485) (0.01489) (0.01542) (0.01433) (0.01504) 
year_educ_head -0.00068 0.00206 -0.00121 0.00197 -0.00030 0.00228* -0.00099 0.00219 
  (0.00131) (0.00136) (0.00124) (0.00127) (0.00127) (0.00132) (0.00125) (0.00133) 
D(Lima) 0.06839*** 0.02750*** 0.04984*** 0.03181* 0.06765*** 0.02594*** 0.06180*** 0.03014*** 
  (0.00952) (0.00979) (0.01719) (0.01758) (0.00956) (0.00989) (0.00933) (0.00975) 
D(Hrs_for) 0.35437*** -0.40959*** 0.34399*** -0.38790*** 0.35307*** -0.41305*** 0.32904*** -0.39643*** 
  (0.07975) (0.08335) (0.07865) (0.08150) (0.08067) (0.08467) (0.07537) (0.08178) 
D(Hrs_inf) -0.24858*** 0.28771*** -0.23706*** 0.27188*** -0.24948*** 0.28993*** -0.22998*** 0.27863*** 
  (0.06025) (0.06296) (0.05926) (0.06139) (0.06060) (0.06359) (0.05695) (0.06178) 
L(pop_urb_dist)     0.16621*** -0.03533        
      (0.04107) (0.04198)        
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq     -0.00680*** 0.00153        
      (0.00193) (0.00197)        
pop_den_distx1000     -0.00069 0.00073        
      (0.00092) (0.00094)        
D(not_slum)     0.01664* 0.01103        
      (0.00899) (0.00921)        
D(mid_city)     -0.03023*** 0.01495        
      (0.00936) (0.00958)        
D(border)     0.04617*** 0.01887        
      (0.01252) (0.01281)        
D(tongue)       0.01807* 0.00593    
        (0.01000) (0.01036)    
D(migrant)       0.00780 0.00513    
        (0.00810) (0.00839)    
D(social)       0.00508 -0.00776    
        (0.00785) (0.00812)    
Station_distx1000           -0.08556*** 0.01990 
            (0.03166) (0.03308) 
Muni_persx1000           -0.00126* 0.00246*** 
            (0.00071) (0.00074) 
L(budget_dist_pc)           0.00600 0.00219 
            (0.00582) (0.00608) 
D(sdp_dist)           -0.05392*** -0.00036 
            (0.01733) (0.01812) 
Constant 0.74400*** -0.79008*** -0.17140 -0.57990** 0.72626*** -0.79687*** 0.69925*** -0.78553*** 
  (0.07162) (0.07403) (0.22081) (0.22571) (0.07421) (0.07716) (0.07465) (0.07882) 
Observations 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 4,874 
Wald(overall) 276.63*** 643.60*** 368.83*** 712.37*** 295.75*** 638.65*** 316.49*** 690.22*** 
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Appendix 4: Definition of variables and basic tabulations (models in Chapter 6)  
 
a) Model for consumption groups 
Variable Definition 
Groups 
7,253 obs. 
mean s.d. 
Dependant variables  
Fon 
Consumption done in food to be consumed within the household as a share of total 
expenditure 
0.363 0.16157 
Foff 
Consumption done in food to be consumed outside the household as a share of total 
expenditure 
0.120 0.13079 
CC Consumption done in clothing and personal care as a share of total expenditure 0.088 0.06294 
HEA Consumption done in health goods and services as a share of total expenditure 0.052 0.07438 
TC 
Consumption done in transportation and communication as a share of total 
expenditure 
0.137 0.09282 
ED 
Consumption done in entertainment, education and cultural goods and services as a 
share of total expenditure 
0.067 0.07895 
OT Consumption done in other or non-classified goods as a share of total expenditure 0.173 0.09932 
D(Fon) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase Fon, 0 = otherwise 0.985 0.12112 
D(Foff) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase Foff, 0 = otherwise 0.865 0.34202 
D(CC) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase CC, 0 = otherwise 0.990 0.09915 
D(HEA) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase HEA, 0 = otherwise 0.830 0.37554 
D(TC) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase TC, 0 = otherwise 0.961 0.19463 
D(ED) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase ED, 0 = otherwise 0.906 0.29208 
D(OT) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase OT, 0 = otherwise 0.999 0.03320 
Independant variables: SUR model 
L(expenditure) Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 8.068 0.71693 
L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.314 0.55974 
D(mem_spo) Dummy variable: 1 = household has a spouse, 0 = otherwise 0.655 0.47548 
D(mem_son) Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or daughter, 0 = otherwise 0.811 0.39188 
D(mem_oth) Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 0 = otherwise 0.309 0.46199 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.500 0.24141 
age_head Age of the head of the household (in years) 48.660 14.31469 
age_head-sq Age of the head of the household (in years) squared 2572.651 1501.49700 
D(gender_head) Dummy variable: 1 = household head in male, 0 = otherwise 0.742 0.43739 
year_educ_head Number of years of education of the head of the household 10.307 4.82042 
Hrs_ff 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
formal workers in formal firms (see Chapter 4) 
20.797 33.62769 
Hrs_if 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
informal workers in formal firms (see Chapter 4) 
5.403 18.56123 
Hrs_ii 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
informal workers in informal firms (see Chapter 4) 
18.539 35.73597 
Hrs_sf 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity,  sector = 
informal self-employment (see Chapter 4) 
7.894 21.96456 
Hrs_si 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
formal self-employment (see Chapter 4) 
29.219 41.04796 
Hrs_fam 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
family work (see Chapter 4) 
8.282 22.38989 
Hrs_second 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, secondary activity (see 
Chapter 4) 
6.482 14.50570 
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D(Hrs_ff) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal worker in formal firm in 
his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.344 0.47498 
D(Hrs_if) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal worker in formal firm in 
his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.102 0.30325 
D(Hrs_ii) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal worker in informal firm in 
his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.306 0.46101 
D(Hrs_sf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal self-employer in his/her 
primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.144 0.35077 
D(Hrs_si) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal self-employer in his/her 
primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.497 0.50003 
D(Hrs_fam) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is family worker in his/her primary 
activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.205 0.40405 
D(Hrs_second) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member has a second job (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.282 0.44998 
D(Lima) Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = otherwise 0.150 0.35710 
Independant variables: PROBIT model 
D(ca_food)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
food, 0 = otherwise 
0.740 0.43876 
D(ca_food)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
tubers and cereals, 0 = otherwise 
0.629 0.48318 
D(ca_food)_3 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
fruits and vegetables, 0 = otherwise 
0.551 0.49742 
D(ca_food)_4 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
meat, fish and chicken, 0 = otherwise 
0.547 0.49780 
Agropec_firmPC Number of agropecuarian firms per 1,000 habs (province level) 0.489 1.31330 
D(agro_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = agrarian activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.590 0.49185 
D(pec_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = pecuarian activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.298 0.45720 
D(fish_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = fishing activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.110 0.31260 
Prop(workagro_dist) Proportion of urban workers in agropecuarian sector in the district  0.097 0.13243 
Prop(workfish_dist) Proportion of urban workers in fishing sector in the district  0.010 0.02806 
Hotel_firmPC Number of tourism (hotel and restaurants) firms per 1,000 habs (province level) 3.547 1.34299 
D(rest_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = restaurant activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.765 0.42373 
D(tour_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = tourism activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.223 0.41652 
Prop(workrest_dist) Proportion of urban workers in restaurant and hotel sector in the district  0.058 0.01435 
Com_firmPC Number of commercial firms per 1,000 habs (province level) 23.024 6.84234 
Prop(workcom_dist) Proportion of urban workers in commercial sector in the district  0.228 0.05515 
D(ca_cloth)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
clothes, 0 = otherwise 
0.393 0.48835 
D(ca_cloth)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
shoes, 0 = otherwise 
0.377 0.48476 
D(ca_health)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
medicines, 0 = otherwise 
0.422 0.49398 
D(ca_health)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
soaps, 0 = otherwise 
0.506 0.50000 
n_chronic Number family members with a chronic illness 1.063 1.11382 
Health1_distx1000 Number of health centres per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.697 0.69784 
Health2_distx1000 Number of hospitals per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.026 0.04061 
Health3_distx1000 Number of health micro-centres per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.098 0.23481 
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Health4_distx1000 Number of other health providers per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.526 0.59335 
Health_firmPC Number of health firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 0.612 0.35445 
Prop(workhealth_dist) Proportion of urban workers in health sector in the district  0.028 0.01200 
D(ca_transport) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
transport, 0 = otherwise 
0.522 0.49957 
comm1_distx1000 Number of communal phones per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.170 0.30509 
comm2_distx1000 Number of telephone centrals per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.024 0.09046 
comm3_distx1000 Number of post offices per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.020 0.04793 
comm4_distx1000 Number of satellite dishes per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.068 0.20115 
comm5_distx1000 Number of internet cabins per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.818 1.26340 
comm6_distx1000 Number of other communication infrastructures per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.014 0.06966 
D(comm_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the district has other transportation and communication 
infrastructure , 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
0.665 0.47218 
D(transp_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = transportation activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.912 0.28386 
transp_distx1000 Number of transport lines per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.304 0.36089 
D(good_roads_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 =the roads in the district are good, 0 = otherwise (declared by 
the mayor) 
0.927 0.25937 
Transport_firmPC Number of transport firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 0.799 0.41888 
D(TC_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = there are workers on transport and communication in the 
district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
0.143 0.34993 
Prop(worktransp_dist) Proportion of urban workers in transport and communication sector in the district  0.102 0.02749 
Commun_firmPC Number of communication firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 1.754 0.71898 
D(ca_educ) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
education, 0 = otherwise 
0.455 0.49797 
D(ca_entert) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
entertainment, 0 = otherwise 
0.132 0.33860 
school_distx1000 Number of school rooms per 1,000 habitants (district level) 4.736 1.84052 
Educa_firmPC Number of educational firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 0.523 0.31554 
Entert_firmPC Number of entertainment firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 0.244 0.09157 
Prop(workeduca_dist) Proportion of urban workers in educational sector in the district  0.082 0.03701 
 
 
b) Models for markets within consumption groups (1) 
 
Variable Definition 
Fon Foff CC 
7,145 obs. 6,272 obs. 7,181 obs. 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Dependent variables  
Fon_inf 
Consumption of Fon done at informal markets as a 
share of total Fon expenditure 
0.603 0.28492 
        
Fon_semi 
Consumption of Fon done at semi-formal markets as a 
share of total Fon expenditure 
0.332 0.27992 
        
Fon_for 
Consumption of Fon done at formal markets as a share 
of total Fon expenditure 
0.065 0.14366 
        
D(Fon_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Fon_inf, 
0 = otherwise 
0.970 0.17162 
        
262 
 
 
 
D(Fon_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from 
Fon_semi, 0 = otherwise 
0.934 0.24914 
        
D(Fon_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Fon_for, 
0 = otherwise 
0.467 0.49893 
        
Foff_inf 
Consumption of Foff done at informal markets as a 
share of total Foff expenditure 
    
0.279 0.37052 
    
Foff_semi 
Consumption of Foff done at semi-formal markets as a 
share of total Foff expenditure 
    
0.196 0.33898 
    
Foff_for 
Consumption of Foff done at formal markets as a share 
of total Foff expenditure 
    
0.525 0.41753 
    
D(Foff_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Foff_inf, 
0 = otherwise 
    
0.588 0.49232 
    
D(Foff_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from 
Foff_semi, 0 = otherwise 
    
0.299 0.45783 
    
D(Foff_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Foff_for, 
0 = otherwise 
    
0.766 0.42354 
    
CC_inf 
Consumption of CC done at informal markets as a 
share of total CC expenditure 
        
0.417 0.32832 
CC_semi 
Consumption of CC done at semi-formal markets as a 
share of total CC expenditure 
        
0.515 0.32139 
CC_for 
Consumption of CC done at formal markets as a share 
of total CC expenditure 
        
0.068 0.15302 
D(CC_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from CC_inf, 
0 = otherwise 
        
0.823 0.38169 
D(CC_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from 
CC_semi, 0 = otherwise 
        
0.954 0.20849 
D(CC_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from CC_for, 
0 = otherwise 
        
0.300 0.45845 
Independent variables: SUR model 
L(expend_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles (Fon) 
6.935 0.74619 
        
L(expenditure_Foff) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles (Foff) 
    
5.649 1.33060 
    
L(expenditure_CC) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles (CC) 
        
5.422 1.03924 
L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.326 0.54964 1.349 0.54910 1.321 0.55516 
D(mem_spo) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a spouse, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.660 0.47359 0.667 0.47135 0.658 0.47428 
D(mem_son) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or daughter, 
0 = otherwise 
0.818 0.38560 0.830 0.37535 0.817 0.38679 
D(mem_oth) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.311 0.46310 0.319 0.46608 0.309 0.46194 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.498 0.23776 0.509 0.23685 0.501 0.23962 
age_head Age of the head of the household (in years) 48.704 14.24073 48.036 13.72804 48.518 14.19388 
age_head-sq Age of the head of the household (in years) squared 2574.889 1493.76600 2495.844 1417.64800 2555.411 1484.79200 
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D(gender_head) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household head in male, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.742 0.43730 0.759 0.42796 0.745 0.43580 
year_educ_head 
Number of years of education of the head of the 
household 
10.297 4.81120 10.511 4.76424 10.357 4.79832 
Hrs_ff 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = formal workers in formal firms 
(see Chapter 4) 
20.955 33.73765 22.757 34.76091 20.987 33.72882 
Hrs_if 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = informal workers in formal 
firms (see Chapter 4) 
5.420 18.55995 5.905 19.50229 5.457 18.64613 
Hrs_ii 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = informal workers in informal 
firms (see Chapter 4) 
18.698 35.89226 20.198 37.19842 18.644 35.83561 
Hrs_sf 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity,  sector = informal self-employment (see 
Chapter 4) 
7.925 22.00129 7.903 22.04935 7.901 21.98871 
Hrs_si 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = formal self-employment (see 
Chapter 4) 
29.268 41.03178 30.672 42.14880 29.323 41.11847 
Hrs_fam 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
primary activity, sector = family work (see Chapter 4) 
8.306 22.38653 8.177 21.77709 8.331 22.47213 
Hrs_second 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, 
secondary activity (see Chapter 4) 
6.507 14.50371 6.888 15.02152 6.519 14.54816 
D(Hrs_ff) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal 
worker in formal firm in his/her primary activity (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.346 0.47572 0.373 0.48358 0.347 0.47597 
D(Hrs_if) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal 
worker in formal firm in his/her primary activity (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.103 0.30417 0.110 0.31313 0.103 0.30459 
D(Hrs_ii) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal 
worker in informal firm in his/her primary activity (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.309 0.46201 0.328 0.46945 0.307 0.46137 
D(Hrs_sf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal 
self-employer in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 
0 = otherwise 
0.144 0.35141 0.142 0.34947 0.144 0.35082 
D(Hrs_si) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal 
self-employer in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 
0 = otherwise 
0.499 0.50003 0.509 0.49995 0.498 0.50003 
D(Hrs_fam) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is family 
worker in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.206 0.40478 0.207 0.40492 0.206 0.40473 
D(Hrs_second) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member has a 
second job (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.284 0.45089 0.295 0.45592 0.283 0.45067 
D(Lima) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.151 0.35836 0.149 0.35635 0.150 0.35721 
Independent variables: PROBIT model 
D(ca_food)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of food, 0 = otherwise 
0.740 0.43861 
        
D(ca_food)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of tubers and cereals, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.629 0.48304 
        
D(ca_food)_3 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of fruits and vegetables, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.552 0.49729 
        
D(ca_food)_4 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of meat, fish and chicken, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.548 0.49776 
        
Agropec_firmPC 
Number of agropecuarian firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level) 
0.488 1.31486 
        
D(agro_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = agrarian activity is important in the 
district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
0.588 0.49231 
        
D(pec_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = pecuarian activity is important in 
the district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
0.295 0.45628 
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D(fish_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = fishing activity is important in the 
district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
0.110 0.31344 
        
Prop(workagro_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in agropecuarian sector in 
the district  
0.096 0.13200 
        
Prop(workfish_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in fishing sector in the 
district  
0.010 0.02794 
        
Hotel_firmPC 
Number of tourism (hotel and restaurants) firms per 
1,000 habitants (province level) 
    
3.605 1.34239 
    
D(rest_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = restaurant activity is important in 
the district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
    
0.776 0.41675 
    
D(tour_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = tourism activity is important in the 
district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor) 
    
0.223 0.41612 
    
Prop(workrest_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in restaurant and hotel 
sector in the district  
    
0.059 0.01391 
    
Com_firmPC 
Number of commercial firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level) 
        
23.062 6.82462 
Prop(workcom_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in commercial sector in the 
district  
        
0.229 0.05489 
D(ca_cloth)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of clothes, 0 = otherwise 
        
0.395 0.48884 
D(ca_cloth)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of shoes, 0 = otherwise 
        
0.380 0.48532 
P(pop_slums_dist) Proportion of people in the district living in a slum 0.328 0.33782 0.337 0.33937 0.330 0.33815 
P(migrant_dist) 
Proportion of migrants living in the district (urban 
places) 
0.312 0.10376 0.315 0.10145 0.312 0.10365 
P(race_dist) 
Proportion of indigenous people (by declared race) 
living in the district  (urban places) 
0.089 0.11848 0.089 0.11391 0.088 0.11710 
informal_index 
Index of tax informality at the province level, varies from 
1 (high informality) to 0 (no informality) Index = (Tax of 
the IVA - (IVA payments/Value Added))/Tax of the IVA 
0.283 0.30138 0.277 0.30031 0.282 0.30125 
D(conf_gov_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that the public administration performance is 
good or very good , 0 = otherwise 
0.310 0.46236 0.304 0.46018 0.309 0.46218 
D(conf_gov_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that the performance of the government is not 
an obstacle for development , 0 = otherwise 
0.192 0.39403 0.184 0.38777 0.191 0.39294 
D(conf_gov_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the head of the household has a 
positive opinion in all responses related to the 
government , 0 = otherwise 
0.083 0.27653 0.080 0.27113 0.083 0.27569 
D(overall_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers his/her family as non-poor, 0 = otherwise 
0.615 0.48657 0.603 0.48938 0.613 0.48700 
D(income_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household is 
satisfied with his/her income, 0 = otherwise 
0.355 0.47853 0.343 0.47463 0.355 0.47866 
D(income_stab) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that his/her income is stable, 0 = otherwise 
0.782 0.41324 0.779 0.41462 0.781 0.41382 
D(sub_pov) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if income is below the minimum 
income question, 0 = otherwise 
0.320 0.46665 0.309 0.46218 0.323 0.46779 
D(road_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is a non-
asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.178 0.38280 0.173 0.37799 0.179 0.38310 
D(road_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is an 
asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.670 0.47025 0.674 0.46863 0.669 0.47076 
D(road_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is any 
other type, 0 = otherwise 
0.029 0.16734 0.025 0.15672 0.029 0.16772 
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distance 
Distance from the district to the capital of the province in 
minutes 
75.658 125.83730 73.845 125.09920 75.689 126.41520 
P(nowater_dist) 
Proportion of households without water service in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.208 0.19994 0.204 0.19364 0.208 0.19871 
P(nodrain_dist) 
Proportion of houses without drain service in the district  
(urban places) 
0.280 0.21226 0.273 0.20610 0.280 0.21203 
P(noelec_dist) 
Proportion of houses without electricity in the district  
(urban places) 
0.113 0.08178 0.110 0.07881 0.113 0.08189 
P(nofloor_dist) 
Proportion of houses with floor of inadequate materials 
in the district  (urban places) 
0.300 0.16361 0.295 0.15776 0.300 0.16256 
P(nowall_dist) 
Proportion of houses with walls of inadequate materials 
in the district  (urban places) 
0.422 0.23411 0.416 0.23027 0.422 0.23367 
P(noinsu_dist) 
Proportion of people without insurance in the district  
(urban places) 
0.578 0.09535 0.579 0.09476 0.578 0.09507 
P(illiterate_dist) 
Proportion of illiterate people in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.038 0.02871 0.037 0.02661 0.038 0.02830 
P(selfwork_dist) 
Proportion of self-employed in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.383 0.07291 0.382 0.07164 0.383 0.07271 
P(unreg_dist) 
Proportion of unregistered people in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.974 0.01438 0.974 0.01387 0.974 0.01439 
P(undernut_dist) 
Proportion of under-nourished children below 5 years 
old in the district 
0.179 0.12251 0.175 0.11854 0.179 0.12237 
Mort_distx1000 Child mortality, number per 1,000 born alive 17.031 6.37148 16.975 6.27833 17.033 6.34784 
P(poor_dist) Proportion of poor people in the district 0.294 0.16316 0.288 0.15676 0.293 0.16227 
icf_index 
Targeting index (between 0 and 1) of the government 
for social programs (district level) 
0.130 0.16463 0.123 0.15474 0.129 0.16373 
lifeexp_dist Average life expectancy of the district 73.733 2.06017 73.747 2.03231 73.733 2.05428 
 
c) Models for markets within consumption groups (2) 
Variable Definition 
HEA TC ED 
6,021 obs. 6,967 obs. 6,570 obs. 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Dependent variables  
HEA_inf 
Consumption of HEA done at informal markets as a 
share of total HEA expenditure 
0.071 0.20316 
        
HEA_semi 
Consumption of HEA done at semi-formal markets as 
a share of total HEA expenditure 
0.154 0.30664 
        
HEA_for 
Consumption of HEA done at formal markets as a 
share of total HEA expenditure 
0.776 0.34955 
        
D(HEA_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
HEA_inf, 0 = otherwise 
0.199 0.39951 
        
D(HEA_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
HEA_semi, 0 = otherwise 
0.384 0.48632 
        
D(HEA_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
HEA_for, 0 = otherwise 
0.892 0.31098 
        
TC_inf 
Consumption of TC done at informal markets as a 
share of total TC expenditure     
0.455 0.31597 
    
TC_semi 
Consumption of TC done at semi-formal markets as a 
share of total TC expenditure     
0.099 0.16694 
    
TC_for 
Consumption of TC done at formal markets as a 
share of total TC expenditure     
0.445 0.32183 
    
D(TC_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
TC_inf, 0 = otherwise     
0.890 0.31320 
    
D(TC_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
TC_semi, 0 = otherwise     
0.647 0.47801 
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D(TC_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
TC_for, 0 = otherwise     
0.837 0.36944 
    
ED_inf 
Consumption of ED done at informal markets as a 
share of total ED expenditure         
0.279 0.33212 
ED_semi 
Consumption of ED done at semi-formal markets as a 
share of total ED expenditure         
0.247 0.27189 
ED_for 
Consumption of ED done at formal markets as a 
share of total ED expenditure         
0.474 0.32686 
D(ED_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
ED_inf, 0 = otherwise         
0.751 0.43274 
D(ED_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
ED_semi, 0 = otherwise         
0.711 0.45335 
D(ED_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
ED_for, 0 = otherwise         
0.877 0.32844 
Independent variables: SUR model 
L(expenditure_HEA) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles (HEA) 
4.612 1.57623 
        
L(expenditure_TC) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles (TC)     
5.912 1.20291 
    
L(expenditure_ED) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles (ED)         
4.941 1.36778 
L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.380 0.52056 1.329 0.54909 1.385 0.50933 
D(mem_spo) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a spouse, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.681 0.46602 0.661 0.47351 0.684 0.46494 
D(mem_son) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or 
daughter, 0 = otherwise 
0.846 0.36110 0.821 0.38337 0.861 0.34562 
D(mem_oth) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 0 
= otherwise 
0.333 0.47144 0.313 0.46371 0.319 0.46631 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.494 0.22703 0.499 0.23799 0.505 0.22667 
age_head Age of the head of the household (in years) 48.750 13.89760 48.564 14.13041 47.770 13.72667 
age_head-sq Age of the head of the household (in years) squared 2569.678 1458.76500 2558.138 1478.30200 2470.396 1421.74600 
D(gender_head) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household head is male, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.747 0.43464 0.744 0.43673 0.760 0.42732 
year_educ_head 
Number of years of education of the head of the 
household 
10.454 4.77763 10.457 4.77208 10.587 4.73053 
Hrs_ff 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, primary activity, sector = formal workers in 
formal firms (see Chapter 4) 
21.966 34.61431 21.553 34.01283 22.274 34.43539 
Hrs_if 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, primary activity, sector = informal workers 
in formal firms (see Chapter 4) 
5.849 19.34720 5.507 18.73742 5.617 18.80602 
Hrs_ii 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, primary activity, sector = informal workers 
in informal firms (see Chapter 4) 
19.460 36.46896 18.911 36.16941 18.973 36.33052 
Hrs_sf 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, primary activity,  sector = informal self-
employment (see Chapter 4) 
8.324 22.49613 7.962 22.13226 8.129 22.39012 
Hrs_si 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, primary activity, sector = formal self-
employment (see Chapter 4) 
30.394 42.17762 29.414 41.43377 29.985 41.62005 
Hrs_fam 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, primary activity, sector = family work (see 
Chapter 4) 
8.727 23.13826 8.330 22.53500 8.737 22.88572 
Hrs_second 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family 
members, secondary activity (see Chapter 4) 
6.872 14.94628 6.585 14.65703 6.812 14.87236 
D(Hrs_ff) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is 
formal worker in formal firm in his/her primary activity 
(see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.359 0.47972 0.356 0.47884 0.367 0.48202 
D(Hrs_if) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is 
informal worker in formal firm in his/her primary 
activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.111 0.31409 0.104 0.30592 0.107 0.30953 
D(Hrs_ii) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is 
informal worker in informal firm in his/her primary 
activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.319 0.46602 0.310 0.46248 0.311 0.46298 
D(Hrs_sf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is 
formal self-employer in his/her primary activity (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.151 0.35773 0.144 0.35093 0.146 0.35325 
D(Hrs_si) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is 
informal self-employer in his/her primary activity (see 
Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.508 0.49997 0.495 0.50002 0.506 0.50000 
D(Hrs_fam) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is family 
worker in his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.214 0.41010 0.206 0.40454 0.216 0.41185 
D(Hrs_second) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member has a 
second job (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.296 0.45644 0.285 0.45141 0.294 0.45566 
D(Lima) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.157 0.36378 0.153 0.36016 0.150 0.35717 
Independent variables: PROBIT model 
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D(ca_health)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has 
an adequate consumption of medicines, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.430 0.49509 
        
D(ca_health)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has 
an adequate consumption of soaps, 0 = otherwise 
0.519 0.49969 
        
n_chronic Number family members with a chronic illness 1.152 1.14623 
        
Health1_distx1000 
Number of health centres per 1,000 habitants (district 
level) 
0.698 0.70087 
        
Health2_distx1000 
Number of hospitals per 1,000 habitants (district 
level) 
0.026 0.03945 
        
Health3_distx1000 
Number of health micro-centres per 1,000 habitants 
(district level) 
0.092 0.22241 
        
Health4_distx1000 
Number of other health providers per 1,000 habitants 
(district level) 
0.534 0.60490 
        
Health_firmPC 
Number of health firms per 1,000 habitants (province 
level) 
0.619 0.35202 
        
Prop(workhealth_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in health sector in the 
district  
0.028 0.01191 
        
D(ca_transport) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has 
an adequate consumption of transport, 0 = otherwise 
    
0.535 0.49879 
    
comm1_distx1000 
Number of communal phones per 1,000 habitants 
(district level)     
0.163 0.29462 
    
comm2_distx1000 
Number of telephone centrals per 1,000 habitants 
(district level)     
0.023 0.08987 
    
comm3_distx1000 
Number of post offices per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)     
0.019 0.04563 
    
comm4_distx1000 
Number of satellite dishes per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)     
0.066 0.20047 
    
comm5_distx1000 
Number of internet cabins per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)     
0.827 1.27892 
    
comm6_distx1000 
Number of other communication infrastructures per 
1,000 habitants (district level)     
0.013 0.06567 
    
D(comm_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the district has other 
transportation and communication infrastructure , 0 = 
otherwise (declared by the mayor)     
0.669 0.47055 
    
D(transp_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = transportation activity is 
important in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared by 
the mayor)     
0.915 0.27886 
    
transp_distx1000 
Number of transport lines per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)     
0.305 0.36144 
    
D(good_roads_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 =the roads in the district are good, 
0 = otherwise (declared by the mayor)     
0.930 0.25548 
    
Transport_firmPC 
Number of transport firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level)     
0.809 0.41754 
    
D(TC_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = there are workers on transport 
and communication in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor)     
0.143 0.35050 
    
Prop(worktransp_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in transport and 
communication sector in the district      
0.103 0.02633 
    
Commun_firmPC 
Number of communication firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level)     
1.771 0.71247 
    
D(ca_educ) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has 
an adequate consumption of education, 0 = otherwise 
    
    0.491 0.49996 
D(ca_entert) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has 
an adequate consumption of entertainment, 0 = 
otherwise     
    0.137 0.34386 
school_distx1000 
Number of school rooms per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)     
    4.712 1.80304 
Educa_firmPC 
Number of educational firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level)     
    0.526 0.31555 
Entert_firmPC 
Number of entertainment firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level)     
    0.245 0.09117 
Prop(workeduca_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in educational sector in 
the district      
    0.082 0.03669 
P(pop_slums_dist) Proportion of people in the district living in a slum 0.335 0.33681 0.332 0.33827 0.333 0.33820 
P(migrant_dist) 
Proportion of migrants living in the district (urban 
places) 
0.313 0.10123 0.314 0.10180 0.312 0.10298 
P(race_dist) 
Proportion of indigenous people (by declared race) 
living in the district  (urban places) 
0.083 0.11215 0.087 0.11327 0.088 0.11696 
informal_index 
Index of tax informality at the province level, varies 
from 1 (high informality) to 0 (no informality) Index = 
(Tax of the IVA - (IVA payments/Value Added))/Tax of 
the IVA 
0.269 0.29506 0.278 0.29922 0.280 0.30005 
D(conf_gov_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that the public administration performance 
is good or very good , 0 = otherwise 
0.306 0.46091 0.307 0.46135 0.309 0.46230 
D(conf_gov_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that the performance of the government is 
not an obstacle for development , 0 = otherwise 
0.183 0.38699 0.185 0.38810 0.185 0.38827 
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D(conf_gov_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the head of the household has 
a positive opinion in all responses related to the 
government , 0 = otherwise 
0.079 0.26985 0.081 0.27234 0.080 0.27141 
D(overall_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers his/her family as non-poor, 0 = otherwise 
0.605 0.48895 0.605 0.48886 0.603 0.48937 
D(income_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household is 
satisfied with his//her income, 0 = otherwise 
0.354 0.47828 0.349 0.47680 0.353 0.47779 
D(income_stab) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that his/her income is stable, 0 = otherwise 
0.782 0.41320 0.777 0.41613 0.780 0.41403 
D(sub_pov) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if income is below the minimum 
income question, 0 = otherwise 
0.299 0.45769 0.316 0.46514 0.317 0.46542 
D(road_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is a 
non-asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.168 0.37397 0.173 0.37787 0.179 0.38312 
D(road_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is an 
asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.681 0.46608 0.675 0.46834 0.670 0.47008 
D(road_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is any 
other type, 0 = otherwise 
0.027 0.16182 0.028 0.16618 0.030 0.17098 
distance 
Distance from the district to the capital of the province 
in minutes 
73.609 124.44530 74.018 123.01220 75.455 125.66960 
P(nowater_dist) 
Proportion of households without water service in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.206 0.19478 0.204 0.19478 0.208 0.19716 
P(nodrain_dist) 
Proportion of houses without drain service in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.276 0.20856 0.275 0.20715 0.279 0.21082 
P(noelec_dist) 
Proportion of houses without electricity in the district  
(urban places) 
0.111 0.07961 0.111 0.07844 0.113 0.08202 
P(nofloor_dist) 
Proportion of houses with floor of inadequate 
materials in the district  (urban places) 
0.295 0.15916 0.296 0.15855 0.299 0.16205 
P(nowall_dist) 
Proportion of houses with walls of inadequate 
materials in the district  (urban places) 
0.417 0.23084 0.417 0.23148 0.420 0.23271 
P(noinsu_dist) 
Proportion of people without insurance in the district  
(urban places) 
0.579 0.09344 0.578 0.09441 0.578 0.09438 
P(illiterate_dist) 
Proportion of illiterate people in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.037 0.02667 0.037 0.02653 0.038 0.02811 
P(selfwork_dist) 
Proportion of self-employers in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.382 0.07047 0.381 0.07199 0.382 0.07225 
P(unreg_dist) 
Proportion of unregistered people in the district  
(urban places) 
0.974 0.01411 0.974 0.01404 0.974 0.01410 
P(undernut_dist) 
Proportion of under-nourished children below 5 years 
old in the district 
0.176 0.11902 0.176 0.11999 0.179 0.12207 
Mort_distx1000 Child mortality, number per 1,000 born alive 16.863 6.24006 16.923 6.30119 17.067 6.40444 
P(poor_dist) Proportion of poor people in the district 0.289 0.15769 0.289 0.15889 0.292 0.16167 
icf_index 
Targeting index (between 0 and 1) of the government 
for social programs (district level) 
0.124 0.15791 0.124 0.15705 0.128 0.16156 
lifeexp_dist Average life expectancy of the district 73.785 2.02323 73.768 2.04196 73.727 2.07170 
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Appendix 5: Full regression results (models in Chapter 6)  
 
a) PROBIT for consumption groups 
  D(Fon) D(Foff) D(CC) D(HEA) D(TC) D(ED) 
L(expenditure) 0.52061*** 0.69847*** 0.90564*** 0.52624*** 0.89699*** 0.44086*** 
  (0.08090) (0.04344) (0.11204) (0.03819) (0.06636) (0.04926) 
L(fam_size) 1.08460*** 0.58821*** 0.81506*** 0.79104*** 0.81035*** 1.41548*** 
  (0.23774) (0.08424) (0.17941) (0.07833) (0.13562) (0.11366) 
D(mem_spo) 0.05625 -0.49868*** -0.09311 -0.03524 0.03287 -0.37282*** 
  (0.16574) (0.08591) (0.22523) (0.07626) (0.15228) (0.10702) 
D(mem_son) 0.17887 -0.16428* 0.59261*** -0.03831 -0.03046 0.38365*** 
  (0.21576) (0.08411) (0.21761) (0.07684) (0.13142) (0.10046) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01597 -0.02618 -0.24251 0.07916 0.10801 -0.20389*** 
  (0.19840) (0.06366) (0.16495) (0.05995) (0.11261) (0.07885) 
P(men) -0.23213 0.23459** 0.48787 -0.17470* -0.02004 0.36110*** 
  (0.18920) (0.10071) (0.31122) (0.09181) (0.17940) (0.13245) 
age_head 0.02891* 0.00720 0.01920 0.00962 0.02564* -0.01808* 
  (0.01596) (0.00873) (0.01828) (0.00778) (0.01340) (0.01042) 
age_head-sq -0.00028* -0.00019** -0.00033** -0.00011 -0.00022* 0.00002 
  (0.00016) (0.00008) (0.00016) (0.00008) (0.00013) (0.00010) 
D(gender_head) -0.03338 0.44099*** 0.07756 -0.06591 -0.35036** 0.25598** 
  (0.13980) (0.08563) (0.25712) (0.07786) (0.16166) (0.11417) 
year_educ_head -0.05087*** -0.02301*** 0.00777 0.01153** 0.03700*** 0.02244*** 
  (0.01330) (0.00567) (0.01466) (0.00524) (0.00999) (0.00697) 
Hrs_ff -0.00468 0.00394** 0.00623 -0.00089 -0.00215 -0.00451** 
  (0.00295) (0.00173) (0.00774) (0.00122) (0.00489) (0.00201) 
Hrs_if -0.01237*** 0.01248***  -0.00174 -0.00368 -0.00834*** 
  (0.00314) (0.00351)  (0.00203) (0.00354) (0.00244) 
Hrs_ii -0.00456*** 0.00513*** 0.00604 -0.00140 0.00393* -0.00177 
  (0.00160) (0.00146) (0.00478) (0.00102) (0.00218) (0.00124) 
Hrs_sf -0.00667 -0.00223 -0.01281*** -0.00195 -0.00538 0.00157 
  (0.00497) (0.00221) (0.00420) (0.00201) (0.00335) (0.00262) 
Hrs_si -0.00422** 0.00549*** -0.00174 0.00121 0.00456*** -0.00191* 
  (0.00198) (0.00102) (0.00301) (0.00076) (0.00137) (0.00102) 
Hrs_fam -0.00339 -0.00332** 0.00566 0.00092 0.00134 -0.00243 
  (0.00292) (0.00147) (0.00375) (0.00139) (0.00237) (0.00224) 
Hrs_second -0.00797* 0.00730*** 0.00601 0.00055 0.00786* 0.00625* 
  (0.00443) (0.00258) (0.00921) (0.00212) (0.00443) (0.00325) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.12858 0.34688*** -0.50985 -0.06680 0.60333** 0.23636* 
  (0.20111) (0.10813) (0.45326) (0.08365) (0.29482) (0.13771) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.55166** -0.14763  0.20298 0.23909 0.27328 
  (0.27598) (0.17993)  (0.13016) (0.24099) (0.17462) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.37509** 0.40973*** -0.52180** 0.19520*** 0.07408 -0.15264 
  (0.16138) (0.09053) (0.23377) (0.07370) (0.13463) (0.09443) 
D(Hrs_sf) 0.34694 0.33319** 0.40825 0.26839** 0.39355* -0.16874 
  (0.32441) (0.13309) (0.36243) (0.12728) (0.20794) (0.16132) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.09239 0.14633** -0.12990 0.01546 -0.28798*** -0.00086 
  (0.16413) (0.06816) (0.21813) (0.05843) (0.10282) (0.08338) 
D(Hrs_fam) -0.22097 0.17410** 0.03211 -0.05383 0.09755 0.16364 
  (0.17785) (0.08551) (0.21628) (0.07469) (0.13097) (0.12261) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.25881 -0.08248 0.10468 0.04733 -0.05680 -0.00248 
  (0.17366) (0.07449) (0.26407) (0.06470) (0.11922) (0.09587) 
D(Lima) 0.11073 -0.27119*** -0.41491** 0.08609 0.07224 -0.14835 
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  (0.18467) (0.06088) (0.19207) (0.05793) (0.16180) (0.09212) 
D(ca_food)_1 -0.04541       
  (0.14421)       
D(ca_food)_2 -0.01748       
  (0.12457)       
D(ca_food)_3 0.21109*       
  (0.12728)       
D(ca_food)_4 -0.17106       
  (0.13443)       
Agropec_firmPC 0.00032       
  (0.02582)       
D(agro_dist) -0.15155       
  (0.12371)       
D(pec_dist) -0.00735       
  (0.10517)       
D(fish_dist) 0.49692**       
  (0.21894)       
Prop(workagro_dist) -0.24235       
  (0.31854)       
Prop(workfish_dist) -4.53789***       
  (1.35840)       
Hotel_firmPC   0.05773***      
    (0.01982)      
D(rest_dist)   0.07081      
    (0.05229)      
D(tour_dist)   -0.18134***      
    (0.05208)      
Prop(workrest_dist)   6.19586***      
    (1.87182)      
Com_firmPC    0.00287     
     (0.01039)     
Prop(workcom_dist)    2.03269**     
     (0.94270)     
D(ca_cloth)_1    -0.21381     
     (0.24818)     
D(ca_cloth)_2    0.16059     
     (0.26181)     
D(ca_health)_1     -0.16271***    
      (0.05105)    
D(ca_health)_2     0.03938    
      (0.05059)    
n_chronic     0.22926***    
      (0.02345)    
Health1_distx1000     -0.49065    
      (0.31091)    
Health2_distx1000     0.15624    
      (0.58177)    
Health3_distx1000     0.37626    
      (0.34413)    
Health4_distx1000     0.60433*    
      (0.32122)    
Health_firmPC     0.00121    
      (0.05888)    
Prop(workhealth_dist)     -7.40630***    
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      (1.73438)    
D(ca_transport)      0.24479***   
       (0.08106)   
comm1_distx1000      -0.13124   
       (0.11137)   
comm2_distx1000      0.04017   
       (0.34286)   
comm3_distx1000      -2.62139***   
       (0.55440)   
comm4_distx1000      0.14933   
       (0.21787)   
comm5_distx1000      0.05075   
       (0.03540)   
comm6_distx1000      -0.63236   
       (0.40835)   
D(comm_dist)      0.08191   
       (0.07870)   
D(transp_dist)      0.14888   
       (0.12774)   
transp_distx1000      0.19422   
       (0.13118)   
D(good_roads_dist)      -0.08045   
       (0.12682)   
Transport_firmPC      -0.20621   
       (0.16900)   
D(TC_dist)      -0.14870   
       (0.10174)   
Prop(worktransp_dist)      0.58087   
       (1.44796)   
Commun_firmPC      0.20324***   
       (0.07888)   
D(ca_educ)       0.56772*** 
        (0.06795) 
D(ca_entert)       0.07634 
        (0.09375) 
school_distx1000       0.00158 
        (0.01708) 
Educa_firmPC       0.14586 
        (0.14177) 
Entert_firmPC       -0.31799 
        (0.33271) 
Prop(workeduca_dist)       1.55043** 
        (0.77032) 
Constant -2.83153*** -5.93074*** -6.15729*** -4.41544*** -7.44405*** -3.55692*** 
  (0.68246) (0.38857) (0.90524) (0.33608) (0.59006) (0.48626) 
Observations 7,253 7,253 7,253 7,253 7,253 7,253 
LogL -404.675 -2220.828 -211.496 -2807.751 -764.385 -1400.052 
Pseudo-R2 0.279 0.227 0.476 0.150 0.366 0.381 
Wald (overall) 369.818*** 861.934*** 236.714*** 820.379*** 606.535*** 1304.011*** 
Wald (indent. vars.) 19.86** 53.39*** 5.79 131.78*** 67.28*** 78.83*** 
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b) SUR for consumption groups 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
L(expenditure) -0.08205*** -0.02567*** 0.00796*** 0.00515* 0.03033*** 0.02868*** 
  (0.00434) (0.00416) (0.00170) (0.00303) (0.00277) (0.00235) 
L(fam_size) 0.03725*** -0.09061*** 0.00220 -0.01909*** -0.00086 0.04649*** 
  (0.00702) (0.00658) (0.00283) (0.00473) (0.00396) (0.00471) 
D(mem_spo) 0.06054*** -0.04215*** -0.01467*** 0.01834*** -0.00517 -0.01844*** 
  (0.00637) (0.00653) (0.00276) (0.00388) (0.00372) (0.00350) 
D(mem_son) 0.02327*** -0.03037*** 0.00539* -0.00063 -0.01642*** 0.01648*** 
  (0.00731) (0.00689) (0.00308) (0.00447) (0.00439) (0.00446) 
D(mem_oth) -0.00500 0.00435 -0.00352* 0.01126*** 0.00078 -0.00633** 
  (0.00448) (0.00402) (0.00196) (0.00276) (0.00282) (0.00263) 
P(men) -0.01837** 0.05703*** -0.00042 -0.00931* 0.00512 -0.02244*** 
  (0.00892) (0.00847) (0.00368) (0.00528) (0.00532) (0.00517) 
age_head -0.00015 -0.00039 -0.00162*** 0.00037 0.00181*** 0.00114** 
  (0.00085) (0.00081) (0.00035) (0.00050) (0.00050) (0.00047) 
age_head-sq 0.00001 -0.00000 0.00001*** 0.00000 -0.00001** -0.00001** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
D(gender_head) -0.03023*** 0.02463*** 0.01103*** -0.01046** 0.00244 0.00240 
  (0.00660) (0.00683) (0.00280) (0.00410) (0.00387) (0.00372) 
year_educ_head -0.00305*** -0.00182*** -0.00005 -0.00034 0.00141*** 0.00296*** 
  (0.00046) (0.00042) (0.00021) (0.00028) (0.00030) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ff -0.00052*** 0.00069*** 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00013** -0.00017*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00006) 
Hrs_if -0.00077*** 0.00093*** 0.00009 -0.00005 0.00017* -0.00019* 
  (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
Hrs_ii -0.00064*** 0.00100*** 0.00005 0.00002 0.00010** -0.00035*** 
  (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
Hrs_sf -0.00068*** 0.00011 -0.00005 0.00015 0.00013 -0.00001 
  (0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) 
Hrs_si -0.00061*** 0.00057*** 0.00014*** -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00009*** 
  (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
Hrs_fam -0.00049*** 0.00027*** 0.00010** 0.00002 0.00019*** -0.00004 
  (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00006) 
Hrs_second -0.00060*** -0.00000 0.00029*** -0.00010 0.00031*** -0.00004 
  (0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) 
D(Hrs_ff) -0.02244*** 0.00129 0.00817*** -0.00894** 0.01647*** 0.00901** 
  (0.00558) (0.00540) (0.00287) (0.00362) (0.00413) (0.00420) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.01017 -0.00659 -0.00613 -0.00906* 0.00756 -0.00027 
  (0.00860) (0.00786) (0.00493) (0.00526) (0.00615) (0.00627) 
D(Hrs_ii) -0.00661 0.00829 -0.00298 -0.01060*** 0.00119 0.00901*** 
  (0.00559) (0.00533) (0.00260) (0.00335) (0.00334) (0.00301) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.00454 0.01187 0.00846* -0.00572 0.00575 -0.00069 
  (0.00996) (0.00890) (0.00480) (0.00611) (0.00676) (0.00601) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.00490 -0.00229 -0.00483** 0.00190 0.00103 -0.00409 
  (0.00487) (0.00469) (0.00214) (0.00290) (0.00305) (0.00272) 
D(Hrs_fam) -0.00805 -0.00026 -0.00136 -0.00072 0.00150 0.01098*** 
  (0.00639) (0.00543) (0.00274) (0.00348) (0.00384) (0.00345) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.00194 -0.00210 -0.00212 0.00355 0.00284 0.00195 
  (0.00511) (0.00451) (0.00244) (0.00303) (0.00326) (0.00292) 
D(Lima) 0.03407*** -0.00239 -0.02898*** -0.00062 0.00749*** -0.00571** 
  (0.00491) (0.00404) (0.00162) (0.00280) (0.00288) (0.00287) 
PHI 0.20134*** -0.03038* 0.10260*** -0.03036*** 0.03529** 0.01777* 
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  (0.05094) (0.01556) (0.02660) (0.01102) (0.01550) (0.01014) 
Constant 1.03831*** 0.46284*** 0.06957*** 0.03642 -0.18485*** -0.26387*** 
  (0.04245) (0.04317) (0.01680) (0.03200) (0.02641) (0.02444) 
Observations 7,253 
LogL 48858.641 
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c) PROBIT for markets within groups 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon) 0.57678*** 0.54711***                    
  (0.04131) (0.03205)                    
L(expend_Foff)     0.03803** 0.19543***                
      (0.01529) (0.01682)                
L(expend_CC)         0.40686*** 0.36147***            
          (0.02279) (0.02160)            
L(expend_HEA)             0.21079*** 0.50681***        
              (0.01452) (0.02024)        
L(expend_TC)                 0.37532*** 0.77407***    
                  (0.02412) (0.02813)    
L(expend_ED)                     0.04890*** 0.73460*** 
                      (0.01629) (0.03922) 
L(fam_size) 0.53882*** 0.14501** 0.37251*** 0.37216*** 0.72708*** 0.43976*** 0.38808*** 0.78177*** 0.44288*** 0.87911*** 0.25441*** 2.10373*** 
  (0.14028) (0.06002) (0.06348) (0.06932) (0.07260) (0.06277) (0.07278) (0.09525) (0.08360) (0.08511) (0.06424) (0.15101) 
D(mem_spo) 0.08585 -0.09365 -0.09390 -0.06989 -0.01843 0.03910 -0.12981* -0.08395 0.20817** -0.27679*** 0.04160 -0.07820 
  (0.13592) (0.06211) (0.06375) (0.07092) (0.07390) (0.06547) (0.07604) (0.09522) (0.08451) (0.08640) (0.06637) (0.12716) 
D(mem_son) 0.16947 0.05835 -0.20955*** 0.01068 0.03610 0.12542* 0.08682 -0.00542 0.01540 -0.02174 -0.39602*** 0.63278*** 
  (0.13954) (0.06599) (0.06834) (0.07613) (0.07324) (0.07008) (0.08244) (0.10565) (0.08936) (0.09103) (0.07718) (0.12236) 
D(mem_oth) -0.00502 0.02852 -0.01179 0.03539 -0.17553*** 0.02309 0.02622 -0.02173 0.06496 -0.07219 -0.11302** 0.08304 
  (0.12155) (0.04588) (0.04803) (0.05379) (0.05626) (0.04803) (0.05318) (0.07378) (0.06946) (0.06564) (0.04934) (0.10694) 
P(men) -0.36097** 0.06347 0.06230 0.16023* -0.22688** -0.27269*** -0.15582 -0.28325** -0.06132 -0.24893** 0.27975*** -0.18032 
  (0.17417) (0.08110) (0.08393) (0.09257) (0.09596) (0.08465) (0.09959) (0.12576) (0.11113) (0.10828) (0.08914) (0.16649) 
age_head 0.01583 -0.00391 0.00014 0.02784*** 0.00169 -0.01058 0.00776 -0.02284** 0.00793 0.00970 0.02014** -0.03615*** 
  (0.01496) (0.00756) (0.00752) (0.00843) (0.00796) (0.00762) (0.00945) (0.01145) (0.01007) (0.00977) (0.00820) (0.01334) 
age_head-sq -0.00007 0.00007 -0.00005 -0.00021** -0.00008 0.00014* -0.00008 0.00017 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00011 0.00001 
  (0.00015) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00013) 
D(gender_head) -0.00770 0.12598* 0.07983 0.01243 0.06183 -0.16910** 0.06178 0.09614 -0.09514 0.17973** 0.16842** -0.18812 
  (0.14252) (0.06538) (0.06738) (0.07492) (0.07849) (0.06874) (0.07923) (0.09786) (0.09054) (0.08649) (0.06832) (0.13736) 
year_educ_head -0.01820* 0.03389*** -0.02272*** 0.03940*** -0.02722*** 0.04452*** 0.00378 -0.00176 -0.01390** 0.04713*** 0.01005** -0.03100*** 
  (0.01044) (0.00442) (0.00453) (0.00500) (0.00518) (0.00470) (0.00530) (0.00740) (0.00634) (0.00633) (0.00497) (0.00879) 
Hrs_ff 0.00065 0.00221** 0.00217** 0.00363*** -0.00157 0.00147 -0.00003 -0.00114 0.00154 0.00017 -0.00020 -0.00491** 
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  (0.00249) (0.00094) (0.00096) (0.00132) (0.00111) (0.00090) (0.00102) (0.00155) (0.00156) (0.00176) (0.00101) (0.00237) 
Hrs_if -0.00296 -0.00152 0.00129 0.00065 -0.00294 -0.00130 -0.00075 0.00138 -0.00075 -0.00083 0.00329* -0.00673** 
  (0.00322) (0.00167) (0.00177) (0.00184) (0.00199) (0.00186) (0.00191) (0.00235) (0.00250) (0.00226) (0.00174) (0.00295) 
Hrs_ii -0.00076 -0.00140* 0.00132* -0.00176** -0.00015 -0.00069 0.00015 0.00083 0.00263** -0.00211** -0.00098 -0.00348** 
  (0.00164) (0.00073) (0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00097) (0.00077) (0.00084) (0.00122) (0.00102) (0.00090) (0.00079) (0.00147) 
Hrs_sf 0.00472 0.00164 -0.00041 0.00176 -0.00303* -0.00103 -0.00147 0.00505* -0.00536*** 0.00102 0.00371** 0.00253 
  (0.00487) (0.00159) (0.00166) (0.00201) (0.00173) (0.00157) (0.00167) (0.00270) (0.00194) (0.00255) (0.00180) (0.00316) 
Hrs_si 0.00174 0.00104* 0.00338*** -0.00116* 0.00043 -0.00044 0.00054 0.00047 -0.00170** -0.00012 0.00284*** -0.00318*** 
  (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00067) (0.00063) (0.00078) (0.00062) (0.00067) (0.00094) (0.00082) (0.00078) (0.00067) (0.00115) 
Hrs_fam -0.00577*** -0.00096 0.00184 0.00041 -0.00057 -0.00189 -0.00031 -0.00353** 0.00028 0.00083 0.00032 -0.00804*** 
  (0.00210) (0.00112) (0.00127) (0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00115) (0.00114) (0.00145) (0.00146) (0.00153) (0.00122) (0.00193) 
Hrs_second 0.00723 0.00021 0.00246 0.00106 -0.00423** -0.00265 -0.00068 0.00410 -0.00217 0.00406* 0.00200 -0.00390 
  (0.00521) (0.00162) (0.00172) (0.00178) (0.00197) (0.00165) (0.00176) (0.00284) (0.00220) (0.00232) (0.00170) (0.00321) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.11001 -0.04926 -0.15256** 0.01590 -0.10675 -0.03251 -0.01712 -0.00310 0.07470 -0.02326 0.08240 0.00113 
  (0.17754) (0.06828) (0.06865) (0.08650) (0.08057) (0.06776) (0.07688) (0.11485) (0.10520) (0.11388) (0.07360) (0.15196) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.09048 0.07559 0.02329 0.02496 0.07451 -0.04425 0.11290 -0.07638 0.16700 -0.15899 -0.26787** -0.00218 
  (0.20631) (0.10372) (0.10798) (0.11547) (0.12622) (0.11115) (0.11653) (0.14817) (0.15027) (0.13986) (0.10527) (0.19501) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.05747 0.04829 -0.03984 -0.07226 -0.04014 -0.09824 0.02745 0.01985 0.00977 -0.03002 0.08047 -0.10023 
  (0.12616) (0.05680) (0.05861) (0.06145) (0.06949) (0.06038) (0.06635) (0.09293) (0.07765) (0.07432) (0.06213) (0.11877) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.16443 0.07941 0.08352 0.11900 -0.03259 0.02755 0.27747** -0.24879 0.21863* 0.06686 -0.11166 -0.34425* 
  (0.27550) (0.10079) (0.10669) (0.12689) (0.11342) (0.10250) (0.10831) (0.16263) (0.13176) (0.16081) (0.11198) (0.20333) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.07959 -0.07493 0.24549*** 0.00292 0.04337 -0.09421* 0.01411 0.13380* 0.10989 -0.03568 -0.01538 -0.05618 
  (0.12190) (0.04861) (0.05142) (0.05509) (0.05820) (0.05077) (0.05665) (0.07969) (0.06996) (0.06936) (0.05352) (0.09986) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.09443 0.00240 0.06051 -0.01080 0.04513 -0.02728 0.00767 0.09133 0.13941* -0.19127** -0.00558 0.20574 
  (0.15335) (0.06178) (0.06736) (0.07299) (0.07827) (0.06486) (0.06820) (0.09443) (0.08286) (0.08373) (0.06652) (0.13154) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.10066 0.06716 -0.00222 0.04968 0.16609*** 0.10486* 0.06855 -0.08839 0.12504* -0.03416 -0.05483 0.07476 
  (0.14208) (0.05203) (0.05480) (0.05936) (0.06395) (0.05354) (0.05943) (0.08520) (0.07411) (0.07351) (0.05601) (0.10964) 
D(Lima) -0.64649*** 0.63497*** 0.01997 0.11248 -0.04760 0.59147*** -0.13410* -0.11653 -0.26503** 0.06870 -0.17259** 0.12539 
  (0.14692) (0.06814) (0.07004) (0.07759) (0.07864) (0.07117) (0.07937) (0.10681) (0.12312) (0.12739) (0.07564) (0.14085) 
P(pop_slums_dist) -0.01926 0.07539 -0.03661 0.06154 0.09562 -0.01855 -0.04743 -0.10909 0.01244 -0.07266 -0.13504** 0.10547 
  (0.13323) (0.05923) (0.06216) (0.06851) (0.06669) (0.06077) (0.07047) (0.09081) (0.09128) (0.08689) (0.06180) (0.10950) 
P(migrant_dist) 0.10588 -0.26504 -0.94421*** 0.78673*** -0.57126** 1.06470*** 0.23424 0.58936 -0.53901* 0.96047*** -1.06281*** 0.13568 
  (0.52576) (0.25319) (0.27183) (0.30318) (0.28072) (0.26796) (0.30636) (0.38424) (0.32574) (0.36143) (0.26495) (0.51268) 
P(race_dist) 0.50669 -0.20853 1.52876*** -0.45823 1.37996*** -0.62942** 1.14813*** -1.34521*** 0.82596*** 0.19191 1.38603*** 0.38369 
  (0.44698) (0.25382) (0.27993) (0.29103) (0.27799) (0.27167) (0.29352) (0.34915) (0.29017) (0.35226) (0.26061) (0.49720) 
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informal_index 0.00021 -0.11798* 0.12792* -0.37229*** -0.16659** 0.02162 -0.07861 -0.00790 0.31836*** -0.05488 -0.18205*** 0.09012 
  (0.15280) (0.07144) (0.07659) (0.08536) (0.07728) (0.07470) (0.08492) (0.10827) (0.09996) (0.10455) (0.07031) (0.13225) 
D(conf_gov_1) 0.03412 -0.05348 0.03709 0.05773 -0.07499 -0.01469 -0.06441 0.03419 0.04229 0.04139 -0.11937*** -0.06975 
  (0.09743) (0.04031) (0.04216) (0.04772) (0.04746) (0.04222) (0.04919) (0.06433) (0.05739) (0.05748) (0.04413) (0.08024) 
D(conf_gov_2) -0.06951 -0.13375** 0.06961 0.00640 0.00124 -0.03481 -0.01071 -0.05370 -0.01046 -0.08812 -0.11307* 0.24409** 
  (0.11314) (0.05564) (0.05755) (0.06308) (0.06323) (0.05991) (0.06750) (0.08768) (0.07398) (0.07403) (0.05895) (0.11159) 
D(conf_gov_3) 0.11272 0.13577 -0.02969 -0.14741 0.08081 0.07604 0.19493* -0.00852 -0.00620 -0.04082 0.05425 -0.09865 
  (0.18190) (0.08653) (0.09032) (0.09733) (0.09737) (0.09120) (0.10276) (0.13439) (0.11463) (0.11151) (0.09018) (0.17455) 
D(overall_satis) 0.09992 -0.11632*** 0.04705 -0.08701** 0.11857*** -0.10480*** 0.03209 0.08730 0.06625 -0.11808** -0.05468 0.16516** 
  (0.08548) (0.03748) (0.03875) (0.04400) (0.04452) (0.03891) (0.04538) (0.06177) (0.05290) (0.05691) (0.04197) (0.07560) 
D(income_satis) 0.09328 -0.07579** 0.06190 -0.07853* 0.04364 -0.08282** 0.01582 0.04761 0.09412* -0.04810 -0.18022*** 0.26645*** 
  (0.08803) (0.03806) (0.03876) (0.04170) (0.04444) (0.03996) (0.04503) (0.05781) (0.05083) (0.05001) (0.04021) (0.07800) 
D(income_stab) 0.01965 -0.13720*** 0.13253*** -0.24995*** 0.10684** -0.00120 -0.06983 0.08452 -0.08189 0.04764 -0.05367 0.00965 
  (0.10099) (0.04276) (0.04415) (0.05420) (0.04882) (0.04458) (0.05096) (0.07027) (0.06361) (0.06821) (0.04861) (0.08892) 
D(sub_pov) 0.00613 -0.07608** -0.00464 -0.02307 0.04168 -0.07747** 0.07936* 0.03795 0.00544 -0.11088** -0.07229* 0.10938 
  (0.07982) (0.03683) (0.03849) (0.04258) (0.04236) (0.03920) (0.04521) (0.05755) (0.05096) (0.04972) (0.04020) (0.07613) 
D(road_1) -0.19164 -0.04943 -0.12215* 0.00459 0.10957 0.08891 0.06768 0.02433 -0.10511 0.08708 0.33161*** 0.20270 
  (0.13152) (0.06474) (0.06601) (0.07467) (0.06949) (0.06868) (0.07809) (0.10266) (0.08420) (0.09066) (0.06662) (0.14220) 
D(road_2) -0.20660 0.12750** 0.00389 -0.06444 -0.02301 0.16877*** 0.04273 -0.02161 0.10073 0.06257 0.14541** 0.09166 
  (0.13310) (0.05861) (0.05999) (0.06779) (0.06184) (0.06242) (0.07190) (0.09029) (0.07936) (0.08336) (0.06357) (0.13198) 
D(road_3) 0.07782 0.09523 0.16257 -0.06925 0.08137 -0.03103 -0.19424 0.11426 0.38046** -0.18299 0.16255 -0.11611 
  (0.29151) (0.13260) (0.13957) (0.14586) (0.14231) (0.15499) (0.17266) (0.21272) (0.17768) (0.17515) (0.13259) (0.23723) 
distance -0.00072** 0.00000 -0.00017 -0.00039** -0.00054*** -0.00069*** -0.00048** 0.00047* -0.00054** 0.00014 -0.00021 -0.00046 
  (0.00029) (0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00029) (0.00025) (0.00030) (0.00019) (0.00028) 
P(nowater_dist) 0.46438* -0.09334 0.21216 -0.04669 0.14186 -0.25805 -0.08030 -0.29116 -0.22437 0.49711** -0.13360 0.49558* 
  (0.25546) (0.14382) (0.15139) (0.16119) (0.15526) (0.15917) (0.17549) (0.22249) (0.17425) (0.19488) (0.14778) (0.29575) 
P(nodrain_dist) -0.94802*** -0.36022* -0.28560 0.20152 0.04284 -0.29329 0.09349 0.36729 0.21719 -0.85834*** 0.30060 -0.39150 
  (0.35902) (0.20333) (0.19772) (0.21669) (0.21024) (0.21179) (0.22507) (0.28722) (0.23475) (0.24205) (0.19868) (0.37192) 
P(noelec_dist) 2.08140*** -1.53627*** 0.02980 -0.58840 1.12733** 0.21179 -0.71216 0.44110 -0.80537 -0.22851 -0.03031 -0.30679 
  (0.76864) (0.43369) (0.43453) (0.45664) (0.47439) (0.47011) (0.49490) (0.58899) (0.50002) (0.52709) (0.41449) (0.73652) 
P(nofloor_dist) 0.14305 0.27361 0.68361*** -0.87088*** 1.21486*** -0.31759 0.32299 -0.05629 0.51782* 0.06323 0.31469 -0.21796 
  (0.53080) (0.24829) (0.25885) (0.28304) (0.25265) (0.26640) (0.29710) (0.36878) (0.30934) (0.34171) (0.25077) (0.44539) 
P(nowall_dist) 0.26490 0.53784*** -0.23721 0.44298*** -0.56647*** 0.16864 -0.20931 -0.24305 -0.36592* -0.24442 0.08709 0.51421* 
  (0.35490) (0.14495) (0.15341) (0.16997) (0.15822) (0.15230) (0.17768) (0.21914) (0.19027) (0.19314) (0.15253) (0.29533) 
P(noinsu_dist) 0.85548 -0.31202 0.08562 -0.29431 0.64543** -1.37420*** 0.20498 1.33418*** 0.33692 -0.99919*** 0.65117** -0.05661 
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  (0.54973) (0.26911) (0.26455) (0.28864) (0.31888) (0.30652) (0.33288) (0.39755) (0.35022) (0.37356) (0.27480) (0.47962) 
P(illiterate_dist) -4.03362 1.57066 -2.75280** -0.33339 -6.49851*** 10.86513*** -3.53556** 5.54417*** 0.17177 4.72671*** -3.66117*** -5.13211** 
  (2.53951) (1.43001) (1.37049) (1.42593) (1.35178) (1.33270) (1.39665) (1.82768) (1.50538) (1.79706) (1.29435) (2.25370) 
P(selfwork_dist) 0.88699 0.09053 0.33797 0.75589 1.04196** -0.20968 0.46764 -0.24091 -0.92390* 0.71481 0.18041 0.84232 
  (0.86826) (0.45291) (0.44021) (0.46790) (0.50624) (0.50486) (0.51266) (0.60005) (0.53083) (0.55683) (0.44792) (0.77864) 
P(unreg_dist) 8.02098** -6.16399*** -0.29771 0.95537 10.27742*** -1.52350 0.77133 7.47605*** -2.76201 3.23073 7.43306*** 0.80149 
  (3.82354) (2.08350) (2.27549) (2.50941) (2.28664) (2.26369) (2.48487) (2.87945) (2.84131) (3.13127) (2.27070) (3.87793) 
icf_index -0.93053* 0.32601 -0.93361*** 0.61160** -0.12060 -1.19358*** 0.41600 0.11260 0.66672* 0.15037 -0.17009 -0.07731 
  (0.48940) (0.26730) (0.26144) (0.28689) (0.27338) (0.30002) (0.29543) (0.36690) (0.34825) (0.38212) (0.26868) (0.51826) 
P(undernut_dist) 0.07292 0.71765** -0.23224 0.71353** -0.38856 -0.02867 0.92721*** 0.04331 0.67840* -0.84485* 0.94210*** -0.48312 
  (0.64388) (0.29917) (0.31275) (0.33921) (0.32516) (0.31330) (0.35198) (0.42805) (0.39045) (0.44140) (0.31818) (0.57506) 
Mort_distx1000 -0.00626 0.01500 0.00983 -0.01299 0.04554*** -0.06313*** 0.03245* -0.02967 -0.04620** 0.03020* 0.02969* -0.08433 
  (0.01853) (0.01630) (0.01560) (0.02223) (0.01671) (0.01790) (0.01946) (0.02312) (0.02127) (0.01741) (0.01790) (0.08357) 
P(poor_dist) 2.36792*** -1.09205*** 0.70435** -0.43255 -0.20692 0.56751* -0.00942 -0.54729 -0.68895* 0.16339 -1.28428*** 1.88036*** 
  (0.62910) (0.28503) (0.30465) (0.33296) (0.32321) (0.30227) (0.32872) (0.41500) (0.36767) (0.38862) (0.29715) (0.52288) 
lifeexp_dist 0.09604 0.04307 0.07759 -0.11506 0.16002*** -0.25127*** 0.08446 -0.05942 -0.07698 0.05780 0.11905** -0.27203 
  (0.07000) (0.05250) (0.05083) (0.07090) (0.05463) (0.05756) (0.06344) (0.07694) (0.07097) (0.05832) (0.05788) (0.25715) 
D(ca_food)_1 0.06122 0.00702                    
  (0.10380) (0.05118)                    
D(ca_food)_2 0.02809 0.06851                    
  (0.11089) (0.05253)                    
D(ca_food)_3 0.18152 0.00570                    
  (0.11546) (0.05066)                    
D(ca_food)_4 -0.12192 -0.02398                    
  (0.10832) (0.04908)                    
Agropec_firmPC -0.06398 -0.02960                    
  (0.04187) (0.01930)                    
D(agro_dist) 0.11864 0.03421                    
  (0.10758) (0.04500)                    
D(pec_dist) -0.02205 -0.06270                    
  (0.11955) (0.05163)                    
D(fish_dist) 0.46597** 0.00076                    
  (0.19783) (0.06300)                    
Prop(workagro_dist) -1.44438*** -0.80262***                    
  (0.51303) (0.25520)                    
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Prop(workfish_dist) 0.83220 2.07161**                    
  (1.72810) (0.93450)                    
Hotel_firmPC     -0.03313 0.08169***                
      (0.02222) (0.02507)                
D(rest_dist)     -0.07115 0.08811*                
      (0.04730) (0.05130)                
D(tour_dist)     -0.03315 -0.06682                
      (0.04672) (0.05234)                
Prop(workrest_dist)     8.35082*** -7.23300***                
      (2.17364) (2.40466)                
Com_firmPC         -0.00376 -0.00103            
          (0.00458) (0.00435)            
Prop(workcom_dist)         0.09871 2.66049***            
          (0.68942) (0.68028)            
D(ca_cloth)_1         -0.20071** -0.01062            
          (0.09175) (0.08762)            
D(ca_cloth)_2         -0.00642 0.15777*            
          (0.09292) (0.08833)            
D(ca_health)_1             -0.01459 0.10911        
              (0.05119) (0.06842)        
D(ca_health)_2             0.01236 -0.04536        
              (0.04999) (0.06619)        
n_chronic             0.04517** 0.04863*        
              (0.01872) (0.02845)        
Health1_distx1000             -0.58038 0.72646        
              (0.38441) (0.58983)        
Health2_distx1000             0.35439 -0.76783        
              (0.72508) (0.96679)        
Health3_distx1000             0.33831 -0.63814        
              (0.43025) (0.64520)        
Health4_distx1000             0.56963 -0.78309        
              (0.39229) (0.59615)        
Health_firmPC             0.19715** -0.24585**        
              (0.09120) (0.11795)        
Prop(workhealth_dist)             2.65729 1.25137        
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              (2.63676) (3.43334)        
D(ca_transport)                 0.07290 0.15265***    
                  (0.05128) (0.05018)    
comm1_distx1000                 -0.08174 0.18855**    
                  (0.08332) (0.09431)    
comm2_distx1000                 0.47212* -0.04100    
                  (0.27648) (0.26839)    
comm3_distx1000                 -1.21592** -0.71579    
                  (0.54528) (0.63151)    
comm4_distx1000                 -0.30926** -0.19020    
                  (0.15444) (0.15083)    
comm5_distx1000                 0.00091 0.00124    
                  (0.02128) (0.02236)    
comm6_distx1000                 0.92129** 0.31068    
                  (0.42816) (0.38633)    
D(comm_dist)                 0.14591** -0.02443    
                  (0.05902) (0.05893)    
D(transp_dist)                 0.16061* 0.10601    
                  (0.09061) (0.10327)    
transp_distx1000                 -0.09879 0.05864    
                  (0.07088) (0.07739)    
D(good_roads_dist)                 0.01783 -0.18528*    
                  (0.10273) (0.10845)    
Transport_firmPC                 0.07488 -0.31498**    
                  (0.13883) (0.14454)    
D(TC_dist)                 0.05232 0.00070    
                  (0.07866) (0.07354)    
Prop(worktransp_dist)                 6.25037*** -0.51688    
                  (1.27880) (1.16777)    
Commun_firmPC                 0.30634*** 0.03042    
                  (0.06595) (0.06656)    
D(ca_educ)                     0.02843 0.46454*** 
                      (0.03994) (0.07769) 
D(ca_entert)                     -0.00227 -0.24531** 
                      (0.05667) (0.10033) 
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school_distx1000                     -0.03432** 0.03713 
                      (0.01378) (0.02473) 
Educa_firmPC                     0.38821*** -0.13270 
                      (0.11388) (0.21306) 
Entert_firmPC                     -1.38455*** -0.07381 
                      (0.28426) (0.51712) 
Prop(workeduca_dist)                     -0.46820 -0.05660 
                      (0.72711) (1.41979) 
Constant -19.05277*** -1.57650 -6.37904 5.85095 -24.65814*** 17.46112*** -10.82364* -4.30091 6.28307 -12.27537** -16.74992*** 17.20068 
  (7.06877) (4.79282) (4.83008) (6.30671) (5.02155) (5.21635) (5.67418) (6.70530) (6.43912) (5.82459) (5.24351) (21.23984) 
Observations 7,145 7,145 6,272 6,272 7,181 7,181 6,021 6,021 6,967 6,967 6,570 6,570 
LogL -626.346 -4082.925 -3843.844 -2999.566 -2800.179 -3659.533 -2753.117 -1480.547 -1895.040 -1964.155 -3378.221 -897.204 
Pseudo-R2 0.356 0.173 0.096 0.121 0.165 0.166 0.084 0.284 0.216 0.366 0.085 0.634 
Wald (overall) 571.647*** 1326.961*** 728.585*** 723.333*** 918.361*** 1187.793*** 458.021*** 880.028*** 938.327*** 1453.861*** 580.604*** 1165.773*** 
Wald (indent. vars.) 164.02*** 235.10*** 209.63*** 174.79*** 368.38*** 271.75*** 175.36*** 89.01*** 330.99***  129.96*** 309.39*** 149.63*** 
 
d) SUR for markets within groups 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon) -0.01111 0.01161                
  (0.00720) (0.01386)                
L(expend_Foff)     -0.13601*** -0.07062***              
      (0.00659) (0.00701)              
L(expend_CC)       -0.08257*** -0.11007***          
        (0.00656) (0.01116)          
L(expend_HEA)           -0.07617*** 0.00938        
            (0.01278) (0.00610)        
L(expend_TC)             -0.07099*** 0.13331***    
              (0.00679) (0.00652)    
L(expend_ED)                 -0.14352*** 0.14999*** 
                  (0.00426) (0.00352) 
L(fam_size) -0.01432 -0.05074*** -0.20732*** -0.14122*** -0.14284*** -0.15584*** -0.17865*** -0.02675 -0.09010*** 0.06830*** -0.24900*** 0.13550*** 
  (0.01286) (0.01369) (0.02630) (0.02372) (0.01775) (0.02363) (0.04322) (0.01810) (0.01605) (0.01534) (0.01558) (0.01395) 
D(mem_spo) 0.02389* -0.01506 0.01731 -0.02077 0.00158 -0.00479 -0.03255 0.00961 0.06974*** -0.01976 0.02626 -0.02316* 
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  (0.01305) (0.01519) (0.02589) (0.02284) (0.01702) (0.02383) (0.04502) (0.01681) (0.01612) (0.01520) (0.01651) (0.01367) 
D(mem_son) 0.01098 -0.02507 -0.01108 0.03219 -0.04986*** -0.04571* 0.05018 0.00130 -0.00378 0.00198 -0.13960*** 0.07354*** 
  (0.01421) (0.01639) (0.03014) (0.02520) (0.01935) (0.02729) (0.05048) (0.01807) (0.01646) (0.01598) (0.02036) (0.02011) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01146 -0.00166 0.01382 0.00020 0.00459 0.03434** 0.02238 0.00274 0.02163* 0.00246 -0.02137* 0.01978** 
  (0.00927) (0.00930) (0.01875) (0.01675) (0.01235) (0.01422) (0.03074) (0.01207) (0.01153) (0.01126) (0.01138) (0.00920) 
P(men) -0.05660*** 0.01308 0.01213 0.03282 0.00528 0.01539 0.05865 0.00752 -0.03130 -0.02513 0.06078*** -0.06723*** 
  (0.01772) (0.02128) (0.03638) (0.03144) (0.02245) (0.02856) (0.06493) (0.02322) (0.02094) (0.02004) (0.02291) (0.01838) 
age_head 0.00547*** -0.00356* -0.00136 -0.00048 -0.00465** 0.00407 -0.00710 -0.00149 -0.00348* 0.00410** 0.00103 0.00110 
  (0.00162) (0.00194) (0.00344) (0.00306) (0.00214) (0.00257) (0.00605) (0.00208) (0.00191) (0.00185) (0.00225) (0.00174) 
age_head-sq -0.00003** 0.00004** 0.00001 0.00003 0.00004* -0.00002 0.00007 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00003 -0.00002 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00006) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.01802 -0.00084 0.00004 0.01502 0.00912 -0.00073 0.04244 -0.02140 -0.00354 0.01247 -0.01403 -0.01246 
  (0.01367) (0.01655) (0.02773) (0.02415) (0.01775) (0.02324) (0.04499) (0.01697) (0.01668) (0.01569) (0.01798) (0.01406) 
year_educ_head 0.00041 0.00632*** -0.00933*** 0.01134*** -0.00237** 0.00454*** 0.00246 -0.00387*** -0.01007*** 0.00841*** 0.00211* -0.00383*** 
  (0.00087) (0.00116) (0.00190) (0.00181) (0.00120) (0.00176) (0.00309) (0.00117) (0.00110) (0.00109) (0.00116) (0.00095) 
Hrs_ff 0.00025 0.00002 0.00016 -0.00009 -0.00018 0.00016 -0.00033 -0.00017 0.00045** -0.00033* 0.00054*** -0.00022 
  (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00032) (0.00027) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00049) (0.00023) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) 
Hrs_if 0.00047 0.00056* 0.00088 -0.00091* 0.00012 -0.00031 0.00051 0.00026 0.00079** -0.00073** 0.00039 -0.00039 
  (0.00033) (0.00029) (0.00055) (0.00051) (0.00047) (0.00054) (0.00081) (0.00041) (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00037) (0.00034) 
Hrs_ii -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00036 -0.00151*** -0.00021 -0.00006 -0.00054 0.00026 0.00089*** -0.00080*** 0.00050** -0.00048*** 
  (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00018) (0.00023) (0.00037) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00020) (0.00015) 
Hrs_sf 0.00165*** 0.00004 0.00022 0.00095* 0.00001 0.00005 0.00020 0.00034 -0.00095*** 0.00058* 0.00040 0.00014 
  (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00063) (0.00049) (0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00090) (0.00035) (0.00033) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00029) 
Hrs_si 0.00044*** -0.00011 0.00113*** -0.00009 0.00004 -0.00009 0.00004 0.00001 0.00014 -0.00012 0.00051*** -0.00060*** 
  (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00033) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00012) 
Hrs_fam 0.00042* 0.00057** 0.00029 -0.00003 0.00047* 0.00065 0.00031 0.00008 0.00010 -0.00020 0.00022 -0.00038* 
  (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00043) (0.00038) (0.00028) (0.00055) (0.00059) (0.00027) (0.00029) (0.00027) (0.00024) (0.00021) 
Hrs_second 0.00005 -0.00023 -0.00041 -0.00013 0.00117*** -0.00014 0.00013 -0.00007 0.00033 -0.00016 0.00007 -0.00024 
  (0.00037) (0.00031) (0.00057) (0.00055) (0.00043) (0.00052) (0.00119) (0.00042) (0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00034) (0.00032) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.01573 0.00192 -0.05621** 0.00859 0.02708 0.02263 0.02202 -0.01109 0.02258 -0.02130 -0.01867 -0.00167 
  (0.01282) (0.01367) (0.02589) (0.02193) (0.01752) (0.01969) (0.04152) (0.01797) (0.01434) (0.01373) (0.01428) (0.01314) 
D(Hrs_if) -0.02548 -0.03638** -0.07784** 0.00935 0.00114 0.01951 -0.02893 -0.00581 0.01315 -0.03330 -0.00469 0.02155 
  (0.02014) (0.01756) (0.03548) (0.03269) (0.02793) (0.03530) (0.05311) (0.02524) (0.02186) (0.02089) (0.02347) (0.02045) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.01580 -0.01113 -0.08654*** -0.03064 0.02628* 0.00204 0.01135 -0.00005 0.02617* -0.04603*** -0.02115 0.02078* 
  (0.01154) (0.01199) (0.02141) (0.02129) (0.01482) (0.01898) (0.03579) (0.01487) (0.01363) (0.01370) (0.01487) (0.01174) 
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D(Hrs_sf) -0.07534*** -0.01234 -0.04346 0.00201 0.00882 0.00808 -0.01851 -0.03674 0.03083 0.00472 -0.01186 -0.01540 
  (0.02102) (0.02106) (0.04005) (0.03370) (0.02705) (0.02966) (0.05965) (0.02488) (0.02357) (0.02249) (0.02381) (0.02006) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.00344 -0.01360 -0.00050 -0.02048 -0.00487 -0.00721 -0.02609 0.00354 0.00356 -0.00612 -0.02237* 0.02511** 
  (0.00966) (0.01043) (0.02134) (0.01776) (0.01298) (0.01640) (0.03068) (0.01284) (0.01220) (0.01173) (0.01204) (0.00981) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.00209 0.00054 -0.01466 -0.05535** 0.00612 -0.00988 0.02754 0.00418 0.01531 -0.02681* -0.03437** 0.03274*** 
  (0.01241) (0.01264) (0.02424) (0.02275) (0.01568) (0.02447) (0.03918) (0.01586) (0.01576) (0.01508) (0.01398) (0.01148) 
D(Hrs_second) -0.00863 0.01529 -0.03671* 0.00610 -0.04036*** -0.00740 0.04617 -0.01994 -0.01246 0.01006 -0.00150 0.00235 
  (0.01122) (0.01141) (0.02032) (0.01887) (0.01358) (0.01730) (0.03663) (0.01423) (0.01284) (0.01248) (0.01213) (0.01019) 
D(Lima) 0.10451*** 0.07177*** 0.06927*** 0.00340 -0.01502 0.03858** -0.01113 -0.00647 0.09336*** -0.07546*** 0.09591*** -0.02489*** 
  (0.00977) (0.01185) (0.01944) (0.01647) (0.01242) (0.01610) (0.02987) (0.01202) (0.00987) (0.00961) (0.01223) (0.00958) 
PHI -0.22651*** -0.04543* -0.04389 -0.05292 -0.41433*** -0.07401** 0.04710 0.16085*** 0.44836*** 0.56496*** -0.00381 0.39844*** 
  (0.06863) (0.02421) (0.04509) (0.05273) (0.03763) (0.03021) (0.05461) (0.06201) (0.02923) (0.02370) (0.03288) (0.03602) 
Constant 0.51113*** 0.15951 1.69780*** 1.15139*** 1.42909*** 0.95526*** 0.99426*** 0.94808*** 1.10856*** -0.64058*** 1.36824*** -0.43323*** 
  (0.06816) (0.13148) (0.10002) (0.11041) (0.07018) (0.12183) (0.22011) (0.06540) (0.06152) (0.06063) (0.06881) (0.04682) 
Observations 7,145 6,272 7,181 6,021 6,967 6,570 
LogL 4043.816 -3196.704 2225.751 309.848 2056.629 29.746 
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Appendix 6: Definition of variables and basic tabulations (models in Chapter 7)  
 
Variable Definition 
Price 
7,513 obs. 
Mean s.d. 
Dependant variables  
Fon_inf Consumption of Fon done at informal markets as a share of total Fon expenditure 0.600 0.28714 
Fon_semi Consumption of Fon done at semi-formal markets as a share of total Fon expenditure 0.332 0.28153 
Fon_for Consumption of Fon done at formal markets as a share of total Fon expenditure 0.068 0.14901 
D(Fon_inf) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Fon_inf, 0 = otherwise 0.967 0.17832 
D(Fon_semi) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Fon_semi, 0 = otherwise 0.932 0.25225 
D(Fon_for) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase from Fon_for, 0 = otherwise 0.471 0.49916 
Independant variables: SUR model 
L(expend_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 
(Fon) 
6.943 0.75845 
O1L(expend_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 
(Fon) adjusted by Stone price index using UV-1 
5.648 0.74036 
O2L(expend_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 
(Fon) adjusted by Stone price index using UV-2 
5.650 0.74486 
O3L(expend_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total per-capita expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 
(Fon) adjusted by Stone price index using UV-3 
5.643 0.74680 
L(O1_uv_for) Natural logarithm of UV-1 (formal) 1.970 0.36204 
L(O1_uv_semi) Natural logarithm of UV-1 (semi-formal) 1.402 0.11151 
L(O1_uv_inf) Natural logarithm of UV-1 (informal) 1.160 0.16511 
L(O2_uv_for) Natural logarithm of UV-2 (formal) 1.969 0.33268 
L(O2_uv_semi) Natural logarithm of UV-2 (semi-formal) 1.399 0.08443 
L(O2_uv_inf) Natural logarithm of UV-2 (informal) 1.158 0.12423 
L(O3_uv_for) Natural logarithm of UV-3 (formal) 1.963 0.26767 
L(O3_uv_semi) Natural logarithm of UV-3 (semi-formal) 1.404 0.07567 
L(O3_uv_inf) Natural logarithm of UV-3 (informal) 1.168 0.09634 
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L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.299 0.56504 
D(mem_spo) Dummy variable: 1 = household has a spouse, 0 = otherwise 0.651 0.47673 
D(mem_son) Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or daughter, 0 = otherwise 0.799 0.40076 
D(mem_oth) Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 0 = otherwise 0.307 0.46136 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.502 0.24325 
age_head Age of the head of the household (in years) 49.048 14.45457 
age_head-sq Age of the head of the household (in years) squared 2614.644 1523.76500 
D(gender_head) Dummy variable: 1 = household head in male, 0 = otherwise 0.743 0.43709 
year_educ_head Number of years of education of the head of the household 10.303 4.82066 
Hrs_ff 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
formal workers in formal firms (see Chapter 4) 
20.907 33.79519 
Hrs_if 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
informal workers in formal firms (see Chapter 4) 
5.399 18.48301 
Hrs_ii 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
informal workers in informal firms (see Chapter 4) 
18.420 35.53746 
Hrs_sf 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity,  sector = 
informal self-employment (see Chapter 4) 
7.952 22.00029 
Hrs_si 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
formal self-employment (see Chapter 4) 
28.571 40.57227 
Hrs_fam 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, primary activity, sector = 
family work (see Chapter 4) 
8.034 22.01353 
Hrs_second 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of all family members, secondary activity (see 
Chapter 4) 
6.389 14.38882 
D(Hrs_ff) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal worker in formal firm in his/her 
primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.345 0.47540 
D(Hrs_if) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal worker in formal firm in 
his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.103 0.30401 
D(Hrs_ii) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal worker in informal firm in 
his/her primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.306 0.46092 
D(Hrs_sf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is formal self-employer in his/her 
primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.145 0.35194 
D(Hrs_si) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is informal self-employer in his/her 
primary activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.491 0.49995 
D(Hrs_fam) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member is family worker in his/her primary 
activity (see Chapter 4), 0 = otherwise 
0.200 0.40007 
D(Hrs_second) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any household member has a second job (see Chapter 4), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.279 0.44840 
D(Lima) Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = otherwise 0.159 0.36575 
L(pop_urb_dist) Natural logarithm of the population size of the district where the household lives 11.058 1.27918 
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L(pop_urb_dist)-sq 
Natural logarithm of the population size of the district where the household lives 
squared 
123.907 27.47688 
pop_den_distx1000 Population density: inhabitants per 1,000 km2  2.880 5.29031 
D(not_slum) Dummy variable: 1 = household does not live in a slum, 0 = otherwise 0.471 0.49919 
D(mid_city) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in a departmental capital (except Lima), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.514 0.49983 
D(border) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in a border city (Tumbes, Tacna or Puno), 0 = 
otherwise 
0.114 0.31759 
D(tongue) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the two parents of the household has indigenous mother 
tongue , 0 = otherwise 
0.242 0.42823 
D(migrant) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the two parents of the household is a migrant, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.646 0.47822 
D(social) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the household members pertain to social organizations 
(unions, social clubs, social programs, etc.) , 0 = otherwise 
0.406 0.49108 
Station_distx1000 Number of police stations in the district per 1,000 inhabitants 0.059 0.10864 
Muni_persx1000 Number of workers in the local government of the district per 1,000 inhabitants 3.605 4.85469 
L(budget_dist_pc) 
Natural logarithm of the per-capita budget of the local government, in thousands of 
new soles 
5.116 0.65747 
D(sdp_dist) Dummy variable: 1 = the district has a slum development plan, 0 = otherwise 0.049 0.21612 
Independant variables: PROBIT model 
D(ca_food)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
food, 0 = otherwise 
0.739 0.43914 
D(ca_food)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
tubers and cereals, 0 = otherwise 
0.630 0.48281 
D(ca_food)_3 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
fruits and vegetables, 0 = otherwise 
0.555 0.49699 
D(ca_food)_4 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
meat, fish and chicken, 0 = otherwise 
0.551 0.49741 
Agropec_firmPC Number of agropecuarian firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 0.489 1.31546 
D(agro_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = agrarian activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.582 0.49325 
D(pec_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = pecuarian activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.290 0.45393 
D(fish_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = fishing activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared 
by the mayor) 
0.111 0.31416 
Prop(workagro_dist) Proportion of urban workers in agropecuarian sector in the district  0.095 0.13118 
Prop(workfish_dist) Proportion of urban workers in fishing sector in the district  0.010 0.02792 
P(pop_slums_dist) Proportion of people in the district living in a slum 0.334 0.34174 
P(migrant_dist) Proportion of migrants living in the district (urban places) 0.313 0.10293 
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P(race_dist) Proportion of indigenous people (by declared race) living in the district  (urban places) 0.089 0.11666 
informal_index 
Index of tax informality at the province level, varies from 1 (high informality) to 0 (no 
informality) Index = (Tax of the IVA - (IVA payments/Value Added))/Tax of the IVA 
0.279 0.30053 
D(conf_gov_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household considers that the public 
administration performance is good or very good , 0 = otherwise 
0.308 0.46175 
D(conf_gov_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household considers that the performance of the 
government is not an obstacle for development , 0 = otherwise 
0.190 0.39217 
D(conf_gov_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the head of the household has a positive opinion in all 
responses related to the government , 0 = otherwise 
0.082 0.27437 
D(overall_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household considers his/her family as non-poor, 
0 = otherwise 
0.611 0.48751 
D(income_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household is satisfied with his/her income, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.356 0.47874 
D(income_stab) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household considers that his/her income is 
stable, 0 = otherwise 
0.775 0.41731 
D(sub_pov) Dummy variable: 1 = if income is below the minimum income question, 0 = otherwise 0.325 0.46852 
D(road_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is a non-asphalted highway, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.175 0.38002 
D(road_2) Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is an asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 0.678 0.46726 
D(road_3) Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is any other type, 0 = otherwise 0.029 0.16711 
distance Distance from the district to the capital of the province in minutes 75.054 126.70420 
P(nowater_dist) Proportion of households without water service in the district  (urban places) 0.206 0.19863 
P(nodrain_dist) Proportion of houses without drain service in the district  (urban places) 0.276 0.21222 
P(noelec_dist) Proportion of houses without electricity in the district  (urban places) 0.111 0.08137 
P(nofloor_dist) Proportion of houses with floor of inadequate materials in the district  (urban places) 0.295 0.16419 
P(nowall_dist) Proportion of houses with walls of inadequate materials in the district  (urban places) 0.413 0.23527 
P(noinsu_dist) Proportion of people without insurance in the district  (urban places) 0.577 0.09569 
P(illiterate_dist) Proportion of illiterate people in the district  (urban places) 0.037 0.02837 
P(selfwork_dist) Proportion of self-employers in the district  (urban places) 0.381 0.07310 
P(unreg_dist) Proportion of unregistered people in the district  (urban places) 0.974 0.01436 
P(undernut_dist) Proportion of under-nourished children below 5 years old in the district 0.176 0.12226 
Mort_distx1000 Child mortality, number per 1,000 born alive 16.943 6.31018 
P(poor_dist) Proportion of poor people in the district 0.291 0.16235 
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icf_index 
Targeting index (between 0 and 1) of the government for social programs (district 
level) 
0.127 0.16325 
lifeexp_dist Average life expectancy of the district 73.762 2.04419 
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Appendix 7: Full regression results (models in Chapter 7) 
 
a) Results for models with UV-1  
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon)         0.56693*** 0.55184***     0.56693*** 0.55184***     
        (0.03851) (0.03062)   (0.03851) (0.03062)    
O1L(expend_Fon) 
0.57087*** 0.56310*** -0.00596 -0.00366     -0.00675 -0.00268     -0.00704 0.00207 
  (0.03863) (0.03096) (0.00720) (0.01331)     (0.00718) (0.01300)     (0.00716) (0.01300) 
L(O1_uv_inf) 
-0.35757 0.38637** -0.14533*** 0.07775***     -0.17200*** 0.07993***     -0.19317*** 0.16278*** 
  (0.26768) (0.17089) (0.02502) (0.00910)     (0.02398) (0.00909)     (0.02442) (0.01843) 
L(O1_uv_semi) 
0.65455 0.43651** 0.06758*** -0.05840***     0.09207*** -0.01953*     0.11373*** -0.09647*** 
  (0.42218) (0.19326) (0.02530) (0.01294)     (0.02447) (0.01184)     (0.02393) (0.01887) 
L(O1_uv_for) 
0.10512 -0.46372*** 0.07775*** -0.01935*     0.07993*** -0.06040***     0.07944*** -0.06631*** 
  (0.11170) (0.06111) (0.00910) (0.01113)     (0.00909) (0.00951)     (0.00900) (0.00933) 
L(fam_size) 0.49040*** 0.14956** -0.00535 -0.06104*** 0.49213*** 0.14577** -0.00684 -0.06049*** 0.49213*** 0.14577** -0.00729 -0.05847*** 
  (0.13673) (0.05905) (0.01246) (0.01336) (0.13455) (0.05881) (0.01245) (0.01336) (0.13455) (0.05881) (0.01245) (0.01334) 
D(mem_spo) 0.09863 -0.09592 0.03533*** -0.01888 0.08425 -0.10800* 0.03581*** -0.01836 0.08425 -0.10800* 0.03621*** -0.02013 
  (0.13132) (0.06068) (0.01256) (0.01440) (0.13235) (0.06034) (0.01257) (0.01441) (0.13235) (0.06034) (0.01255) (0.01426) 
D(mem_son) 0.22910* 0.03304 0.02381* -0.03098** 0.22643* 0.03798 0.02397* -0.03318** 0.22643* 0.03798 0.02406* -0.03357** 
  (0.13466) (0.06376) (0.01374) (0.01561) (0.13365) (0.06352) (0.01375) (0.01565) (0.13365) (0.06352) (0.01374) (0.01555) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00603 0.02390 0.01425 -0.00065 -0.00176 0.02727 0.01472 -0.00082 -0.00176 0.02727 0.01513* -0.00156 
  (0.11902) (0.04540) (0.00908) (0.00925) (0.11806) (0.04526) (0.00908) (0.00927) (0.11806) (0.04526) (0.00907) (0.00919) 
P(men) -0.31675* 0.08064 -0.07255*** 0.01582 -0.30304* 0.06990 -0.07144*** 0.01577 -0.30304* 0.06990 -0.07112*** 0.01559 
  (0.16823) (0.07929) (0.01695) (0.02062) (0.16909) (0.07881) (0.01695) (0.02073) (0.16909) (0.07881) (0.01694) (0.02059) 
age_head 0.01903 -0.00611 0.00588*** -0.00351* 0.01998 -0.00455 0.00587*** -0.00377** 0.01998 -0.00455 0.00584*** -0.00367* 
  (0.01379) (0.00731) (0.00157) (0.00191) (0.01376) (0.00722) (0.00157) (0.00190) (0.01376) (0.00722) (0.00157) (0.00189) 
age_head-sq -0.00009 0.00008 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** 
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  (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.02166 0.12332* -0.02318* 0.00283 -0.02722 0.14705** -0.02296* 0.00038 -0.02722 0.14705** -0.02320* 0.00199 
  (0.13788) (0.06430) (0.01313) (0.01573) (0.13934) (0.06383) (0.01314) (0.01577) (0.13934) (0.06383) (0.01311) (0.01560) 
year_educ_head -0.01185 0.03595*** -0.00047 0.00626*** -0.01170 0.03421*** -0.00050 0.00646*** -0.01170 0.03421*** -0.00048 0.00677*** 
  (0.00991) (0.00434) (0.00085) (0.00117) (0.00988) (0.00431) (0.00085) (0.00114) (0.00988) (0.00431) (0.00085) (0.00114) 
D(Lima) -0.52076*** 0.55424*** 0.11759*** 0.07080*** -0.57041*** 0.66697*** 0.11864*** 0.06124*** -0.57041*** 0.66697*** 0.11915*** 0.06295*** 
  (0.14952) (0.07015) (0.00924) (0.01146) (0.13895) (0.06615) (0.00924) (0.01153) (0.13895) (0.06615) (0.00914) (0.01147) 
Hrs_ff -0.00108 0.00219** 0.00026 0.00010 -0.00105 0.00205** 0.00026 0.00012 -0.00105 0.00205** 0.00026 0.00013 
  (0.00253) (0.00092) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00251) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00251) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) 
Hrs_if -0.00254 -0.00165 0.00042 0.00045 -0.00237 -0.00163 0.00042 0.00047* -0.00237 -0.00163 0.00042 0.00046 
  (0.00325) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00337) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00337) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ii -0.00129 -0.00128* -0.00005 0.00003 -0.00106 -0.00137* -0.00005 0.00002 -0.00106 -0.00137* -0.00005 0.00002 
  (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_sf 0.00627 0.00145 0.00169*** -0.00003 0.00618 0.00123 0.00167*** 0.00001 0.00618 0.00123 0.00167*** 0.00000 
  (0.00508) (0.00156) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00491) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00491) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) 
Hrs_si 0.00216 0.00127** 0.00040*** -0.00008 0.00226 0.00113* 0.00039*** -0.00006 0.00226 0.00113* 0.00039*** -0.00005 
  (0.00161) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
Hrs_fam -0.00509** -0.00074 0.00030 0.00058** -0.00517** -0.00090 0.00030 0.00061** -0.00517** -0.00090 0.00030 0.00060** 
  (0.00224) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00029) (0.00223) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00223) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) 
Hrs_second 0.00659 0.00015 0.00008 -0.00027 0.00656 -0.00010 0.00009 -0.00027 0.00656 -0.00010 0.00011 -0.00031 
  (0.00507) (0.00160) (0.00037) (0.00031) (0.00495) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00495) (0.00160) (0.00037) (0.00031) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.16868 -0.04612 0.00803 0.00890 0.17409 -0.04611 0.00796 0.00831 0.17409 -0.04611 0.00751 0.00989 
  (0.17759) (0.06684) (0.01271) (0.01437) (0.17599) (0.06647) (0.01271) (0.01434) (0.17599) (0.06647) (0.01271) (0.01426) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.12381 0.08103 -0.01943 -0.03329* 0.09041 0.07711 -0.01903 -0.03271* 0.09041 0.07711 -0.01865 -0.03346** 
  (0.20804) (0.10187) (0.01947) (0.01705) (0.21040) (0.10160) (0.01950) (0.01705) (0.21040) (0.10160) (0.01948) (0.01695) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.16169 0.03777 0.01216 -0.01080 0.15223 0.03578 0.01177 -0.00927 0.15223 0.03578 0.01168 -0.00847 
  (0.12719) (0.05586) (0.01132) (0.01174) (0.12696) (0.05583) (0.01132) (0.01175) (0.12696) (0.05583) (0.01132) (0.01170) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.27003 0.08473 -0.07334*** -0.00590 -0.26919 0.09041 -0.07218*** -0.00655 -0.26919 0.09041 -0.07207*** -0.00564 
  (0.27554) (0.09917) (0.02044) (0.02065) (0.26821) (0.09839) (0.02039) (0.02087) (0.26821) (0.09839) (0.02038) (0.02084) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.03962 -0.08039* 0.00542 -0.01606 0.03676 -0.08468* 0.00524 -0.01522 0.03676 -0.08468* 0.00503 -0.01556 
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  (0.11668) (0.04788) (0.00942) (0.01010) (0.11666) (0.04771) (0.00941) (0.01015) (0.11666) (0.04771) (0.00941) (0.01013) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.08108 -0.00969 0.00075 0.00224 0.07843 0.00380 0.00091 0.00212 0.07843 0.00380 0.00078 0.00239 
  (0.15763) (0.06120) (0.01230) (0.01274) (0.15723) (0.06134) (0.01226) (0.01260) (0.15723) (0.06134) (0.01227) (0.01260) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.09510 0.06436 -0.00759 0.01271 0.10310 0.07213 -0.00766 0.01232 0.10310 0.07213 -0.00766 0.01234 
  (0.13677) (0.05157) (0.01097) (0.01131) (0.13484) (0.05136) (0.01095) (0.01127) (0.13484) (0.05136) (0.01095) (0.01122) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.00776 0.00256   -0.04430 0.07969   -0.04430 0.07969    
  (0.12847) (0.05903)   (0.12734) (0.05740)   (0.12734) (0.05740)    
P(migrant_dist) 0.13901 -0.25379   0.18024 -0.24649   0.18024 -0.24649    
  (0.52690) (0.25199)   (0.51392) (0.25037)   (0.51392) (0.25037)    
P(race_dist) 0.23823 0.52517*   0.42377 -0.28657   0.42377 -0.28657    
  (0.46498) (0.27302)   (0.42861) (0.25057)   (0.42861) (0.25057)    
informal_index 0.01237 -0.14893**   -0.05393 -0.12182*   -0.05393 -0.12182*    
  (0.14979) (0.07183)   (0.14623) (0.07013)   (0.14623) (0.07013)    
D(conf_gov_1) 0.02827 -0.04830   0.01997 -0.05265   0.01997 -0.05265    
  (0.09302) (0.03945)   (0.09246) (0.03936)   (0.09246) (0.03936)    
D(conf_gov_2) -0.10453 -0.12698**   -0.10316 -0.13439**   -0.10316 -0.13439**    
  (0.10912) (0.05519)   (0.10850) (0.05469)   (0.10850) (0.05469)    
D(conf_gov_3) -0.01382 0.12617   0.00501 0.12391   0.00501 0.12391    
  (0.16558) (0.08628)   (0.16659) (0.08521)   (0.16659) (0.08521)    
D(overall_satis) 0.08578 -0.10330***   0.08940 -0.10733***   0.08940 -0.10733***    
  (0.08157) (0.03671)   (0.08074) (0.03652)   (0.08074) (0.03652)    
D(income_satis) 0.11146 -0.08317**   0.10792 -0.08179**   0.10792 -0.08179**    
  (0.08498) (0.03724)   (0.08444) (0.03710)   (0.08444) (0.03710)    
D(income_stab) 0.03804 -0.13723***   0.02924 -0.13535***   0.02924 -0.13535***    
  (0.09325) (0.04177)   (0.09282) (0.04148)   (0.09282) (0.04148)    
D(sub_pov) 0.00152 -0.08601**   0.00182 -0.08120**   0.00182 -0.08120**    
  (0.07634) (0.03590)   (0.07602) (0.03584)   (0.07602) (0.03584)    
D(road_1) -0.18999 -0.01815   -0.19268 -0.04821   -0.19268 -0.04821    
  (0.13034) (0.06547)   (0.12846) (0.06417)   (0.12846) (0.06417)    
D(road_2) -0.23358* 0.10567*   -0.20665 0.11462**   -0.20665 0.11462**    
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  (0.12911) (0.05842)   (0.12780) (0.05798)   (0.12780) (0.05798)    
D(road_3) 0.15471 0.19519   0.17902 0.12951   0.17902 0.12951    
  (0.28498) (0.12900)   (0.29140) (0.12928)   (0.29140) (0.12928)    
distance -0.00034 0.00009   -0.00058** -0.00003   -0.00058** -0.00003    
  (0.00030) (0.00019)   (0.00029) (0.00018)   (0.00029) (0.00018)    
P(nowater_dist) 0.47109* -0.14208   0.53204** -0.11970   0.53204** -0.11970    
  (0.25231) (0.14792)   (0.24867) (0.14239)   (0.24867) (0.14239)    
P(nodrain_dist) -0.85538** -0.26899   -0.95589*** -0.36117*   -0.95589*** -0.36117*    
  (0.35820) (0.20669)   (0.34665) (0.19988)   (0.34665) (0.19988)    
P(noelec_dist) 1.92485** -1.51051***   2.07547*** -1.58577***   2.07547*** -1.58577***    
  (0.78637) (0.43312)   (0.74530) (0.43348)   (0.74530) (0.43348)    
P(nofloor_dist) -0.02600 0.44540*   -0.12444 0.26527   -0.12444 0.26527    
  (0.53125) (0.24887)   (0.52026) (0.24438)   (0.52026) (0.24438)    
P(nowall_dist) 0.30119 0.49940***   0.31744 0.56225***   0.31744 0.56225***    
  (0.34643) (0.14265)   (0.34226) (0.14214)   (0.34226) (0.14214)    
P(noinsu_dist) 1.19515** -0.08951   1.28200** -0.31394   1.28200** -0.31394    
  (0.53968) (0.27504)   (0.52609) (0.26523)   (0.52609) (0.26523)    
P(illiterate_dist) -3.51012 -0.92582   -3.75728 1.58955   -3.75728 1.58955    
  (2.50419) (1.46958)   (2.49769) (1.41485)   (2.49769) (1.41485)    
P(selfwork_dist) 0.76447 0.26934   0.95424 0.20626   0.95424 0.20626    
  (0.85148) (0.45522)   (0.84814) (0.44523)   (0.84814) (0.44523)    
P(unreg_dist) 8.84917** -4.61979**   9.62524** -5.29650***   9.62524** -5.29650***    
  (3.81623) (2.13932)   (3.76598) (2.04666)   (3.76598) (2.04666)    
icf_index -0.80592* 0.03468   -1.11717** 0.35269   -1.11717** 0.35269    
  (0.47259) (0.27775)   (0.46755) (0.26136)   (0.46755) (0.26136)    
P(undernut_dist) -0.30501 0.99478***   0.05551 0.72415**   0.05551 0.72415**    
  (0.63911) (0.30142)   (0.62044) (0.29309)   (0.62044) (0.29309)    
Mort_distx1000 -0.00368 0.00823   -0.01036 0.01884   -0.01036 0.01884    
  (0.01909) (0.01891)   (0.01948) (0.01663)   (0.01948) (0.01663)    
P(poor_dist) 2.29411*** -1.10006***   2.57002*** -1.07810***   2.57002*** -1.07810***    
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  (0.66781) (0.29692)   (0.62227) (0.28032)   (0.62227) (0.28032)    
lifeexp_dist 0.08563 0.01885   0.06327 0.05670   0.06327 0.05670    
  (0.07127) (0.06012)   (0.07323) (0.05339)   (0.07323) (0.05339)    
D(ca_food)_1 0.07921 0.00308   0.07998 0.01147   0.07998 0.01147    
  (0.09969) (0.05066)   (0.09924) (0.05050)   (0.09924) (0.05050)    
D(ca_food)_2 0.01063 0.07968   0.02962 0.07169   0.02962 0.07169    
  (0.10885) (0.05188)   (0.10721) (0.05172)   (0.10721) (0.05172)    
D(ca_food)_3 0.19425* 0.01044   0.19070* 0.00564   0.19070* 0.00564    
  (0.11260) (0.04950)   (0.11247) (0.04961)   (0.11247) (0.04961)    
D(ca_food)_4 -0.08436 -0.02041   -0.10697 -0.02248   -0.10697 -0.02248    
  (0.10532) (0.04807)   (0.10445) (0.04806)   (0.10445) (0.04806)    
Agropec_firmPC -0.04049 -0.02426   -0.05484 -0.03096   -0.05484 -0.03096    
  (0.04396) (0.01895)   (0.04315) (0.01899)   (0.04315) (0.01899)    
D(agro_dist) 0.12789 0.03851   0.13768 0.02670   0.13768 0.02670    
  (0.10229) (0.04392)   (0.10168) (0.04389)   (0.10168) (0.04389)    
D(pec_dist) -0.06012 -0.07484   -0.06448 -0.05682   -0.06448 -0.05682    
  (0.11222) (0.05142)   (0.11543) (0.05052)   (0.11543) (0.05052)    
D(fish_dist) 0.34882* 0.01670   0.43587** -0.00207   0.43587** -0.00207    
  (0.17953) (0.06253)   (0.18180) (0.06171)   (0.18180) (0.06171)    
Prop(workagro_dist) -1.11172** -0.93570***   -1.14757** -0.80565***   -1.14757** -0.80565***    
  (0.52946) (0.25786)   (0.50026) (0.24798)   (0.50026) (0.24798)    
Prop(workfish_dist) 1.01626 1.72546*   1.22674 2.36604***   1.22674 2.36604***    
  (1.73818) (0.91032)   (1.77318) (0.91223)   (1.77318) (0.91223)    
PHI     -0.13311** -0.05838**     -0.14399** -0.05859***     -0.14704** -0.04373* 
      (0.06728) (0.02300)     (0.06633) (0.02224)     (0.06627) (0.02237) 
Constant -19.40841*** -0.84400 0.35993*** 0.31995*** -18.60654*** -3.53289 0.35873*** 0.34547*** -18.60654*** -3.53289 0.35633*** 0.32099*** 
  (7.24520) (5.35204) (0.06404) (0.10813) (7.09483) (4.81140) (0.06363) (0.10771) (7.09483) (4.81140) (0.06350) (0.10720) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
LogL -692.833 -4228.773 4124.244 -697.076 -4266.134 4134.204 -697.076 -4266.134 4152.785 
Wald (ident. vars.) 100.09*** 227.72***     176.93*** 252.03***     176.93*** 252.03***     
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b) Results for models with UV-2 
 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon)         0.56693*** 0.55184***     0.56693*** 0.55184***     
         (0.03851) (0.03062)   (0.03851) (0.03062)    
O2L(expend_Fon) 
0.57560*** 0.55904*** -0.01073 -0.00006    -0.01149 0.00342     -0.01124 0.00801 
  (0.03834) (0.03082) (0.00717) (0.01376)    (0.00718) (0.01351)     (0.00716) (0.01357) 
L(O2_uv_inf) 
-1.17828*** 0.07250 -0.05553* 0.06436***    -0.10769*** 0.06903***     -0.12805*** 0.14365*** 
  (0.44486) (0.24273) (0.03120) (0.00929)    (0.03058) (0.00918)     (0.03119) (0.01806) 
L(O2_uv_semi) 
1.35390** 0.85780*** -0.00883 -0.08200***    0.03866 -0.05243***     0.05794* -0.12075*** 
  (0.54006) (0.25295) (0.03095) (0.01406)    (0.03052) (0.01345)     (0.03010) (0.02029) 
L(O2_uv_for) 
0.28939** -0.34219*** 0.06436*** 0.01764    0.06903*** -0.01661     0.07010*** -0.02289** 
  (0.12750) (0.06844) (0.00929) (0.01222)    (0.00918) (0.01127)     (0.00881) (0.01060) 
L(fam_size) 0.50081*** 0.14925** -0.00841 -0.05955*** 0.49213*** 0.14577** -0.01004 -0.05826*** 0.49213*** 0.14577** -0.01003 -0.05669*** 
  (0.13663) (0.05900) (0.01244) (0.01335) (0.13455) (0.05881) (0.01246) (0.01342) (0.13455) (0.05881) (0.01246) (0.01344) 
D(mem_spo) 0.08304 -0.10861* 0.03311*** -0.01887 0.08425 -0.10800* 0.03338*** -0.01924 0.08425 -0.10800* 0.03348*** -0.02017 
  (0.12941) (0.06049) (0.01261) (0.01436) (0.13235) (0.06034) (0.01265) (0.01447) (0.13235) (0.06034) (0.01264) (0.01436) 
D(mem_son) 0.22699* 0.03328 0.02153 -0.03163** 0.22643* 0.03798 0.02157 -0.03317** 0.22643* 0.03798 0.02173 -0.03339** 
  (0.13473) (0.06362) (0.01376) (0.01562) (0.13365) (0.06352) (0.01378) (0.01572) (0.13365) (0.06352) (0.01378) (0.01566) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00014 0.02680 0.01209 -0.00047 -0.00176 0.02727 0.01294 -0.00004 -0.00176 0.02727 0.01321 -0.00050 
  (0.11829) (0.04531) (0.00912) (0.00923) (0.11806) (0.04526) (0.00912) (0.00929) (0.11806) (0.04526) (0.00912) (0.00923) 
P(men) -0.30690* 0.07491 -0.07067*** 0.01636 -0.30304* 0.06990 -0.06903*** 0.01598 -0.30304* 0.06990 -0.06891*** 0.01589 
  (0.16687) (0.07901) (0.01702) (0.02063) (0.16909) (0.07881) (0.01703) (0.02080) (0.16909) (0.07881) (0.01702) (0.02071) 
age_head 0.02179 -0.00559 0.00565*** -0.00363* 0.01998 -0.00455 0.00568*** -0.00370* 0.01998 -0.00455 0.00568*** -0.00374** 
  (0.01371) (0.00727) (0.00157) (0.00190) (0.01376) (0.00722) (0.00157) (0.00190) (0.01376) (0.00722) (0.00157) (0.00190) 
age_head-sq -0.00012 0.00008 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** 
  (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
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D(gender_head) -0.01839 0.13933** -0.02312* 0.00366 -0.02722 0.14705** -0.02305* 0.00260 -0.02722 0.14705** -0.02308* 0.00354 
  (0.13547) (0.06404) (0.01321) (0.01569) (0.13934) (0.06383) (0.01324) (0.01584) (0.13934) (0.06383) (0.01323) (0.01570) 
year_educ_head -0.01412 0.03512*** -0.00029 0.00590*** -0.01170 0.03421*** -0.00029 0.00629*** -0.01170 0.03421*** -0.00028 0.00661*** 
  (0.01007) (0.00434) (0.00085) (0.00117) (0.00988) (0.00431) (0.00085) (0.00114) (0.00988) (0.00431) (0.00085) (0.00114) 
D(Lima) -0.41779** 0.55336*** 0.11768*** 0.07656*** -0.57041*** 0.66697*** 0.12048*** 0.07152*** -0.57041*** 0.66697*** 0.12131*** 0.07290*** 
  (0.17091) (0.07575) (0.00956) (0.01183) (0.13895) (0.06615) (0.00956) (0.01197) (0.13895) (0.06615) (0.00941) (0.01188) 
Hrs_ff -0.00120 0.00210** 0.00028* 0.00008 -0.00105 0.00205** 0.00029* 0.00010 -0.00105 0.00205** 0.00029* 0.00011 
  (0.00257) (0.00092) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00251) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00251) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) 
Hrs_if -0.00177 -0.00159 0.00043 0.00047* -0.00237 -0.00163 0.00044 0.00046 -0.00237 -0.00163 0.00045 0.00044 
  (0.00352) (0.00163) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00337) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00337) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ii -0.00127 -0.00129* -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00106 -0.00137* -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00106 -0.00137* -0.00002 0.00000 
  (0.00169) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_sf 0.00619 0.00141 0.00170*** -0.00007 0.00618 0.00123 0.00168*** -0.00002 0.00618 0.00123 0.00168*** -0.00002 
  (0.00499) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00491) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00491) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) 
Hrs_si 0.00230 0.00119** 0.00041*** -0.00009 0.00226 0.00113* 0.00041*** -0.00007 0.00226 0.00113* 0.00041*** -0.00007 
  (0.00161) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
Hrs_fam -0.00513** -0.00074 0.00032 0.00058** -0.00517** -0.00090 0.00033 0.00059** -0.00517** -0.00090 0.00033 0.00058** 
  (0.00223) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00029) (0.00223) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00223) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) 
Hrs_second 0.00708 0.00028 0.00004 -0.00030 0.00656 -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00028 0.00656 -0.00010 0.00008 -0.00032 
  (0.00486) (0.00161) (0.00036) (0.00030) (0.00495) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00495) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.17230 -0.04041 0.00868 0.00850 0.17409 -0.04611 0.00806 0.00850 0.17409 -0.04611 0.00778 0.00954 
  (0.17970) (0.06689) (0.01277) (0.01437) (0.17599) (0.06647) (0.01276) (0.01443) (0.17599) (0.06647) (0.01276) (0.01440) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.07768 0.08389 -0.02152 -0.03411** 0.09041 0.07711 -0.02155 -0.03245* 0.09041 0.07711 -0.02145 -0.03233* 
  (0.21909) (0.10147) (0.01957) (0.01692) (0.21040) (0.10160) (0.01960) (0.01714) (0.21040) (0.10160) (0.01958) (0.01709) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.15892 0.03514 0.01172 -0.01060 0.15223 0.03578 0.01169 -0.01070 0.15223 0.03578 0.01159 -0.01005 
  (0.12920) (0.05590) (0.01133) (0.01182) (0.12696) (0.05583) (0.01131) (0.01181) (0.12696) (0.05583) (0.01131) (0.01180) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.26828 0.08763 -0.07518*** -0.00404 -0.26919 0.09041 -0.07386*** -0.00536 -0.26919 0.09041 -0.07419*** -0.00421 
  (0.27073) (0.09831) (0.02047) (0.02079) (0.26821) (0.09839) (0.02046) (0.02094) (0.26821) (0.09839) (0.02045) (0.02098) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.03469 -0.07886* 0.00603 -0.01554 0.03676 -0.08468* 0.00569 -0.01579 0.03676 -0.08468* 0.00560 -0.01647 
  (0.11608) (0.04777) (0.00944) (0.01009) (0.11666) (0.04771) (0.00943) (0.01018) (0.11666) (0.04771) (0.00943) (0.01016) 
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D(Hrs_fam) 0.07099 -0.00780 0.00042 0.00295 0.07843 0.00380 -0.00072 0.00298 0.07843 0.00380 -0.00102 0.00360 
  (0.15608) (0.06130) (0.01227) (0.01271) (0.15723) (0.06134) (0.01224) (0.01258) (0.15723) (0.06134) (0.01224) (0.01257) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.09093 0.05925 -0.00779 0.01418 0.10310 0.07213 -0.00825 0.01305 0.10310 0.07213 -0.00836 0.01356 
  (0.13300) (0.05145) (0.01093) (0.01126) (0.13484) (0.05136) (0.01092) (0.01129) (0.13484) (0.05136) (0.01092) (0.01126) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.02679 0.01785     -0.04430 0.07969   -0.04430 0.07969    
  (0.13031) (0.05896)     (0.12734) (0.05740)   (0.12734) (0.05740)    
P(migrant_dist) 0.01127 -0.24910     0.18024 -0.24649   0.18024 -0.24649    
  (0.52854) (0.25391)     (0.51392) (0.25037)   (0.51392) (0.25037)    
P(race_dist) 0.18627 0.30824     0.42377 -0.28657   0.42377 -0.28657    
  (0.47120) (0.27789)     (0.42861) (0.25057)   (0.42861) (0.25057)    
informal_index -0.03032 -0.14629**     -0.05393 -0.12182*   -0.05393 -0.12182*    
  (0.15688) (0.07183)     (0.14623) (0.07013)   (0.14623) (0.07013)    
D(conf_gov_1) 0.02939 -0.04536     0.01997 -0.05265   0.01997 -0.05265    
  (0.09387) (0.03943)     (0.09246) (0.03936)   (0.09246) (0.03936)    
D(conf_gov_2) -0.10150 -0.12632**     -0.10316 -0.13439**   -0.10316 -0.13439**    
  (0.10952) (0.05495)     (0.10850) (0.05469)   (0.10850) (0.05469)    
D(conf_gov_3) -0.03549 0.12589     0.00501 0.12391   0.00501 0.12391    
  (0.16730) (0.08611)     (0.16659) (0.08521)   (0.16659) (0.08521)    
D(overall_satis) 0.09118 -0.10563***     0.08940 -0.10733***   0.08940 -0.10733***    
  (0.08172) (0.03662)     (0.08074) (0.03652)   (0.08074) (0.03652)    
D(income_satis) 0.10250 -0.08192**     0.10792 -0.08179**   0.10792 -0.08179**    
  (0.08486) (0.03719)     (0.08444) (0.03710)   (0.08444) (0.03710)    
D(income_stab) 0.03139 -0.13639***     0.02924 -0.13535***   0.02924 -0.13535***    
  (0.09349) (0.04162)     (0.09282) (0.04148)   (0.09282) (0.04148)    
D(sub_pov) -0.00655 -0.08900**     0.00182 -0.08120**   0.00182 -0.08120**    
  (0.07711) (0.03586)     (0.07602) (0.03584)   (0.07602) (0.03584)    
D(road_1) -0.24644* -0.03475     -0.19268 -0.04821   -0.19268 -0.04821    
  (0.13465) (0.06614)     (0.12846) (0.06417)   (0.12846) (0.06417)    
D(road_2) -0.26585** 0.09581     -0.20665 0.11462**   -0.20665 0.11462**    
  (0.12963) (0.05881)     (0.12780) (0.05798)   (0.12780) (0.05798)    
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D(road_3) 0.11654 0.18037     0.17902 0.12951   0.17902 0.12951    
  (0.28464) (0.12887)     (0.29140) (0.12928)   (0.29140) (0.12928)    
distance -0.00057** -0.00002     -0.00058** -0.00003   -0.00058** -0.00003    
  (0.00028) (0.00018)     (0.00029) (0.00018)   (0.00029) (0.00018)    
P(nowater_dist) 0.42441 -0.17526     0.53204** -0.11970   0.53204** -0.11970    
  (0.26075) (0.14660)     (0.24867) (0.14239)   (0.24867) (0.14239)    
P(nodrain_dist) -0.75845** -0.23329     -0.95589*** -0.36117*   -0.95589*** -0.36117*    
  (0.36891) (0.20446)     (0.34665) (0.19988)   (0.34665) (0.19988)    
P(noelec_dist) 1.82241** -1.56153***     2.07547*** -1.58577***   2.07547*** -1.58577***    
  (0.77343) (0.43466)     (0.74530) (0.43348)   (0.74530) (0.43348)    
P(nofloor_dist) 0.11150 0.38133     -0.12444 0.26527   -0.12444 0.26527    
  (0.54539) (0.24764)     (0.52026) (0.24438)   (0.52026) (0.24438)    
P(nowall_dist) 0.16741 0.54437***     0.31744 0.56225***   0.31744 0.56225***    
  (0.35130) (0.14274)     (0.34226) (0.14214)   (0.34226) (0.14214)    
P(noinsu_dist) 0.68895 -0.37573     1.28200** -0.31394   1.28200** -0.31394    
  (0.53433) (0.28064)     (0.52609) (0.26523)   (0.52609) (0.26523)    
P(illiterate_dist) -3.69442 -0.59252     -3.75728 1.58955   -3.75728 1.58955    
  (2.57473) (1.48331)     (2.49769) (1.41485)   (2.49769) (1.41485)    
P(selfwork_dist) 1.25863 0.34805     0.95424 0.20626   0.95424 0.20626    
  (0.85704) (0.45091)     (0.84814) (0.44523)   (0.84814) (0.44523)    
P(unreg_dist) 6.61604 -5.16514**     9.62524** -5.29650***   9.62524** -5.29650***    
  (4.07361) (2.17429)     (3.76598) (2.04666)   (3.76598) (2.04666)    
icf_index -0.83282* 0.21922     -1.11717** 0.35269   -1.11717** 0.35269    
  (0.47451) (0.27138)     (0.46755) (0.26136)   (0.46755) (0.26136)    
P(undernut_dist) -0.28404 0.66549**     0.05551 0.72415**   0.05551 0.72415**    
  (0.63585) (0.30054)     (0.62044) (0.29309)   (0.62044) (0.29309)    
Mort_distx1000 -0.00733 0.01642     -0.01036 0.01884   -0.01036 0.01884    
  (0.02102) (0.01671)     (0.01948) (0.01663)   (0.01948) (0.01663)    
P(poor_dist) 2.22234*** -1.07257***     2.57002*** -1.07810***   2.57002*** -1.07810***    
  (0.69249) (0.29593)     (0.62227) (0.28032)   (0.62227) (0.28032)    
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lifeexp_dist 0.07228 0.04299     0.06327 0.05670   0.06327 0.05670    
  (0.07735) (0.05358)     (0.07323) (0.05339)   (0.07323) (0.05339)    
D(ca_food)_1 0.09636 0.00759     0.07998 0.01147   0.07998 0.01147    
  (0.09985) (0.05060)     (0.09924) (0.05050)   (0.09924) (0.05050)    
D(ca_food)_2 0.00678 0.07465     0.02962 0.07169   0.02962 0.07169    
  (0.10794) (0.05183)     (0.10721) (0.05172)   (0.10721) (0.05172)    
D(ca_food)_3 0.17912 0.00733     0.19070* 0.00564   0.19070* 0.00564    
  (0.11166) (0.04947)     (0.11247) (0.04961)   (0.11247) (0.04961)    
D(ca_food)_4 -0.08162 -0.01916     -0.10697 -0.02248   -0.10697 -0.02248    
  (0.10480) (0.04801)     (0.10445) (0.04806)   (0.10445) (0.04806)    
Agropec_firmPC -0.03613 -0.02633     -0.05484 -0.03096   -0.05484 -0.03096    
  (0.04539) (0.01921)     (0.04315) (0.01899)   (0.04315) (0.01899)    
D(agro_dist) 0.12782 0.00687     0.13768 0.02670   0.13768 0.02670    
  (0.10460) (0.04412)     (0.10168) (0.04389)   (0.10168) (0.04389)    
D(pec_dist) -0.07185 -0.04409     -0.06448 -0.05682   -0.06448 -0.05682    
  (0.11747) (0.05119)     (0.11543) (0.05052)   (0.11543) (0.05052)    
D(fish_dist) 0.32519* 0.00576     0.43587** -0.00207   0.43587** -0.00207    
  (0.17951) (0.06219)     (0.18180) (0.06171)   (0.18180) (0.06171)    
Prop(workagro_dist) -1.04719** -0.82522***     -1.14757** -0.80565***   -1.14757** -0.80565***    
  (0.51960) (0.25149)     (0.50026) (0.24798)   (0.50026) (0.24798)    
Prop(workfish_dist) 1.45637 1.77304*     1.22674 2.36604***   1.22674 2.36604***    
  (1.90191) (0.90921)     (1.77318) (0.91223)   (1.77318) (0.91223)    
PHI    -0.18210*** -0.06208***    -0.20214*** -0.05438**     -0.20152*** -0.03924* 
     (0.06526) (0.02395)    (0.06590) (0.02296)     (0.06584) (0.02323) 
Constant -16.40651** -2.49080 0.43080*** 0.28277** -18.60654*** -3.53289 0.42126*** 0.27389** -18.60654*** -3.53289 0.41355*** 0.25108** 
  (7.69309) (4.90095) (0.06398) (0.11187) (7.09483) (4.81140) (0.06375) (0.11063) (7.09483) (4.81140) (0.06355) (0.11050) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
LogL -688.412 -4244.802 4091.817 -697.076 -4266.134 4090.41 -697.076 -4266.134 4099.195 
Wald (ident. vars.) 112.55*** 224.12***     176.93*** 252.03***     176.93*** 252.03***     
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c) Results for models with UV-3 
 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon)         0.56693*** 0.55184***     0.56693*** 0.55184***     
        (0.03851) (0.03062)   (0.03851) (0.03062)    
O3L(expend_Fon) 
0.57590*** 0.55286*** -0.00506 -0.00486     -0.00695 -0.00144     -0.00624 0.00024 
  (0.03852) (0.03073) (0.00715) (0.01367)     (0.00714) (0.01349)     (0.00714) (0.01348) 
L(O3_uv_inf) 
-1.87149*** 0.92472*** -0.23995*** 0.04132***     -0.32262*** 0.04715***     -0.34501*** 0.12296*** 
  (0.49572) (0.29765) (0.04842) (0.01184)     (0.04595) (0.01183)     (0.04653) (0.02402) 
L(O3_uv_semi) 
1.73766*** 0.23860 0.19862*** -0.03980**     0.27547*** -0.01149     0.28500*** -0.07898*** 
  (0.58066) (0.28821) (0.04848) (0.01765)     (0.04633) (0.01777)     (0.04558) (0.02776) 
L(O3_uv_for) 
0.12557 -0.22710*** 0.04132*** -0.00153     0.04715*** -0.03566**     0.06001*** -0.04398*** 
  (0.12283) (0.07100) (0.01184) (0.01455)     (0.01183) (0.01435)     (0.01172) (0.01332) 
L(fam_size) 0.50794*** 0.14829** -0.00318 -0.06266*** 0.49213*** 0.14577** -0.00537 -0.06047*** 0.49213*** 0.14577** -0.00503 -0.06032*** 
  (0.13644) (0.05895) (0.01246) (0.01344) (0.13455) (0.05881) (0.01245) (0.01342) (0.13455) (0.05881) (0.01245) (0.01341) 
D(mem_spo) 0.07275 -0.10464* 0.03143** -0.01729 0.08425 -0.10800* 0.03082** -0.01745 0.08425 -0.10800* 0.03090** -0.01742 
  (0.12972) (0.06046) (0.01259) (0.01449) (0.13235) (0.06034) (0.01260) (0.01457) (0.13235) (0.06034) (0.01260) (0.01448) 
D(mem_son) 0.22535* 0.03528 0.01965 -0.03137** 0.22643* 0.03798 0.01875 -0.03247** 0.22643* 0.03798 0.01920 -0.03226** 
  (0.13456) (0.06365) (0.01374) (0.01576) (0.13365) (0.06352) (0.01375) (0.01577) (0.13365) (0.06352) (0.01375) (0.01572) 
D(mem_oth) -0.00955 0.02455 0.01075 0.00083 -0.00176 0.02727 0.01129 0.00070 -0.00176 0.02727 0.01154 0.00052 
  (0.11809) (0.04529) (0.00912) (0.00932) (0.11806) (0.04526) (0.00911) (0.00934) (0.11806) (0.04526) (0.00911) (0.00929) 
P(men) -0.31179* 0.07291 -0.07367*** 0.01741 -0.30304* 0.06990 -0.07147*** 0.01672 -0.30304* 0.06990 -0.07170*** 0.01677 
  (0.16844) (0.07889) (0.01700) (0.02089) (0.16909) (0.07881) (0.01698) (0.02089) (0.16909) (0.07881) (0.01698) (0.02082) 
age_head 0.02161 -0.00556 0.00572*** -0.00356* 0.01998 -0.00455 0.00568*** -0.00371* 0.01998 -0.00455 0.00573*** -0.00374** 
  (0.01381) (0.00725) (0.00157) (0.00191) (0.01376) (0.00722) (0.00157) (0.00191) (0.01376) (0.00722) (0.00158) (0.00191) 
age_head-sq -0.00012 0.00008 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** 
  (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.01513 0.13952** -0.02395* 0.00204 -0.02722 0.14705** -0.02329* 0.00140 -0.02722 0.14705** -0.02307* 0.00146 
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  (0.13632) (0.06392) (0.01318) (0.01589) (0.13934) (0.06383) (0.01318) (0.01598) (0.13934) (0.06383) (0.01317) (0.01585) 
year_educ_head -0.01269 0.03511*** -0.00016 0.00594*** -0.01170 0.03421*** -0.00011 0.00617*** -0.01170 0.03421*** -0.00016 0.00629*** 
  (0.01005) (0.00433) (0.00085) (0.00116) (0.00988) (0.00431) (0.00085) (0.00114) (0.00988) (0.00431) (0.00085) (0.00114) 
D(Lima) -0.42125*** 0.57133*** 0.11404*** 0.07001*** -0.57041*** 0.66697*** 0.11983*** 0.06823*** -0.57041*** 0.66697*** 0.12234*** 0.06531*** 
  (0.16173) (0.07420) (0.00955) (0.01183) (0.13895) (0.06615) (0.00959) (0.01202) (0.13895) (0.06615) (0.00954) (0.01185) 
Hrs_ff -0.00105 0.00209** 0.00030* 0.00009 -0.00105 0.00205** 0.00031* 0.00010 -0.00105 0.00205** 0.00031* 0.00010 
  (0.00262) (0.00092) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00251) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00251) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) 
Hrs_if -0.00182 -0.00174 0.00042 0.00048* -0.00237 -0.00163 0.00043 0.00047* -0.00237 -0.00163 0.00043 0.00047* 
  (0.00355) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00337) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00337) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ii -0.00112 -0.00130* -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00106 -0.00137* -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00106 -0.00137* -0.00003 0.00002 
  (0.00171) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_sf 0.00662 0.00126 0.00173*** -0.00003 0.00618 0.00123 0.00171*** -0.00002 0.00618 0.00123 0.00172*** -0.00001 
  (0.00504) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00491) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00491) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00032) 
Hrs_si 0.00239 0.00115* 0.00041*** -0.00009 0.00226 0.00113* 0.00041*** -0.00008 0.00226 0.00113* 0.00041*** -0.00007 
  (0.00160) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00162) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
Hrs_fam -0.00543** -0.00086 0.00031 0.00061** -0.00517** -0.00090 0.00031 0.00060** -0.00517** -0.00090 0.00030 0.00061** 
  (0.00218) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00223) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00223) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) 
Hrs_second 0.00740 0.00009 0.00006 -0.00026 0.00656 -0.00010 0.00008 -0.00024 0.00656 -0.00010 0.00009 -0.00025 
  (0.00486) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00495) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00495) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.16752 -0.04699 0.00956 0.00755 0.17409 -0.04611 0.00893 0.00732 0.17409 -0.04611 0.00878 0.00772 
  (0.18254) (0.06669) (0.01273) (0.01447) (0.17599) (0.06647) (0.01270) (0.01445) (0.17599) (0.06647) (0.01271) (0.01444) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.07383 0.08037 -0.01936 -0.03348* 0.09041 0.07711 -0.01889 -0.03282* 0.09041 0.07711 -0.01886 -0.03309* 
  (0.22167) (0.10161) (0.01945) (0.01710) (0.21040) (0.10160) (0.01942) (0.01716) (0.21040) (0.10160) (0.01941) (0.01708) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.14945 0.03365 0.01291 -0.01147 0.15223 0.03578 0.01241 -0.01120 0.15223 0.03578 0.01245 -0.01077 
  (0.12965) (0.05587) (0.01133) (0.01182) (0.12696) (0.05583) (0.01131) (0.01182) (0.12696) (0.05583) (0.01131) (0.01180) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.26883 0.09119 -0.07591*** -0.00656 -0.26919 0.09041 -0.07466*** -0.00641 -0.26919 0.09041 -0.07526*** -0.00584 
  (0.27401) (0.09877) (0.02049) (0.02121) (0.26821) (0.09839) (0.02045) (0.02093) (0.26821) (0.09839) (0.02046) (0.02096) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.02810 -0.08212* 0.00859 -0.01573 0.03676 -0.08468* 0.00827 -0.01584 0.03676 -0.08468* 0.00812 -0.01636 
  (0.11528) (0.04772) (0.00941) (0.01018) (0.11666) (0.04771) (0.00939) (0.01021) (0.11666) (0.04771) (0.00939) (0.01018) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.06126 0.00266 -0.00023 0.00215 0.07843 0.00380 -0.00067 0.00254 0.07843 0.00380 -0.00076 0.00264 
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  (0.15509) (0.06127) (0.01230) (0.01260) (0.15723) (0.06134) (0.01226) (0.01260) (0.15723) (0.06134) (0.01226) (0.01258) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.09138 0.06912 -0.00894 0.01292 0.10310 0.07213 -0.00979 0.01291 0.10310 0.07213 -0.00967 0.01307 
  (0.13267) (0.05139) (0.01092) (0.01135) (0.13484) (0.05136) (0.01090) (0.01133) (0.13484) (0.05136) (0.01090) (0.01130) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.00435 0.04205   -0.04430 0.07969   -0.04430 0.07969    
  (0.12911) (0.05864)   (0.12734) (0.05740)   (0.12734) (0.05740)    
P(migrant_dist) -0.33160 -0.18028   0.18024 -0.24649   0.18024 -0.24649    
  (0.50340) (0.25395)   (0.51392) (0.25037)   (0.51392) (0.25037)    
P(race_dist) 0.47875 -0.13558   0.42377 -0.28657   0.42377 -0.28657    
  (0.44773) (0.25739)   (0.42861) (0.25057)   (0.42861) (0.25057)    
informal_index -0.01239 -0.14907**   -0.05393 -0.12182*   -0.05393 -0.12182*    
  (0.16055) (0.07213)   (0.14623) (0.07013)   (0.14623) (0.07013)    
D(conf_gov_1) 0.03660 -0.05564   0.01997 -0.05265   0.01997 -0.05265    
  (0.09435) (0.03945)   (0.09246) (0.03936)   (0.09246) (0.03936)    
D(conf_gov_2) -0.10364 -0.13331**   -0.10316 -0.13439**   -0.10316 -0.13439**    
  (0.10904) (0.05477)   (0.10850) (0.05469)   (0.10850) (0.05469)    
D(conf_gov_3) -0.02704 0.13473   0.00501 0.12391   0.00501 0.12391    
  (0.16801) (0.08557)   (0.16659) (0.08521)   (0.16659) (0.08521)    
D(overall_satis) 0.09355 -0.10404***   0.08940 -0.10733***   0.08940 -0.10733***    
  (0.08222) (0.03661)   (0.08074) (0.03652)   (0.08074) (0.03652)    
D(income_satis) 0.09273 -0.08278**   0.10792 -0.08179**   0.10792 -0.08179**    
  (0.08497) (0.03716)   (0.08444) (0.03710)   (0.08444) (0.03710)    
D(income_stab) 0.02039 -0.13682***   0.02924 -0.13535***   0.02924 -0.13535***    
  (0.09370) (0.04156)   (0.09282) (0.04148)   (0.09282) (0.04148)    
D(sub_pov) 0.00478 -0.08594**   0.00182 -0.08120**   0.00182 -0.08120**    
  (0.07729) (0.03588)   (0.07602) (0.03584)   (0.07602) (0.03584)    
D(road_1) -0.23039* -0.03566   -0.19268 -0.04821   -0.19268 -0.04821    
  (0.13735) (0.06515)   (0.12846) (0.06417)   (0.12846) (0.06417)    
D(road_2) -0.26414** 0.12411**   -0.20665 0.11462**   -0.20665 0.11462**    
  (0.13029) (0.05850)   (0.12780) (0.05798)   (0.12780) (0.05798)    
D(road_3) 0.14714 0.09387   0.17902 0.12951   0.17902 0.12951    
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  (0.29198) (0.13173)   (0.29140) (0.12928)   (0.29140) (0.12928)    
distance -0.00067** -0.00004   -0.00058** -0.00003   -0.00058** -0.00003    
  (0.00030) (0.00018)   (0.00029) (0.00018)   (0.00029) (0.00018)    
P(nowater_dist) 0.45894* -0.08667   0.53204** -0.11970   0.53204** -0.11970    
  (0.25424) (0.14485)   (0.24867) (0.14239)   (0.24867) (0.14239)    
P(nodrain_dist) -0.68376* -0.40585**   -0.95589*** -0.36117*   -0.95589*** -0.36117*    
  (0.35477) (0.20316)   (0.34665) (0.19988)   (0.34665) (0.19988)    
P(noelec_dist) 1.54315* -1.51536***   2.07547*** -1.58577***   2.07547*** -1.58577***    
  (0.79505) (0.43561)   (0.74530) (0.43348)   (0.74530) (0.43348)    
P(nofloor_dist) -0.00764 0.29302   -0.12444 0.26527   -0.12444 0.26527    
  (0.52991) (0.24569)   (0.52026) (0.24438)   (0.52026) (0.24438)    
P(nowall_dist) 0.11860 0.59131***   0.31744 0.56225***   0.31744 0.56225***    
  (0.35396) (0.14398)   (0.34226) (0.14214)   (0.34226) (0.14214)    
P(noinsu_dist) 0.90051* -0.17580   1.28200** -0.31394   1.28200** -0.31394    
  (0.50944) (0.27385)   (0.52609) (0.26523)   (0.52609) (0.26523)    
P(illiterate_dist) -5.05595** 1.59883   -3.75728 1.58955   -3.75728 1.58955    
  (2.55669) (1.44885)   (2.49769) (1.41485)   (2.49769) (1.41485)    
P(selfwork_dist) 0.86008 0.15528   0.95424 0.20626   0.95424 0.20626    
  (0.83362) (0.45045)   (0.84814) (0.44523)   (0.84814) (0.44523)    
P(unreg_dist) 8.06918** -4.34551**   9.62524** -5.29650***   9.62524** -5.29650***    
  (3.92492) (2.13814)   (3.76598) (2.04666)   (3.76598) (2.04666)    
icf_index -0.73464 0.15128   -1.11717** 0.35269   -1.11717** 0.35269    
  (0.49280) (0.27225)   (0.46755) (0.26136)   (0.46755) (0.26136)    
P(undernut_dist) -0.02108 0.66342**   0.05551 0.72415**   0.05551 0.72415**    
  (0.62776) (0.29516)   (0.62044) (0.29309)   (0.62044) (0.29309)    
Mort_distx1000 -0.01352 0.01922   -0.01036 0.01884   -0.01036 0.01884    
  (0.02280) (0.01772)   (0.01948) (0.01663)   (0.01948) (0.01663)    
P(poor_dist) 2.20941*** -0.84373***   2.57002*** -1.07810***   2.57002*** -1.07810***    
  (0.69467) (0.29682)   (0.62227) (0.28032)   (0.62227) (0.28032)    
lifeexp_dist 0.05121 0.05520   0.06327 0.05670   0.06327 0.05670    
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  (0.08275) (0.05653)   (0.07323) (0.05339)   (0.07323) (0.05339)    
D(ca_food)_1 0.08140 0.00538   0.07998 0.01147   0.07998 0.01147    
  (0.10018) (0.05055)   (0.09924) (0.05050)   (0.09924) (0.05050)    
D(ca_food)_2 0.01266 0.08188   0.02962 0.07169   0.02962 0.07169    
  (0.10676) (0.05183)   (0.10721) (0.05172)   (0.10721) (0.05172)    
D(ca_food)_3 0.17974 0.01083   0.19070* 0.00564   0.19070* 0.00564    
  (0.11189) (0.04951)   (0.11247) (0.04961)   (0.11247) (0.04961)    
D(ca_food)_4 -0.09157 -0.03135   -0.10697 -0.02248   -0.10697 -0.02248    
  (0.10439) (0.04803)   (0.10445) (0.04806)   (0.10445) (0.04806)    
Agropec_firmPC -0.04845 -0.03361*   -0.05484 -0.03096   -0.05484 -0.03096    
  (0.04567) (0.01915)   (0.04315) (0.01899)   (0.04315) (0.01899)    
D(agro_dist) 0.08665 0.01637   0.13768 0.02670   0.13768 0.02670    
  (0.10417) (0.04424)   (0.10168) (0.04389)   (0.10168) (0.04389)    
D(pec_dist) -0.04715 -0.03262   -0.06448 -0.05682   -0.06448 -0.05682    
  (0.11776) (0.05156)   (0.11543) (0.05052)   (0.11543) (0.05052)    
D(fish_dist) 0.40962** -0.00135   0.43587** -0.00207   0.43587** -0.00207    
  (0.18479) (0.06186)   (0.18180) (0.06171)   (0.18180) (0.06171)    
Prop(workagro_dist) -1.08520** -0.85901***   -1.14757** -0.80565***   -1.14757** -0.80565***    
  (0.50443) (0.25036)   (0.50026) (0.24798)   (0.50026) (0.24798)    
Prop(workfish_dist) 1.55234 2.36456***   1.22674 2.36604***   1.22674 2.36604***    
  (2.06721) (0.90970)   (1.77318) (0.91223)   (1.77318) (0.91223)    
PHI     -0.15120** -0.07075***     -0.18362*** -0.06449***     -0.17783*** -0.05812** 
      (0.06453) (0.02329)     (0.06559) (0.02291)     (0.06553) (0.02297) 
Constant -15.36639* -4.71809 0.36071*** 0.32460*** -18.60654*** -3.53289 0.35369*** 0.31885*** -18.60654*** -3.53289 0.33473*** 0.32572*** 
  (8.01587) (5.15879) (0.06549) (0.11123) (7.09483) (4.81140) (0.06451) (0.11152) (7.09483) (4.81140) (0.06458) (0.11085) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
LogL -685.106 -4256.626 4096.869 -697.076 -4266.134 4096.895 -697.076 -4266.134 4105.179 
Wald (ident. vars.) 114.40*** 231.61***     176.93*** 252.03***     176.93*** 252.03***     
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d) Results for models under specification 2 
 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon)         0.56793*** 0.54547***    0.56793*** 0.54547***     
         (0.03893) (0.03078)    (0.03893) (0.03078)     
O1L(expend_Fon) 
0.57234*** 0.55621*** -0.00403 0.02167     -0.00413 0.02023     -0.00386 0.02592** 
  (0.03899) (0.03113) (0.00692) (0.01341)     (0.00689) (0.01284)     (0.00688) (0.01285) 
L(O1_uv_inf) 
-0.43002 0.41347** -0.14266*** 0.07048***     -0.16086*** 0.07166***     -0.18210*** 0.15595*** 
  (0.26255) (0.17283) (0.02288) (0.00904)     (0.02198) (0.00908)     (0.02243) (0.01813) 
L(O1_uv_semi) 
0.65799 0.37183* 0.07218*** -0.01598     0.08920*** 0.00920     0.10599*** -0.06804*** 
  (0.41824) (0.19654) (0.02338) (0.01444)     (0.02266) (0.01199)     (0.02204) (0.01873) 
L(O1_uv_for) 
0.10879 -0.47852*** 0.07048*** -0.05449***     0.07166*** -0.08086***     0.07611*** -0.08791*** 
  (0.10966) (0.06178) (0.00904) (0.01296)     (0.00908) (0.00997)     (0.00885) (0.00974) 
L(fam_size) 0.49312*** 0.14936** 0.00610 -0.05164*** 0.48937*** 0.14426** 0.00526 -0.05152*** 0.48937*** 0.14426** 0.00517 -0.04992*** 
  (0.13953) (0.05926) (0.01216) (0.01310) (0.13752) (0.05902) (0.01217) (0.01304) (0.13752) (0.05902) (0.01217) (0.01302) 
D(mem_spo) 0.11768 -0.08756 0.04101*** -0.01982 0.10531 -0.09983* 0.04140*** -0.01878 0.10531 -0.09983* 0.04170*** -0.02031 
  (0.13382) (0.06073) (0.01239) (0.01412) (0.13492) (0.06041) (0.01239) (0.01405) (0.13492) (0.06041) (0.01238) (0.01391) 
D(mem_son) 0.22754* 0.03167 0.02109 -0.03129** 0.22602* 0.03926 0.02137 -0.03297** 0.22602* 0.03926 0.02170 -0.03306** 
  (0.13605) (0.06399) (0.01346) (0.01518) (0.13525) (0.06370) (0.01347) (0.01514) (0.13525) (0.06370) (0.01346) (0.01505) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00575 0.02217 0.01311 0.00139 0.00105 0.02582 0.01355 0.00118 0.00105 0.02582 0.01405 0.00041 
  (0.11976) (0.04562) (0.00889) (0.00907) (0.11869) (0.04544) (0.00890) (0.00906) (0.11869) (0.04544) (0.00889) (0.00899) 
P(men) -0.33054* 0.07431 -0.07637*** 0.02105 -0.31244* 0.06263 -0.07572*** 0.02083 -0.31244* 0.06263 -0.07568*** 0.02116 
  (0.17103) (0.07977) (0.01666) (0.02019) (0.17178) (0.07927) (0.01665) (0.02024) (0.17178) (0.07927) (0.01665) (0.02010) 
age_head 0.01515 -0.00594 0.00629*** -0.00323* 0.01654 -0.00487 0.00632*** -0.00341* 0.01654 -0.00487 0.00632*** -0.00338* 
  (0.01391) (0.00732) (0.00154) (0.00189) (0.01386) (0.00722) (0.00155) (0.00188) (0.01386) (0.00722) (0.00155) (0.00186) 
age_head-sq -0.00005 0.00007 -0.00004*** 0.00003* -0.00006 0.00006 -0.00004*** 0.00003* -0.00006 0.00006 -0.00004*** 0.00003* 
  (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.03094 0.13387** -0.02365* 0.00759 -0.03568 0.15777** -0.02385* 0.00561 -0.03568 0.15777** -0.02390* 0.00792 
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  (0.14013) (0.06448) (0.01296) (0.01545) (0.14191) (0.06403) (0.01297) (0.01540) (0.14191) (0.06403) (0.01295) (0.01523) 
year_educ_head -0.01129 0.03157*** -0.00186** 0.00654*** -0.01179 0.02991*** -0.00186** 0.00655*** -0.01179 0.02991*** -0.00184** 0.00686*** 
  (0.01010) (0.00440) (0.00085) (0.00114) (0.01008) (0.00438) (0.00085) (0.00111) (0.01008) (0.00438) (0.00085) (0.00110) 
Hrs_ff -0.00123 0.00220** 0.00019 0.00018 -0.00121 0.00205** 0.00020 0.00019 -0.00121 0.00205** 0.00020 0.00020 
  (0.00247) (0.00092) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00247) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00247) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00018) 
Hrs_if -0.00310 -0.00155 0.00035 0.00044 -0.00290 -0.00151 0.00035 0.00045 -0.00290 -0.00151 0.00035 0.00044 
  (0.00308) (0.00165) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00318) (0.00165) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00318) (0.00165) (0.00032) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ii -0.00129 -0.00110 -0.00009 0.00010 -0.00112 -0.00122* -0.00008 0.00010 -0.00112 -0.00122* -0.00009 0.00009 
  (0.00162) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00162) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00162) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_sf 0.00676 0.00133 0.00152*** 0.00008 0.00649 0.00110 0.00151*** 0.00011 0.00649 0.00110 0.00151*** 0.00011 
  (0.00519) (0.00158) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00499) (0.00156) (0.00030) (0.00031) (0.00499) (0.00156) (0.00030) (0.00031) 
Hrs_si 0.00219 0.00129** 0.00030*** 0.00001 0.00227 0.00116* 0.00030*** 0.00002 0.00227 0.00116* 0.00031*** 0.00003 
  (0.00167) (0.00059) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00168) (0.00059) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00168) (0.00059) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
Hrs_fam -0.00482** -0.00065 0.00024 0.00046* -0.00496** -0.00079 0.00024 0.00048* -0.00496** -0.00079 0.00024 0.00047* 
  (0.00229) (0.00112) (0.00022) (0.00028) (0.00225) (0.00112) (0.00022) (0.00028) (0.00225) (0.00112) (0.00022) (0.00028) 
Hrs_second 0.00755 0.00002 0.00000 -0.00023 0.00742 -0.00025 0.00001 -0.00021 0.00742 -0.00025 0.00002 -0.00025 
  (0.00516) (0.00161) (0.00036) (0.00030) (0.00503) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00030) (0.00503) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00030) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.17373 -0.04439 0.01079 0.00872 0.18640 -0.04484 0.01064 0.00835 0.18640 -0.04484 0.01021 0.00994 
  (0.17576) (0.06688) (0.01242) (0.01382) (0.17508) (0.06656) (0.01242) (0.01378) (0.17508) (0.06656) (0.01242) (0.01371) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.15532 0.07651 -0.02133 -0.02907* 0.12424 0.07294 -0.02109 -0.02868* 0.12424 0.07294 -0.02076 -0.02936* 
  (0.20119) (0.10245) (0.01922) (0.01693) (0.20245) (0.10228) (0.01922) (0.01684) (0.20245) (0.10228) (0.01921) (0.01676) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.17513 0.03541 0.01347 -0.01425 0.16764 0.03480 0.01317 -0.01332 0.16764 0.03480 0.01312 -0.01265 
  (0.12668) (0.05595) (0.01121) (0.01151) (0.12632) (0.05593) (0.01121) (0.01151) (0.12632) (0.05593) (0.01121) (0.01147) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.26682 0.08637 -0.05433*** -0.00832 -0.25699 0.09116 -0.05379*** -0.00905 -0.25699 0.09116 -0.05389*** -0.00795 
  (0.27817) (0.09980) (0.01965) (0.02041) (0.26972) (0.09882) (0.01966) (0.02066) (0.26972) (0.09882) (0.01966) (0.02060) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.03738 -0.07696 0.00658 -0.01629 0.03545 -0.08259* 0.00652 -0.01546 0.03545 -0.08259* 0.00620 -0.01616 
  (0.11783) (0.04791) (0.00924) (0.00995) (0.11785) (0.04774) (0.00923) (0.00997) (0.11785) (0.04774) (0.00923) (0.00995) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.09423 -0.00736 0.00634 0.00159 0.09397 0.00717 0.00621 0.00193 0.09397 0.00717 0.00606 0.00241 
  (0.16043) (0.06145) (0.01196) (0.01246) (0.15924) (0.06152) (0.01194) (0.01232) (0.15924) (0.06152) (0.01195) (0.01233) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.07048 0.07028 -0.00344 0.01590 0.08182 0.07719 -0.00341 0.01537 0.08182 0.07719 -0.00335 0.01562 
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  (0.13714) (0.05179) (0.01079) (0.01102) (0.13490) (0.05154) (0.01078) (0.01096) (0.13490) (0.05154) (0.01078) (0.01090) 
L(pop_urb_dist) 
0.18155 0.25047 0.18784*** 0.21534*** 0.16208 0.01340 0.18181*** 0.23042*** 0.16208 0.01340 0.18209*** 0.23033*** 
  (0.38129) (0.21676) (0.03829) (0.04899) (0.36378) (0.21323) (0.03843) (0.04778) (0.36378) (0.21323) (0.03850) (0.04704) 
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq 
0.00072 -0.00830 -0.00709*** -0.01050*** 0.00220 0.00333 -0.00685*** -0.01123*** 0.00220 0.00333 -0.00688*** -0.01112*** 
  (0.01790) (0.00993) (0.00180) (0.00227) (0.01723) (0.00978) (0.00181) (0.00223) (0.01723) (0.00978) (0.00181) (0.00220) 
pop_den_distx1000 
0.02628*** 0.01803*** -0.00008 -0.00214** 0.02547*** 0.01776*** -0.00006 -0.00243*** 0.02547*** 0.01776*** -0.00003 -0.00235*** 
  (0.00963) (0.00524) (0.00086) (0.00086) (0.00947) (0.00523) (0.00086) (0.00087) (0.00947) (0.00523) (0.00086) (0.00087) 
D(not_slum) 
0.08483 0.22584*** 0.03067*** 0.04485*** 0.08143 0.21698*** 0.03052*** 0.04461*** 0.08143 0.21698*** 0.02994*** 0.04837*** 
  (0.07943) (0.03520) (0.00669) (0.00759) (0.07956) (0.03503) (0.00669) (0.00736) (0.07956) (0.03503) (0.00670) (0.00736) 
D(Lima) -1.00387*** 0.38016*** 0.05232*** 0.17512*** -1.02283*** 0.42623*** 0.05340*** 0.17398*** -1.02283*** 0.42623*** 0.05466*** 0.17270*** 
  (0.22359) (0.10003) (0.01810) (0.01968) (0.22161) (0.09726) (0.01811) (0.01958) (0.22161) (0.09726) (0.01806) (0.01933) 
D(mid_city) 
-0.25502** -0.02502 -0.05375*** 0.03760*** -0.19727 -0.04928 -0.05405*** 0.03948*** -0.19727 -0.04928 -0.05471*** 0.04119*** 
  (0.12291) (0.04868) (0.00771) (0.00740) (0.12197) (0.04826) (0.00770) (0.00738) (0.12197) (0.04826) (0.00772) (0.00738) 
D(border) 
0.58006*** 0.05490 0.08556*** -0.00017 0.52497*** 0.03690 0.08752*** -0.00222 0.52497*** 0.03690 0.08769*** -0.00651 
  (0.17063) (0.06714) (0.01037) (0.01072) (0.16726) (0.06660) (0.01037) (0.01044) (0.16726) (0.06660) (0.01035) (0.01045) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.13348 0.04729    0.07333 0.12714**    0.07333 0.12714**     
  (0.13105) (0.06044)    (0.12932) (0.05889)    (0.12932) (0.05889)     
P(migrant_dist) 0.04317 -0.36816    0.16872 -0.35268    0.16872 -0.35268     
  (0.54610) (0.25589)    (0.52679) (0.25371)    (0.52679) (0.25371)     
P(race_dist) 0.46426 0.77796***    0.65923 -0.03784    0.65923 -0.03784     
  (0.48850) (0.28465)    (0.45177) (0.26058)    (0.45177) (0.26058)     
informal_index 0.14026 -0.13760*    0.06315 -0.11752    0.06315 -0.11752     
  (0.15287) (0.07376)    (0.14959) (0.07266)    (0.14959) (0.07266)     
D(conf_gov_1) 0.04823 -0.05086    0.03788 -0.05635    0.03788 -0.05635     
  (0.09415) (0.03970)    (0.09351) (0.03962)    (0.09351) (0.03962)     
D(conf_gov_2) -0.08143 -0.11766**    -0.08303 -0.12564**    -0.08303 -0.12564**     
  (0.11022) (0.05529)    (0.10982) (0.05481)    (0.10982) (0.05481)     
D(conf_gov_3) -0.01495 0.13814    0.01211 0.13716    0.01211 0.13716     
  (0.16799) (0.08649)    (0.16916) (0.08539)    (0.16916) (0.08539)     
D(overall_satis) 0.08208 -0.10720***    0.08264 -0.11250***    0.08264 -0.11250***     
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  (0.08202) (0.03694)    (0.08151) (0.03674)    (0.08151) (0.03674)     
D(income_satis) 0.10153 -0.09087**    0.09875 -0.08747**    0.09875 -0.08747**     
  (0.08523) (0.03741)    (0.08470) (0.03726)    (0.08470) (0.03726)     
D(income_stab) 0.05501 -0.13181***    0.04372 -0.12945***    0.04372 -0.12945***     
  (0.09433) (0.04198)    (0.09406) (0.04170)    (0.09406) (0.04170)     
D(sub_pov) 0.03189 -0.08428**    0.03239 -0.07904**    0.03239 -0.07904**     
  (0.07659) (0.03617)    (0.07668) (0.03607)    (0.07668) (0.03607)     
D(road_1) -0.17669 0.01420    -0.16088 -0.01611    -0.16088 -0.01611     
  (0.13517) (0.06758)    (0.13192) (0.06587)    (0.13192) (0.06587)     
D(road_2) -0.23954* 0.09331    -0.20670 0.09804*    -0.20670 0.09804*     
  (0.13404) (0.05941)    (0.13173) (0.05903)    (0.13173) (0.05903)     
D(road_3) 0.13603 0.16339    0.14675 0.09831    0.14675 0.09831     
  (0.27725) (0.12998)    (0.28032) (0.13038)    (0.28032) (0.13038)     
distance -0.00038 0.00015    -0.00061** 0.00002    -0.00061** 0.00002     
  (0.00031) (0.00019)    (0.00030) (0.00018)    (0.00030) (0.00018)     
P(nowater_dist) 0.37646 -0.05611    0.45152* -0.04571    0.45152* -0.04571     
  (0.24508) (0.15083)    (0.24143) (0.14545)    (0.24143) (0.14545)     
P(nodrain_dist) -0.40866 -0.10745    -0.54722 -0.17560    -0.54722 -0.17560     
  (0.35377) (0.21429)    (0.34254) (0.20594)    (0.34254) (0.20594)     
P(noelec_dist) 2.00830*** -1.39756***    2.11415*** -1.47745***    2.11415*** -1.47745***     
  (0.74533) (0.43898)    (0.70396) (0.43697)    (0.70396) (0.43697)     
P(nofloor_dist) -0.23299 0.42066    -0.35804 0.21996    -0.35804 0.21996     
  (0.52876) (0.25606)    (0.51860) (0.25088)    (0.51860) (0.25088)     
P(nowall_dist) 0.62711* 0.59360***    0.66623* 0.66285***    0.66623* 0.66285***     
  (0.35189) (0.14941)    (0.34564) (0.14814)    (0.34564) (0.14814)     
P(noinsu_dist) 0.91573 -0.20988    0.92120* -0.49536*    0.92120* -0.49536*     
  (0.57069) (0.27913)    (0.55375) (0.26721)    (0.55375) (0.26721)     
P(illiterate_dist) -3.38387 -1.63750    -3.56749 0.94056    -3.56749 0.94056     
  (2.52850) (1.47813)    (2.48691) (1.41620)    (2.48691) (1.41620)     
P(selfwork_dist) -0.06616 0.05098    0.25366 0.04043    0.25366 0.04043     
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  (0.89582) (0.47198)    (0.88597) (0.46140)    (0.88597) (0.46140)     
P(unreg_dist) 8.77300** -4.26241*    9.99294*** -4.91631**    9.99294*** -4.91631**     
  (3.85954) (2.20736)    (3.78599) (2.09061)    (3.78599) (2.09061)     
icf_index -0.81775* 0.00606    -1.15007** 0.30619    -1.15007** 0.30619     
  (0.49072) (0.28829)    (0.48443) (0.27289)    (0.48443) (0.27289)     
P(undernut_dist) 0.01472 0.97452***    0.40261 0.68232**    0.40261 0.68232**     
  (0.64082) (0.30330)    (0.61900) (0.29479)    (0.61900) (0.29479)     
Mort_distx1000 -0.01695 0.00143    -0.02533 0.01261    -0.02533 0.01261     
  (0.02076) (0.01807)    (0.02178) (0.01633)    (0.02178) (0.01633)     
P(poor_dist) 2.24291*** -0.96634***    2.57869*** -0.93299***    2.57869*** -0.93299***     
  (0.67626) (0.30884)    (0.62557) (0.28818)    (0.62557) (0.28818)     
lifeexp_dist 0.04698 0.00457    0.02094 0.04426    0.02094 0.04426     
  (0.07501) (0.05756)    (0.07931) (0.05244)    (0.07931) (0.05244)     
D(ca_food)_1 0.07524 0.00236    0.07092 0.01058    0.07092 0.01058     
  (0.10058) (0.05081)    (0.09993) (0.05064)    (0.09993) (0.05064)     
D(ca_food)_2 -0.01976 0.07819    0.01006 0.07087    0.01006 0.07087     
  (0.11097) (0.05211)    (0.10944) (0.05194)    (0.10944) (0.05194)     
D(ca_food)_3 0.21353* 0.00847    0.20609* 0.00322    0.20609* 0.00322     
  (0.11284) (0.04962)    (0.11324) (0.04973)    (0.11324) (0.04973)     
D(ca_food)_4 -0.11771 -0.03176    -0.14236 -0.03230    -0.14236 -0.03230     
  (0.10437) (0.04831)    (0.10367) (0.04829)    (0.10367) (0.04829)     
Agropec_firmPC -0.06710* -0.02740    -0.07744* -0.03276*    -0.07744* -0.03276*     
  (0.03981) (0.01936)    (0.03959) (0.01957)    (0.03959) (0.01957)     
D(agro_dist) 0.11622 0.07236    0.13781 0.07198    0.13781 0.07198     
  (0.10039) (0.04625)    (0.10044) (0.04607)    (0.10044) (0.04607)     
D(pec_dist) 0.03277 -0.05006    0.03172 -0.03075    0.03172 -0.03075     
  (0.10961) (0.05185)    (0.11195) (0.05106)    (0.11195) (0.05106)     
D(fish_dist) 0.43862** 0.05437    0.52917*** 0.02677    0.52917*** 0.02677     
  (0.19019) (0.06499)    (0.19065) (0.06401)    (0.19065) (0.06401)     
Prop(workagro_dist) -0.75432 -0.72507**    -0.67198 -0.61843**    -0.67198 -0.61843**     
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  (0.59870) (0.30289)    (0.57666) (0.29199)    (0.57666) (0.29199)     
Prop(workfish_dist) 0.68483 2.22590**    1.09289 2.78119***    1.09289 2.78119***     
  (1.50168) (0.92672)    (1.48801) (0.92916)    (1.48801) (0.92916)     
PHI     0.00838 0.02003     0.00372 0.01480     0.00455 0.03488 
      (0.06445) (0.02535)     (0.06364) (0.02343)     (0.06361) (0.02338) 
Constant -18.02501** -1.70452 -0.84322*** -1.03329*** -17.48736** -3.40827 -0.81110*** -1.07363*** -17.48736** -3.40827 -0.82102*** -1.12134*** 
  (7.92250) (5.42370) (0.21207) (0.30136) (7.93998) (5.05107) (0.21262) (0.28616) (7.93998) (5.05107) (0.21269) (0.28160) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
LogL -680.086 -4197.159 4367.198 -684.824 -4235.236 4373.806 -684.824 -4235.236 4394.748 
Wald (ident. vars.) 88.05*** 166.90***     141.31*** 197.68***     141.31*** 197.68***     
 
e) Results for models under specification 3 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon)         0.56935*** 0.55005***    0.56935*** 0.55005***     
         (0.03887) (0.03065)    (0.03887) (0.03065)     
O1L(expend_Fon) 
0.57274*** 0.56194*** -0.00604 0.00013     -0.00686 -0.00088     -0.00714 0.00267 
  (0.03896) (0.03101) (0.00718) (0.01340)     (0.00716) (0.01326)     (0.00715) (0.01324) 
L(O1_uv_inf) 
-0.32654 0.36301** -0.13773*** 0.07148***     -0.16374*** 0.07403***     -0.18492*** 0.15421*** 
  (0.27029) (0.17142) (0.02529) (0.00977)     (0.02431) (0.00975)     (0.02490) (0.01952) 
L(O1_uv_semi) 
0.65088 0.41853** 0.06625*** -0.05267***     0.08972*** -0.01466     0.10964*** -0.08832*** 
  (0.42096) (0.19344) (0.02517) (0.01309)     (0.02438) (0.01229)     (0.02391) (0.01963) 
L(O1_uv_for) 
0.10340 -0.45633*** 0.07148*** -0.01881*     0.07403*** -0.05937***     0.07528*** -0.06589*** 
  (0.11234) (0.06107) (0.00977) (0.01111)     (0.00975) (0.00990)     (0.00953) (0.00978) 
L(fam_size) 0.47660*** 0.15974*** -0.00374 -0.05943*** 0.47685*** 0.15659*** -0.00508 -0.05989*** 0.47685*** 0.15659*** -0.00543 -0.05834*** 
  (0.13703) (0.05922) (0.01238) (0.01343) (0.13496) (0.05896) (0.01237) (0.01347) (0.13496) (0.05896) (0.01237) (0.01345) 
D(mem_spo) 0.10314 -0.08620 0.02963** -0.01487 0.08886 -0.09822 0.03012** -0.01416 0.08886 -0.09822 0.03049** -0.01569 
  (0.13086) (0.06103) (0.01257) (0.01435) (0.13179) (0.06071) (0.01257) (0.01435) (0.13179) (0.06071) (0.01256) (0.01420) 
D(mem_son) 0.23283* 0.02750 0.02378* -0.03295** 0.23110* 0.03218 0.02385* -0.03450** 0.23110* 0.03218 0.02392* -0.03472** 
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  (0.13511) (0.06370) (0.01372) (0.01565) (0.13415) (0.06343) (0.01373) (0.01569) (0.13415) (0.06343) (0.01372) (0.01559) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01391 0.01329 0.01552* -0.00114 0.00789 0.01583 0.01587* -0.00081 0.00789 0.01583 0.01621* -0.00151 
  (0.11834) (0.04556) (0.00905) (0.00922) (0.11746) (0.04542) (0.00906) (0.00924) (0.11746) (0.04542) (0.00905) (0.00916) 
P(men) -0.31984* 0.07751 -0.07081*** 0.01700 -0.30816* 0.06664 -0.06985*** 0.01669 -0.30816* 0.06664 -0.06960*** 0.01640 
  (0.16781) (0.07947) (0.01691) (0.02049) (0.16856) (0.07900) (0.01691) (0.02061) (0.16856) (0.07900) (0.01690) (0.02047) 
age_head 0.01734 -0.00454 0.00573*** -0.00353* 0.01810 -0.00293 0.00574*** -0.00384** 0.01810 -0.00293 0.00572*** -0.00376** 
  (0.01387) (0.00733) (0.00157) (0.00190) (0.01383) (0.00723) (0.00158) (0.00189) (0.01383) (0.00723) (0.00158) (0.00188) 
age_head-sq -0.00007 0.00007 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00008 0.00006 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00008 0.00006 -0.00004** 0.00004** 
  (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.02795 0.13669** -0.02471* 0.00393 -0.03340 0.16042** -0.02445* 0.00079 -0.03340 0.16042** -0.02454* 0.00206 
  (0.13793) (0.06459) (0.01313) (0.01574) (0.13928) (0.06414) (0.01314) (0.01579) (0.13928) (0.06414) (0.01312) (0.01561) 
year_educ_head -0.01075 0.03173*** 0.00032 0.00623*** -0.01033 0.02980*** 0.00026 0.00642*** -0.01033 0.02980*** 0.00025 0.00668*** 
  (0.01022) (0.00446) (0.00087) (0.00116) (0.01018) (0.00443) (0.00087) (0.00114) (0.01018) (0.00443) (0.00087) (0.00113) 
Hrs_ff -0.00086 0.00219** 0.00024 0.00013 -0.00083 0.00205** 0.00024 0.00014 -0.00083 0.00205** 0.00024 0.00014 
  (0.00258) (0.00092) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00257) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00257) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) 
Hrs_if -0.00240 -0.00172 0.00040 0.00047* -0.00223 -0.00170 0.00040 0.00049* -0.00223 -0.00170 0.00040 0.00049* 
  (0.00322) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00334) (0.00163) (0.00032) (0.00028) (0.00334) (0.00163) (0.00032) (0.00028) 
Hrs_ii -0.00122 -0.00126* -0.00007 0.00005 -0.00100 -0.00134* -0.00007 0.00004 -0.00100 -0.00134* -0.00008 0.00004 
  (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_sf 0.00638 0.00160 0.00159*** -0.00004 0.00631 0.00138 0.00157*** -0.00000 0.00631 0.00138 0.00157*** -0.00000 
  (0.00507) (0.00157) (0.00031) (0.00030) (0.00491) (0.00156) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00491) (0.00156) (0.00031) (0.00031) 
Hrs_si 0.00206 0.00135** 0.00036*** -0.00004 0.00214 0.00121** 0.00036*** -0.00003 0.00214 0.00121** 0.00036*** -0.00003 
  (0.00160) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00161) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00161) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
Hrs_fam -0.00504** -0.00072 0.00028 0.00058** -0.00511** -0.00086 0.00028 0.00061** -0.00511** -0.00086 0.00028 0.00061** 
  (0.00225) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00029) (0.00224) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00224) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00028) 
Hrs_second 0.00699 0.00004 0.00004 -0.00025 0.00697 -0.00022 0.00006 -0.00024 0.00697 -0.00022 0.00007 -0.00028 
  (0.00508) (0.00161) (0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00497) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) (0.00497) (0.00160) (0.00036) (0.00031) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.14725 -0.03745 0.00838 0.00904 0.15051 -0.03682 0.00837 0.00807 0.15051 -0.03682 0.00801 0.00947 
  (0.18032) (0.06690) (0.01269) (0.01435) (0.17907) (0.06655) (0.01269) (0.01433) (0.17907) (0.06655) (0.01269) (0.01425) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.10708 0.08221 -0.01819 -0.03366** 0.07325 0.07851 -0.01786 -0.03325* 0.07325 0.07851 -0.01749 -0.03407** 
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  (0.20669) (0.10180) (0.01933) (0.01701) (0.20906) (0.10156) (0.01936) (0.01700) (0.20906) (0.10156) (0.01934) (0.01690) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.16415 0.04099 0.01103 -0.01159 0.15463 0.03881 0.01066 -0.01000 0.15463 0.03881 0.01058 -0.00925 
  (0.12726) (0.05594) (0.01131) (0.01164) (0.12691) (0.05590) (0.01130) (0.01166) (0.12691) (0.05590) (0.01130) (0.01161) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.28429 0.08558 -0.06878*** -0.00413 -0.28542 0.09135 -0.06772*** -0.00563 -0.28542 0.09135 -0.06752*** -0.00507 
  (0.27595) (0.09939) (0.02036) (0.02043) (0.26902) (0.09857) (0.02033) (0.02063) (0.26902) (0.09857) (0.02032) (0.02059) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.04311 -0.08095* 0.00635 -0.01719* 0.04137 -0.08505* 0.00618 -0.01594 0.04137 -0.08505* 0.00599 -0.01611 
  (0.11648) (0.04797) (0.00938) (0.01010) (0.11643) (0.04779) (0.00938) (0.01016) (0.11643) (0.04779) (0.00938) (0.01014) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.07891 -0.00435 0.00079 0.00205 0.07557 0.00867 0.00102 0.00167 0.07557 0.00867 0.00097 0.00181 
  (0.15719) (0.06107) (0.01225) (0.01292) (0.15672) (0.06119) (0.01221) (0.01277) (0.15672) (0.06119) (0.01222) (0.01275) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.08277 0.06613 -0.00474 0.01352 0.08972 0.07422 -0.00477 0.01269 0.08972 0.07422 -0.00467 0.01246 
  (0.13599) (0.05168) (0.01094) (0.01132) (0.13404) (0.05146) (0.01092) (0.01131) (0.13404) (0.05146) (0.01092) (0.01126) 
D(Lima) -0.51712*** 0.56033*** 0.10834*** 0.07737*** -0.56207*** 0.66815*** 0.10942*** 0.06584*** -0.56207*** 0.66815*** 0.11023*** 0.06635*** 
  (0.14888) (0.07042) (0.00936) (0.01209) (0.13833) (0.06646) (0.00936) (0.01239) (0.13833) (0.06646) (0.00925) (0.01227) 
D(tongue) 
0.13061 -0.21094*** 0.02217*** -0.02021** 0.15001 -0.22238*** 0.02033** -0.01133 0.15001 -0.22238*** 0.01901** -0.00900 
 (0.10461) (0.04836) (0.00827) (0.00927) (0.10313) (0.04789) (0.00826) (0.00942) (0.10313) (0.04789) (0.00826) (0.00941) 
D(migrant) 
-0.06584 -0.04891 0.03740*** -0.02026** -0.06929 -0.04594 0.03744*** -0.01980** -0.06929 -0.04594 0.03763*** -0.02023** 
 (0.08020) (0.03597) (0.00717) (0.00837) (0.08024) (0.03579) (0.00717) (0.00836) (0.08024) (0.03579) (0.00717) (0.00832) 
D(social) 
0.08367 -0.01509 -0.01629** 0.00215 0.08980 -0.01657 -0.01607** 0.00273 0.08980 -0.01657 -0.01621** 0.00299 
 (0.08014) (0.03402) (0.00682) (0.00770) (0.07997) (0.03384) (0.00682) (0.00771) (0.07997) (0.03384) (0.00682) (0.00766) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.02661 -0.01002    -0.02090 0.06406    -0.02090 0.06406     
  (0.13043) (0.05910)    (0.12961) (0.05753)    (0.12961) (0.05753)     
P(migrant_dist) 0.25249 -0.14649    0.29641 -0.13813    0.29641 -0.13813     
  (0.53836) (0.25655)    (0.52501) (0.25528)    (0.52501) (0.25528)     
P(race_dist) -0.00593 0.92684***    0.13590 0.15126    0.13590 0.15126     
  (0.47995) (0.28750)    (0.45315) (0.26625)    (0.45315) (0.26625)     
informal_index 0.00619 -0.15230**    -0.05669 -0.12819*    -0.05669 -0.12819*     
  (0.14919) (0.07197)    (0.14603) (0.07030)    (0.14603) (0.07030)     
D(conf_gov_1) 0.02614 -0.04743    0.01783 -0.05181    0.01783 -0.05181     
  (0.09280) (0.03943)    (0.09223) (0.03935)    (0.09223) (0.03935)     
D(conf_gov_2) -0.10471 -0.12829**    -0.10280 -0.13527**    -0.10280 -0.13527**     
311 
 
 
 
  (0.10939) (0.05522)    (0.10882) (0.05473)    (0.10882) (0.05473)     
D(conf_gov_3) -0.00884 0.12469    0.00832 0.12268    0.00832 0.12268     
  (0.16531) (0.08644)    (0.16633) (0.08532)    (0.16633) (0.08532)     
D(overall_satis) 0.08290 -0.09559***    0.08606 -0.09930***    0.08606 -0.09930***     
  (0.08121) (0.03672)    (0.08040) (0.03655)    (0.08040) (0.03655)     
D(income_satis) 0.10862 -0.08103**    0.10518 -0.07951**    0.10518 -0.07951**     
  (0.08450) (0.03726)    (0.08398) (0.03712)    (0.08398) (0.03712)     
D(income_stab) 0.03417 -0.13639***    0.02519 -0.13448***    0.02519 -0.13448***     
  (0.09213) (0.04178)    (0.09169) (0.04151)    (0.09169) (0.04151)     
D(sub_pov) -0.00222 -0.08188**    -0.00245 -0.07753**    -0.00245 -0.07753**     
  (0.07623) (0.03599)    (0.07590) (0.03593)    (0.07590) (0.03593)     
D(road_1) -0.20805 -0.01283    -0.21174* -0.04253    -0.21174* -0.04253     
  (0.13045) (0.06572)    (0.12838) (0.06440)    (0.12838) (0.06440)     
D(road_2) -0.23729* 0.10538*    -0.21288* 0.11527**    -0.21288* 0.11527**     
  (0.12793) (0.05849)    (0.12664) (0.05806)    (0.12664) (0.05806)     
D(road_3) 0.14849 0.20617    0.17162 0.14109    0.17162 0.14109     
  (0.28445) (0.12905)    (0.29018) (0.12928)    (0.29018) (0.12928)     
distance -0.00035 0.00010    -0.00058** -0.00002    -0.00058** -0.00002     
  (0.00030) (0.00019)    (0.00029) (0.00018)    (0.00029) (0.00018)     
P(nowater_dist) 0.45512* -0.14798    0.51363** -0.12200    0.51363** -0.12200     
  (0.25110) (0.14801)    (0.24766) (0.14248)    (0.24766) (0.14248)     
P(nodrain_dist) -0.83622** -0.27861    -0.93488*** -0.37271*    -0.93488*** -0.37271*     
  (0.36214) (0.20713)    (0.35071) (0.20044)    (0.35071) (0.20044)     
P(noelec_dist) 1.96053** -1.53848***    2.11163*** -1.62208***    2.11163*** -1.62208***     
  (0.79237) (0.43248)    (0.75374) (0.43280)    (0.75374) (0.43280)     
P(nofloor_dist) -0.02236 0.43434*    -0.11451 0.25801    -0.11451 0.25801     
  (0.52908) (0.24889)    (0.51810) (0.24468)    (0.51810) (0.24468)     
P(nowall_dist) 0.31195 0.51127***    0.32975 0.57217***    0.32975 0.57217***     
  (0.34755) (0.14313)    (0.34395) (0.14267)    (0.34395) (0.14267)     
P(noinsu_dist) 1.21636** -0.07307    1.30655** -0.28715    1.30655** -0.28715     
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  (0.53959) (0.27434)    (0.52468) (0.26403)    (0.52468) (0.26403)     
P(illiterate_dist) -3.31319 -1.26675    -3.49123 1.23989    -3.49123 1.23989     
  (2.50925) (1.46526)    (2.50453) (1.40348)    (2.50453) (1.40348)     
P(selfwork_dist) 0.66417 0.36068    0.82326 0.30423    0.82326 0.30423     
  (0.85468) (0.45652)    (0.85083) (0.44627)    (0.85083) (0.44627)     
P(unreg_dist) 8.56601** -4.01111*    9.24571** -4.59968**    9.24571** -4.59968**     
  (3.84533) (2.14641)    (3.80244) (2.05922)    (3.80244) (2.05922)     
icf_index -0.84992* 0.05859    -1.15167** 0.36345    -1.15167** 0.36345     
  (0.47072) (0.27628)    (0.46509) (0.26024)    (0.46509) (0.26024)     
P(undernut_dist) -0.25605 0.97962***    0.09325 0.71826**    0.09325 0.71826**     
  (0.63877) (0.30207)    (0.61913) (0.29343)    (0.61913) (0.29343)     
Mort_distx1000 -0.00431 0.00848    -0.01072 0.01870    -0.01072 0.01870     
  (0.01899) (0.01871)    (0.01933) (0.01640)    (0.01933) (0.01640)     
P(poor_dist) 2.35220*** -1.11691***    2.60998*** -1.08303***    2.60998*** -1.08303***     
  (0.66837) (0.29621)    (0.62221) (0.27948)    (0.62221) (0.27948)     
lifeexp_dist 0.08512 0.01946    0.06364 0.05576    0.06364 0.05576     
  (0.07069) (0.05961)    (0.07242) (0.05277)    (0.07242) (0.05277)     
D(ca_food)_1 0.07990 -0.00183    0.08117 0.00597    0.08117 0.00597     
  (0.09939) (0.05074)    (0.09898) (0.05057)    (0.09898) (0.05057)     
D(ca_food)_2 0.00720 0.08356    0.02463 0.07695    0.02463 0.07695     
  (0.10891) (0.05206)    (0.10728) (0.05190)    (0.10728) (0.05190)     
D(ca_food)_3 0.19555* 0.00916    0.19231* 0.00409    0.19231* 0.00409     
  (0.11272) (0.04963)    (0.11246) (0.04975)    (0.11246) (0.04975)     
D(ca_food)_4 -0.07864 -0.02783    -0.09884 -0.03077    -0.09884 -0.03077     
  (0.10519) (0.04814)    (0.10428) (0.04813)    (0.10428) (0.04813)     
Agropec_firmPC -0.04288 -0.02375    -0.05686 -0.03056    -0.05686 -0.03056     
  (0.04346) (0.01894)    (0.04265) (0.01898)    (0.04265) (0.01898)     
D(agro_dist) 0.12606 0.04278    0.13601 0.03129    0.13601 0.03129     
  (0.10257) (0.04395)    (0.10205) (0.04388)    (0.10205) (0.04388)     
D(pec_dist) -0.07091 -0.07543    -0.07636 -0.05673    -0.07636 -0.05673     
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  (0.11158) (0.05156)    (0.11462) (0.05068)    (0.11462) (0.05068)     
D(fish_dist) 0.34831* 0.02511    0.43121** 0.00766    0.43121** 0.00766     
  (0.17996) (0.06258)    (0.18217) (0.06179)    (0.18217) (0.06179)     
Prop(workagro_dist) -1.13021** -0.94245***    -1.17074** -0.81337***    -1.17074** -0.81337***     
  (0.52980) (0.25840)    (0.50151) (0.24859)    (0.50151) (0.24859)     
Prop(workfish_dist) 1.18677 1.58013*    1.42053 2.20632**    1.42053 2.20632**     
  (1.77733) (0.90802)    (1.81788) (0.91131)    (1.81788) (0.91131)     
PHI     -0.14306** -0.04731**     -0.15328** -0.05418**     -0.15539** -0.04326* 
      (0.06704) (0.02344)     (0.06612) (0.02330)     (0.06608) (0.02335) 
Constant -19.10400*** -1.46978 0.34381*** 0.29445*** -18.24321*** -4.16662 0.34279*** 0.33826*** -18.24321*** -4.16662 0.33923*** 0.32533*** 
  (7.22901) (5.31686) (0.06373) (0.10843) (7.05045) (4.76887) (0.06331) (0.10981) (7.05045) (4.76887) (0.06318) (0.10919) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
LogL -691.436 -4216.255 4157.312 -695.351 -4252.393 4165.933 -695.351 -4252.393 4184.239 
Wald (ident. vars.) 99.46*** 228.57***     165.70*** 231.97***     165.70*** 231.97***     
 
f) Results for models under specification 4 
  Restriction 1 Restriction 2 Restriction 3 
  PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR PROBIT SUR 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
L(expend_Fon)         0.56833*** 0.55535***    0.56833*** 0.55535***     
         (0.03870) (0.03073)    (0.03870) (0.03073)     
O1L(expend_Fon) 
0.57167*** 0.56737*** -0.00588 0.00717     -0.00587 0.00940     -0.00634 0.01224 
  (0.03885) (0.03108) (0.00719) (0.01359)     (0.00717) (0.01330)     (0.00716) (0.01331) 
L(O1_uv_inf) 
-0.28682 0.26844 -0.15092*** 0.06607***     -0.17553*** 0.06817***     -0.19127*** 0.13079*** 
  (0.27504) (0.17472) (0.02501) (0.00899)     (0.02419) (0.00901)     (0.02464) (0.01815) 
L(O1_uv_semi) 
0.60173 0.42150** 0.08485*** -0.05175***     0.10736*** -0.01738     0.12745*** -0.07644*** 
  (0.43955) (0.19429) (0.02525) (0.01282)     (0.02459) (0.01179)     (0.02410) (0.01885) 
L(O1_uv_for) 
0.06141 -0.46611*** 0.06607*** -0.01432     0.06817*** -0.05079***     0.06383*** -0.05435*** 
  (0.11015) (0.06177) (0.00899) (0.01079)     (0.00901) (0.00925)     (0.00886) (0.00899) 
L(fam_size) 0.49108*** 0.15798*** -0.00495 -0.04857*** 0.49147*** 0.15480*** -0.00534 -0.04891*** 0.49147*** 0.15480*** -0.00578 -0.04769*** 
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  (0.13674) (0.05914) (0.01238) (0.01330) (0.13482) (0.05891) (0.01238) (0.01333) (0.13482) (0.05891) (0.01238) (0.01332) 
D(mem_spo) 0.09145 -0.09220 0.03573*** -0.01806 0.07854 -0.10476* 0.03659*** -0.01803 0.07854 -0.10476* 0.03693*** -0.01932 
  (0.13197) (0.06076) (0.01250) (0.01428) (0.13327) (0.06042) (0.01251) (0.01432) (0.13327) (0.06042) (0.01250) (0.01421) 
D(mem_son) 0.21459 0.03343 0.02275* -0.02859* 0.21121 0.03949 0.02317* -0.03029** 0.21121 0.03949 0.02308* -0.03075** 
  (0.13471) (0.06382) (0.01365) (0.01532) (0.13380) (0.06356) (0.01366) (0.01536) (0.13380) (0.06356) (0.01366) (0.01531) 
D(mem_oth) -0.01425 0.02256 0.01444 0.00098 -0.02227 0.02568 0.01479 0.00132 -0.02227 0.02568 0.01503* 0.00068 
  (0.11953) (0.04551) (0.00904) (0.00903) (0.11868) (0.04535) (0.00905) (0.00906) (0.11868) (0.04535) (0.00904) (0.00900) 
P(men) -0.31754* 0.07355 -0.07209*** 0.01756 -0.30377* 0.06287 -0.07174*** 0.01836 -0.30377* 0.06287 -0.07142*** 0.01814 
  (0.17043) (0.07944) (0.01691) (0.02025) (0.17157) (0.07895) (0.01691) (0.02041) (0.17157) (0.07895) (0.01691) (0.02033) 
age_head 0.02063 -0.00687 0.00597*** -0.00386** 0.02174 -0.00559 0.00593*** -0.00402** 0.02174 -0.00559 0.00588*** -0.00394** 
  (0.01375) (0.00731) (0.00156) (0.00184) (0.01374) (0.00724) (0.00157) (0.00184) (0.01374) (0.00724) (0.00157) (0.00183) 
age_head-sq -0.00010 0.00009 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00011 0.00008 -0.00004** 0.00004** -0.00011 0.00008 -0.00004** 0.00004** 
  (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
D(gender_head) -0.02231 0.11605* -0.02369* 0.00448 -0.02626 0.14045** -0.02397* 0.00329 -0.02626 0.14045** -0.02432* 0.00429 
  (0.14025) (0.06438) (0.01309) (0.01571) (0.14196) (0.06393) (0.01311) (0.01579) (0.14196) (0.06393) (0.01309) (0.01566) 
year_educ_head -0.01231 0.03677*** -0.00038 0.00653*** -0.01281 0.03489*** -0.00041 0.00682*** -0.01281 0.03489*** -0.00038 0.00704*** 
  (0.01000) (0.00435) (0.00084) (0.00114) (0.00998) (0.00432) (0.00085) (0.00111) (0.00998) (0.00432) (0.00085) (0.00111) 
Hrs_ff -0.00098 0.00219** 0.00026 0.00012 -0.00094 0.00206** 0.00025 0.00015 -0.00094 0.00206** 0.00026 0.00015 
  (0.00257) (0.00092) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00257) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00257) (0.00091) (0.00017) (0.00019) 
Hrs_if -0.00226 -0.00166 0.00041 0.00040 -0.00209 -0.00163 0.00040 0.00044 -0.00209 -0.00163 0.00040 0.00043 
  (0.00331) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00027) (0.00343) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00027) (0.00343) (0.00164) (0.00032) (0.00027) 
Hrs_ii -0.00126 -0.00135* -0.00005 0.00000 -0.00108 -0.00142** -0.00005 -0.00002 -0.00108 -0.00142** -0.00005 -0.00002 
  (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00166) (0.00072) (0.00015) (0.00014) 
Hrs_sf 0.00617 0.00142 0.00174*** -0.00002 0.00605 0.00120 0.00172*** 0.00004 0.00605 0.00120 0.00172*** 0.00003 
  (0.00525) (0.00156) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00512) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00512) (0.00155) (0.00031) (0.00031) 
Hrs_si 0.00239 0.00123** 0.00039*** -0.00007 0.00250 0.00108* 0.00039*** -0.00005 0.00250 0.00108* 0.00039*** -0.00005 
  (0.00163) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00164) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00164) (0.00060) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
Hrs_fam -0.00530** -0.00072 0.00029 0.00059** -0.00535** -0.00088 0.00029 0.00061** -0.00535** -0.00088 0.00030 0.00060** 
  (0.00228) (0.00111) (0.00023) (0.00029) (0.00228) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) (0.00228) (0.00112) (0.00023) (0.00028) 
Hrs_second 0.00646 0.00003 0.00009 -0.00029 0.00640 -0.00018 0.00010 -0.00028 0.00640 -0.00018 0.00011 -0.00031 
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  (0.00507) (0.00160) (0.00037) (0.00030) (0.00498) (0.00160) (0.00037) (0.00030) (0.00498) (0.00160) (0.00037) (0.00030) 
D(Hrs_ff) 0.17321 -0.05171 0.00783 0.00488 0.18042 -0.05240 0.00753 0.00469 0.18042 -0.05240 0.00716 0.00599 
  (0.18063) (0.06688) (0.01270) (0.01405) (0.17979) (0.06650) (0.01272) (0.01404) (0.17979) (0.06650) (0.01272) (0.01401) 
D(Hrs_if) 0.12376 0.08193 -0.01951 -0.03161* 0.09795 0.07707 -0.01893 -0.03166* 0.09795 0.07707 -0.01857 -0.03239* 
  (0.21090) (0.10185) (0.01930) (0.01691) (0.21341) (0.10164) (0.01932) (0.01695) (0.21341) (0.10164) (0.01930) (0.01687) 
D(Hrs_ii) 0.16577 0.04140 0.01221 -0.00937 0.15978 0.03914 0.01202 -0.00797 0.15978 0.03914 0.01198 -0.00745 
  (0.12838) (0.05596) (0.01128) (0.01135) (0.12823) (0.05595) (0.01129) (0.01138) (0.12823) (0.05595) (0.01128) (0.01136) 
D(Hrs_sf) -0.25425 0.09009 -0.07479*** -0.00518 -0.25157 0.09581 -0.07368*** -0.00636 -0.25157 0.09581 -0.07348*** -0.00580 
  (0.28387) (0.09930) (0.02038) (0.02024) (0.27854) (0.09852) (0.02034) (0.02040) (0.27854) (0.09852) (0.02034) (0.02039) 
D(Hrs_si) 0.03236 -0.07859 0.00514 -0.01477 0.02979 -0.08181* 0.00515 -0.01448 0.02979 -0.08181* 0.00514 -0.01469 
  (0.11735) (0.04795) (0.00938) (0.00996) (0.11749) (0.04777) (0.00938) (0.01003) (0.11749) (0.04777) (0.00938) (0.01002) 
D(Hrs_fam) 0.10273 -0.01044 0.00092 -0.00010 0.10290 0.00227 0.00111 -0.00006 0.10290 0.00227 0.00099 0.00021 
  (0.15965) (0.06128) (0.01225) (0.01278) (0.15995) (0.06143) (0.01222) (0.01257) (0.15995) (0.06143) (0.01223) (0.01257) 
D(Hrs_second) 0.09704 0.06506 -0.00796 0.01575 0.10587 0.07283 -0.00788 0.01525 0.10587 0.07283 -0.00792 0.01519 
  (0.13740) (0.05164) (0.01095) (0.01114) (0.13579) (0.05143) (0.01094) (0.01112) (0.13579) (0.05143) (0.01094) (0.01110) 
D(Lima) -0.52473*** 0.57420*** 0.10925*** 0.08696*** -0.56484*** 0.67136*** 0.11041*** 0.07975*** -0.56484*** 0.67136*** 0.10999*** 0.08032*** 
  (0.14993) (0.07092) (0.00951) (0.01170) (0.13994) (0.06687) (0.00951) (0.01189) (0.13994) (0.06687) (0.00943) (0.01180) 
Pn_comisa_dist -0.06153 0.21181 -0.13223*** -0.01248 -0.02846 0.22108 -0.13080*** -0.01295 -0.02846 0.22108 -0.13071*** -0.01065 
  (0.24035) (0.16734) (0.02910) (0.03584) (0.24188) (0.15911) (0.02885) (0.03704) (0.24188) (0.15911) (0.02871) (0.03694) 
Pn_persmuni_dist -0.00587 0.01816*** -0.00070 0.00435*** -0.00828* 0.01715*** -0.00067 0.00456*** -0.00828* 0.01715*** -0.00060 0.00442*** 
  (0.00515) (0.00393) (0.00095) (0.00109) (0.00496) (0.00371) (0.00096) (0.00113) (0.00496) (0.00371) (0.00096) (0.00113) 
LPCppto_dist -0.19860*** -0.05244 0.00380 0.03330*** -0.18971*** -0.02973 0.00471 0.03124*** -0.18971*** -0.02973 0.00501 0.02954*** 
  (0.07065) (0.03455) (0.00573) (0.00697) (0.06965) (0.03431) (0.00574) (0.00704) (0.06965) (0.03431) (0.00573) (0.00700) 
d_paahh_dist -0.10462 -0.08933 -0.02870* -0.00411 -0.11849 -0.03212 -0.02648 -0.00886 -0.11849 -0.03212 -0.02598 -0.01301 
  (0.22005) (0.09511) (0.01634) (0.01626) (0.21878) (0.09475) (0.01634) (0.01610) (0.21878) (0.09475) (0.01636) (0.01617) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.04063 0.01054    -0.00350 0.07298    -0.00350 0.07298     
  (0.13303) (0.06134)    (0.13139) (0.05996)    (0.13139) (0.05996)     
P(migrant_dist) 0.03613 -0.42878*    0.13069 -0.36905    0.13069 -0.36905     
  (0.54942) (0.25640)    (0.53275) (0.25383)    (0.53275) (0.25383)     
P(race_dist) 0.44967 0.51111*    0.55618 -0.29977    0.55618 -0.29977     
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  (0.47269) (0.27591)    (0.44156) (0.25186)    (0.44156) (0.25186)     
informal_index 0.06820 -0.17895**    0.01588 -0.15734**    0.01588 -0.15734**     
  (0.15462) (0.07278)    (0.15165) (0.07142)    (0.15165) (0.07142)     
D(conf_gov_1) 0.02586 -0.04768    0.01858 -0.05206    0.01858 -0.05206     
  (0.09342) (0.03954)    (0.09323) (0.03945)    (0.09323) (0.03945)     
D(conf_gov_2) -0.11323 -0.11555**    -0.11603 -0.12344**    -0.11603 -0.12344**     
  (0.10833) (0.05536)    (0.10800) (0.05489)    (0.10800) (0.05489)     
D(conf_gov_3) -0.00965 0.11747    0.00703 0.11568    0.00703 0.11568     
  (0.16555) (0.08654)    (0.16681) (0.08548)    (0.16681) (0.08548)     
D(overall_satis) 0.07951 -0.09790***    0.08100 -0.10165***    0.08100 -0.10165***     
  (0.08252) (0.03677)    (0.08191) (0.03661)    (0.08191) (0.03661)     
D(income_satis) 0.11776 -0.08089**    0.11413 -0.08023**    0.11413 -0.08023**     
  (0.08538) (0.03727)    (0.08491) (0.03714)    (0.08491) (0.03714)     
D(income_stab) 0.01299 -0.12962***    0.00124 -0.12894***    0.00124 -0.12894***     
  (0.09606) (0.04178)    (0.09577) (0.04151)    (0.09577) (0.04151)     
D(sub_pov) -0.00052 -0.09251**    -0.00024 -0.08738**    -0.00024 -0.08738**     
  (0.07737) (0.03598)    (0.07720) (0.03593)    (0.07720) (0.03593)     
D(road_1) -0.27185** -0.05315    -0.27415** -0.07214    -0.27415** -0.07214     
  (0.13421) (0.06815)    (0.13389) (0.06697)    (0.13389) (0.06697)     
D(road_2) -0.32280** 0.09716    -0.30358** 0.12583**    -0.30358** 0.12583**     
  (0.13101) (0.06148)    (0.13075) (0.06111)    (0.13075) (0.06111)     
D(road_3) 0.12023 0.19779    0.13071 0.13687    0.13071 0.13687     
  (0.28793) (0.13093)    (0.29362) (0.13149)    (0.29362) (0.13149)     
distance -0.00033 0.00013    -0.00055* -0.00002    -0.00055* -0.00002     
  (0.00030) (0.00019)    (0.00029) (0.00018)    (0.00029) (0.00018)     
P(nowater_dist) 0.62412** -0.20246    0.68926*** -0.15928    0.68926*** -0.15928     
  (0.25902) (0.14907)    (0.25547) (0.14316)    (0.25547) (0.14316)     
P(nodrain_dist) -1.11949*** -0.18958    -1.23297*** -0.30218    -1.23297*** -0.30218     
  (0.36531) (0.20997)    (0.35346) (0.20268)    (0.35346) (0.20268)     
P(noelec_dist) 1.62253** -1.57376***    1.74773** -1.61465***    1.74773** -1.61465***     
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  (0.81398) (0.45804)    (0.77567) (0.46365)    (0.77567) (0.46365)     
P(nofloor_dist) -0.09927 0.44952*    -0.17063 0.25318    -0.17063 0.25318     
  (0.51855) (0.25142)    (0.50840) (0.24689)    (0.50840) (0.24689)     
P(nowall_dist) 0.36876 0.49557***    0.37761 0.54305***    0.37761 0.54305***     
  (0.35440) (0.14394)    (0.34967) (0.14372)    (0.34967) (0.14372)     
P(noinsu_dist) 0.86656 -0.02698    0.87405 -0.18640    0.87405 -0.18640     
  (0.55000) (0.27853)    (0.54150) (0.26904)    (0.54150) (0.26904)     
P(illiterate_dist) -3.15256 -1.44704    -3.07462 1.40917    -3.07462 1.40917     
  (2.45357) (1.51131)    (2.42321) (1.44169)    (2.42321) (1.44169)     
P(selfwork_dist) 0.42952 0.60805    0.55569 0.48967    0.55569 0.48967     
  (0.87474) (0.46541)    (0.86945) (0.45538)    (0.86945) (0.45538)     
P(unreg_dist) 9.84563*** -4.25891**    10.39691*** -4.91951**    10.39691*** -4.91951**     
  (3.78492) (2.16610)    (3.75052) (2.08318)    (3.75052) (2.08318)     
icf_index -0.68200 0.21475    -0.98212** 0.44290    -0.98212** 0.44290     
  (0.49800) (0.28787)    (0.48780) (0.27181)    (0.48780) (0.27181)     
P(undernut_dist) -0.43098 0.97546***    -0.13400 0.74983**    -0.13400 0.74983**     
  (0.63180) (0.30427)    (0.61012) (0.29578)    (0.61012) (0.29578)     
Mort_distx1000 -0.00678 0.01095    -0.01307 0.02152    -0.01307 0.02152     
  (0.01994) (0.01970)    (0.02086) (0.01723)    (0.02086) (0.01723)     
P(poor_dist) 2.00302*** -1.26953***    2.27912*** -1.10684***    2.27912*** -1.10684***     
  (0.67561) (0.30958)    (0.62602) (0.29024)    (0.62602) (0.29024)     
lifeexp_dist 0.05629 0.03066    0.03458 0.06972    0.03458 0.06972     
  (0.07541) (0.06272)    (0.07894) (0.05533)    (0.07894) (0.05533)     
D(ca_food)_1 0.07748 0.00574    0.07910 0.01361    0.07910 0.01361     
  (0.09975) (0.05077)    (0.09935) (0.05060)    (0.09935) (0.05060)     
D(ca_food)_2 0.02820 0.07479    0.04459 0.06797    0.04459 0.06797     
  (0.11003) (0.05201)    (0.10857) (0.05184)    (0.10857) (0.05184)     
D(ca_food)_3 0.17802 0.01452    0.17197 0.01077    0.17197 0.01077     
  (0.11563) (0.04958)    (0.11573) (0.04967)    (0.11573) (0.04967)     
D(ca_food)_4 -0.06289 -0.02259    -0.08173 -0.02719    -0.08173 -0.02719     
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  (0.10764) (0.04819)    (0.10708) (0.04818)    (0.10708) (0.04818)     
Agropec_firmPC -0.01762 -0.02086    -0.03267 -0.03126    -0.03267 -0.03126     
  (0.04604) (0.01934)    (0.04473) (0.01935)    (0.04473) (0.01935)     
D(agro_dist) 0.13239 0.02946    0.14000 0.02279    0.14000 0.02279     
  (0.10230) (0.04442)    (0.10144) (0.04442)    (0.10144) (0.04442)     
D(pec_dist) -0.10934 -0.03706    -0.11172 -0.02870    -0.11172 -0.02870     
  (0.12407) (0.05592)    (0.12644) (0.05506)    (0.12644) (0.05506)     
D(fish_dist) 0.30187* 0.02980    0.37514** 0.01056    0.37514** 0.01056     
  (0.17906) (0.06319)    (0.18058) (0.06245)    (0.18058) (0.06245)     
Prop(workagro_dist) -0.81870 -1.05053***    -0.83160* -0.91776***    -0.83160* -0.91776***     
  (0.52985) (0.26283)    (0.50275) (0.25282)    (0.50275) (0.25282)     
Prop(workfish_dist) 1.39896 1.27838    1.72177 2.03494**    1.72177 2.03494**     
  (1.85393) (0.92575)    (1.88503) (0.92593)    (1.88503) (0.92593)     
PHI     -0.13726** -0.02104     -0.14029** -0.01544     -0.14469** -0.00643 
      (0.06673) (0.02302)     (0.06600) (0.02199)     (0.06594) (0.02212) 
Constant -16.54432** -1.82627 0.35539*** 0.02443 -15.63869** -4.96872 0.34394*** 0.04136 -15.63869** -4.96872 0.34521*** 0.03840 
  (7.45083) (5.52327) (0.06931) (0.11861) (7.38198) (4.93610) (0.06898) (0.11858) (7.38198) (4.93610) (0.06880) (0.11785) 
Observations 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 7,513 
LogL -686.014 -4218.244 4313.524 -689.148 -4255.895 4320.728 -689.148 -4255.895 4328.787 
Wald (ident. vars.) 107.10*** 227.24***     173.58*** 247.39***     173.58*** 247.39***     
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Appendix 8: Definition of variables and basic tabulations (models in Chapter 8)  
 
a) Models with aggregate markets (non-linear SUR–GLS) and IV models  
Variable Definition 
Non-linear SUR–GLS Linear IV (aggregate) Linear IV (Fon_inf) 
2,222 obs. 2,160 obs. 2,142 obs. 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Dependant variables 
Informal 
Informal consumption as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), three-market definition 
(see Chapter 3) 
0.404 0.17961 0.403 0.17868 
    
Semi-Formal 
Semi-formal consumption as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), three-market definition 
(see Chapter 3) 
0.335 0.18368 0.335 0.18245 
    
Formal 
Formal consumption as a share of total expenditure 
(purchased), three-market definition (see Chapter 3) 
0.261 0.15701 0.263 0.15663 
    
Market_1 
Consumption done in market 1 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see 
Chapter 3) 
0.176 0.13073 
        
Market_2 
Consumption done in Market 2 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see 
Chapter 3) 
0.228 0.17202 
        
Market_3 
Consumption done in Market 3 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see 
Chapter 3) 
0.335 0.18368 
        
Market_4 
Consumption done in Market 4 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see 
Chapter 3) 
0.082 0.08702 
        
Market_5 
Consumption done in Market 5 as a share of total 
expenditure (purchased), five-market definition (see 
Chapter 3) 
0.179 0.12874 
        
Fon_inf 
Consumption of Fon done at informal markets as a 
share of total Fon expenditure 
    
    
0.602 0.28459 
Fon_semi 
Consumption of Fon done at semi-formal markets 
as a share of total Fon expenditure 
    
    
0.333 0.27943 
Fon_for 
Consumption of Fon done at formal markets as a 
share of total Fon expenditure 
    
    
0.065 0.14230 
Independant variables: main regressions 
M  
Total household expenditure (purchased) in annual 
new soles 
14991.810 11526.95000 
        
L(expenditure) 
Natural logarithm of total household expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles 
    9.421 0.63892 
    
L(expenditure_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total household expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles - Fon 
    
    
8.404 0.67194 
  Income of the husband over the sum of the income of the husband and wife 0.761 0.27930 0.761 0.27817 0.761 0.27763 
L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.369 0.31920 1.370 0.31355 1.372 0.31141 
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D(mem_son) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or 
daughter, 0 = otherwise 
0.893 0.30875 0.900 0.30069 0.902 0.29744 
D(mem_oth) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 
0 = otherwise 
0.059 0.23560 0.057 0.23179 0.057 0.23270 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.507 0.16123 0.508 0.16191 0.508 0.16226 
D(gender_head) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household head is male, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.967 0.17947 0.967 0.17834 0.967 0.17906 
age_male Age of the male parent of the household (in years) 41.012 9.48395 
        
age_female 
Age of the female parent of the household (in years) 
squared 
37.102 9.07936 
        
year_educ_male 
Number of years of education of the male parent of 
the household 
11.851 3.96380 
        
year_educ_female 
Number of years of education of the female parent 
of the household 
10.773 4.52228 
        
D(chronic_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =male parent has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
0.236 0.42461 
        
D(chronic_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =female parent has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
0.282 0.44994 
        
Hrs_male 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the male parent 
including all labour options 
53.067 21.95015 
        
Hrs_female 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the female 
parent including all labour options 
31.277 28.74865 
        
D(Hrs_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the male parent works, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.947 0.22429 
        
D(Hrs_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the female parent works, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.688 0.46337 
        
Hrs_both 
Dummy variable: 1 =if either of the parents works, 0 
= otherwise 
    84.561 37.92940 84.521 37.83645 
D(Hrs_both) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = 
otherwise 
    0.983 0.12805 0.983 0.12858 
D(Lima) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.165 0.37101 0.165 0.37110 0.165 0.37151 
Pcoh_1 Proportion of household members under 3 years old  0.075 0.12077 0.076 0.12183 0.077 0.12195 
Pcoh_2 
Proportion of household members between 4 and 9 
years old 
0.163 0.15938 0.165 0.15912 0.165 0.15912 
Pcoh_3 
Proportion of household members between 10 and 
13 years old 
0.110 0.14025 0.110 0.13977 0.110 0.13990 
Pcoh_4 
Proportion of household members between 14 and 
18 years old 
0.076 0.12976 0.076 0.12971 0.076 0.13001 
Pcoh_5 
Proportion of household members between 19 and 
24 years old 
0.050 0.13155 0.050 0.13179 0.050 0.13189 
Pcoh_6 
Proportion of household members between 25 and 
34 years old 
0.174 0.22488 0.177 0.22548 0.176 0.22381 
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Pcoh_7 
Proportion of household members between 35 and 
40 years old 
0.130 0.17724 0.132 0.17844 0.132 0.17766 
Pcoh_8 
Proportion of household members between 41 and 
64 years old 
0.218 0.28531 0.211 0.27906 0.211 0.27918 
Pcoh_9 Proportion of household members over 64 years old 0.003 0.02835 0.004 0.02853 0.004 0.02865 
L(pop_urb_dist) 
Natural logarithm of the population size of the 
district where the household lives 
10.955 1.32787 10.979 1.30586 10.985 1.30121 
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq 
Natural logarithm of the population size of the 
district where the household lives squared 
121.771 28.38226 122.240 28.02395 122.370 27.96144 
pop_den_distx1000 Population density: inhabitants per 1,000 km2  2.611 4.98810 2.626 4.99287 2.638 5.00317 
D(not_slum) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household does nott live in a 
slum, 0 = otherwise 
0.428 0.49483 0.431 0.49527 0.430 0.49519 
D(mid_city) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in a 
departmental capital (except Lima), 0 = otherwise 
0.482 0.49979 0.486 0.49991 0.486 0.49993 
D(border) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in a border 
city (Tumbes, Tacna or Puno), 0 = otherwise 
0.117 0.32204 0.118 0.32220 0.117 0.32171 
D(tongue) 
Dummy variable: 1 = either of the two parents of the 
household has indigenous mother tongue , 0 = 
otherwise 
0.257 0.43681 0.245 0.43013 0.245 0.42997 
D(migrant) 
Dummy variable: 1 = either of the two parents of the 
household is a migrant, 0 = otherwise 
0.691 0.46207 0.689 0.46287 0.690 0.46241 
D(social) 
Dummy variable: 1 = any of the household 
members pertain to social organizations (unions, 
social clubs, social programs, etc.) , 0 = otherwise 
0.457 0.49824 0.456 0.49818 0.456 0.49815 
Station_distx1000 
Number of police stations in the district per 1,000 
inhabitants 
0.065 0.12995 0.065 0.13132 0.065 0.13162 
Muni_persx1000 
Number of workers in the local government of the 
district per 1,000 inhabitants 
3.444 3.91409 3.455 3.95910 3.465 3.97148 
L(budget_dist_pc) 
Natural logarithm of the per-capita budget of the 
local government, in thousands of new soles 
5.088 0.63421 5.089 0.63545 5.091 0.63525 
D(sdp_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the district has a slum 
development plan, 0 = otherwise 
0.038 0.19185 0.038 0.19115 0.038 0.19192 
Instruments 
theta_educ_prima 
Ratio of years of education of the male parent over 
years of education of the female parent 
    
1.229 0.64824 1.231 0.65026 
L(asset) 
Natural logarithm of the value of assets owned by 
the household 
    
7.487 1.46548 7.491 1.46633 
year_educ_female 
Number of years of education of the female parent 
of the household 
    
11.071 4.21378 11.074 4.21487 
year_educ_female-
sq 
Number of years of education of the female parent 
of the household (squared) 
    
140.321 90.93251 140.395 90.96803 
D(risk7) 
Dummy variable 1 = if the family has experienced 
robbery or other crime against it in the last year, 0 = 
otherwise 
    0.036 0.18661 0.036 0.18736 
D(house1) 
Dummy variable 1 = if the family house is 
overcrowded (INEI, methodology), 0 = otherwise 
    0.091 0.28731 0.091 0.28773 
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Additional covariates: reduced form exercise 
M  
Total household expenditure (purchased) in annual 
new soles 
    15191.830 11576.390 
    
educ_  Years of education of the male parent over the sum 
of years of education of both parents 
    0.526 0.09784 
    
asset Value of assets in new soles     4446.628 8155.50100 
    
age_male Age of the male parent of the household (in years)     40.752 9.34443 
    
age_female 
Age of the female parent of the household (in years) 
squared 
    36.789 8.82229 
    
year_educ_male 
Number of years of education of the male parent of 
the household 
    12.028 3.82081 
    
year_educ_female 
Number of years of education of the female parent 
of the household 
    11.071 4.21378 
    
D(chronic_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =male parent has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
    0.232 0.42247 
    
D(chronic_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =female parent has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
    0.274 0.44615 
    
Hrs_male 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the male parent 
including all labour options 
    53.263 21.94676 
    
Hrs_female 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the female 
parent including all labour options 
    31.298 28.74015 
    
D(Hrs_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the male parent works, 0 = 
otherwise 
    0.948 0.22271 
    
D(Hrs_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the female parent works, 0 = 
otherwise 
    0.689 0.46287 
    
 
b) Models with disaggregated markets (consumption groups) 
Variable Definition 
Groups 
2,105 obs. 
Mean s.d. 
Dependant variables 
Fon 
Consumption done in food to be consumed within the household as a share of 
total expenditure 
0.400 0.15278 
Foff 
Consumption done in food to be consumed outside the household as a share of 
total expenditure 
0.090 0.09919 
CC Consumption done in clothing and personal care as a share of total expenditure 0.093 0.06157 
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HEA Consumption done in health goods and services as a share of total expenditure 0.047 0.07111 
TC 
Consumption done in transportation and communication as a share of total 
expenditure 
0.122 0.08609 
ED 
Consumption done in entertainment, education and cultural goods and services 
as a share of total expenditure 
0.069 0.07473 
OT 
Consumption done in other or non-classified goods as a share of total 
expenditure 
0.179 0.09575 
D(Fon) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase Fon, 0 = otherwise 0.993 0.08413 
D(Foff) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase Foff, 0 = otherwise 0.852 0.35493 
D(CC) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase CC, 0 = otherwise 0.996 0.06155 
D(HEA) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase HEA, 0 = otherwise 0.823 0.38193 
D(TC) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase TC, 0 = otherwise 0.955 0.20660 
D(ED) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase ED, 0 = otherwise 0.949 0.22067 
D(OT) Dummy variable: 1 = household purchase OT, 0 = otherwise 1.000 0.00000 
Independant variables: SUR model 
M  Total household expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 14812.390 10708.40000 
  Income of the husband over the sum of the income of the husband and wife 0.762 0.27769 
L(fam_size) Natural logarithm of the number of family members 1.382 0.30825 
D(mem_son) Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or daughter, 0 = otherwise 0.911 0.28457 
D(mem_oth) Dummy variable: 1 = household has other member, 0 = otherwise 0.058 0.23372 
P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.507 0.16227 
D(gender_head) Dummy variable: 1 = household head is male, 0 = otherwise 0.971 0.16911 
age_male Age of the male parent of the household (in years) 40.842 9.39173 
age_female Age of the female parent of the household (in years) squared 36.904 8.91651 
year_educ_male Number of years of education of the male parent of the household 11.838 3.95257 
year_educ_female Number of years of education of the female parent of the household 10.759 4.51841 
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D(chronic_male) Dummy variable: 1 =male parent has a chronic illness, 0 = otherwise 0.235 0.42420 
D(chronic_female) Dummy variable: 1 =female parent has a chronic illness, 0 = otherwise 0.279 0.44855 
Hrs_male Sum of the weekly hours of work of the male parent including all labour options 53.256 21.70760 
Hrs_female Sum of the weekly hours of work of the female parent including all labour options 31.222 28.71036 
D(Hrs_male) Dummy variable: 1 =if the male parent works, 0 = otherwise 0.950 0.21873 
D(Hrs_female) Dummy variable: 1 =if the female parent works, 0 = otherwise 0.687 0.46385 
D(Lima) Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = otherwise 0.158 0.36501 
Pcoh_1 Proportion of household members under 3 years old  0.077 0.12183 
Pcoh_2 Proportion of household members between 4 and 9 years old 0.168 0.15947 
Pcoh_3 Proportion of household members between 10 and 13 years old 0.113 0.14139 
Pcoh_4 Proportion of household members between 14 and 18 years old 0.077 0.12968 
Pcoh_5 Proportion of household members between 19 and 24 years old 0.049 0.12812 
Pcoh_6 Proportion of household members between 25 and 34 years old 0.175 0.22200 
Pcoh_7 Proportion of household members between 35 and 40 years old 0.131 0.17549 
Pcoh_8 Proportion of household members between 41 and 64 years old 0.209 0.27620 
Pcoh_9 Proportion of household members over 64 years old 0.003 0.02674 
Independant variables: PROBIT model (change of variables) 
L(expenditure) Natural logarithm of total expenditure (purchased) in annual new soles 9.394 0.64954 
age_average Average age of the male and female parents (in years) 38.873 8.71466 
year_educ_average Average years of education of the male and female parents 11.298 3.85377 
D(chronic_any) Dummy variable: 1 = either of the parents has a chronic illness, 0 = otherwise 0.419 0.49343 
Hrs_both 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the male and female parents including all 
labour options 
84.477 37.96372 
D(Hrs_both) Dummy variable: 1 =if either of the parents works, 0 = otherwise 0.983 0.12968 
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Independant variables: PROBIT model (new variables) 
Hotel_firmPC 
Number of tourism (hotel and restaurants) firms per 1,000 habitants (province 
level) 
3.611 1.42221 
D(rest_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = restaurant activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.747 0.43468 
D(tour_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = tourism activity is important in the district, 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor) 
0.209 0.40637 
Prop(workrest_dist) Proportion of urban workers in restaurant and hotel sector in the district  0.058 0.01500 
D(ca_health)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
medicines, 0 = otherwise 
0.437 0.49608 
D(ca_health)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it has an adequate consumption of 
soaps, 0 = otherwise 
0.523 0.49961 
n_eventual Number of family members present a health episode 2.231 1.44082 
Health1_distx1000 Number of health centres per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.746 0.77491 
Health2_distx1000 Number of hospitals per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.028 0.04693 
Health3_distx1000 Number of health micro-centres per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.113 0.28048 
Health4_distx1000 Number of other health providers per 1,000 habitants (district level) 0.555 0.64424 
Health_firmPC Number of health firms per 1,000 habitants (province level) 0.609 0.36250 
Prop(workhealth_dist) Proportion of urban workers in health sector in the district  0.027 0.01182 
 
c) Models with disaggregated markets (markets within groups) 1 
Variable Definition 
Fon Foff CC 
2,090 obs. 1,794 obs. 2,097 obs. 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Dependent variables 
Fon_inf 
Consumption of Fon done at informal markets as 
a share of total Fon expenditure 
0.600 0.28433 
        
Fon_semi 
Consumption of Fon done at semi-formal 
markets as a share of total Fon expenditure 
0.338 0.27956 
        
Fon_for 
Consumption of Fon done at formal markets as a 
share of total Fon expenditure 
0.062 0.13680 
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D(Fon_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
Fon_inf, 0 = otherwise 
0.983 0.12835 
        
D(Fon_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
Fon_semi, 0 = otherwise 
0.936 0.24416 
        
D(Fon_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
Fon_for, 0 = otherwise 
0.487 0.49994 
        
Foff_inf 
Consumption of Foff done at informal markets as 
a share of total Foff expenditure 
    
0.289 0.38728 
    
Foff_semi 
Consumption of Foff done at semi-formal 
markets as a share of total Foff expenditure 
    
0.167 0.33237 
    
Foff_for 
Consumption of Foff done at formal markets as a 
share of total Foff expenditure 
    
0.544 0.42859 
    
D(Foff_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
Foff_inf, 0 = otherwise 
    
0.550 0.49762 
    
D(Foff_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
Foff_semi, 0 = otherwise 
    
0.231 0.42144 
    
D(Foff_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
Foff_for, 0 = otherwise 
    
0.735 0.44133 
    
CC_inf 
Consumption of CC done at informal markets as 
a share of total CC expenditure 
        
0.442 0.32654 
CC_semi 
Consumption of CC done at semi-formal markets 
as a share of total CC expenditure 
        
0.495 0.31734 
CC_for 
Consumption of CC done at formal markets as a 
share of total CC expenditure 
        
0.063 0.13750 
D(CC_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
CC_inf, 0 = otherwise 
        
0.855 0.35215 
D(CC_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
CC_semi, 0 = otherwise 
        
0.958 0.20164 
D(CC_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household purchases from 
CC_for, 0 = otherwise 
        
0.323 0.46767 
Independent variables: SUR  model 
Expenditure_Fon 
Total household expenditure (purchased) in 
annual new soles - Fon 
5277.114 2878.78600 
        
Expenditure_Foff 
Total household expenditure (purchased) in 
annual new soles - Foff 
    1540.758 1734.03700 
    
Expenditure_CC 
Total household expenditure (purchased) in 
annual new soles - CC 
        
1404.166 1436.82800 
  Income of the husband over the sum of the income of the husband and wife 0.762 0.27752 0.759 0.27208 0.761 0.27793 
L(fam_size) 
Natural logarithm of the number of family 
members 
1.384 0.30618 1.380 0.30447 1.384 0.30652 
D(mem_son) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has a son or 
daughter, 0 = otherwise 
0.913 0.28132 0.914 0.28103 0.914 0.28089 
D(mem_oth) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household has other 
member, 0 = otherwise 
0.058 0.23450 0.054 0.22511 0.058 0.23414 
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P(men) Proportion of men in the household  0.507 0.16256 0.508 0.16359 0.507 0.16242 
D(gender_head) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household head is male, 0 
= otherwise 
0.970 0.16970 0.971 0.16781 0.970 0.16943 
age_male 
Age of the male parent of the household (in 
years) 
40.868 9.38621 40.624 9.15184 40.791 9.34065 
age_female 
Age of the female parent of the household (in 
years) squared 
36.916 8.92542 36.747 8.70405 36.858 8.87404 
year_educ_male 
Number of years of education of the male parent 
of the household 
11.838 3.93943 12.101 3.80796 11.865 3.93184 
year_educ_female 
Number of years of education of the female 
parent of the household 
10.756 4.52233 11.022 4.42538 10.785 4.50286 
D(chronic_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =male parent has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
0.234 0.42376 0.233 0.42286 0.234 0.42326 
D(chronic_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =female parent has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
0.278 0.44788 0.282 0.45012 0.278 0.44789 
Hrs_male 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the male 
parent including all labour options 
53.214 21.71216 54.350 21.31183 53.271 21.72827 
Hrs_female 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the female 
parent including all labour options 
31.185 28.67835 32.196 28.61971 31.197 28.70000 
D(Hrs_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the male parent works, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.949 0.21947 0.957 0.20274 0.949 0.21913 
D(Hrs_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the female parent works, 0 
= otherwise 
0.687 0.46399 0.702 0.45760 0.687 0.46376 
D(Lima) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household lives in Lima, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.158 0.36518 0.163 0.36976 0.159 0.36558 
Pcoh_1 
Proportion of household members under 3 years 
old  
0.077 0.12191 0.077 0.12253 0.077 0.12195 
Pcoh_2 
Proportion of household members between 4 
and 9 years old 
0.168 0.15956 0.166 0.15806 0.168 0.15944 
Pcoh_3 
Proportion of household members between 10 
and 13 years old 
0.113 0.14148 0.110 0.14088 0.113 0.14136 
Pcoh_4 
Proportion of household members between 14 
and 18 years old 
0.077 0.12993 0.081 0.13258 0.077 0.12984 
Pcoh_5 
Proportion of household members between 19 
and 24 years old 
0.049 0.12814 0.051 0.13191 0.048 0.12781 
Pcoh_6 
Proportion of household members between 25 
and 34 years old 
0.173 0.22023 0.174 0.22538 0.175 0.22208 
Pcoh_7 
Proportion of household members between 35 
and 40 years old 
0.131 0.17558 0.134 0.17728 0.131 0.17566 
Pcoh_8 
Proportion of household members between 41 
and 64 years old 
0.209 0.27618 0.205 0.26943 0.207 0.27378 
Pcoh_9 
Proportion of household members over 64 years 
old 
0.003 0.02684 0.003 0.02551 0.003 0.02679 
Independent variables: PROBIT model (change of variables) 
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L(expenditure_Fon) 
Natural logarithm of total expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles - Fon 
8.394 0.67229 
        
L(expenditure_Foff) 
Natural logarithm of total expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles - Foff 
    6.737 1.23559 
    
L(expenditure_CC) 
Natural logarithm of total expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new soles - CC 
        
6.806 1.00638 
age_average 
Average age of the male and female parents (in 
years) 
38.892 8.71776 38.686 8.48887 38.825 8.66641 
year_educ_average 
Average years of education of the male and 
female parents 
11.297 3.84775 11.562 3.73132 11.325 3.83344 
D(chronic_any) 
Dummy variable: 1 = either of the parents has a 
chronic illness, 0 = otherwise 
0.417 0.49314 0.420 0.49365 0.417 0.49322 
Hrs_both 
Sum of the weekly hours of work of the male and 
female parent including all labour options 
84.400 37.86125 86.546 37.40526 84.468 37.96785 
D(Hrs_both) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if either of the parents 
works, 0 = otherwise 
0.983 0.13014 0.987 0.11492 0.983 0.12993 
Independent variables: PROBIT model (new variables) 
D(ca_food)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it 
has an adequate consumption of food, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.766 0.42346 
        
D(ca_food)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it 
has an adequate consumption of tubers and 
cereals, 0 = otherwise 
0.648 0.47761 
        
D(ca_food)_3 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it 
has an adequate consumption of fruits and 
vegetables, 0 = otherwise 
0.569 0.49528 
        
D(ca_food)_4 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it 
has an adequate consumption of meat, fish and 
chicken, 0 = otherwise 
0.560 0.49653 
        
Agropec_firmPC 
Number of agropecuarian firms per 1,000 
habitants (province level) 
0.519 1.38545 
        
D(agro_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = agrarian activity is 
important in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared 
by the mayor) 
0.607 0.48860 
        
D(pec_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = pecuarian activity is 
important in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared 
by the mayor) 
0.313 0.46399 
        
D(fish_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = fishing activity is important 
in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the 
mayor) 
0.110 0.31302 
        
Prop(workagro_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in agropecuarian 
sector in the district  
0.103 0.14231 
        
Prop(workfish_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in fishing sector in 
the district  
0.011 0.02947 
        
Hotel_firmPC 
Number of tourism (hotel and restaurants) firms 
per 1,000 habitants (province level) 
    
3.703 1.41693 
    
D(rest_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = restaurant activity is 
important in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared 
by the mayor)     
0.764 0.42461 
    
D(tour_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = tourism activity is important 
in the district, 0 = otherwise (declared by the 
mayor)     
0.212 0.40910 
    
Prop(workrest_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in restaurant and 
hotel sector in the district  
    
0.059 0.01449 
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Com_firmPC 
Number of commercial firms per 1,000 habitants 
(province level) 
        
23.029 7.00569 
Prop(workcom_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in commercial sector 
in the district  
        
0.225 0.05624 
D(ca_cloth)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it 
has an adequate consumption of clothes, 0 = 
otherwise         
0.420 0.49362 
D(ca_cloth)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the household considers it 
has an adequate consumption of shoes, 0 = 
otherwise         
0.403 0.49061 
P(pop_slums_dist) Proportion of people in the district living in a slum 0.334 0.34640 0.345 0.34797 0.335 0.34622 
P(migrant_dist) 
Proportion of migrants living in the district (urban 
places) 
0.316 0.10812 0.321 0.10466 0.316 0.10813 
P(race_dist) 
Proportion of indigenous people (by declared 
race) living in the district  (urban places) 
0.097 0.12619 0.095 0.11599 0.096 0.12536 
informal_index 
Index of tax informality at the province level, 
varies from 1 (high informality) to 0 (no 
informality) Index = (Tax of the IVA - (IVA 
payments/Value Added))/Tax of the IVA 
0.305 0.31147 0.296 0.31056 0.305 0.31125 
D(conf_gov_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that the public administration 
performance is good or very good , 0 = otherwise 
0.311 0.46302 0.303 0.45954 0.312 0.46356 
D(conf_gov_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that the performance of the 
government is not an obstacle for development , 
0 = otherwise 
0.197 0.39793 0.186 0.38891 0.197 0.39815 
D(conf_gov_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the head of the household 
has a positive opinion in all responses related to 
the government , 0 = otherwise 
0.089 0.28549 0.083 0.27604 0.090 0.28575 
D(overall_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers his/her family as non-poor, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.589 0.49205 0.570 0.49518 0.588 0.49232 
D(income_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
is satisfied with his/her income, 0 = otherwise 
0.327 0.46915 0.309 0.46213 0.329 0.46998 
D(income_stab) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head of the household 
considers that his/her income is stable, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.793 0.40538 0.784 0.41143 0.793 0.40557 
D(sub_pov) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if income is below the 
minimum income question, 0 = otherwise 
0.400 0.49002 0.386 0.48703 0.401 0.49013 
D(road_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is a 
non-asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.205 0.40399 0.196 0.39681 0.206 0.40488 
D(road_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is 
an asphalted highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.663 0.47291 0.674 0.46891 0.662 0.47301 
D(road_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road of the district is 
any other type, 0 = otherwise 
0.025 0.15580 0.019 0.13639 0.025 0.15554 
distance 
Distance from the district to the capital of the 
province in minutes 
83.752 163.17620 81.945 164.12380 83.577 162.74860 
P(nowater_dist) 
Proportion of households without water service in 
the district  (urban places) 
0.225 0.21029 0.215 0.20242 0.224 0.20954 
P(nodrain_dist) 
Proportion of houses without drain service in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.302 0.22440 0.288 0.21614 0.303 0.22447 
P(noelec_dist) 
Proportion of houses without electricity in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.119 0.08698 0.113 0.08154 0.119 0.08753 
P(nofloor_dist) 
Proportion of houses with floor of inadequate 
materials in the district  (urban places) 
0.308 0.16765 0.298 0.16046 0.308 0.16750 
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P(nowall_dist) 
Proportion of houses with walls of inadequate 
materials in the district  (urban places) 
0.432 0.23726 0.419 0.23323 0.433 0.23725 
P(noinsu_dist) 
Proportion of people without insurance in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.582 0.09933 0.582 0.09903 0.582 0.09932 
P(illiterate_dist) 
Proportion of illiterate people in the district  
(urban places) 
0.040 0.03129 0.038 0.02752 0.040 0.03125 
P(selfwork_dist) 
Proportion of self-employers in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.385 0.07573 0.383 0.07368 0.385 0.07563 
P(unreg_dist) 
Proportion of unregistered people in the district  
(urban places) 
0.973 0.01523 0.974 0.01477 0.973 0.01524 
P(undernut_dist) 
Proportion of under-nourished children below 5 
years old in the district 
0.187 0.12998 0.180 0.12383 0.188 0.13010 
Mort_distx1000 Child mortality, number per 1,000 born alive 17.175 6.61441 16.946 6.41947 17.167 6.59815 
P(poor_dist) Proportion of poor people in the district 0.308 0.16866 0.296 0.15948 0.308 0.16879 
icf_index 
Targeting index (between 0 and 1) of the 
government for social programs (district level) 
0.147 0.18272 0.134 0.16713 0.148 0.18319 
lifeexp_dist Average life expectancy of the district 73.679 2.11702 73.746 2.06219 73.681 2.11264 
 
d) Models with disaggregated markets (markets within groups) 2 
Variable Definition 
HEA TC ED 
1,732 obs. 2,011 obs. 1,997 obs. 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Dependent variables  
HEA_inf 
Consumption of HEA done at 
informal markets as a share of 
total HEA expenditure 
0.075 0.21179 
        
HEA_semi 
Consumption of HEA done at 
semi-formal markets as a share 
of total HEA expenditure 
0.158 0.31198 
       
HEA_for 
Consumption of HEA done at 
formal markets as a share of 
total HEA expenditure 
0.767 0.35820 
       
D(HEA_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from HEA_inf, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.193 0.39464 
       
D(HEA_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from HEA_semi, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.374 0.48404 
       
D(HEA_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from HEA_for, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.887 0.31688 
       
TC_inf 
Consumption of TC done at 
informal markets as a share of 
total TC expenditure   
0.466 0.33220 
   
TC_semi 
Consumption of TC done at 
semi-formal markets as a share 
of total TC expenditure   
0.075 0.14524 
   
TC_for 
Consumption of TC done at 
formal markets as a share of 
total TC expenditure   
0.459 0.33387 
   
D(TC_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from TC_inf, 0 = 
otherwise   
0.878 0.32717 
   
D(TC_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from TC_semi, 0 = 
otherwise   
0.569 0.49536 
   
D(TC_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from TC_for, 0 = 
otherwise   
0.824 0.38094 
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ED_inf 
Consumption of ED done at 
informal markets as a share of 
total ED expenditure       
0.264 0.29928 
ED_semi 
Consumption of ED done at 
semi-formal markets as a share 
of total ED expenditure       
0.283 0.27569 
ED_for 
Consumption of ED done at 
formal markets as a share of 
total ED expenditure       
0.453 0.29667 
D(ED_inf) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from ED_inf, 0 = 
otherwise       
0.757 0.42922 
D(ED_semi) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from ED_semi, 0 = 
otherwise       
0.763 0.42557 
D(ED_for) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
purchases from ED_for, 0 = 
otherwise         
0.947 0.22325 
Independent variables: SUR model 
Expenditure_HEA 
Total household expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new 
soles - HEA 
944.095 1886.59800 
       
Expenditure_TC 
Total household expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new 
soles - TC   
2177.255 2519.43400 
   
Expenditure_ED 
Total household expenditure 
(purchased) in annual new 
soles - ED   
    1385.675 2584.36300 
  
Income of the husband over the 
sum of the income of the 
husband and wife 
0.762 0.27641 0.759 0.27678 0.762 0.27476 
L(fam_size) 
Natural logarithm of the number 
of family members 
1.392 0.30274 1.383 0.30465 1.407 0.28750 
D(mem_son) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
has a son or daughter, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.919 0.27265 0.915 0.27900 0.940 0.23771 
D(mem_oth) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
has other member, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.059 0.23549 0.058 0.23320 0.060 0.23678 
P(men) 
Proportion of men in the 
household  
0.503 0.16339 0.507 0.16301 0.508 0.16444 
D(gender_head) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
head is male, 0 = otherwise 
0.968 0.17693 0.970 0.17155 0.970 0.16937 
age_male 
Age of the male parent of the 
household (in years) 
40.865 9.36338 40.904 9.32613 40.529 8.97328 
age_female 
Age of the female parent of the 
household (in years) squared 
36.931 8.85788 36.934 8.83357 36.582 8.43719 
year_educ_male 
Number of years of education of 
the male parent of the 
household 
11.975 3.88831 12.020 3.85723 11.992 3.87692 
year_educ_female 
Number of years of education of 
the female parent of the 
household 
10.932 4.42402 10.938 4.43568 10.886 4.48596 
D(chronic_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =male 
parent has a chronic illness, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.244 0.42975 0.237 0.42516 0.232 0.42212 
D(chronic_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =female 
parent has a chronic illness, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.296 0.45645 0.278 0.44811 0.273 0.44557 
Hrs_male 
Sum of the weekly hours of 
work of the male parent 
including all labour options 
53.734 21.87513 53.436 21.86137 53.472 21.55967 
Hrs_female 
Sum of the weekly hours of 
work of the female parent 
including all labour options 
30.976 28.83244 31.676 28.83767 31.409 28.67560 
D(Hrs_male) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the male 
parent works, 0 = otherwise 
0.950 0.21848 0.949 0.22050 0.952 0.21291 
D(Hrs_female) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if the 
female parent works, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.682 0.46566 0.691 0.46232 0.691 0.46239 
D(Lima) 
Dummy variable: 1 = household 
lives in Lima, 0 = otherwise 
0.171 0.37704 0.164 0.37046 0.161 0.36785 
Pcoh_1 
Proportion of household 
members under 3 years old  
0.079 0.12336 0.075 0.12165 0.076 0.11950 
Pcoh_2 
Proportion of household 
members between 4 and 9 
years old 
0.169 0.15961 0.167 0.15927 0.175 0.15904 
Pcoh_3 
Proportion of household 
members between 10 and 13 
years old 
0.115 0.14135 0.114 0.14200 0.119 0.14258 
Pcoh_4 
Proportion of household 
members between 14 and 18 
years old 
0.076 0.12929 0.078 0.13071 0.081 0.13179 
Pcoh_5 
Proportion of household 
members between 19 and 24 
years old 
0.048 0.12616 0.048 0.12612 0.047 0.12364 
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Pcoh_6 
Proportion of household 
members between 25 and 34 
years old 
0.175 0.21941 0.174 0.22274 0.174 0.21860 
Pcoh_7 
Proportion of household 
members between 35 and 40 
years old 
0.126 0.17095 0.132 0.17534 0.134 0.17342 
Pcoh_8 
Proportion of household 
members between 41 and 64 
years old 
0.209 0.27287 0.208 0.27254 0.191 0.25092 
Pcoh_9 
Proportion of household 
members over 64 years old 
0.003 0.02742 0.003 0.02654 0.003 0.02745 
Independent variables: PROBIT model (change of variables) 
L(expenditure_HEA) 
Natural logarithm of total 
expenditure (purchased) in 
annual new soles - HEA 
5.864 1.51231 
        
L(expenditure_TC) 
Natural logarithm of total 
expenditure (purchased) in 
annual new soles - TC   
7.125 1.17207 
   
L(expenditure_ED) 
Natural logarithm of total 
expenditure (purchased) in 
annual new soles - ED   
    6.339 1.33424 
age_average 
Average age of the male and 
female parents (in years) 
38.898 8.67263 38.919 8.63106 38.556 8.24450 
year_educ_average 
Average years of education of 
the male and female parents 
11.454 3.76709 11.479 3.76058 11.439 3.79584 
D(chronic_any) 
Dummy variable: 1 = either of 
the parents has a chronic 
illness, 0 = otherwise 
0.442 0.49673 0.419 0.49355 0.412 0.49234 
Hrs_both 
Sum of the weekly hours of 
work of the male and female 
parents including all labour 
options 
84.710 38.32369 85.111 38.14834 84.880 37.93108 
D(Hrs_both) 
Dummy variable: 1 =if either of 
the parents works, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.981 0.13675 0.983 0.13080 0.985 0.12167 
Independent variables: PROBIT model (new variables) 
D(ca_health)_1 
Dummy variable: 1 = the 
household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of 
medicines, 0 = otherwise 
0.442 0.49673 
        
D(ca_health)_2 
Dummy variable: 1 = the 
household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of 
soaps, 0 = otherwise 
0.538 0.49873 
       
n_eventual 
Number family members with a 
chronic illness 
2.436 1.38447 
       
Health1_distx1000 
Number of health centres per 
1,000 habitants (district level) 
0.741 0.77835 
       
Health2_distx1000 
Number of hospitals per 1,000 
habitants (district level) 
0.027 0.04466 
       
Health3_distx1000 
Number of health micro-centres 
per 1,000 habitants (district 
level) 
0.105 0.26380 
       
Health4_distx1000 
Number of other health 
providers per 1,000 habitants 
(district level) 
0.560 0.65469 
       
Health_firmPC 
Number of health firms per 
1,000 habs. (province level) 
0.620 0.36229 
       
Prop(workhealth_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in 
health sector in the district  
0.027 0.01181 
       
D(ca_transport) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the 
household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of 
transport, 0 = otherwise   
0.529 0.49928 
   
comm1_distx1000 
Number of communal phones 
per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)   
0.170 0.31255 
   
comm2_distx1000 
Number of telephone centrals 
per 1,000 habitants (district 
level)   
0.022 0.08685 
   
comm3_distx1000 
Number of post offices per 
1,000 habitants (district level)   
0.023 0.05928 
   
comm4_distx1000 
Number of satellite dishes per 
1,000 habitants (district level)   
0.073 0.21245 
   
comm5_distx1000 
Number of internet cabins per 
1,000 habitants (district level)   
0.829 1.22915 
   
comm6_distx1000 
Number of other communication 
infrastructure per 1,000 
habitants (district level)   
0.012 0.06788 
   
D(comm_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the 
district has other transportation 
and communication 
infrastructure , 0 = otherwise 
(declared by the mayor)   
0.672 0.46967 
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D(transp_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = 
transportation activity is 
important in the district, 0 = 
otherwise (declared by the 
mayor)   
0.912 0.28339 
   
transp_distx1000 
Number of transport lines per 
1,000 habitants (district level)   
0.309 0.37557 
   
D(good_roads_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 =the roads 
in the district are good, 0 = 
otherwise (declared by the 
mayor)   
0.914 0.28047 
   
Transport_firmPC 
Number of transport firms per 
1,000 habitants (province level)   
0.821 0.42971 
   
D(TC_dist) 
Dummy variable: 1 = there are 
workers in transport and 
communication in the district, 0 
= otherwise (declared by the 
mayor)   
0.127 0.33339 
   
Prop(worktransp_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in 
transport and communication 
sector in the district    
0.102 0.02732 
   
Commun_firmPC 
Number of communication firms 
per 1,000 habitants (province 
level)   
1.756 0.72512 
   
D(ca_educ) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the 
household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of 
education, 0 = otherwise       
0.567 0.49564 
D(ca_entert) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the 
household considers it has an 
adequate consumption of 
entertainment, 0 = otherwise       
0.149 0.35640 
school_distx1000 
Number of school rooms per 
1,000 habitants (district level)       
4.726 1.79051 
Educa_firmPC 
Number of educational firms per 
1,000 habitants (province level)       
0.521 0.32609 
Entert_firmPC 
Number of entertainment firms 
per 1,000 habitants (province 
level)       
0.247 0.09741 
Prop(workeduca_dist) 
Proportion of urban workers in 
educational sector in the district        
0.080 0.03886 
P(pop_slums_dist) 
Proportion of people in the 
district living in a slum 
0.337 0.34386 0.337 0.34521 0.336 0.34545 
P(migrant_dist) 
Proportion of migrants living in 
the district (urban places) 
0.318 0.10702 0.318 0.10510 0.316 0.10682 
P(race_dist) 
Proportion of indigenous people 
(by declared race) living in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.094 0.12104 0.094 0.11667 0.096 0.12262 
informal_index 
Index of tax informality at the 
province level, varies from 1 
(high informality) to 0 (no 
informality) Index = (Tax of the 
IVA - (IVA payments/Value 
Added))/Tax of the IVA 
0.289 0.30684 0.300 0.30912 0.303 0.31057 
D(conf_gov_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head 
of the household considers that 
the public administration 
performance is good or very 
good , 0 = otherwise 
0.301 0.45899 0.311 0.46293 0.309 0.46218 
D(conf_gov_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head 
of the household considers that 
the performance of the 
government is not an obstacle 
for development , 0 = otherwise 
0.191 0.39283 0.188 0.39078 0.195 0.39614 
D(conf_gov_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if the head 
of the household has a positive 
opinion in all responses related 
to the government , 0 = 
otherwise 
0.087 0.28218 0.088 0.28266 0.089 0.28501 
D(overall_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head 
of the household considers 
his/her family as non-poor, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.582 0.49337 0.576 0.49434 0.581 0.49346 
D(income_satis) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head 
of the household is satisfied 
with his/her income, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.330 0.47044 0.321 0.46707 0.327 0.46942 
D(income_stab) 
Dummy variable: 1 = the head 
of the household considers that 
his/her income is stable, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.792 0.40589 0.787 0.40976 0.788 0.40870 
D(sub_pov) 
Dummy variable: 1 = if income 
is below the minimum income 
question, 0 = otherwise 
0.387 0.48717 0.395 0.48904 0.402 0.49045 
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D(road_1) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road 
of the district is a non-asphalted 
highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.195 0.39643 0.197 0.39815 0.207 0.40512 
D(road_2) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road 
of the district is an asphalted 
highway, 0 = otherwise 
0.679 0.46700 0.669 0.47058 0.663 0.47263 
D(road_3) 
Dummy variable: 1 = main road 
of the district is any other type, 
0 = otherwise 
0.021 0.14271 0.024 0.15422 0.026 0.15779 
distance 
Distance from the district to the 
capital of the province in 
minutes 
81.236 161.92620 81.303 156.38560 83.619 161.84560 
P(nowater_dist) 
Proportion of households 
without water service in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.220 0.20423 0.219 0.20504 0.221 0.20554 
P(nodrain_dist) 
Proportion of houses without 
drain service in the district  
(urban places) 
0.294 0.21857 0.293 0.21725 0.298 0.22094 
P(noelec_dist) 
Proportion of houses without 
electricity in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.116 0.08514 0.115 0.08159 0.119 0.08703 
P(nofloor_dist) 
Proportion of houses with floor 
of inadequate materials in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.303 0.16540 0.302 0.16067 0.306 0.16554 
P(nowall_dist) 
Proportion of houses with walls 
of inadequate materials in the 
district  (urban places) 
0.425 0.23420 0.425 0.23399 0.429 0.23592 
P(noinsu_dist) 
Proportion of people without 
insurance in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.583 0.09908 0.582 0.09807 0.581 0.09872 
P(illiterate_dist) 
Proportion of illiterate people in 
the district  (urban places) 
0.039 0.02907 0.038 0.02747 0.039 0.03043 
P(selfwork_dist) 
Proportion of self-employers in 
the district  (urban places) 
0.384 0.07328 0.384 0.07466 0.384 0.07537 
P(unreg_dist) 
Proportion of unregistered 
people in the district  (urban 
places) 
0.974 0.01407 0.974 0.01501 0.974 0.01461 
P(undernut_dist) 
Proportion of under-nourished 
children below 5 years old in the 
district 
0.183 0.12684 0.183 0.12673 0.186 0.12972 
Mort_distx1000 
Child mortality, number per 
1,000 born alive 
16.904 6.47019 17.014 6.51228 17.120 6.60302 
P(poor_dist) 
Proportion of poor people in the 
district 
0.302 0.16474 0.301 0.16334 0.305 0.16703 
icf_index 
Targeting index (between 0 and 
1) of the government for social 
programs (district level) 
0.140 0.17602 0.139 0.17304 0.144 0.17901 
lifeexp_dist 
Average life expectancy of the 
district 
73.766 2.07355 73.730 2.09164 73.706 2.11957 
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Appendix 9: Full regression results (models in Chapter 8) 
 
a) Aggregate model (three-market definition) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.18973 -0.07715 -0.04667 -0.08721 -0.16462 -0.07486 -0.18738 -0.07391 
  (0.18485) (0.15310) (0.17807) (0.14998) (0.18372) (0.15417) (0.18469) (0.15166) 
)ln( M  -0.03248*** 0.07278*** -0.04710*** 0.07239*** -0.03290*** 0.07235*** -0.03169*** 0.07152*** 
  (0.00906) (0.00791) (0.00894) (0.00777) (0.00904) (0.00796) (0.00906) (0.00789) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.05555*** 0.06595*** -0.05635*** 0.06484*** -0.05353*** 0.06577*** -0.05444*** 0.06507*** 
  (0.01569) (0.01313) (0.01506) (0.01299) (0.01563) (0.01320) (0.01564) (0.01299) 
L(fam_size) -0.03624 0.01902 -0.03251 0.01879 -0.03820 0.01981 -0.03671 0.02146 
  (0.03166) (0.02339) (0.03052) (0.02315) (0.03180) (0.02347) (0.03171) (0.02339) 
D(mem_son) -0.01181 0.00102 -0.02099 0.00441 -0.00966 0.00080 -0.01214 0.00149 
  (0.01865) (0.01522) (0.01812) (0.01504) (0.01866) (0.01529) (0.01864) (0.01519) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01501 -0.01432 0.01860 -0.01682 0.01774 -0.01460 0.01458 -0.01412 
  (0.02076) (0.01312) (0.02073) (0.01341) (0.02064) (0.01311) (0.02078) (0.01316) 
P(men) -0.01304 -0.04202** -0.00677 -0.04133** -0.01081 -0.04188** -0.01161 -0.04255** 
  (0.02227) (0.01656) (0.02168) (0.01645) (0.02222) (0.01659) (0.02224) (0.01652) 
D(gender_head) -0.02360 0.00828 -0.02431 0.00846 -0.02322 0.00842 -0.02406 0.00587 
  (0.02315) (0.01501) (0.02215) (0.01513) (0.02353) (0.01500) (0.02309) (0.01503) 
age_male -0.00039 0.00137** -0.00018 0.00127* -0.00054 0.00135** -0.00040 0.00133** 
  (0.00086) (0.00066) (0.00084) (0.00066) (0.00086) (0.00066) (0.00086) (0.00066) 
age_female 0.00110 0.00151* 0.00139 0.00130* 0.00113 0.00154** 0.00114 0.00130* 
  (0.00097) (0.00078) (0.00094) (0.00077) (0.00097) (0.00078) (0.00097) (0.00078) 
year_educ_male -0.00079 0.00607*** -0.00143 0.00589*** -0.00089 0.00610*** -0.00089 0.00617*** 
  (0.00136) (0.00096) (0.00133) (0.00097) (0.00137) (0.00097) (0.00136) (0.00096) 
year_educ_female -0.00351*** 0.00459*** -0.00317*** 0.00401*** -0.00239** 0.00456*** -0.00345*** 0.00449*** 
  (0.00116) (0.00086) (0.00114) (0.00087) (0.00117) (0.00087) (0.00116) (0.00086) 
D(chronic_male) 0.00205 0.00274 -0.00281 0.00296 0.00236 0.00286 0.00131 0.00337 
  (0.00906) (0.00684) (0.00878) (0.00673) (0.00905) (0.00688) (0.00906) (0.00683) 
D(chronic_female) -0.00056 0.01370** -0.00519 0.01495** -0.00034 0.01381** -0.00108 0.01374** 
  (0.00850) (0.00665) (0.00834) (0.00666) (0.00848) (0.00668) (0.00847) (0.00663) 
Hrs_male 0.00032 -0.00011 0.00013 -0.00006 0.00032 -0.00012 0.00029 -0.00010 
  (0.00021) (0.00017) (0.00021) (0.00017) (0.00021) (0.00017) (0.00022) (0.00017) 
Hrs_female 0.00012 0.00069*** 0.00013 0.00069*** 0.00007 0.00069*** 0.00013 0.00069*** 
  (0.00020) (0.00016) (0.00019) (0.00016) (0.00020) (0.00016) (0.00020) (0.00016) 
D(Hrs_male) -0.06673*** 0.02467 -0.05562*** 0.02291 -0.06764*** 0.02517 -0.06438*** 0.02347 
  (0.02134) (0.01898) (0.02080) (0.01867) (0.02132) (0.01892) (0.02131) (0.01897) 
D(Hrs_female) -0.01444 0.00105 -0.01170 0.00019 -0.01142 0.00145 -0.01570 0.00067 
  (0.01225) (0.00898) (0.01186) (0.00892) (0.01226) (0.00905) (0.01228) (0.00899) 
D(Lima) 0.10529*** 0.01989** 0.11961*** -0.00163 0.10266*** 0.01937** 0.10175*** 0.01949** 
  (0.01005) (0.00803) (0.01790) (0.01339) (0.01013) (0.00812) (0.01025) (0.00817) 
Pcoh_1 0.02581 -0.04956 -0.06917 -0.05340 0.03734 -0.05028 0.01947 -0.04776 
  (0.15386) (0.11620) (0.15947) (0.11680) (0.15705) (0.11656) (0.15331) (0.11640) 
Pcoh_2 0.07402 -0.12471 -0.00358 -0.12913 0.08948 -0.12526 0.07116 -0.12507 
  (0.15115) (0.11323) (0.15697) (0.11360) (0.15455) (0.11362) (0.15053) (0.11334) 
Pcoh_3 0.14447 -0.12622 0.05555 -0.12752 0.15201 -0.12659 0.14211 -0.12492 
  (0.15269) (0.11351) (0.15856) (0.11410) (0.15588) (0.11398) (0.15212) (0.11364) 
Pcoh_4 0.09980 -0.06660 0.02809 -0.07306 0.10775 -0.06768 0.09579 -0.06375 
  (0.15341) (0.11473) (0.15883) (0.11532) (0.15650) (0.11507) (0.15290) (0.11478) 
Pcoh_5 -0.01180 0.04152 -0.09293 0.03678 -0.00440 0.04139 -0.01457 0.04534 
  (0.15034) (0.11226) (0.15645) (0.11294) (0.15322) (0.11243) (0.14964) (0.11228) 
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Pcoh_6 -0.02421 0.02124 -0.11822 0.02137 -0.01580 0.02106 -0.03074 0.02688 
  (0.15369) (0.11415) (0.15943) (0.11507) (0.15651) (0.11431) (0.15307) (0.11411) 
Pcoh_7 0.00550 0.00873 -0.09138 0.00802 0.01493 0.00826 0.00043 0.01672 
  (0.15711) (0.11710) (0.16260) (0.11818) (0.15973) (0.11723) (0.15660) (0.11711) 
Pcoh_8 -0.02423 0.01622 -0.12072 0.01588 -0.01056 0.01550 -0.03061 0.02815 
  (0.16064) (0.11933) (0.16671) (0.12035) (0.16331) (0.11949) (0.16009) (0.11928) 
L(pop_urb_dist)     0.19329*** -0.03656         
      (0.04264) (0.03599)         
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq     -0.00797*** 0.00163         
      (0.00202) (0.00169)         
pop_den_distx1000     -0.00289*** 0.00150*         
      (0.00099) (0.00082)         
D(not_slum)     -0.00396 0.02725***         
      (0.00754) (0.00596)         
D(mid_city)     -0.00490 -0.00902         
      (0.00845) (0.00653)         
D(border)     0.05692*** -0.00202         
      (0.01085) (0.00906)         
D(tongue)       0.03387*** -0.00235     
        (0.00887) (0.00697)     
D(migrant)       0.01118 0.00263     
        (0.00806) (0.00616)     
D(social)       -0.00923 -0.00179     
        (0.00762) (0.00587)     
Station_distx1000           -0.06530*** 0.01154 
            (0.02245) (0.01393) 
Muni_persx1000           -0.00084 0.00232*** 
            (0.00115) (0.00061) 
L(budget_dist_pc)           0.00567 -0.00727 
            (0.00657) (0.00488) 
D(sdp_dist)           -0.00959 -0.03224** 
            (0.01830) (0.01283) 
Constant 1.00976*** -0.58901*** -0.06600 -0.36283 0.95982*** -0.58910*** 0.98431*** -0.54795*** 
  (0.22202) (0.17348) (0.32285) (0.24467) (0.22381) (0.17400) (0.22181) (0.17332) 
Observations 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
LogL 2348.952 2429.140 2360.635 2359.235 
 
b) Aggregate model (five-market definition) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.13513 -0.04445 0.14510 -0.04415 0.13882 -0.04584 0.13908 -0.04199 
  (0.14335) (0.12500) (0.14196) (0.12352) (0.13834) (0.12589) (0.14265) (0.12414) 
)ln( M  -0.02651*** 0.05196*** -0.02738*** 0.05013*** -0.02357*** 0.05168*** -0.02836*** 0.05069*** 
  (0.00663) (0.00630) (0.00656) (0.00629) (0.00643) (0.00639) (0.00659) (0.00630) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.01534 0.04750*** -0.01519 0.04591*** -0.01229 0.04706*** -0.01677 0.04652*** 
  (0.01265) (0.01114) (0.01236) (0.01097) (0.01219) (0.01120) (0.01263) (0.01106) 
L(fam_size) -0.04575** 0.02862 -0.04122* 0.02925 -0.05390** 0.02922 -0.04307** 0.03093* 
  (0.02187) (0.01842) (0.02132) (0.01833) (0.02207) (0.01848) (0.02115) (0.01842) 
D(mem_son) -0.00871 0.00698 -0.01344 0.00905 -0.00397 0.00723 -0.00941 0.00739 
  (0.01366) (0.01142) (0.01306) (0.01133) (0.01360) (0.01142) (0.01345) (0.01137) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01905 -0.00815 0.02604** -0.00938 0.02415* -0.00836 0.01856 -0.00806 
  (0.01350) (0.01015) (0.01324) (0.01054) (0.01327) (0.01015) (0.01350) (0.01016) 
P(men) -0.00721 -0.04638*** -0.00416 -0.04526*** -0.00632 -0.04652*** -0.00251 -0.04610*** 
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  (0.01601) (0.01381) (0.01529) (0.01369) (0.01559) (0.01382) (0.01587) (0.01381) 
D(gender_head) -0.03088* 0.01741 -0.03279** 0.01740 -0.03230** 0.01710 -0.02892* 0.01537 
  (0.01584) (0.01234) (0.01549) (0.01217) (0.01591) (0.01236) (0.01523) (0.01228) 
age_male -0.00081 0.00145*** -0.00058 0.00140*** -0.00082 0.00142*** -0.00084 0.00140*** 
  (0.00062) (0.00052) (0.00061) (0.00052) (0.00062) (0.00052) (0.00062) (0.00052) 
age_female 0.00090 0.00219*** 0.00100 0.00199*** 0.00066 0.00220*** 0.00105 0.00203*** 
  (0.00071) (0.00059) (0.00067) (0.00059) (0.00070) (0.00059) (0.00070) (0.00059) 
year_educ_male -0.00012 0.00454*** 0.00002 0.00430*** -0.00055 0.00453*** -0.00014 0.00463*** 
  (0.00095) (0.00079) (0.00094) (0.00080) (0.00094) (0.00080) (0.00094) (0.00079) 
year_educ_female -0.00118 0.00506*** -0.00049 0.00457*** 0.00035 0.00510*** -0.00130 0.00496*** 
  (0.00082) (0.00068) (0.00080) (0.00069) (0.00082) (0.00070) (0.00081) (0.00068) 
D(chronic_male) 0.00696 -0.00120 0.00321 -0.00204 0.00592 -0.00138 0.00841 -0.00051 
  (0.00668) (0.00577) (0.00647) (0.00566) (0.00666) (0.00579) (0.00662) (0.00576) 
D(chronic_female) 0.00734 0.00809 0.00368 0.00823 0.00635 0.00795 0.00592 0.00786 
  (0.00630) (0.00564) (0.00626) (0.00560) (0.00622) (0.00565) (0.00620) (0.00563) 
Hrs_male -0.00023 -0.00044*** -0.00033** -0.00042*** -0.00017 -0.00044*** -0.00024 -0.00043*** 
  (0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00014) 
Hrs_female 0.00084*** 0.00039*** 0.00080*** 0.00038*** 0.00080*** 0.00039*** 0.00084*** 0.00040*** 
  (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00016) (0.00013) 
D(Hrs_male) -0.00104 0.02002 0.00294 0.02002 -0.00608 0.02028 0.00007 0.01930 
  (0.01596) (0.01666) (0.01526) (0.01642) (0.01574) (0.01654) (0.01570) (0.01666) 
D(Hrs_female) -0.00535 0.01066 -0.00517 0.01014 -0.00566 0.01071 -0.00556 0.01008 
  (0.00880) (0.00742) (0.00858) (0.00731) (0.00875) (0.00750) (0.00869) (0.00744) 
D(Lima) -0.02356*** 0.02184*** -0.00580 0.01195 -0.02236*** 0.02143*** -0.01780*** 0.02193*** 
  (0.00591) (0.00711) (0.01193) (0.01185) (0.00597) (0.00717) (0.00614) (0.00726) 
Pcoh_1 0.10168 -0.01658 0.09542 -0.02710 0.11350 -0.02070 0.07385 -0.01903 
  (0.10132) (0.10538) (0.10027) (0.10478) (0.10019) (0.10538) (0.10232) (0.10527) 
Pcoh_2 0.12649 -0.04448 0.12884 -0.05326 0.14130 -0.04836 0.10390 -0.04797 
  (0.09898) (0.10305) (0.09790) (0.10223) (0.09800) (0.10306) (0.09998) (0.10283) 
Pcoh_3 0.10385 -0.04341 0.10569 -0.04988 0.10832 -0.04744 0.08253 -0.04505 
  (0.09961) (0.10345) (0.09825) (0.10276) (0.09849) (0.10342) (0.10066) (0.10327) 
Pcoh_4 0.15285 -0.00839 0.15504 -0.01966 0.16453 -0.01222 0.12196 -0.01050 
  (0.10092) (0.10463) (0.09966) (0.10387) (0.10003) (0.10448) (0.10197) (0.10442) 
Pcoh_5 0.05645 0.06326 0.05991 0.05273 0.06281 0.06171 0.03618 0.06384 
  (0.09922) (0.10380) (0.09769) (0.10305) (0.09779) (0.10358) (0.09998) (0.10358) 
Pcoh_6 0.04339 0.03571 0.04578 0.02939 0.05077 0.03384 0.01788 0.03669 
  (0.10271) (0.10590) (0.10092) (0.10519) (0.10125) (0.10563) (0.10312) (0.10561) 
Pcoh_7 0.06968 0.02854 0.06399 0.02043 0.08116 0.02692 0.04079 0.03142 
  (0.10558) (0.10812) (0.10356) (0.10745) (0.10407) (0.10781) (0.10575) (0.10785) 
Pcoh_8 0.04346 0.02256 0.04483 0.01598 0.06090 0.02045 0.01065 0.02829 
  (0.10895) (0.11007) (0.10672) (0.10937) (0.10743) (0.10974) (0.10896) (0.10978) 
L(pop_urb_dist)     -0.01697 -0.01165        
      (0.03283) (0.02896)        
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq     0.00098 0.00045        
      (0.00153) (0.00137)        
pop_den_distx1000     -0.00226*** 0.00115        
      (0.00063) (0.00072)        
D(not_slum)     -0.01475*** 0.02695***        
      (0.00572) (0.00480)        
D(mid_city)     -0.01072 -0.00651        
      (0.00679) (0.00523)        
D(border)     0.08883*** 0.01858**        
      (0.00984) (0.00775)        
D(tongue)       0.05619*** -0.00062    
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        (0.00749) (0.00571)    
D(migrant)       -0.00304 0.00524    
        (0.00586) (0.00503)    
D(social)       0.00869 0.00136    
        (0.00557) (0.00489)    
Station_distx1000           -0.03321* 0.00022 
            (0.01779) (0.01321) 
Muni_persx1000           0.00049 0.00200*** 
            (0.00084) (0.00064) 
L(budget_dist_pc)           0.02937*** -0.00140 
            (0.00505) (0.00409) 
D(sdp_dist)           0.02688* -0.02814*** 
            (0.01520) (0.00912) 
Constant 0.31792** -0.56283*** 0.36726 -0.46467** 0.26949* -0.56057*** 0.19661 -0.54660*** 
  (0.15941) (0.15108) (0.24207) (0.21199) (0.15566) (0.15102) (0.16023) (0.15090) 
Observations 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
LogL 3270.640 3364.251 3311.910 3308.613 
 
c) IV models with labour supply (OLS version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.00113 -0.00432 0.00618 -0.00462 0.00147 -0.00399 0.00141 -0.00420 
  (0.01376) (0.01072) (0.01334) (0.01066) (0.01381) (0.01071) (0.01375) (0.01068) 
L(expenditure) -0.05396*** 0.10977*** -0.06624*** 0.10511*** -0.04996*** 0.10907*** -0.05356*** 0.10860*** 
  (0.00632) (0.00567) (0.00626) (0.00572) (0.00643) (0.00576) (0.00633) (0.00566) 
L(fam_size) -0.01288 0.02753 -0.00453 0.02438 -0.02013 0.02826 -0.01271 0.02593 
  (0.02636) (0.01988) (0.02533) (0.01961) (0.02654) (0.02001) (0.02633) (0.01976) 
D(mem_son) -0.01114 0.01594 -0.01622 0.01805 -0.00831 0.01573 -0.01148 0.01621 
  (0.01897) (0.01556) (0.01854) (0.01530) (0.01899) (0.01561) (0.01899) (0.01554) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01795 -0.01994 0.02093 -0.02228 0.02009 -0.02028 0.01713 -0.01972 
  (0.02154) (0.01372) (0.02162) (0.01417) (0.02140) (0.01371) (0.02159) (0.01371) 
P(men) -0.02277 -0.02928* -0.01488 -0.03052* -0.01897 -0.03046* -0.02087 -0.03014* 
  (0.02266) (0.01719) (0.02196) (0.01695) (0.02259) (0.01720) (0.02264) (0.01716) 
D(gender_head) -0.02617 0.01883 -0.02773 0.01713 -0.02435 0.01806 -0.02650 0.01629 
  (0.02325) (0.01521) (0.02226) (0.01543) (0.02375) (0.01531) (0.02322) (0.01535) 
Pcoh_1 0.07905 -0.15401 -0.02489 -0.14690 0.08942 -0.15832 0.06827 -0.14737 
  (0.15190) (0.10932) (0.15751) (0.10906) (0.15540) (0.11035) (0.15156) (0.10955) 
Pcoh_2 0.13839 -0.23019** 0.05125 -0.22336** 0.15113 -0.23526** 0.13165 -0.22708** 
  (0.14924) (0.10637) (0.15511) (0.10573) (0.15294) (0.10745) (0.14885) (0.10645) 
Pcoh_3 0.22007 -0.23948** 0.12644 -0.22959** 0.22155 -0.24257** 0.21388 -0.23498** 
  (0.15130) (0.10757) (0.15696) (0.10705) (0.15470) (0.10868) (0.15095) (0.10770) 
Pcoh_4 0.17873 -0.18780* 0.09890 -0.18153* 0.17760 -0.18936* 0.17093 -0.18343* 
  (0.15212) (0.10906) (0.15762) (0.10864) (0.15550) (0.11015) (0.15185) (0.10918) 
Pcoh_5 0.06917 -0.05505 -0.01144 -0.05228 0.06751 -0.05586 0.06311 -0.05062 
  (0.14835) (0.10628) (0.15425) (0.10579) (0.15175) (0.10735) (0.14784) (0.10636) 
Pcoh_6 0.06121 -0.04981 -0.02912 -0.04618 0.06085 -0.05145 0.05122 -0.04615 
  (0.15121) (0.10820) (0.15658) (0.10789) (0.15453) (0.10923) (0.15079) (0.10829) 
Pcoh_7 0.09336 -0.01958 0.00717 -0.02220 0.09380 -0.02116 0.08514 -0.01604 
  (0.15247) (0.11001) (0.15741) (0.10982) (0.15572) (0.11102) (0.15211) (0.11016) 
Pcoh_8 0.09390 0.01228 0.01263 0.00691 0.09443 0.01012 0.08414 0.01601 
  (0.15092) (0.10846) (0.15670) (0.10805) (0.15429) (0.10955) (0.15050) (0.10858) 
Hrs_both 0.00007 0.00019** 0.00006 0.00021** 0.00005 0.00019** 0.00006 0.00020** 
  (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00009) 
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D(Hrs_both) -0.03056 -0.03721 -0.02267 -0.03240 -0.02855 -0.03774 -0.03089 -0.03678 
  (0.03078) (0.02880) (0.03165) (0.02847) (0.03025) (0.02873) (0.03090) (0.02899) 
D(Lima) 0.11012*** 0.00622 0.12330*** -0.00745 0.10606*** 0.00751 0.10665*** 0.00592 
  (0.01009) (0.00838) (0.01834) (0.01414) (0.01023) (0.00850) (0.01032) (0.00852) 
L(pop_urb_dist)     0.20417*** -0.05340         
      (0.04409) (0.03960)         
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq     -0.00841*** 0.00234         
      (0.00208) (0.00185)         
pop_den_distx1000     -0.00283*** 0.00096         
      (0.00100) (0.00083)         
D(not_slum)     -0.00500 0.03822***         
      (0.00749) (0.00607)         
D(mid_city)     -0.00549 -0.00582         
      (0.00864) (0.00678)         
D(border)     0.05807*** -0.00416         
      (0.01093) (0.00944)         
D(tongue)       0.03634*** -0.00580     
        (0.00896) (0.00728)     
D(migrant)       0.01215 -0.00171     
        (0.00806) (0.00640)     
D(social)       -0.01229 0.00617     
        (0.00754) (0.00592)     
Station_distx1000           -0.07084*** 0.01492 
            (0.02256) (0.01539) 
Muni_persx1000           -0.00079 0.00209*** 
            (0.00122) (0.00066) 
L(budget_dist_pc)           0.00640 -0.00562 
            (0.00675) (0.00504) 
D(sdp_dist)           -0.00820 -0.03837*** 
            (0.01864) (0.01294) 
Constant 0.86656*** -0.70077*** -0.16038 -0.37387 0.81839*** -0.69169*** 0.84705*** -0.66821*** 
  (0.17088) (0.12843) (0.28862) (0.23263) (0.17436) (0.12938) (0.17213) (0.12964) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 758.621 1275.637 822.280 1301.578 770.401 1276.560 762.252 1282.255 
 
d) First-stage regression for IV models with labour supply 
  L(expenditure)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(fam_size) 0.3314865*** 0.3274483*** 0.3498183*** 0.343997*** -0.019627 -0.0191199 -0.0109274 -0.0166853 
  (0.06829) (0.06566) (0.06790) (0.06783) (0.04015) (0.04013) (0.04042) (0.04028) 
D(mem_son) 0.1016992** 0.0996555** 0.0968152** 0.095471** -0.0055221 -0.0044957 -0.0083805 -0.0073572 
  (0.04895) (0.04847) (0.04888) (0.04851) (0.03073) (0.03056) (0.03087) (0.03081) 
D(mem_oth) -0.0199442 -0.0209157 -0.024051 -0.0214981 -0.0256886 -0.0267965 -0.0286654 -0.0257683 
  (0.04782) (0.04563) (0.04821) (0.04764) (0.03299) (0.03304) (0.03307) (0.03313) 
P(men) 0.0678127 0.0798221 0.0712308 0.0764876 0.0040099 0.0041602 0.0038984 0.0050857 
  (0.05762) (0.05652) (0.05719) (0.05750) (0.03387) (0.03404) (0.03391) (0.03401) 
D(gender_head)  -0.1129027**  -0.100262**  -0.111196**  -0.111451*** 0.1336476*** 0.1322544*** 0.1338373*** 0.134119*** 
  (0.04431) (0.04300) (0.04349) (0.04423) (0.03632) (0.03636) (0.03663) (0.03628) 
Pcoh_1  -0.9607172***  -1.108212***  -0.9679774***  -1.026393*** 0.1680528 0.1776305 0.1604404 0.158449 
  (0.31901) (0.32519) (0.32381) (0.31992) (0.30243) (0.29557) (0.30613) (0.30325) 
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Pcoh_2  -0.8247098***  -0.9631616***  -0.8227427***  -0.8778704*** -0.0000143 0.0118838 -0.0060389 -0.0075777 
  (0.31061) (0.31755) (0.31536) (0.31210) (0.30194) (0.29475) (0.30587) (0.30270) 
Pcoh_3  -0.7421377**  -0.8855057***  -0.7336148**  -0.7939493** -0.0029513 0.0100085 -0.0014236 -0.011198 
  (0.31611) (0.32247) (0.32037) (0.31718) (0.30097) (0.29393) (0.30453) (0.30170) 
Pcoh_4 -0.4231997  -0.5681839* -0.434056 -0.4842875 0.0292428 0.0368332 0.023862 0.0228387 
  (0.31942) (0.32495) (0.32397) (0.32026) (0.30198) (0.29480) (0.30573) (0.30255) 
Pcoh_5 -0.3473459 -0.4937201 -0.3383481 -0.3921458 0.0136673 0.0234119 0.0153098 0.0073704 
  (0.31490) (0.32141) (0.31947) (0.31541) (0.29951) (0.29238) (0.30297) (0.30023) 
Pcoh_6 -0.4227694  -0.578925* -0.408033 -0.4732332 -0.030795 -0.0155911 -0.0275096 -0.0364642 
  (0.32368) (0.33063) (0.32828) (0.32479) (0.30245) (0.29543) (0.30587) (0.30328) 
Pcoh_7 -0.3675913 -0.5225369 -0.3560038 -0.426148 -0.0920957 -0.0830867 -0.090108 -0.1001198 
  (0.32664) (0.33347) (0.33110) (0.32774) (0.30630) (0.29891) (0.30971) (0.30715) 
Pcoh_8 -0.2934018 -0.4630356 -0.2842821 -0.358195 -0.0984544 -0.0873359 -0.0984918 -0.1071681 
  (0.32083) (0.32827) (0.32531) (0.32222) (0.30252) (0.29527) (0.30614) (0.30338) 
Hrs_both 
0.0009732*** 0.0009344*** 0.0009811*** 0.0009769***  -0.0016842***  -0.0016844***  -0.0016694***  -0.0016831*** 
  (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) 
D(Hrs_both) 
-0.0587325 -0.0087809 -0.0518329 -0.0707466 0.1089451* 0.1069518* 0.1100467* 0.1080064* 
  (0.07295) (0.07102) (0.07350) (0.07278) (0.05876) (0.05933) (0.05870) (0.05874) 
D(Lima) 
0.2461642*** 0.1665346*** 0.2313829*** 0.2549116*** -0.0211301 -0.035964 -0.0248415 -0.0194062 
  (0.02602) (0.04671) (0.02634) (0.02586) (0.01504) (0.02991) (0.01515) (0.01526) 
theta_educ_prima 
0.167793*** 0.1463916*** 0.1688955*** 0.1685395*** 0.0398507*** 0.0424543*** 0.0409871*** 0.0399192*** 
  (0.02162) (0.02086) (0.02185) (0.02148) (0.01238) (0.01255) (0.01243) (0.01247) 
year_educ_female 
0.0423834*** 0.0327692** 0.0396936*** 0.0441876*** 0.0571744*** 0.058449*** 0.0550632*** 0.0572829*** 
  (0.01484) (0.01445) (0.01493) (0.01477) (0.00876) (0.00880) (0.00879) (0.00882) 
year_educ_female-
sq 0.0011286* 0.0012735** 0.0012608* 0.0010182  -0.0029823***  -0.0030225***  -0.0029031***  -0.0029902*** 
  (0.00064) (0.00063) (0.00065) (0.00064) (0.00037) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) 
D(risk7) 
0.1612495*** 0.1605618*** 0.1561633*** 0.1672851*** 0.045552* 0.0446508* 0.0443377* 0.045974* 
  (0.05041) (0.04966) (0.04934) (0.05002) (0.02667) (0.02661) (0.02665) (0.02676) 
L(asset) 
0.1871591*** 0.1818678*** 0.1850781*** 0.186949*** -0.0043055 -0.0037449 -0.0054448 -0.0044358 
  (0.00796) (0.00767) (0.00797) (0.00792) (0.00444) (0.00446) (0.00441) (0.00444) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.4129241***     -0.0599243    
    (0.11724)     (0.06292)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.0170243***     0.0024628    
    (0.00553)     (0.00303)    
pop_den_distx1000   0.0068171***     0.0008579    
    (0.00256)     (0.00162)    
D(not_slum)   0.0817529***     0.0075363    
    (0.02041)     (0.01234)    
D(mid_city)   0.0291951      -0.0248511*    
    (0.02359)     (0.01355)    
D(border)   0.0812128***     0.0103931    
    (0.03009)     (0.01843)    
D(tongue)     -0.0465811*      -0.036889**   
     (0.02362)     (0.01425)   
D(migrant)    0.0654324***     0.0163802   
     (0.02119)     (0.01233)   
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D(social)     -0.0438832**     -0.0119492   
     (0.01994)     (0.01153)   
Station_distx1000     -0.0750482    -0.0041782 
      (0.05114)    (0.04877) 
Muni_persx1000     0.008172***    0.0020579* 
      (0.00265)    (0.00124) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     0.0285633*    -0.0014451 
      (0.01628)    (0.00997) 
D(sdp_dist)     0.0482501    0.0182764 
      (0.05392)    (0.02868) 
Constant 7.170149*** 4.901359*** 7.146818*** 7.045006*** 0.4920025 0.8311044* 0.5044984 0.4973546 
  (0.36550) (0.68447) (0.36948) (0.37131) (0.32028) (0.42403) (0.32373) (0.32775) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
R-squared 0.5119 0.5367 0.5159 0.5168 0.1312 0.1353 0.1351 0.1322 
 
e) Second-stage regression for IV models with labour supply (2SLS version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.22711*** -0.08066 0.18594*** -0.05413 0.22732*** -0.08037 0.23379*** -0.07844 
  (0.06979) (0.05300) (0.06579) (0.05193) (0.07109) (0.05410) (0.06983) (0.05258) 
L(expenditure) -0.04847*** 0.15254*** -0.06364*** 0.15344*** -0.03895*** 0.15310*** -0.04681*** 0.15153*** 
  (0.01184) (0.00861) (0.01166) (0.00886) (0.01238) (0.00904) (0.01194) (0.00858) 
L(fam_size) -0.01142 0.01997 -0.00347 0.01664 -0.02203 0.01840 -0.01226 0.01815 
  (0.02826) (0.02092) (0.02668) (0.02045) (0.02860) (0.02115) (0.02838) (0.02075) 
D(mem_son) -0.00644 -0.00268 -0.01235 0.00045 -0.00475 -0.00238 -0.00649 -0.00224 
  (0.02072) (0.01644) (0.01973) (0.01609) (0.02076) (0.01647) (0.02084) (0.01640) 
D(mem_oth) 0.02334 -0.02003 0.02533 -0.02123 0.02618 -0.01968 0.02272 -0.01976 
  (0.02239) (0.01439) (0.02194) (0.01463) (0.02230) (0.01444) (0.02247) (0.01435) 
P(men) -0.02441 -0.03199* -0.01634 -0.03398** -0.02139 -0.03212* -0.02283 -0.03313* 
  (0.02390) (0.01752) (0.02282) (0.01725) (0.02384) (0.01757) (0.02394) (0.01749) 
D(gender_head) -0.05666** 0.03483** -0.05200** 0.02953* -0.05441** 0.03483** -0.05798** 0.03222* 
  (0.02611) (0.01727) (0.02429) (0.01714) (0.02657) (0.01746) (0.02610) (0.01737) 
Pcoh_1 0.04027 -0.08290 -0.05782 -0.06368 0.05728 -0.08145 0.03191 -0.07498 
  (0.16402) (0.12158) (0.16130) (0.11527) (0.16786) (0.12135) (0.16468) (0.12175) 
Pcoh_2 0.13777 -0.17462 0.04824 -0.15289 0.15578 -0.17377 0.13376 -0.16966 
  (0.16151) (0.11863) (0.15841) (0.11211) (0.16567) (0.11841) (0.16216) (0.11870) 
Pcoh_3 0.21189 -0.17587 0.11752 -0.15222 0.21809 -0.17569 0.20882 -0.17020 
  (0.16317) (0.11960) (0.16028) (0.11312) (0.16694) (0.11941) (0.16386) (0.11973) 
Pcoh_4 0.16110 -0.13653 0.08363 -0.11955 0.16519 -0.13526 0.15445 -0.12958 
  (0.16335) (0.12072) (0.16043) (0.11442) (0.16709) (0.12049) (0.16398) (0.12075) 
Pcoh_5 0.05777 -0.01464 -0.02267 0.00217 0.05891 -0.01485 0.05353 -0.00906 
  (0.16019) (0.11889) (0.15737) (0.11203) (0.16374) (0.11857) (0.16061) (0.11888) 
Pcoh_6 0.06561 -0.01662 -0.02903 0.00547 0.06694 -0.01719 0.05736 -0.01114 
  (0.16314) (0.12065) (0.15963) (0.11413) (0.16664) (0.12035) (0.16367) (0.12067) 
Pcoh_7 0.12307 -0.01355 0.02852 0.00547 0.12342 -0.01404 0.11746 -0.00740 
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  (0.16552) (0.12233) (0.16125) (0.11596) (0.16894) (0.12202) (0.16621) (0.12239) 
Pcoh_8 0.12168 0.02884 0.03182 0.04577 0.12299 0.02852 0.11477 0.03531 
  (0.16344) (0.12118) (0.15995) (0.11464) (0.16701) (0.12093) (0.16407) (0.12126) 
Hrs_both 
0.00043*** -0.00001 0.00034** 0.00005 0.00039** -0.00001 0.00043*** -0.00000 
  (0.00016) (0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00012) 
D(Hrs_both) 
-0.05226 -0.02542 -0.03907 -0.02794 -0.05045 -0.02594 -0.05325 -0.02420 
  (0.03479) (0.02981) (0.03424) (0.02968) (0.03425) (0.02985) (0.03515) (0.02999) 
D(Lima) 
0.11116*** -0.00590 0.12881*** -0.02063 0.10723*** -0.00508 0.10717*** -0.00698 
  (0.01089) (0.00831) (0.01955) (0.01444) (0.01102) (0.00841) (0.01122) (0.00847) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.21308*** -0.09547**       
    (0.04536) (0.04074)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.00878*** 0.00413**       
    (0.00214) (0.00190)       
pop_den_distx1000   -0.00301*** 0.00085       
    (0.00107) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)   -0.00243 0.02351***       
    (0.00809) (0.00663)       
D(mid_city)   0.00081 -0.01141       
    (0.00924) (0.00731)       
D(border)   0.05669*** -0.00754       
    (0.01144) (0.00973)       
D(tongue)       0.04299*** 0.00407     
        (0.01012) (0.00802)     
D(migrant)       0.00737 -0.00412     
        (0.00876) (0.00677)     
D(social)       -0.00645 0.00256     
        (0.00812) (0.00621)     
Station_distx1000         -0.06920*** 0.01157 
          (0.02304) (0.01645) 
Muni_persx1000         -0.00119 0.00157** 
          (0.00113) (0.00065) 
L(budget_dist_pc)         0.00800 -0.00794 
          (0.00705) (0.00514) 
D(sdp_dist)         -0.01637 -0.03431** 
          (0.01961) (0.01365) 
Constant 0.65278*** -1.06303*** -0.36903 -0.56563** 0.55537** -1.06569*** 0.60984*** -1.02225*** 
  (0.23116) (0.16762) (0.30961) (0.25717) (0.23700) (0.16986) (0.23518) (0.16757) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 631.231 1207.603 735.605 1242.857 642.179 1207.132 627.711 1215.471 
 
f) Second-stage regression for IV models with labour supply (LIML version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.24249*** -0.08205 0.19895*** -0.05451 0.23442*** -0.08189 0.24971*** -0.07999 
  (0.07523) (0.05419) (0.07104) (0.05251) (0.07362) (0.05546) (0.07536) (0.05394) 
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L(expenditure) -0.04713*** 0.15250*** -0.06250*** 0.15346*** -0.03827*** 0.15306*** -0.04541*** 0.15149*** 
  (0.01225) (0.00868) (0.01203) (0.00889) (0.01259) (0.00913) (0.01236) (0.00866) 
L(fam_size) -0.01148 0.01997 -0.00353 0.01664 -0.02217 0.01841 -0.01239 0.01814 
  (0.02850) (0.02093) (0.02686) (0.02045) (0.02871) (0.02117) (0.02864) (0.02076) 
D(mem_son) -0.00649 -0.00271 -0.01239 0.00043 -0.00476 -0.00241 -0.00649 -0.00228 
  (0.02091) (0.01645) (0.01987) (0.01609) (0.02085) (0.01648) (0.02105) (0.01641) 
D(mem_oth) 0.02375 -0.02007 0.02569 -0.02124 0.02639 -0.01972 0.02314 -0.01980 
  (0.02254) (0.01439) (0.02203) (0.01463) (0.02237) (0.01444) (0.02263) (0.01435) 
P(men) -0.02460 -0.03198* -0.01652 -0.03398** -0.02148 -0.03210* -0.02304 -0.03312* 
  (0.02408) (0.01753) (0.02295) (0.01725) (0.02392) (0.01758) (0.02413) (0.01749) 
D(gender_head) -0.05861** 0.03502** -0.05365** 0.02958* -0.05530** 0.03504** -0.06002** 0.03243* 
  (0.02652) (0.01734) (0.02462) (0.01717) (0.02676) (0.01754) (0.02653) (0.01745) 
Pcoh_1 0.03889 -0.08267 -0.05877 -0.06358 0.05673 -0.08120 0.03069 -0.07473 
  (0.16575) (0.12179) (0.16219) (0.11531) (0.16867) (0.12157) (0.16654) (0.12198) 
Pcoh_2 0.13893 -0.17462 0.04937 -0.15285 0.15637 -0.17377 0.13511 -0.16967 
  (0.16326) (0.11883) (0.15929) (0.11215) (0.16649) (0.11863) (0.16405) (0.11893) 
Pcoh_3 0.21266 -0.17583 0.11832 -0.15216 0.21844 -0.17563 0.20979 -0.17016 
  (0.16487) (0.11980) (0.16115) (0.11316) (0.16774) (0.11963) (0.16570) (0.11996) 
Pcoh_4 0.16089 -0.13643 0.08364 -0.11949 0.16515 -0.13515 0.15433 -0.12946 
  (0.16503) (0.12091) (0.16126) (0.11446) (0.16788) (0.12070) (0.16578) (0.12097) 
Pcoh_5 0.05779 -0.01457 -0.02249 0.00222 0.05891 -0.01477 0.05368 -0.00899 
  (0.16189) (0.11909) (0.15822) (0.11208) (0.16453) (0.11879) (0.16245) (0.11911) 
Pcoh_6 0.06666 -0.01665 -0.02802 0.00550 0.06738 -0.01721 0.05855 -0.01117 
  (0.16486) (0.12086) (0.16048) (0.11418) (0.16744) (0.12058) (0.16552) (0.12089) 
Pcoh_7 0.12544 -0.01374 0.03072 0.00544 0.12447 -0.01423 0.12007 -0.00761 
  (0.16736) (0.12254) (0.16222) (0.11601) (0.16979) (0.12226) (0.16819) (0.12262) 
Pcoh_8 0.12414 0.02867 0.03407 0.04575 0.12408 0.02834 0.11747 0.03511 
  (0.16522) (0.12140) (0.16086) (0.11469) (0.16785) (0.12116) (0.16600) (0.12150) 
Hrs_both 
0.00045*** -0.00001 0.00036** 0.00005 0.00040** -0.00001 0.00045*** -0.00000 
  (0.00016) (0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00016) (0.00012) 
D(Hrs_both) 
-0.05364 -0.02529 -0.04026 -0.02790 -0.05111 -0.02579 -0.05467 -0.02405 
  (0.03529) (0.02984) (0.03460) (0.02969) (0.03448) (0.02989) (0.03568) (0.03003) 
D(Lima) 
0.11098*** -0.00590 0.12899*** -0.02065 0.10719*** -0.00509 0.10694*** -0.00698 
  (0.01100) (0.00831) (0.01971) (0.01444) (0.01106) (0.00841) (0.01133) (0.00848) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.21296*** -0.09550**       
    (0.04555) (0.04074)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.00878*** 0.00413**       
    (0.00215) (0.00190)       
pop_den_distx1000   -0.00303*** 0.00085       
    (0.00108) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)   -0.00251 0.02350***       
    (0.00814) (0.00663)       
D(mid_city)   0.00119 -0.01143       
    (0.00932) (0.00731)       
D(border)   0.05652*** -0.00754       
    (0.01152) (0.00973)       
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D(tongue)       0.04328*** 0.00403     
        (0.01019) (0.00804)     
D(migrant)       0.00719 -0.00409     
        (0.00880) (0.00678)     
D(social)       -0.00628 0.00252     
        (0.00816) (0.00622)     
Station_distx1000         -0.06915*** 0.01156 
          (0.02327) (0.01646) 
Muni_persx1000         -0.00123 0.00157** 
          (0.00113) (0.00065) 
L(budget_dist_pc)         0.00807 -0.00795 
          (0.00710) (0.00514) 
D(sdp_dist)         -0.01690 -0.03425** 
          (0.01977) (0.01366) 
Constant 0.62877*** -1.06167*** -0.38896 -0.56531** 0.54388** -1.06416*** 0.58465** -1.02072*** 
  (0.23758) (0.16877) (0.31313) (0.25750) (0.24004) (0.17124) (0.24199) (0.16887) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 614.453 1206.746 723.181 1242.653 634.453 1206.201 609.902 1214.526 
 
g) Second-stage regression for IV models with labour supply (GMM version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.23632*** -0.07939 0.19682*** -0.05441 0.23618*** -0.07959 0.24415*** -0.07797 
  (0.06928) (0.05293) (0.06542) (0.05186) (0.07052) (0.05404) (0.06935) (0.05251) 
L(expenditure) -0.04810*** 0.15334*** -0.06265*** 0.15393*** -0.03819*** 0.15404*** -0.04641*** 0.15225*** 
  (0.01181) (0.00859) (0.01164) (0.00884) (0.01236) (0.00901) (0.01192) (0.00855) 
L(fam_size) -0.01005 0.01858 -0.00265 0.01571 -0.02166 0.01695 -0.01062 0.01655 
  (0.02825) (0.02088) (0.02667) (0.02042) (0.02858) (0.02111) (0.02836) (0.02070) 
D(mem_son) -0.00696 -0.00191 -0.01258 0.00079 -0.00495 -0.00159 -0.00704 -0.00166 
  (0.02070) (0.01637) (0.01973) (0.01603) (0.02075) (0.01641) (0.02082) (0.01634) 
D(mem_oth) 0.02298 -0.02043 0.02590 -0.02175 0.02632 -0.02000 0.02238 -0.02025 
  (0.02238) (0.01438) (0.02193) (0.01461) (0.02229) (0.01443) (0.02246) (0.01433) 
P(men) -0.02428 -0.03168* -0.01640 -0.03376* -0.02150 -0.03160* -0.02277 -0.03284* 
  (0.02389) (0.01751) (0.02280) (0.01724) (0.02383) (0.01756) (0.02393) (0.01747) 
D(gender_head) -0.05599** 0.03392** -0.05256** 0.02906* -0.05439** 0.03372* -0.05755** 0.03130* 
  (0.02608) (0.01725) (0.02426) (0.01713) (0.02655) (0.01743) (0.02608) (0.01734) 
Pcoh_1 0.02184 -0.08498 -0.05882 -0.06607 0.04779 -0.08223 0.01308 -0.07594 
  (0.16376) (0.12149) (0.16107) (0.11506) (0.16774) (0.12128) (0.16440) (0.12167) 
Pcoh_2 0.12194 -0.17581 0.04894 -0.15432 0.14793 -0.17411 0.11751 -0.16975 
  (0.16128) (0.11855) (0.15819) (0.11191) (0.16556) (0.11834) (0.16191) (0.11863) 
Pcoh_3 0.19203 -0.17837 0.11500 -0.15483 0.20756 -0.17734 0.18863 -0.17169 
  (0.16289) (0.11949) (0.16000) (0.11289) (0.16678) (0.11933) (0.16356) (0.11964) 
Pcoh_4 0.14532 -0.13685 0.08261 -0.12002 0.15639 -0.13514 0.13812 -0.12831 
  (0.16312) (0.12064) (0.16024) (0.11423) (0.16696) (0.12041) (0.16373) (0.12068) 
Pcoh_5 0.04162 -0.01790 -0.02200 -0.00084 0.05030 -0.01730 0.03724 -0.01171 
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  (0.15998) (0.11881) (0.15718) (0.11186) (0.16363) (0.11852) (0.16040) (0.11882) 
Pcoh_6 0.05276 -0.02001 -0.02568 0.00228 0.06061 -0.01980 0.04468 -0.01394 
  (0.16299) (0.12055) (0.15943) (0.11395) (0.16657) (0.12029) (0.16351) (0.12058) 
Pcoh_7 0.11145 -0.01742 0.03347 0.00185 0.11815 -0.01677 0.10622 -0.01095 
  (0.16538) (0.12223) (0.16107) (0.11582) (0.16888) (0.12197) (0.16605) (0.12230) 
Pcoh_8 0.10852 0.02633 0.03574 0.04311 0.11682 0.02698 0.10182 0.03352 
  (0.16327) (0.12106) (0.15975) (0.11443) (0.16694) (0.12085) (0.16390) (0.12116) 
Hrs_both 
0.00046*** -0.00001 0.00037** 0.00004 0.00042*** -0.00001 0.00046*** -0.00001 
  (0.00016) (0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00012) (0.00016) (0.00012) 
D(Hrs_both) 
-0.05373 -0.02533 -0.04202 -0.02763 -0.05191 -0.02567 -0.05507 -0.02359 
  (0.03472) (0.02970) (0.03420) (0.02960) (0.03415) (0.02974) (0.03507) (0.02989) 
D(Lima) 
0.11066*** -0.00645 0.12918*** -0.02157 0.10695*** -0.00578 0.10675*** -0.00762 
  (0.01087) (0.00830) (0.01951) (0.01440) (0.01100) (0.00840) (0.01119) (0.00846) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.21330*** -0.09729**       
    (0.04531) (0.04061)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq   -0.00878*** 0.00421**       
    (0.00214) (0.00190)       
pop_den_distx1000   -0.00315*** 0.00087       
    (0.00107) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)   -0.00301 0.02326***       
    (0.00808) (0.00663)       
D(mid_city)   0.00107 -0.01154       
    (0.00923) (0.00730)       
D(border)   0.05620*** -0.00797       
    (0.01144) (0.00972)       
D(tongue)       0.04351*** 0.00436     
        (0.01011) (0.00801)     
D(migrant)       0.00662 -0.00379     
        (0.00874) (0.00677)     
D(social)       -0.00599 0.00242     
        (0.00811) (0.00620)     
Station_distx1000         -0.06696*** 0.01206 
          (0.02301) (0.01642) 
Muni_persx1000         -0.00121 0.00157** 
          (0.00113) (0.00065) 
L(budget_dist_pc)         0.00840 -0.00845* 
          (0.00704) (0.00511) 
D(sdp_dist)         -0.01747 -0.03456** 
          (0.01959) (0.01364) 
Constant 0.65441*** -1.06713*** -0.39099 -0.55626** 0.54845** -1.07175*** 0.60836*** -1.02302*** 
  (0.23084) (0.16757) (0.30925) (0.25680) (0.23673) (0.16978) (0.23487) (0.16753) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 621.252 1206.879 725.228 1241.792 632.501 1205.832 616.202 1214.369 
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h) IV models without labour supply (OLS version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.00061 -0.00925 0.00482 -0.01018 0.00040 -0.00907 -0.00010 -0.00936 
  (0.01342) (0.01051) (0.01300) (0.01047) (0.01346) (0.01050) (0.01340) (0.01047) 
L(expenditure) -0.05365*** 0.11065*** -0.06604*** 0.10618*** -0.04978*** 0.11004*** -0.05326*** 0.10958*** 
  (0.00630) (0.00558) (0.00621) (0.00562) (0.00641) (0.00567) (0.00632) (0.00558) 
L(fam_size) -0.01188 0.02827 -0.00376 0.02491 -0.01907 0.02892 -0.01166 0.02662 
  (0.02626) (0.01995) (0.02521) (0.01964) (0.02645) (0.02010) (0.02623) (0.01983) 
D(mem_son) -0.01108 0.01627 -0.01618 0.01840 -0.00831 0.01612 -0.01147 0.01650 
  (0.01899) (0.01555) (0.01856) (0.01530) (0.01901) (0.01560) (0.01901) (0.01553) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01848 -0.01986 0.02131 -0.02240 0.02070 -0.02019 0.01771 -0.01971 
  (0.02153) (0.01354) (0.02165) (0.01403) (0.02138) (0.01354) (0.02157) (0.01353) 
P(men) -0.02298 -0.02953* -0.01502 -0.03070* -0.01915 -0.03063* -0.02111 -0.03038* 
  (0.02265) (0.01720) (0.02194) (0.01697) (0.02258) (0.01721) (0.02263) (0.01717) 
D(gender_head) -0.02584 0.02015 -0.02744 0.01872 -0.02423 0.01946 -0.02626 0.01770 
  (0.02316) (0.01544) (0.02220) (0.01564) (0.02367) (0.01555) (0.02313) (0.01558) 
Pcoh_1 0.08058 -0.16045 -0.02417 -0.15607 0.09251 -0.16489 0.07069 -0.15458 
  (0.15186) (0.10938) (0.15788) (0.10898) (0.15537) (0.11032) (0.15144) (0.10966) 
Pcoh_2 0.13832 -0.23893** 0.05082 -0.23457** 0.15284 -0.24409** 0.13250 -0.23648** 
  (0.14922) (0.10655) (0.15549) (0.10576) (0.15291) (0.10755) (0.14874) (0.10670) 
Pcoh_3 0.22165 -0.24426** 0.12729 -0.23650** 0.22436 -0.24753** 0.21618 -0.24035** 
  (0.15141) (0.10788) (0.15738) (0.10718) (0.15477) (0.10889) (0.15098) (0.10808) 
Pcoh_4 0.18130 -0.19025* 0.10047 -0.18615* 0.18106 -0.19204* 0.17431 -0.18613* 
  (0.15232) (0.10936) (0.15809) (0.10876) (0.15568) (0.11034) (0.15198) (0.10953) 
Pcoh_5 0.07146 -0.06076 -0.01014 -0.06086 0.07136 -0.06185 0.06629 -0.05706 
  (0.14827) (0.10668) (0.15457) (0.10599) (0.15165) (0.10763) (0.14768) (0.10681) 
Pcoh_6 0.06496 -0.05424 -0.02672 -0.05374 0.06617 -0.05612 0.05594 -0.05137 
  (0.15108) (0.10861) (0.15683) (0.10807) (0.15436) (0.10953) (0.15056) (0.10875) 
Pcoh_7 0.09645 -0.02475 0.00906 -0.03045 0.09852 -0.02657 0.08921 -0.02195 
  (0.15226) (0.11026) (0.15759) (0.10985) (0.15550) (0.11117) (0.15181) (0.11046) 
Pcoh_8 0.09832 0.00781 0.01550 -0.00092 0.10055 0.00540 0.08964 0.01069 
  (0.15062) (0.10861) (0.15685) (0.10800) (0.15399) (0.10959) (0.15011) (0.10877) 
D(Lima) 0.11024*** 0.00620 0.12341*** -0.00682 0.10616*** 0.00738 0.10668*** 0.00572 
  (0.01007) (0.00837) (0.01832) (0.01416) (0.01022) (0.00849) (0.01031) (0.00852) 
L(pop_urb_dist)    0.20489*** -0.05205       
     (0.04413) (0.03965)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.00845*** 0.00226       
     (0.00208) (0.00186)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00282*** 0.00097       
     (0.00100) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)    -0.00491 0.03790***       
     (0.00746) (0.00608)       
D(mid_city)    -0.00554 -0.00596       
     (0.00864) (0.00679)       
D(border)    0.05846*** -0.00266       
     (0.01089) (0.00934)       
D(tongue)        0.03638*** -0.00526     
         (0.00895) (0.00727)     
D(migrant)        0.01237 -0.00131     
         (0.00806) (0.00642)     
D(social)        -0.01241* 0.00581     
         (0.00753) (0.00592)     
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Station_distx1000          -0.07139*** 0.01314 
           (0.02247) (0.01535) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00079 0.00208*** 
           (0.00121) (0.00066) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.00605 -0.00605 
           (0.00673) (0.00503) 
D(sdp_dist)          -0.00816 -0.03789*** 
           (0.01859) (0.01299) 
Constant 0.83666*** -0.72322*** -0.18545 -0.39408* 0.78751*** -0.71492*** 0.81708*** -0.68720*** 
  (0.16789) (0.12584) (0.28722) (0.23099) (0.17160) (0.12676) (0.16929) (0.12755) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 758.034 1272.613 821.929 1298.135 769.942 1273.392 761.685 1279.041 
 
i) First-stage regression without labour supply 
  L(expenditure)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(fam_size) 0.3330221*** 0.3281614*** 0.3506159*** 0.3454798*** -0.0149537 -0.0158153 -0.0055746 -0.01258 
  (0.06908) (0.06636) (0.06874) (0.06864) (0.04099) (0.04103) (0.04127) (0.04110) 
D(mem_son) 0.1046536** 0.1020674** 0.1000008** 0.0985517** -0.0141545 -0.0124572 -0.0172818 -0.0155529 
  (0.04901) (0.04854) (0.04894) (0.04862) (0.03082) (0.03073) (0.03099) (0.03093) 
D(mem_oth) -0.0261911 -0.0285105 -0.0303384 -0.0268998 -0.0204745 -0.0220951 -0.0240487 -0.0202913 
  (0.04794) (0.04597) (0.04834) (0.04776) (0.03324) (0.03328) (0.03332) (0.03337) 
P(men) 0.0682079 0.0804893 0.0719048 0.0770331 0.0033165 0.0033536 0.0028866 0.003846 
  (0.05776) (0.05669) (0.05735) (0.05765) (0.03486) (0.03500) (0.03493) (0.03499) 
D(gender_head)  -0.1099522**  -0.0969398**  -0.1080963**  -0.1084435** 0.1276912*** 0.1261593*** 0.1278621*** 0.1280251*** 
  (0.04528) (0.04402) (0.04444) (0.04515) (0.03668) (0.03659) (0.03700) (0.03668) 
Pcoh_1  -1.049436***  -1.202527***  -1.058106***  -1.114161*** 0.3200921 0.3282947 0.3088071 0.3141628 
  (0.31621) (0.32275) (0.32052) (0.31633) (0.31035) (0.30452) (0.31470) (0.31114) 
Pcoh_2  -0.9186865***  -1.06156***  -0.9177212***  -0.9693976*** 0.150558 0.1606509 0.140574 0.1451287 
  (0.30916) (0.31612) (0.31339) (0.30986) (0.31046) (0.30420) (0.31493) (0.31123) 
Pcoh_3  -0.8224865**  -0.9720408***  -0.8159825**  -0.8709521*** 0.1155721 0.1270132 0.11502 0.109844 
  (0.31485) (0.32113) (0.31854) (0.31508) (0.30863) (0.30257) (0.31279) (0.30935) 
Pcoh_4 -0.4922896  -0.6451437** -0.505024  -0.5493352* 0.127781 0.1355357 0.1203174 0.1232849 
  (0.31824) (0.32352) (0.32232) (0.31829) (0.31162) (0.30529) (0.31592) (0.31225) 
Pcoh_5 -0.4394578  -0.5952918* -0.4330609 -0.4798477 0.1509307 0.160218 0.1501653 0.1467775 
  (0.31407) (0.32035) (0.31809) (0.31384) (0.30753) (0.30137) (0.31157) (0.30824) 
Pcoh_6 -0.5143102  -0.6822801** -0.502565  -0.5601176* 0.1065411 0.1206193 0.1072454 0.1037114 
  (0.32309) (0.32980) (0.32719) (0.32337) (0.31063) (0.30472) (0.31462) (0.31146) 
Pcoh_7 -0.4554262  -0.6212727* -0.4466062 -0.5094374 0.0385438 0.0467428 0.0379829 0.0332241 
  (0.32642) (0.33296) (0.33034) (0.32666) (0.31455) (0.30830) (0.31858) (0.31540) 
Pcoh_8 -0.3873419  -0.569908* -0.3812901 -0.4469433 0.0420605 0.0508546 0.0388804 0.0363892 
  (0.32001) (0.32743) (0.32398) (0.32051) (0.31089) (0.30476) (0.31508) (0.31177) 
D(Lima) 
0.2464175*** 0.1726248*** 0.2314304*** 0.2546095*** -0.0208688 -0.0438865 -0.0243137 -0.0182753 
  (0.02580) (0.04644) (0.02612) (0.02563) (0.01557) (0.03021) (0.01569) (0.01583) 
theta_educ_prima 
0.1663211*** 0.1453726*** 0.1673245*** 0.1668861*** 0.0424185*** 0.0449184*** 0.0437612*** 0.0426734*** 
  (0.02182) (0.02107) (0.02203) (0.02169) (0.01258) (0.01275) (0.01261) (0.01267) 
year_educ_female 
0.0432046*** 0.0336106** 0.0407131*** 0.044965*** 0.0559441*** 0.0569651*** 0.0534841*** 0.0561378*** 
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  (0.01491) (0.01451) (0.01497) (0.01483) (0.00884) (0.00886) (0.00887) (0.00888) 
year_educ_female-
sq 0.0010482 0.0011952* 0.0011745* 0.0009409  -0.0028631***  -0.0028942***  -0.0027744***  -0.0028747*** 
  (0.00064) (0.00063) (0.00065) (0.00064) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) 
D(risk7) 
0.1695586*** 0.1688514*** 0.1644345*** 0.1755826*** 0.0328389 0.0313388 0.0318679 0.0330192 
  (0.05029) (0.04964) (0.04926) (0.04985) (0.02649) (0.02648) (0.02638) (0.02658) 
L(asset) 
0.1902762*** 0.1847394*** 0.188285*** 0.1902971***  -0.0110543**  -0.0104043**  -0.012256***  -0.0113107** 
  (0.00792) (0.00762) (0.00793) (0.00787) (0.00454) (0.00457) (0.00453) (0.00455) 
D(house1) 
-0.0199746 -0.0246864 -0.0206102 -0.014854 -0.0113487 -0.0088106 -0.0112565 -0.0110716 
  (0.03275) (0.03166) (0.03244) (0.03282) (0.02201) (0.02218) (0.02190) (0.02212) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.4170538***     -0.0694094    
    (0.11731)     (0.06470)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.0172822***     0.0029923    
    (0.00553)     (0.00311)    
pop_den_distx1000   0.0067841***     0.0008785    
    (0.00253)     (0.00168)    
D(not_slum)   0.0806693***     0.0087232    
    (0.02045)     (0.01253)    
D(mid_city)   0.0316513      -0.0266313**    
    (0.02377)     (0.01385)    
D(border)   0.0880407***     -0.0035699    
    (0.03050)     (0.01891)    
D(tongue)     -0.0427794*      -0.0431669***   
     (0.02367)     (0.01475)   
D(migrant)    0.0661511***     0.0151435   
     (0.02133)     (0.01257)   
D(social)     -0.0442737**     -0.0113628   
     (0.01996)     (0.01184)   
Station_distx1000      -0.0854781*    0.0154037 
      (0.05113)    (0.05624) 
Muni_persx1000     0.0080682***    0.0022449* 
      (0.00270)    (0.00136) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     0.028343*    -0.001824 
      (0.01634)    (0.01040) 
D(sdp_dist)     0.0505594    0.0138813 
      (0.05347)    (0.02989) 
Constant 7.25789*** 5.03025*** 7.241753*** 7.117369*** 0.3746718 0.7581394* 0.3967264 0.3776377 
  (0.35739) (0.67833) (0.36066) (0.36464) (0.32228) (0.43507) (0.32649) (0.32912) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
R-squared 0.509 0.5339 0.5129 0.5139 0.0849 0.0891 0.0897 0.0859 
 
j) Second-stage regression for IV models without labour supply (2SLS version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.23606*** -0.06858 0.18782*** -0.04190 0.23761*** -0.06932 0.24084*** -0.06518 
  (0.07738) (0.05767) (0.07235) (0.05661) (0.07875) (0.05878) (0.07719) (0.05718) 
L(expenditure) -0.04523*** 0.15363*** -0.06123*** 0.15486*** -0.03541*** 0.15416*** -0.04355*** 0.15277*** 
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  (0.01267) (0.00897) (0.01233) (0.00921) (0.01334) (0.00948) (0.01278) (0.00894) 
L(fam_size) -0.01121 0.02106 -0.00325 0.01759 -0.02225 0.01940 -0.01202 0.01905 
  (0.02837) (0.02085) (0.02662) (0.02038) (0.02877) (0.02111) (0.02846) (0.02068) 
D(mem_son) -0.00519 -0.00283 -0.01152 0.00046 -0.00351 -0.00251 -0.00536 -0.00232 
  (0.02082) (0.01638) (0.01975) (0.01605) (0.02090) (0.01643) (0.02093) (0.01635) 
D(mem_oth) 0.02291 -0.01894 0.02494 -0.02033 0.02604 -0.01857 0.02224 -0.01873 
  (0.02235) (0.01428) (0.02191) (0.01457) (0.02227) (0.01433) (0.02243) (0.01425) 
P(men) -0.02494 -0.03232* -0.01667 -0.03435** -0.02178 -0.03246* -0.02332 -0.03352* 
  (0.02407) (0.01750) (0.02288) (0.01726) (0.02401) (0.01755) (0.02409) (0.01747) 
D(gender_head) -0.05583** 0.03309* -0.05062** 0.02809 -0.05383** 0.03320* -0.05690** 0.03036* 
  (0.02607) (0.01727) (0.02417) (0.01717) (0.02655) (0.01747) (0.02604) (0.01735) 
Pcoh_1 0.01223 -0.07809 -0.07923 -0.06340 0.03258 -0.07617 0.00448 -0.07123 
  (0.16649) (0.11951) (0.16334) (0.11383) (0.17090) (0.11932) (0.16669) (0.11950) 
Pcoh_2 0.10930 -0.16900 0.02591 -0.15184 0.13094 -0.16792 0.10579 -0.16491 
  (0.16375) (0.11642) (0.16007) (0.11043) (0.16847) (0.11625) (0.16399) (0.11634) 
Pcoh_3 0.19223 -0.17020 0.10217 -0.14997 0.20078 -0.16987 0.18953 -0.16524 
  (0.16555) (0.11746) (0.16203) (0.11155) (0.16989) (0.11736) (0.16583) (0.11746) 
Pcoh_4 0.14587 -0.13140 0.07163 -0.11726 0.15181 -0.12987 0.14004 -0.12505 
  (0.16616) (0.11876) (0.16242) (0.11302) (0.17043) (0.11859) (0.16644) (0.11866) 
Pcoh_5 0.03284 -0.00800 -0.04227 0.00444 0.03661 -0.00791 0.02914 -0.00348 
  (0.16238) (0.11686) (0.15903) (0.11055) (0.16653) (0.11664) (0.16238) (0.11669) 
Pcoh_6 0.04308 -0.00763 -0.04705 0.01005 0.04713 -0.00798 0.03525 -0.00323 
  (0.16501) (0.11854) (0.16098) (0.11256) (0.16908) (0.11835) (0.16512) (0.11839) 
Pcoh_7 0.10176 -0.00414 0.01095 0.01067 0.10483 -0.00452 0.09644 0.00118 
  (0.16721) (0.11986) (0.16232) (0.11399) (0.17122) (0.11965) (0.16747) (0.11976) 
Pcoh_8 0.09962 0.03997 0.01387 0.05232 0.10390 0.03979 0.09305 0.04544 
  (0.16492) (0.11860) (0.16095) (0.11260) (0.16909) (0.11844) (0.16513) (0.11851) 
D(Lima) 0.11081*** -0.00587 0.13027*** -0.02032 0.10677*** -0.00500 0.10647*** -0.00707 
  (0.01097) (0.00830) (0.01959) (0.01448) (0.01110) (0.00841) (0.01130) (0.00847) 
L(pop_urb_dist)    0.21538*** -0.09466**       
     (0.04576) (0.04081)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.00891*** 0.00409**       
     (0.00216) (0.00191)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00302*** 0.00086       
     (0.00108) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)    -0.00311 0.02356***       
     (0.00809) (0.00666)       
D(mid_city)    0.00097 -0.01106       
     (0.00931) (0.00734)       
D(border)    0.05920*** -0.00725       
     (0.01143) (0.00965)       
D(tongue)        0.04502*** 0.00443     
         (0.01046) (0.00816)     
D(migrant)        0.00757 -0.00423     
         (0.00885) (0.00677)     
D(social)        -0.00664 0.00277     
         (0.00819) (0.00620)     
Station_distx1000          -0.07331*** 0.01148 
           (0.02372) (0.01627) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00126 0.00154** 
           (0.00111) (0.00066) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.00747 -0.00817 
           (0.00705) (0.00510) 
D(sdp_dist)          -0.01573 -0.03484** 
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           (0.01991) (0.01359) 
Constant 0.62134*** -1.11582*** -0.39631 -0.61965** 0.51626** -1.11828*** 0.58142** -1.07284*** 
  (0.23404) (0.16509) (0.31398) (0.25898) (0.24177) (0.16818) (0.23763) (0.16509) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 613.243 1212.338 728.290 1244.112 623.415 1211.342 611.654 1220.488 
 
k) Second-stage regression for IV models without labour supply (LIML version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.26042*** -0.07107 0.20890** -0.04248 0.24991*** -0.07200 0.26640*** -0.06775 
  (0.08667) (0.06081) (0.08163) (0.05860) (0.08345) (0.06223) (0.08680) (0.06064) 
L(expenditure) -0.04291*** 0.15355*** -0.05919*** 0.15493*** -0.03413** 0.15407*** -0.04110*** 0.15271*** 
  (0.01345) (0.00918) (0.01308) (0.00935) (0.01376) (0.00974) (0.01359) (0.00918) 
L(fam_size) -0.01137 0.02105 -0.00341 0.01757 -0.02253 0.01942 -0.01229 0.01905 
  (0.02877) (0.02087) (0.02692) (0.02039) (0.02899) (0.02115) (0.02890) (0.02070) 
D(mem_son) -0.00515 -0.00290 -0.01149 0.00041 -0.00346 -0.00259 -0.00526 -0.00240 
  (0.02114) (0.01640) (0.01998) (0.01606) (0.02106) (0.01644) (0.02127) (0.01636) 
D(mem_oth) 0.02343 -0.01899 0.02544 -0.02033 0.02635 -0.01862 0.02278 -0.01878 
  (0.02259) (0.01429) (0.02206) (0.01458) (0.02240) (0.01435) (0.02269) (0.01426) 
P(men) -0.02525 -0.03230* -0.01697 -0.03435** -0.02195 -0.03243* -0.02367 -0.03350* 
  (0.02439) (0.01751) (0.02311) (0.01726) (0.02417) (0.01756) (0.02442) (0.01747) 
D(gender_head) -0.05874** 0.03341* -0.05313** 0.02817 -0.05529** 0.03355* -0.05998** 0.03069* 
  (0.02675) (0.01743) (0.02474) (0.01726) (0.02688) (0.01765) (0.02675) (0.01753) 
Pcoh_1 0.00729 -0.07735 -0.08308 -0.06307 0.03029 -0.07539 -0.00041 -0.07047 
  (0.16967) (0.11990) (0.16512) (0.11391) (0.17253) (0.11974) (0.17009) (0.11990) 
Pcoh_2 0.10833 -0.16868 0.02539 -0.15162 0.13059 -0.16758 0.10501 -0.16457 
  (0.16686) (0.11676) (0.16172) (0.11050) (0.17008) (0.11663) (0.16734) (0.11669) 
Pcoh_3 0.19135 -0.16987 0.10173 -0.14974 0.20036 -0.16950 0.18887 -0.16490 
  (0.16859) (0.11780) (0.16366) (0.11161) (0.17146) (0.11773) (0.16910) (0.11781) 
Pcoh_4 0.14383 -0.13101 0.07023 -0.11706 0.15090 -0.12946 0.13807 -0.12464 
  (0.16922) (0.11909) (0.16405) (0.11308) (0.17202) (0.11896) (0.16972) (0.11900) 
Pcoh_5 0.03025 -0.00758 -0.04418 0.00465 0.03532 -0.00746 0.02661 -0.00305 
  (0.16545) (0.11722) (0.16065) (0.11062) (0.16811) (0.11704) (0.16567) (0.11706) 
Pcoh_6 0.04216 -0.00739 -0.04759 0.01022 0.04662 -0.00771 0.03441 -0.00297 
  (0.16804) (0.11888) (0.16257) (0.11262) (0.17064) (0.11872) (0.16838) (0.11875) 
Pcoh_7 0.10301 -0.00419 0.01241 0.01074 0.10542 -0.00456 0.09799 0.00112 
  (0.17038) (0.12021) (0.16403) (0.11406) (0.17285) (0.12002) (0.17089) (0.12011) 
Pcoh_8 0.10080 0.03997 0.01526 0.05242 0.10447 0.03980 0.09452 0.04544 
  (0.16799) (0.11894) (0.16256) (0.11267) (0.17068) (0.11881) (0.16846) (0.11887) 
D(Lima) 0.11048*** -0.00588 0.13070*** -0.02036 0.10667*** -0.00502 0.10604*** -0.00708 
  (0.01115) (0.00831) (0.01985) (0.01449) (0.01118) (0.00841) (0.01151) (0.00848) 
L(pop_urb_dist)    0.21536*** -0.09477**       
     (0.04613) (0.04081)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.00891*** 0.00409**       
     (0.00218) (0.00191)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00305*** 0.00086       
     (0.00110) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)    -0.00332 0.02353***       
     (0.00819) (0.00666)       
D(mid_city)    0.00160 -0.01109       
     (0.00947) (0.00736)       
D(border)    0.05915*** -0.00726       
     (0.01156) (0.00965)       
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D(tongue)        0.04561*** 0.00435     
         (0.01062) (0.00822)     
D(migrant)        0.00728 -0.00418     
         (0.00893) (0.00679)     
D(social)        -0.00635 0.00270     
         (0.00827) (0.00622)     
Station_distx1000          -0.07358*** 0.01150 
           (0.02427) (0.01629) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00133 0.00154** 
           (0.00111) (0.00066) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.00756 -0.00819 
           (0.00714) (0.00510) 
D(sdp_dist)          -0.01649 -0.03476** 
           (0.02022) (0.01361) 
Constant 0.58481** -1.11368*** -0.42845 -0.61944** 0.49692** -1.11585*** 0.54262** -1.07070*** 
  (0.24494) (0.16798) (0.32084) (0.26018) (0.24748) (0.17163) (0.24932) (0.16825) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 584.279 1211.043 706.645 1243.777 608.869 1209.948 580.740 1219.187 
 
l) Second-stage regression for IV models without labour supply (GMM version) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  0.25454*** -0.06999 0.20587*** -0.04363 0.25472*** -0.07094 0.26086*** -0.06806 
  (0.07656) (0.05755) (0.07178) (0.05648) (0.07789) (0.05866) (0.07641) (0.05702) 
L(expenditure) -0.04392*** 0.15470*** -0.05934*** 0.15572*** -0.03362** 0.15546*** -0.04215*** 0.15364*** 
  (0.01262) (0.00894) (0.01230) (0.00919) (0.01328) (0.00944) (0.01273) (0.00891) 
L(fam_size) -0.01032 0.02001 -0.00313 0.01681 -0.02257 0.01813 -0.01083 0.01792 
  (0.02834) (0.02079) (0.02660) (0.02034) (0.02875) (0.02107) (0.02844) (0.02062) 
D(mem_son) -0.00560 -0.00196 -0.01138 0.00099 -0.00352 -0.00161 -0.00574 -0.00173 
  (0.02081) (0.01633) (0.01974) (0.01600) (0.02089) (0.01638) (0.02091) (0.01629) 
D(mem_oth) 0.02297 -0.01897 0.02620 -0.02012 0.02653 -0.01849 0.02234 -0.01887 
  (0.02234) (0.01427) (0.02190) (0.01455) (0.02227) (0.01432) (0.02241) (0.01424) 
P(men) -0.02528 -0.03277* -0.01790 -0.03461** -0.02234 -0.03264* -0.02376 -0.03397* 
  (0.02406) (0.01748) (0.02284) (0.01725) (0.02401) (0.01753) (0.02407) (0.01744) 
D(gender_head) -0.05563** 0.03232* -0.05110** 0.02760 -0.05385** 0.03218* -0.05680** 0.02959* 
  (0.02600) (0.01725) (0.02410) (0.01716) (0.02649) (0.01744) (0.02597) (0.01733) 
Pcoh_1 -0.01041 -0.08412 -0.08397 -0.06752 0.02001 -0.08084 -0.01893 -0.07606 
  (0.16619) (0.11931) (0.16305) (0.11352) (0.17074) (0.11915) (0.16637) (0.11932) 
Pcoh_2 0.09033 -0.17100 0.02277 -0.15172 0.12098 -0.16881 0.08606 -0.16548 
  (0.16349) (0.11630) (0.15977) (0.11016) (0.16834) (0.11614) (0.16370) (0.11623) 
Pcoh_3 0.17027 -0.17312 0.09778 -0.15070 0.18905 -0.17184 0.16697 -0.16703 
  (0.16525) (0.11734) (0.16170) (0.11127) (0.16972) (0.11726) (0.16551) (0.11735) 
Pcoh_4 0.12815 -0.13220 0.06812 -0.11651 0.14163 -0.13011 0.12153 -0.12404 
  (0.16592) (0.11864) (0.16217) (0.11276) (0.17030) (0.11847) (0.16617) (0.11856) 
Pcoh_5 0.01390 -0.01216 -0.04399 0.00278 0.02595 -0.01121 0.00989 -0.00679 
  (0.16216) (0.11677) (0.15878) (0.11033) (0.16641) (0.11658) (0.16214) (0.11661) 
Pcoh_6 0.02791 -0.00987 -0.04611 0.01030 0.03889 -0.00940 0.02026 -0.00460 
  (0.16485) (0.11842) (0.16074) (0.11231) (0.16900) (0.11826) (0.16495) (0.11829) 
Pcoh_7 0.08832 -0.00870 0.01380 0.00830 0.09823 -0.00794 0.08338 -0.00289 
  (0.16706) (0.11977) (0.16209) (0.11384) (0.17115) (0.11960) (0.16731) (0.11967) 
Pcoh_8 0.08474 0.03685 0.01565 0.05133 0.09658 0.03770 0.07836 0.04312 
  (0.16474) (0.11847) (0.16069) (0.11235) (0.16902) (0.11835) (0.16495) (0.11840) 
D(Lima) 0.11039*** -0.00676 0.13097*** -0.02164 0.10646*** -0.00604 0.10612*** -0.00797 
352 
 
 
 
  (0.01095) (0.00829) (0.01954) (0.01444) (0.01107) (0.00839) (0.01127) (0.00846) 
L(pop_urb_dist)    0.21570*** -0.10051**       
     (0.04572) (0.04056)       
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.00891*** 0.00435**       
     (0.00216) (0.00190)       
pop_den_distx1000    -0.00320*** 0.00088       
     (0.00108) (0.00083)       
D(not_slum)    -0.00378 0.02358***       
     (0.00809) (0.00664)       
D(mid_city)    0.00111 -0.01116       
     (0.00928) (0.00733)       
D(border)    0.05899*** -0.00665       
     (0.01143) (0.00960)       
D(tongue)        0.04584*** 0.00506     
         (0.01045) (0.00814)     
D(migrant)        0.00655 -0.00394     
         (0.00883) (0.00676)     
D(social)        -0.00640 0.00275     
         (0.00818) (0.00619)     
Station_distx1000          -0.07182*** 0.01230 
           (0.02369) (0.01625) 
Muni_persx1000          -0.00130 0.00156** 
           (0.00111) (0.00066) 
L(budget_dist_pc)          0.00800 -0.00853* 
           (0.00703) (0.00507) 
D(sdp_dist)          -0.01671 -0.03444** 
           (0.01989) (0.01358) 
Constant 0.61149*** -1.12015*** -0.42943 -0.59267** 0.49665** -1.12558*** 0.56670** -1.07306*** 
  (0.23342) (0.16498) (0.31346) (0.25826) (0.24115) (0.16806) (0.23696) (0.16497) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
LogL 591.452 1209.391 709.843 1241.785 603.014 1207.808 587.616 1217.148 
 
m) Reduced form models 
  Original Reduced Form 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.25790 -0.05320     
  (0.19113) (0.16360)    
)ln( M  -0.03052*** 0.07280***    
  (0.00928) (0.00821)    
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.06037*** 0.06799***    
  (0.01596) (0.01389)    
educ_       0.11724 0.09298 
      (0.19766) (0.14304) 
)*ln(_ asseteduc       -0.01505 0.03006*** 
      (0.01276) (0.00958) 
 asseteduceduc *)_1(ln)_1(        -0.01318 0.04715*** 
      (0.01388) (0.01048) 
L(fam_size) -0.03547 0.02197 -0.03796 0.02471 
  (0.03208) (0.02377) (0.03164) (0.02464) 
D(mem_son) -0.00906 0.00388 -0.02084 0.02355 
  (0.01880) (0.01545) (0.01915) (0.01629) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01445 -0.01512 0.01890 -0.02587* 
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  (0.02143) (0.01328) (0.02100) (0.01382) 
P(men) -0.01703 -0.03814** -0.02727 -0.01691 
  (0.02243) (0.01671) (0.02269) (0.01793) 
D(gender_head) -0.02452 0.01044 -0.01625 0.00208 
  (0.02379) (0.01522) (0.02358) (0.01625) 
age_male -0.00039 0.00125* -0.00016 0.00098 
  (0.00087) (0.00067) (0.00088) (0.00070) 
age_female 0.00084 0.00121 0.00070 0.00112 
  (0.00100) (0.00081) (0.00100) (0.00083) 
year_educ_male -0.00095 0.00590***    
  (0.00139) (0.00098)    
year_educ_female -0.00391*** 0.00517***    
  (0.00121) (0.00090)    
D(chronic_male) 0.00444 0.00375 0.00602 0.00250 
  (0.00917) (0.00698) (0.00930) (0.00745) 
D(chronic_female) -0.00163 0.01281* -0.00190 0.01216* 
  (0.00858) (0.00676) (0.00862) (0.00716) 
Hrs_male 0.00029 -0.00014 0.00025 -0.00004 
  (0.00022) (0.00017) (0.00022) (0.00018) 
Hrs_female 0.00009 0.00070*** 0.00020 0.00030* 
  (0.00020) (0.00016) (0.00020) (0.00016) 
D(Hrs_male) -0.07175*** 0.02816 -0.05568*** 0.00642 
  (0.02139) (0.01928) (0.02052) (0.01805) 
D(Hrs_female) -0.01695 0.00284 -0.01406 0.00166 
  (0.01240) (0.00917) (0.01201) (0.00931) 
D(Lima) 0.10300*** 0.01958** 0.09619*** 0.03333*** 
  (0.01017) (0.00808) (0.01055) (0.00862) 
Pcoh_1 0.04035 -0.05426 0.15746 -0.29088** 
  (0.15642) (0.11737) (0.15241) (0.11935) 
Pcoh_2 0.09319 -0.12998 0.20939 -0.36191*** 
  (0.15365) (0.11426) (0.14971) (0.11629) 
Pcoh_3 0.16517 -0.12882 0.29164* -0.38364*** 
  (0.15537) (0.11484) (0.15121) (0.11719) 
Pcoh_4 0.11420 -0.06951 0.23500 -0.30847*** 
  (0.15581) (0.11597) (0.15184) (0.11876) 
Pcoh_5 0.00298 0.04044 0.10504 -0.16662 
  (0.15256) (0.11378) (0.14883) (0.11641) 
Pcoh_6 -0.01460 0.02466 0.09254 -0.19198 
  (0.15563) (0.11568) (0.15189) (0.11853) 
Pcoh_7 0.02017 0.01523 0.11095 -0.17851 
  (0.15885) (0.11874) (0.15546) (0.12169) 
Pcoh_8 -0.00247 0.02921 0.10208 -0.18318 
  (0.16237) (0.12135) (0.15899) (0.12418) 
Constant 1.06608*** -0.61731*** 0.38962** 0.05411 
  (0.22498) (0.17985) (0.19813) (0.13933) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 
LogL 2295.909 2173.723 
 
n) Consumption groups (PROBIT) 
  Foff HEA 
L(expenditure) 0.74934*** 0.58865*** 
  (0.07951) (0.07813) 
L(fam_size) 0.28597 -0.09082 
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  (0.31127) (0.30310) 
D(mem_son) -0.21954 0.03068 
  (0.17948) (0.17633) 
D(mem_oth) -0.14787 -0.17205 
  (0.18512) (0.19121) 
P(men) 0.11969 -0.53890** 
  (0.21971) (0.22451) 
D(gender_head) 0.19623 -0.34899 
  (0.22146) (0.23280) 
age_average -0.03019*** -0.00593 
  (0.01113) (0.01146) 
year_educ_average -0.01060 0.00601 
  (0.01226) (0.01235) 
D(chronic_any) 0.03770 0.12056 
  (0.07654) (0.07936) 
Hrs_both 0.00334*** 0.00027 
  (0.00111) (0.00102) 
D(Hrs_both) 0.36389 -0.48697 
  (0.27991) (0.34364) 
D(Lima) -0.08794 0.46922*** 
  (0.10701) (0.10940) 
Pcoh_1 0.88165 -1.22414 
  (1.67838) (1.64303) 
Pcoh_2 0.76471 -1.35659 
  (1.65281) (1.61689) 
Pcoh_3 0.44343 -1.07198 
  (1.64651) (1.62752) 
Pcoh_4 1.87377 -1.90700 
  (1.68402) (1.62440) 
Pcoh_5 1.78563 -1.21527 
  (1.65598) (1.64083) 
Pcoh_6 1.58656 -0.87628 
  (1.66760) (1.67239) 
Pcoh_7 1.92713 -1.44916 
  (1.69055) (1.68837) 
Pcoh_8 2.05720 -0.71175 
  (1.69160) (1.72557) 
Hotel_firmPC 0.09845***   
  (0.03425)   
D(rest_dist) 0.14875*   
  (0.08841)   
D(tour_dist) -0.05534   
  (0.09485)   
Prop(workrest_dist) 1.68972   
  (3.24268)   
D(ca_health)_1   -0.19607** 
    (0.09872) 
D(ca_health)_2   0.15379 
    (0.09743) 
n_eventual   0.43309*** 
    (0.03632) 
Health1_distx1000   -0.53325 
    (0.54362) 
Health2_distx1000   0.14703 
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    (0.93444) 
Health3_distx1000   0.58769 
    (0.59596) 
Health4_distx1000   0.53803 
    (0.55642) 
Health_firmPC   -0.18976* 
    (0.11419) 
Prop(workhealth_dist)   -4.74650 
    (3.34460) 
Constant -7.59479*** -2.71804 
  (1.86249) (1.88485) 
Observations 2,105 2,105 
LogL -742.355 -793.976 
Wald (ident. vars.) 17.86*** 146.80*** 
 
o) Consumption groups (SUR) 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  0.34594** -0.03839 -0.08762 -0.03271 -0.17543** 0.00913 
  (0.16393) (0.13432) (0.07560) (0.11351) (0.08073) (0.07233) 
)ln( M  -0.06746*** -0.03438*** 0.00788** 0.00232 0.03183*** 0.01645*** 
  (0.00773) (0.00788) (0.00328) (0.00492) (0.00461) (0.00351) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.02930** -0.04369*** -0.00127 0.00001 0.01221* 0.01945*** 
  (0.01388) (0.01143) (0.00663) (0.01015) (0.00738) (0.00699) 
L(fam_size) 0.00882 -0.04480* -0.00102 0.02793* 0.00088 0.04881*** 
  (0.02368) (0.02390) (0.01122) (0.01538) (0.01370) (0.01276) 
D(mem_son) 0.02423 -0.00524 -0.01036 -0.00402 0.00600 0.02321*** 
  (0.01534) (0.01603) (0.00714) (0.01204) (0.00954) (0.00753) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01083 -0.00657 -0.01365*** -0.00262 0.01597** -0.01249 
  (0.01373) (0.01281) (0.00518) (0.00852) (0.00800) (0.00773) 
P(men) 0.02249 0.00427 0.00705 0.00181 -0.00987 -0.01313 
  (0.01679) (0.01394) (0.00798) (0.01011) (0.01020) (0.00916) 
D(gender_head) 0.01814 -0.04933** 0.01098* -0.00459 0.00542 0.01500* 
  (0.01777) (0.02037) (0.00577) (0.01423) (0.00852) (0.00812) 
age_male -0.00062 0.00055 -0.00028 -0.00010 0.00039 0.00039 
  (0.00069) (0.00057) (0.00029) (0.00046) (0.00040) (0.00031) 
age_female -0.00013 0.00069 -0.00041 -0.00074* 0.00067 0.00148*** 
  (0.00074) (0.00069) (0.00033) (0.00043) (0.00047) (0.00037) 
year_educ_male -0.00425*** 0.00001 -0.00016 0.00061 0.00184*** 0.00216*** 
  (0.00104) (0.00085) (0.00044) (0.00066) (0.00061) (0.00049) 
year_educ_female -0.00544*** -0.00126* 0.00111*** -0.00065 0.00212*** 0.00297*** 
  (0.00087) (0.00073) (0.00037) (0.00059) (0.00055) (0.00043) 
D(chronic_male) -0.00653 -0.00935* -0.00194 0.01376*** -0.00037 -0.00395 
  (0.00682) (0.00530) (0.00318) (0.00513) (0.00422) (0.00356) 
D(chronic_female) -0.02126*** -0.00774 -0.00011 0.01445*** 0.00268 0.00399 
  (0.00658) (0.00515) (0.00314) (0.00475) (0.00401) (0.00345) 
Hrs_male 0.00004 0.00022 0.00015** -0.00004 -0.00023* -0.00018** 
  (0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00008) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00009) 
Hrs_female -0.00171*** 0.00029** 0.00021*** 0.00028** 0.00049*** -0.00002 
  (0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00007) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00008) 
D(Hrs_male) -0.02747 -0.02873* -0.00000 -0.00235 0.01887* 0.01895** 
  (0.01762) (0.01674) (0.00741) (0.01698) (0.01019) (0.00896) 
D(Hrs_female) 0.00531 0.00273 -0.00090 -0.00958 -0.00552 0.00952** 
  (0.00968) (0.00792) (0.00425) (0.00613) (0.00552) (0.00472) 
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D(Lima) 0.01928** 0.00396 -0.03001*** 0.00161 0.01381*** -0.00350 
  (0.00758) (0.00540) (0.00268) (0.00517) (0.00482) (0.00414) 
Pcoh_1 0.05115 -0.00409 0.05440 -0.11506 0.12436* -0.14221* 
  (0.11810) (0.09682) (0.04191) (0.08434) (0.06511) (0.08145) 
Pcoh_2 0.05635 0.01084 0.07042* -0.14209* 0.09630 -0.09555 
  (0.11532) (0.09451) (0.04007) (0.08366) (0.06285) (0.08064) 
Pcoh_3 0.06017 0.02707 0.06405 -0.15475* 0.12700** -0.11369 
  (0.11610) (0.09628) (0.04023) (0.08319) (0.06366) (0.08116) 
Pcoh_4 -0.02681 0.03620 0.05752 -0.19289** 0.17374*** -0.05888 
  (0.11729) (0.09665) (0.04022) (0.08454) (0.06372) (0.08192) 
Pcoh_5 -0.13440 0.09472 0.05689 -0.14214* 0.18371*** -0.01300 
  (0.11444) (0.09700) (0.04029) (0.08295) (0.06413) (0.07974) 
Pcoh_6 -0.09802 0.05400 0.04713 -0.08344 0.19450*** -0.06402 
  (0.11657) (0.10073) (0.04298) (0.08572) (0.06574) (0.08132) 
Pcoh_7 -0.07994 -0.00459 0.05834 -0.06608 0.18618*** -0.07640 
  (0.11915) (0.10407) (0.04443) (0.08666) (0.06674) (0.08151) 
Pcoh_8 -0.04342 -0.03646 0.04242 -0.04439 0.18684*** -0.09910 
  (0.12160) (0.10668) (0.04584) (0.08928) (0.06787) (0.08170) 
PHI   -0.08764***  -0.02098**    
    (0.02438)  (0.00890)    
Constant 0.84793*** 0.56201*** 0.05721 0.16930 -0.26488*** -0.24451** 
  (0.18015) (0.16095) (0.07576) (0.13208) (0.09990) (0.10207) 
Observations 2,105 
LogL 15183.850 
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p) Markets within groups (PROBIT) 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
L(expend_Fon) 0.47319***                   
  (0.06266)                   
L(expend_Foff)   0.02135 0.15324***               
    (0.02753) (0.03036)               
L(expend_CC)       0.37662*** 0.37004***           
        (0.04499) (0.04018)           
L(expend_HEA)           0.17310*** 0.54941***       
            (0.02700) (0.04000)       
L(expend_TC)               0.33172*** 0.74107***   
                (0.04503) (0.05382)   
L(expend_ED)                   0.12263*** 
                    (0.03469) 
L(fam_size) -1.11737*** 0.51921** 0.18821 0.00790 -0.48001* -0.57811* 0.23641 0.23935 0.08706 0.60539** 
  (0.25474) (0.26121) (0.30732) (0.29969) (0.27153) (0.31825) (0.38583) (0.34977) (0.33599) (0.27399) 
D(mem_son) 0.03697 -0.16172 0.27030 -0.03679 -0.05952 -0.13416 0.06763 -0.17150 0.27465 -0.73172*** 
  (0.15875) (0.16216) (0.18101) (0.17824) (0.17050) (0.19240) (0.24105) (0.20529) (0.20156) (0.19427) 
D(mem_oth) 0.04820 -0.02510 0.00752 0.08113 0.01731 0.30721* -0.11471 -0.17065 -0.00501 -0.16827 
  (0.15242) (0.16251) (0.18661) (0.19089) (0.16572) (0.17865) (0.22769) (0.21151) (0.20519) (0.15833) 
P(men) -0.07918 0.05268 0.11416 -0.43730* 0.01932 -0.10232 -0.73980** -0.00360 -0.50954** -0.16718 
  (0.18482) (0.18729) (0.21115) (0.23716) (0.18986) (0.22451) (0.29396) (0.23867) (0.25190) (0.19748) 
D(gender_head) 0.21652 -0.08631 -0.21933 0.13650 -0.03547 0.09617 0.35501 0.16160 0.25050 0.04158 
  (0.17451) (0.19539) (0.22296) (0.21517) (0.18273) (0.21107) (0.23991) (0.22431) (0.20388) (0.18769) 
age_average 0.01941** -0.01787* -0.00088 -0.00874 0.01005 0.00530 -0.01121 -0.02071 0.02211* -0.00083 
  (0.00980) (0.01012) (0.01150) (0.01151) (0.01062) (0.01152) (0.01439) (0.01363) (0.01307) (0.01085) 
year_educ_average 0.03997*** -0.03746*** 0.08608*** -0.05388*** 0.06139*** 0.00045 0.00932 -0.02841* 0.05853*** -0.00817 
  (0.00968) (0.00997) (0.01104) (0.01241) (0.01075) (0.01204) (0.01703) (0.01467) (0.01391) (0.01166) 
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D(chronic_any) 0.01726 0.13696** -0.01112 -0.00516 -0.02361 -0.06658 0.08842 0.07803 -0.11486 0.14601** 
  (0.06391) (0.06562) (0.07258) (0.07938) (0.06638) (0.08012) (0.10324) (0.08912) (0.08488) (0.06904) 
Hrs_both 0.00125 0.00252*** -0.00010 -0.00001 -0.00109 -0.00032 0.00070 -0.00127 -0.00055 0.00127 
  (0.00087) (0.00089) (0.00097) (0.00107) (0.00089) (0.00103) (0.00152) (0.00112) (0.00115) (0.00092) 
D(Hrs_both) 0.02785 0.32097 -0.58826* -0.06189 0.10429 -0.26353 0.19347 0.21185 -0.26735 -0.04186 
  (0.24407) (0.29900) (0.35403) (0.25072) (0.25997) (0.26213) (0.29326) (0.36708) (0.35128) (0.29167) 
D(Lima) 0.48586*** 0.03122 0.15951 -0.01447 0.54732*** -0.22969 -0.13985 -0.38273* 0.13940 -0.02569 
  (0.12314) (0.12969) (0.14159) (0.15237) (0.13179) (0.15067) (0.19553) (0.22001) (0.20919) (0.13538) 
Pcoh_1 0.16767 0.60024 -1.77313 2.24661 -0.89272 -0.30231 -1.32111 -3.34266* 1.30628 1.34337 
  (1.38771) (1.43388) (1.72805) (1.41690) (1.41280) (1.48304) (1.88890) (1.90642) (1.64684) (1.31723) 
Pcoh_2 -0.39275 0.67841 -2.02699 2.38722* -0.98672 -0.53109 -1.36425 -3.02145 0.78868 2.05090 
  (1.36733) (1.41204) (1.70759) (1.37922) (1.39433) (1.45025) (1.82795) (1.90422) (1.61034) (1.29128) 
Pcoh_3 -0.05995 0.94618 -1.87491 3.11065** -1.64454 -0.21626 -0.79774 -3.51309* 1.38612 2.26681* 
  (1.37085) (1.41766) (1.71230) (1.40024) (1.39992) (1.45104) (1.84244) (1.88387) (1.61560) (1.28966) 
Pcoh_4 -0.76857 1.23500 -0.63003 2.39225* -1.59635 -0.11378 -1.83594 -1.93801 -0.20920 1.53509 
  (1.37531) (1.42235) (1.72077) (1.41482) (1.40396) (1.46162) (1.87005) (1.92968) (1.61174) (1.30237) 
Pcoh_5 -1.22710 1.25657 -0.51952 2.41923* -2.11350 -0.35744 -0.49243 -2.80053 1.04687 2.08805 
  (1.35950) (1.40575) (1.71259) (1.36291) (1.39281) (1.43996) (1.83343) (1.90855) (1.60456) (1.27249) 
Pcoh_6 -1.68198 1.38933 -0.84915 1.71808 -2.07177 -1.10846 -0.75785 -2.68581 1.16008 2.33333* 
  (1.38460) (1.41890) (1.73529) (1.38353) (1.42205) (1.45464) (1.86126) (1.96030) (1.64422) (1.30126) 
Pcoh_7 -1.64892 1.70981 -1.17795 1.52896 -1.78209 -0.83787 -0.93241 -1.93817 0.90419 2.68145** 
  (1.40521) (1.43267) (1.74991) (1.40321) (1.44245) (1.48091) (1.91274) (1.98334) (1.67639) (1.32053) 
Pcoh_8 -1.89515 1.56717 -0.86889 1.60537 -2.08377 -1.05194 -0.87322 -2.25026 0.76566 2.28057* 
  (1.43716) (1.44868) (1.77035) (1.44083) (1.47501) (1.50611) (1.94234) (2.03138) (1.72706) (1.34938) 
P(pop_slums_dist) 0.08410 0.02918 0.03584 0.17458 -0.09508 -0.03135 0.06199 -0.17662 0.02247 -0.07162 
  (0.10644) (0.11043) (0.12148) (0.12710) (0.10915) (0.12864) (0.16608) (0.15450) (0.15044) (0.11064) 
P(migrant_dist) -0.20707 -0.46231 1.34815** -1.01823* 0.88629* 0.64604 0.95039 -0.78081 1.12935* -1.17080** 
  (0.47249) (0.49838) (0.53267) (0.53072) (0.48587) (0.56514) (0.71354) (0.58438) (0.62663) (0.48856) 
P(race_dist) -0.09123 2.11913*** -1.00065* 0.70335 -0.19086 0.65493 -1.32648** 1.21977** 0.06618 1.10456** 
  (0.47648) (0.50092) (0.53406) (0.51518) (0.47074) (0.53297) (0.59483) (0.51865) (0.64120) (0.45301) 
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informal_index -0.02772 0.09049 -0.41554*** -0.23020 -0.01284 -0.00789 -0.05188 0.30318* -0.04395 -0.25994** 
  (0.12881) (0.14076) (0.15656) (0.14940) (0.13584) (0.15646) (0.20832) (0.17894) (0.20301) (0.12773) 
D(conf_gov_1) 0.02340 -0.05379 0.09349 -0.08713 -0.00407 0.08473 0.26058** 0.06797 0.02208 0.03001 
  (0.07586) (0.07814) (0.08933) (0.09405) (0.07655) (0.09362) (0.12690) (0.10204) (0.10195) (0.08333) 
D(conf_gov_2) -0.24880** 0.16629 -0.07407 0.10866 0.03174 0.19204 0.06562 0.01379 -0.30161** -0.04027 
  (0.10935) (0.10926) (0.11549) (0.12474) (0.10823) (0.12836) (0.16225) (0.14335) (0.13113) (0.10743) 
D(conf_gov_3) 0.11826 -0.05069 -0.14425 -0.24818 -0.14062 0.01509 -0.19591 -0.27564 0.26315 0.01354 
  (0.16227) (0.16563) (0.17626) (0.18167) (0.16270) (0.19118) (0.24515) (0.20782) (0.19574) (0.16144) 
D(overall_satis) -0.22963*** 0.12725* -0.02810 0.02721 -0.07680 0.00110 0.21108* 0.01302 -0.18963* -0.13455* 
  (0.06907) (0.07032) (0.07868) (0.08669) (0.07098) (0.08823) (0.12096) (0.09120) (0.10021) (0.07574) 
D(income_satis) -0.05951 0.05147 -0.15627** 0.03216 -0.00355 0.03770 0.04817 0.24443** -0.10311 -0.11868 
  (0.07192) (0.07309) (0.07854) (0.08716) (0.07426) (0.08513) (0.11011) (0.09659) (0.09083) (0.07480) 
D(income_stab) -0.12401 0.25192*** -0.23432** 0.19881** 0.02913 0.09851 0.03682 -0.30754*** 0.18699 -0.06523 
  (0.07909) (0.08085) (0.09549) (0.09633) (0.08150) (0.09736) (0.13947) (0.11782) (0.12155) (0.09023) 
D(sub_pov) 0.05556 0.03838 -0.07789 0.08667 -0.11918* 0.09067 0.06636 -0.13355 -0.06889 -0.01311 
  (0.06499) (0.06686) (0.07234) (0.07954) (0.06679) (0.07845) (0.10281) (0.08532) (0.08643) (0.06945) 
D(road_1) -0.07355 -0.17425 0.08078 0.03389 -0.09750 -0.06824 -0.00676 -0.31523** 0.23018 0.21890* 
  (0.11756) (0.12205) (0.13809) (0.12626) (0.12679) (0.14465) (0.18054) (0.14917) (0.16722) (0.11949) 
D(road_2) 0.09109 0.00125 -0.11004 -0.20206* 0.02486 -0.07653 0.05643 0.20685 0.03282 0.09936 
  (0.10854) (0.11337) (0.12620) (0.12014) (0.11495) (0.13550) (0.17196) (0.14467) (0.15701) (0.11661) 
D(road_3) 0.04098 -0.22231 -0.08743 -0.36686 -0.23659 -0.10003 0.44215 -0.17472 -0.20844 -0.23896 
  (0.25765) (0.26638) (0.29746) (0.25860) (0.33877) (0.33312) (0.33481) (0.30575) (0.31917) (0.23173) 
distance 0.00027 0.00016 -0.00044 -0.00041 -0.00077** -0.00070* -0.00036 0.00022 -0.00019 -0.00006 
  (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00032) (0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00027) 
P(nowater_dist) 0.10280 0.38563 -0.17886 0.47859* -0.53036* -0.12515 -0.68851* -0.43088 0.13172 0.04072 
  (0.28877) (0.27897) (0.31362) (0.27389) (0.29677) (0.34305) (0.37479) (0.32390) (0.34215) (0.28134) 
P(nodrain_dist) -0.39068 -0.49088 0.25944 -0.40196 0.36200 0.40817 0.18976 0.66611 -0.66535 -0.05987 
  (0.37893) (0.34661) (0.38586) (0.36729) (0.36481) (0.43044) (0.48417) (0.41178) (0.42386) (0.35257) 
P(noelec_dist) -1.70534** 0.50829 0.79651 1.72161* 0.39822 -0.71585 1.11079 -0.26177 -0.01256 0.52542 
  (0.81608) (0.76969) (0.82477) (0.88485) (0.85102) (0.96444) (1.04196) (0.85346) (0.87831) (0.75707) 
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P(nofloor_dist) 0.33004 0.04602 0.03699 1.68533*** -0.63907 0.08024 -0.05855 0.14105 0.56782 0.30034 
  (0.43181) (0.45962) (0.49707) (0.45915) (0.45487) (0.55947) (0.62478) (0.55444) (0.56793) (0.44363) 
P(nowall_dist) 0.50196* -0.00457 -0.05534 -0.93838*** 0.20131 -0.18078 0.09074 -0.29869 -0.66269* 0.12254 
  (0.25953) (0.27800) (0.30758) (0.29169) (0.26980) (0.32036) (0.40597) (0.33279) (0.34736) (0.27491) 
P(noinsu_dist) -0.18428 -0.45471 -0.68662 0.11860 -0.42293 0.92206 2.77763*** -0.25262 -1.12363* 0.81366* 
  (0.50273) (0.47120) (0.51561) (0.57110) (0.53843) (0.59860) (0.68722) (0.57227) (0.60208) (0.47775) 
P(illiterate_dist) 3.40970 -1.69790 -0.35974 -6.18368** 8.09241*** -2.13967 6.27624** -0.91336 5.79958* -4.02653* 
  (2.72306) (2.38799) (2.54890) (2.42074) (2.21651) (2.47492) (3.05419) (2.67059) (2.97077) (2.17182) 
P(selfwork_dist) 0.10452 0.94610 0.64813 0.72449 0.04474 1.16998 0.75725 0.82496 0.39639 -0.01742 
  (0.81375) (0.77152) (0.82550) (0.89612) (0.84506) (0.93939) (0.97928) (0.90283) (0.94660) (0.73619) 
P(unreg_dist) -5.13255 -5.05780 2.94592 6.50263 3.54274 5.46768 13.30646** 2.74515 0.71516 8.09505* 
  (3.92929) (3.97422) (4.31546) (4.45610) (4.01562) (4.83413) (5.58059) (5.17727) (5.64743) (4.14589) 
icf_index 0.03283 -1.47878*** 0.82123 -0.01526 -0.94842* -0.03244 0.33142 -0.12017 0.27173 -0.29335 
  (0.47256) (0.46027) (0.52783) (0.51492) (0.50687) (0.51050) (0.65475) (0.61311) (0.67403) (0.46674) 
P(undernut_dist) 1.39671** 0.23059 1.07311* -1.05221* 0.55196 1.20481* 0.70194 2.20362*** -0.33151 0.41799 
  (0.55910) (0.55267) (0.61462) (0.61214) (0.54944) (0.61517) (0.73346) (0.74301) (0.82849) (0.56282) 
Mort_distx1000 0.00857 -0.02424 0.01270 0.03078 -0.01013 0.07920*** -0.02618 -0.06350** 0.01722 -0.05087* 
  (0.02339) (0.02225) (0.02711) (0.02558) (0.02254) (0.02712) (0.04440) (0.02871) (0.02210) (0.02740) 
P(poor_dist) -1.45046*** 0.70115 -0.19480 -0.07363 0.28241 -0.36929 -2.03156*** -1.08696* -0.10494 -1.02380** 
  (0.51902) (0.53294) (0.59866) (0.57265) (0.51566) (0.62316) (0.77505) (0.64527) (0.67876) (0.52231) 
lifeexp_dist 0.03029 -0.01379 -0.02033 0.08589 -0.07080 0.20534** -0.02949 -0.13347 -0.02591 -0.19821** 
  (0.07702) (0.07438) (0.08979) (0.08484) (0.07614) (0.09430) (0.15091) (0.09770) (0.07896) (0.08983) 
D(ca_food)_1 -0.01488                   
  (0.09689)                   
D(ca_food)_2 0.08744                   
  (0.09856)                   
D(ca_food)_3 0.05360                   
  (0.09515)                   
D(ca_food)_4 -0.03281                   
  (0.09097)                   
Agropec_firmPC -0.00401                   
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  (0.03611)                   
D(agro_dist) 0.03093                   
  (0.08457)                   
D(pec_dist) -0.15893*                   
  (0.09503)                   
D(fish_dist) -0.08889                   
  (0.11659)                   
Prop(workagro_dist) -0.95435**                   
  (0.47716)                   
Prop(workfish_dist) 1.57452                   
  (1.79328)                   
Hotel_firmPC   -0.02861 0.19280***               
    (0.04018) (0.04498)               
D(rest_dist)   -0.02697 0.16790*               
    (0.08583) (0.09401)               
D(tour_dist)   0.02910 0.00555               
    (0.08861) (0.09733)               
Prop(workrest_dist)   1.66370 -5.69826               
    (3.85588) (4.16451)               
Com_firmPC       0.01303 -0.00226           
        (0.00887) (0.00774)           
Prop(workcom_dist)       0.29707 2.92296**           
        (1.32091) (1.18588)           
D(ca_cloth)_1       -0.13766 0.06932           
        (0.16268) (0.15386)           
D(ca_cloth)_2       -0.03983 0.10576           
        (0.16713) (0.15576)           
D(ca_health)_1           0.06234 0.32558**       
            (0.09903) (0.13331)       
D(ca_health)_2           0.04734 -0.15003       
            (0.09613) (0.12252)       
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n_eventual           0.17462*** 0.10571***       
            (0.03073) (0.04066)       
Health1_distx1000           -0.06369 2.26392**       
            (0.69866) (1.11030)       
Health2_distx1000           0.28185 -3.86212**       
            (1.25017) (1.59632)       
Health3_distx1000           -0.13656 -2.17195*       
            (0.78424) (1.19732)       
Health4_distx1000           -0.03163 -2.22156**       
            (0.71558) (1.12998)       
Health_firmPC           0.05078 -0.76529***       
            (0.17314) (0.22785)       
Prop(workhealth_dist)           9.20844** 11.16693*       
            (4.63229) (6.18071)       
D(ca_transport)               -0.01996 0.26231***   
                (0.09450) (0.09274)   
comm1_distx1000               0.14392 0.17575   
                (0.13669) (0.15737)   
comm2_distx1000               1.48066** -0.84796*   
                (0.58080) (0.48832)   
comm3_distx1000               -1.40595 -0.46152   
                (0.95157) (1.02545)   
comm4_distx1000               -0.61898** -0.63355**   
                (0.29360) (0.28467)   
comm5_distx1000               0.01134 0.05467   
                (0.04378) (0.04384)   
comm6_distx1000               1.96459*** -0.00320   
                (0.75639) (0.63404)   
D(comm_dist)               0.13426 0.01170   
                (0.10552) (0.10516)   
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D(transp_dist)               -0.02967 0.26980   
                (0.17615) (0.18814)   
transp_distx1000               -0.12705 0.13362   
                (0.11861) (0.13272)   
D(good_roads_dist)               0.08431 -0.11040   
                (0.18252) (0.18473)   
Transport_firmPC               0.33054 -0.33736   
                (0.26504) (0.26187)   
D(TC_dist)               0.13651 -0.05817   
                (0.15102) (0.13933)   
Prop(worktransp_dist)               4.97339** 0.66752   
                (2.15580) (2.03411)   
Commun_firmPC               0.28769** 0.07435   
                (0.12359) (0.11928)   
D(ca_educ)                   0.01480 
                    (0.07609) 
D(ca_entert)                   -0.07431 
                    (0.09984) 
school_distx1000                   -0.05004** 
                    (0.02507) 
Educa_firmPC                   0.38569* 
                    (0.20404) 
Entert_firmPC                   -1.76933*** 
                    (0.50187) 
Prop(workeduca_dist)                   -0.15966 
                    (1.29089) 
Constant -0.00648 4.69367 -1.94904 -15.68530* -0.71720 -24.07521*** -13.61778 9.33189 -5.41106 6.01634 
  (7.94450) (7.61202) (8.92143) (8.65220) (7.76230) (9.19451) (12.67570) (9.90060) (8.94634) (8.58600) 
Observations 2,090 1,794 1,794 2,097 2,097 1,732 1,732 2,011 2,011 1,997 
LogL -1201.192 -1151.687 -903.171 -729.423 -1105.531 -757.782 -423.804 -584.848 -604.473 -1005.104 
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Wald (ident. vars.) 106.73*** 77.07*** 76.75*** 153.07*** 85.05*** 114.97*** 65.55*** 172.38*** 83.22*** 112.79*** 
 
q) Markets within groups (SUR) 
  Fon Foff CC HEA TC ED 
  Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
  -0.81048*** 0.46787 0.20671 0.45732* 0.34401 -0.00971 0.24175 -0.13556 0.04227 -0.08267 0.05886 0.10023 
  (0.27644) (0.54355) (0.27672) (0.23479) (0.21437) (0.27672) (0.54383) (0.17860) (0.23010) (0.24588) (0.14459) (0.10630) 
)ln( M  0.01511 0.00988 -0.15215*** -0.07700*** -0.07074*** -0.06351*** -0.07523*** 0.01480 -0.07286*** 0.12045*** -0.10708*** 0.11529*** 
  (0.01402) (0.02599) (0.01686) (0.01520) (0.01292) (0.01909) (0.02808) (0.01120) (0.01553) (0.01583) (0.00997) (0.00801) 
 M)1(ln)1(    -0.09206*** 0.06727 -0.12480*** -0.01675 -0.03765 -0.07855** -0.03100 -0.01219 -0.06602*** 0.10945*** -0.10556*** 0.13507*** 
  (0.02689) (0.05189) (0.03224) (0.02698) (0.02520) (0.03243) (0.06548) (0.02212) (0.02514) (0.02573) (0.01634) (0.01245) 
L(fam_size) 0.00229 -0.08742 0.15528 -0.09606 -0.09076 0.08061 -0.06696 0.01268 -0.00396 -0.13672** -0.00657 0.02995 
  (0.05385) (0.05776) (0.12882) (0.10001) (0.06746) (0.10842) (0.18674) (0.07104) (0.06725) (0.06572) (0.06378) (0.05258) 
D(mem_son) 0.01675 -0.05722 -0.13201* 0.00363 -0.06716 -0.00728 -0.06554 0.02716 -0.02670 0.02981 -0.24369*** 0.14574*** 
  (0.03516) (0.04275) (0.07913) (0.06098) (0.04487) (0.05990) (0.11402) (0.04669) (0.03894) (0.03855) (0.05146) (0.03608) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00479 0.00426 0.03046 -0.03210 -0.01738 0.03213 0.06055 -0.07264 0.03878 -0.02131 -0.04123 0.06372** 
  (0.03287) (0.03757) (0.07983) (0.06780) (0.04121) (0.06560) (0.10061) (0.04518) (0.04552) (0.04686) (0.04136) (0.03129) 
P(men) -0.07926** 0.04133 0.08208 -0.02352 -0.06675 0.03214 0.30153** -0.03246 0.05389 -0.09501** 0.03780 -0.03635 
  (0.03804) (0.03751) (0.09118) (0.07532) (0.04627) (0.04554) (0.13038) (0.04989) (0.04708) (0.04645) (0.04194) (0.03177) 
D(gender_head) -0.01042 -0.01184 -0.04732 0.08169 -0.11213** -0.03366 -0.00411 -0.04467 0.05797 -0.04514 -0.04898 0.07781** 
  (0.03907) (0.03681) (0.08595) (0.07056) (0.04520) (0.04999) (0.12963) (0.04059) (0.05046) (0.05159) (0.04369) (0.03105) 
age_male -0.00024 0.00122 -0.00525 0.00670** 0.00124 0.00204 0.00468 -0.00143 -0.00276 0.00339* 0.00137 0.00017 
  (0.00144) (0.00136) (0.00353) (0.00299) (0.00177) (0.00211) (0.00569) (0.00186) (0.00195) (0.00188) (0.00177) (0.00134) 
age_female 0.00369** -0.00092 0.00618 -0.00173 -0.00137 -0.00215 -0.00274 0.00238 -0.00605*** 0.00620*** -0.00274 0.00032 
  (0.00167) (0.00172) (0.00394) (0.00328) (0.00208) (0.00262) (0.00619) (0.00223) (0.00220) (0.00215) (0.00211) (0.00163) 
year_educ_male 0.00600*** 0.00690*** -0.01323** 0.01466*** -0.00858*** 0.01111*** 0.00542 -0.00020 -0.00561* 0.00390 -0.00277 -0.00169 
  (0.00208) (0.00201) (0.00523) (0.00466) (0.00262) (0.00345) (0.00947) (0.00301) (0.00293) (0.00291) (0.00272) (0.00191) 
year_educ_female -0.00111 0.00145 -0.00647 0.00639 0.00115 0.00216 -0.00695 -0.00448* -0.01057*** 0.00727*** -0.00494** 0.00305* 
  (0.00182) (0.00196) (0.00472) (0.00424) (0.00240) (0.00321) (0.00680) (0.00267) (0.00260) (0.00260) (0.00237) (0.00170) 
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D(chronic_male) 0.00813 -0.00880 -0.00018 -0.01467 -0.00386 -0.00053 0.03803 0.03359* 0.00512 -0.00663 0.01493 -0.03064** 
  (0.01493) (0.01459) (0.03612) (0.02919) (0.01885) (0.02078) (0.05632) (0.01897) (0.01783) (0.01818) (0.01720) (0.01314) 
D(chronic_female) 0.01356 0.00401 -0.06241* 0.01315 -0.00964 0.01494 -0.02088 -0.01165 0.03471** -0.03278* 0.00333 -0.00840 
  (0.01429) (0.01471) (0.03395) (0.02782) (0.01813) (0.02013) (0.05235) (0.01870) (0.01705) (0.01702) (0.01602) (0.01263) 
Hrs_male 0.00015 -0.00007 0.00010 0.00128* -0.00098** 0.00068 0.00063 -0.00059 -0.00049 0.00034 0.00054 -0.00018 
  (0.00037) (0.00034) (0.00087) (0.00072) (0.00044) (0.00052) (0.00135) (0.00047) (0.00045) (0.00044) (0.00040) (0.00032) 
Hrs_female 0.00147*** 0.00030 0.00186** -0.00058 0.00086** 0.00003 0.00184 0.00003 0.00014 0.00002 -0.00051 -0.00002 
  (0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00077) (0.00066) (0.00042) (0.00056) (0.00127) (0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00040) (0.00039) (0.00031) 
D(Hrs_male) -0.09307*** 0.05079 -0.02858 -0.13221* -0.04897 -0.16227** -0.15161 0.08622* -0.00165 0.02421 -0.08405** 0.01131 
  (0.03447) (0.04027) (0.10902) (0.07043) (0.04479) (0.06406) (0.13364) (0.05161) (0.04154) (0.04194) (0.04256) (0.03282) 
D(Hrs_female) -0.03116 0.00557 -0.16987*** -0.03571 0.01226 -0.00421 -0.04819 0.04518* -0.05328** 0.06369** 0.02412 0.04519** 
  (0.02064) (0.02161) (0.05140) (0.04258) (0.02611) (0.02921) (0.07858) (0.02731) (0.02640) (0.02597) (0.02603) (0.01858) 
D(Lima) 0.13893*** 0.04908** 0.07692* -0.00101 -0.02533 0.05714** -0.08003 0.03080 0.12234*** -0.11483*** 0.07854*** -0.01716 
  (0.01718) (0.01944) (0.03976) (0.03257) (0.02092) (0.02720) (0.06824) (0.02150) (0.01746) (0.01789) (0.02151) (0.01412) 
Pcoh_1 -0.03720 -0.00331 0.36589 -0.25284 0.23039 -0.06011 0.49412 -0.25809 -0.34541 0.46658 -0.40514 0.13809 
  (0.25464) (0.21924) (0.70049) (0.50148) (0.35449) (0.38526) (0.57985) (0.30508) (0.31190) (0.31585) (0.42353) (0.24377) 
Pcoh_2 0.01911 0.01637 0.37344 -0.28152 0.23938 -0.14136 0.42462 -0.29566 -0.20447 0.30542 -0.52266 0.00328 
  (0.25033) (0.21453) (0.69005) (0.49419) (0.35063) (0.37401) (0.55422) (0.29807) (0.30579) (0.31048) (0.42041) (0.23997) 
Pcoh_3 0.10876 -0.01456 0.30895 -0.27458 0.25718 -0.11622 0.50903 -0.38453 -0.49194 0.46873 -0.59502 -0.01014 
  (0.25180) (0.21792) (0.69376) (0.49125) (0.35256) (0.38233) (0.59234) (0.30245) (0.30989) (0.31442) (0.42099) (0.23959) 
Pcoh_4 0.11934 0.08970 0.09529 -0.41070 0.26975 -0.10777 0.51154 -0.39312 -0.27306 0.10634 -0.64573 0.20676 
  (0.25475) (0.22205) (0.69385) (0.48677) (0.35460) (0.37706) (0.55559) (0.30422) (0.31016) (0.31479) (0.42174) (0.24128) 
Pcoh_5 0.08533 -0.04006 0.25286 -0.37684 0.22794 0.22133 0.36655 -0.38158 -0.28689 0.13184 -0.69532* 0.28512 
  (0.25241) (0.21844) (0.68435) (0.47288) (0.34954) (0.38989) (0.58549) (0.30217) (0.30455) (0.30551) (0.41783) (0.23661) 
Pcoh_6 0.08199 -0.03164 0.42466 -0.36249 0.20270 0.20256 0.31765 -0.24150 -0.27354 0.17396 -0.47063 0.27721 
  (0.26044) (0.23785) (0.68979) (0.47241) (0.35689) (0.43068) (0.59923) (0.30445) (0.31022) (0.30931) (0.42811) (0.24134) 
Pcoh_7 0.11386 0.02768 0.51240 -0.36076 0.20990 0.31557 0.49037 -0.32675 -0.10072 -0.00310 -0.43220 0.26783 
  (0.26528) (0.24570) (0.70042) (0.47470) (0.36301) (0.43900) (0.64405) (0.31360) (0.31082) (0.31058) (0.43243) (0.24455) 
Pcoh_8 0.09970 -0.04126 0.40100 -0.39175 0.18124 0.22914 0.36297 -0.33602 -0.10264 0.00759 -0.38503 0.24811 
  (0.27046) (0.25695) (0.70394) (0.47707) (0.36910) (0.44747) (0.72317) (0.32435) (0.31947) (0.31841) (0.43696) (0.24941) 
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PHI   -0.03192 0.05354 0.05364 -0.36065*** -0.00037 0.21562*** 0.20992** 0.50701*** 0.50485*** -0.00341   
    (0.03285) (0.08386) (0.08351) (0.06138) (0.05201) (0.06948) (0.08770) (0.03797) (0.03435) (0.05390)   
Constant 1.09156*** -0.42390 1.10421 0.82192 1.02430** 0.41278 -0.08064 1.15450*** 1.63057*** -0.80908** 1.88313*** -0.80745*** 
  (0.35996) (0.51144) (0.74151) (0.53991) (0.40960) (0.50652) (0.80462) (0.36323) (0.38115) (0.38465) (0.45697) (0.26117) 
Observations 2,090 1,794 2,097 1,732 2,011 1,997 
LogL 1251.457 -1059.761 921.617 21.343 803.544 151.769 
Note: M corresponds to each consumption group’s expenditure. 
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r) IV model for informal Fon consumption (OLS version) 
  With labour supply Without labour supply 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  0.00786 0.01928 0.00724 0.00941 -0.00658 0.00640 -0.00667 -0.00472 
  (0.02245) (0.02183) (0.02245) (0.02227) (0.02192) (0.02138) (0.02190) (0.02177) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.00900 -0.01245 0.01151 0.00991 0.00628 -0.01500 0.00892 0.00730 
  (0.01141) (0.01138) (0.01148) (0.01128) (0.01145) (0.01141) (0.01151) (0.01132) 
L(fam_size) 0.04894 0.05757 0.04072 0.04319 0.05086 0.05871 0.04259 0.04506 
  (0.04295) (0.04145) (0.04324) (0.04257) (0.04282) (0.04129) (0.04313) (0.04245) 
D(mem_son) 0.03070 0.02169 0.03617 0.03237 0.03338 0.02403 0.03879 0.03488 
  (0.03190) (0.03113) (0.03204) (0.03169) (0.03191) (0.03115) (0.03205) (0.03169) 
D(mem_oth) 0.00782 0.00920 0.00983 0.00645 0.00704 0.00809 0.00910 0.00557 
  (0.03235) (0.03108) (0.03219) (0.03202) (0.03232) (0.03115) (0.03214) (0.03200) 
P(men) -0.07477** -0.06379* -0.07129* -0.07428** -0.07442** -0.06325* -0.07079* -0.07385** 
  (0.03669) (0.03551) (0.03671) (0.03655) (0.03671) (0.03552) (0.03673) (0.03656) 
D(gender_head) -0.00598 -0.00664 -0.00593 -0.00935 -0.00218 -0.00301 -0.00222 -0.00560 
  (0.03664) (0.03476) (0.03720) (0.03593) (0.03621) (0.03439) (0.03678) (0.03552) 
Pcoh_1 -0.21108 -0.37588 -0.21619 -0.20852 -0.24141 -0.40798* -0.24493 -0.23932 
  (0.22800) (0.22934) (0.22871) (0.22578) (0.22982) (0.23109) (0.23106) (0.22760) 
Pcoh_2 -0.11914 -0.25252 -0.12120 -0.11390 -0.15363 -0.28708 -0.15375 -0.14833 
  (0.22415) (0.22630) (0.22494) (0.22193) (0.22597) (0.22800) (0.22728) (0.22383) 
Pcoh_3 -0.06078 -0.19740 -0.07794 -0.05456 -0.08511 -0.22309 -0.10106 -0.07924 
  (0.22690) (0.22855) (0.22735) (0.22475) (0.22896) (0.23035) (0.22992) (0.22687) 
Pcoh_4 -0.02342 -0.15060 -0.04086 -0.01685 -0.04036 -0.17025 -0.05722 -0.03393 
  (0.22818) (0.22999) (0.22863) (0.22613) (0.23041) (0.23196) (0.23138) (0.22843) 
Pcoh_5 -0.02907 -0.17209 -0.03712 -0.02455 -0.05622 -0.20179 -0.06302 -0.05202 
  (0.22646) (0.22893) (0.22701) (0.22421) (0.22809) (0.23038) (0.22918) (0.22586) 
Pcoh_6 -0.01039 -0.16908 -0.01906 -0.01303 -0.03583 -0.19814 -0.04320 -0.03903 
  (0.23059) (0.23290) (0.23106) (0.22839) (0.23196) (0.23416) (0.23295) (0.22976) 
Pcoh_7 0.07381 -0.09461 0.06875 0.07920 0.04904 -0.12289 0.04528 0.05394 
  (0.23284) (0.23478) (0.23334) (0.23067) (0.23427) (0.23609) (0.23529) (0.23209) 
Pcoh_8 0.11533 -0.04406 0.10534 0.11896 0.08980 -0.07381 0.08112 0.09272 
  (0.22942) (0.23254) (0.22992) (0.22732) (0.23053) (0.23363) (0.23156) (0.22840) 
Hrs_both 0.00052*** 0.00047*** 0.00050*** 0.00051***       
  (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00018)       
D(Hrs_both) -0.07638* -0.04967 -0.07317* -0.07187*       
  (0.04386) (0.04381) (0.04350) (0.04368)       
D(Lima) 0.13300*** 0.12390*** 0.12761*** 0.12056*** 0.13413*** 0.12637*** 0.12840*** 0.12138*** 
  (0.01579) (0.03202) (0.01606) (0.01617) (0.01574) (0.03204) (0.01601) (0.01613) 
L(pop_urb_dist)  0.33998***     0.34489***    
   (0.06902)     (0.06936)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq  -0.01408***     -0.01432***    
   (0.00328)     (0.00329)    
pop_den_distx1000  -0.00247     -0.00244    
   (0.00150)     (0.00150)    
D(not_slum)  0.05277***     0.05302***    
   (0.01196)     (0.01194)    
D(mid_city)  -0.02525*     -0.02517*    
   (0.01397)     (0.01402)    
D(border)  0.07924***     0.08282***    
   (0.01859)     (0.01855)    
D(tongue)   0.04316***     0.04370***   
    (0.01415)     (0.01416)   
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D(migrant)   0.03359**     0.03465***   
    (0.01315)     (0.01316)   
D(social)   -0.00594     -0.00695   
    (0.01221)     (0.01225)   
Station_distx1000    -0.13356***     -0.13772*** 
     (0.03399)     (0.03359) 
Muni_persx1000    -0.00328*     -0.00328* 
     (0.00173)     (0.00170) 
L(budget_dist_pc)    -0.00112     -0.00160 
     (0.01026)     (0.01023) 
D(sdp_dist)    -0.06286*     -0.06172* 
     (0.03424)     (0.03463) 
Constant 0.49072* -1.24153*** 0.45175* 0.51473* 0.51116** -1.22307*** 0.47039* 0.54070** 
  (0.26398) (0.44272) (0.26463) (0.26345) (0.25993) (0.44246) (0.26112) (0.25929) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -273.311 -210.055 -263.974 -264.031 -278.260 -214.005 -268.538 -268.742 
 
s) First-stage regression for IV models for Fon shares (with labour supply) 
  L(expenditure_Fon)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(fam_size) 0.2863361*** 0.2806483*** 0.3052114*** 0.2875527*** -0.0216221 -0.0210947 -0.0137437 -0.0187512 
  (0.08762) (0.08560) (0.08805) (0.08669) (0.04027) (0.04028) (0.04052) (0.04040) 
D(mem_son) 0.2143842*** 0.2142722*** 0.2069655*** 0.2167356*** -0.0014088 -0.0006027 -0.0036641 -0.0030949 
  (0.06715) (0.06736) (0.06744) (0.06712) (0.03106) (0.03092) (0.03120) (0.03115) 
D(mem_oth) 0.0102579 0.0062688 0.0065656 0.0087224 -0.0251461 -0.0265724 -0.0277601 -0.025161 
  (0.05730) (0.05657) (0.05747) (0.05747) (0.03296) (0.03300) (0.03304) (0.03310) 
P(men) 0.1067553 0.1175679 0.1130172 0.113451 0.0047234 0.0047219 0.0043471 0.0057609 
  (0.07647) (0.07542) (0.07638) (0.07665) (0.03388) (0.03405) (0.03394) (0.03403) 
D(gender_head) 0.0364591 0.0497447 0.0417154 0.0371746 0.1338942*** 0.132626*** 0.1339685*** 0.1344142*** 
  (0.08408) (0.08430) (0.08411) (0.08277) (0.03633) (0.03633) (0.03664) (0.03630) 
Pcoh_1 -0.5735691  -0.7242102* -0.5519869 -0.6130142 0.1581487 0.1659335 0.1512578 0.1491591 
  (0.40406) (0.40646) (0.40202) (0.40886) (0.30197) (0.29588) (0.30558) (0.30271) 
Pcoh_2 -0.4127199 -0.5570166 -0.3836162 -0.4455544 -0.00399 0.0062154 -0.0096124 -0.0112539 
  (0.38902) (0.39206) (0.38685) (0.39481) (0.30139) (0.29499) (0.30523) (0.30208) 
Pcoh_3 -0.2942532 -0.4431698 -0.2557384 -0.3223287 -0.0124594 -0.0015165 -0.011152 -0.0203379 
  (0.39858) (0.40103) (0.39563) (0.40404) (0.30041) (0.29413) (0.30388) (0.30106) 
Pcoh_4 -0.325117 -0.4731626 -0.3109738 -0.377706 0.0190996 0.025208 0.0136942 0.0127614 
  (0.40405) (0.40607) (0.40138) (0.40969) (0.30146) (0.29503) (0.30511) (0.30196) 
Pcoh_5 -0.5338057  -0.6813312* -0.5147844 -0.5627934 0.013044 0.0202947 0.0143571 0.0070552 
  (0.38987) (0.39166) (0.38808) (0.39512) (0.29900) (0.29262) (0.30236) (0.29962) 
Pcoh_6 -0.5927034  -0.7494015* -0.564542 -0.6322816 -0.0298701 -0.0177435 -0.0267101 -0.0351096 
  (0.40396) (0.40663) (0.40209) (0.40993) (0.30199) (0.29576) (0.30530) (0.30272) 
Pcoh_7 -0.5495615  -0.7039098* -0.5265385 -0.5883376 -0.0806093 -0.0742519 -0.0785701 -0.0883246 
  (0.40758) (0.41141) (0.40562) (0.41336) (0.30576) (0.29914) (0.30906) (0.30649) 
Pcoh_8 -0.3759724 -0.5502392 -0.3484812 -0.4185302 -0.1001237 -0.0912745 -0.0997709 -0.1084257 
  (0.39820) (0.40240) (0.39611) (0.40433) (0.30205) (0.29560) (0.30557) (0.30282) 
Hrs_both 
 -0.0022365***  -0.0022316***  -0.002222***  -0.0022416***  -0.0016928***  -0.0016936***  -0.0016791***  -0.001691*** 
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  (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) 
D(Hrs_both) 
0.0979292 0.1451162 0.1023745 0.0854048 0.1089409 0.1070885* 0.1101389* 0.1077836* 
 (0.09816) (0.09953) (0.09806) (0.09809) (0.05867) (0.05920) (0.05858) (0.05864) 
D(Lima) 
0.300507*** 0.1836383*** 0.2860999*** 0.3051301*** -0.0183473 -0.0300198 -0.0221084 -0.0162712 
  (0.03426) (0.06714) (0.03433) (0.03442) (0.01498) (0.02985) (0.01509) (0.01521) 
theta_educ_prima 
0.1272289*** 0.1082058*** 0.1296094*** 0.1279237*** 0.0389426*** 0.0410557*** 0.039985*** 0.0390872*** 
  (0.02536) (0.02551) (0.02544) (0.02539) (0.01247) (0.01261) (0.01250) (0.01256) 
year_educ_female 
0.0282876 0.0188017 0.0242718 0.0300442* 0.0568976*** 0.0579221*** 0.0550449*** 0.05702*** 
  (0.01744) (0.01747) (0.01751) (0.01744) (0.00881) (0.00884) (0.00885) (0.00887) 
year_educ_female-sq 
0.0003256 0.0004863 0.0005232 0.0002231  -0.002991***  -0.003022***  -0.002921***  -0.0029993*** 
  (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) 
D(risk7) 
0.0805201 0.0785648 0.076467 0.0862917 0.0455305* 0.044595* 0.0443043* 0.0459134* 
  (0.06271) (0.06323) (0.06228) (0.06265) (0.02669) (0.02663) (0.02668) (0.02677) 
L(asset) 
0.1308416*** 0.1255911*** 0.1289422*** 0.1315638*** -0.0034024 -0.0029717 -0.0044881 -0.0035434 
  (0.01059) (0.01042) (0.01053) (0.01057) (0.00444) (0.00447) (0.00442) (0.00445) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.4248284**      -0.0487762    
    (0.16651)      (0.06427)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.0174487**      0.0019439    
    (0.00772)      (0.00308)    
pop_den_distx1000   0.0085288**      0.0007593    
    (0.00336)      (0.00162)    
D(not_slum)   0.0774306***      0.0063109    
    (0.02711)      (0.01244)    
D(mid_city)   0.0108429       -0.0224367*    
    (0.03036)      (0.01354)    
D(border)   0.0310749      0.0068517    
    (0.03672)      (0.01850)    
D(tongue)    -0.0499408       -0.0335845**   
     (0.03184)      (0.01423)   
D(migrant)    0.0341891      0.0171236   
     (0.02726)      (0.01241)   
D(social)     -0.0678107***      -0.0108992   
     (0.02574)      (0.01155)   
Station_distx1000     -0.0621391     0.0012379 
      (0.07509)     (0.04849) 
Muni_persx1000     -0.0015389     0.0020043 
      (0.00695)     (0.00123) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     0.053817**     -0.0009492 
      (0.02392)     (0.00999) 
D(sdp_dist)     -0.0168214     0.018512 
      (0.07537)     (0.02865) 
Constant 6.723974*** 4.390253*** 6.714677*** 6.490674*** 0.4915182 0.7765834* 0.5009891 0.4937143 
  (0.46067) (0.95682) (0.46149) (0.47567) (0.31990) (0.43021) (0.32327) (0.32737) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
R-squared 0.2445 0.2658 0.2484 0.2467 0.132 0.1354 0.1354 0.133 
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t) First-stage regression for IV models for Fon shares (without labour supply) 
  L(expenditure_Fon)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L(fam_size) 0.2874371*** 0.2792781*** 0.3072909*** 0.2878319*** -0.016749 -0.0175234 -0.0081469 -0.0144433 
  (0.08821) (0.08634) (0.08864) (0.08721) (0.04107) (0.04114) (0.04133) (0.04119) 
D(mem_son) 0.2069824*** 0.2073368*** 0.199207*** 0.2100302*** -0.0093965 -0.0079137 -0.0118841 -0.0106826 
  (0.06841) (0.06855) (0.06870) (0.06836) (0.03114) (0.03108) (0.03129) (0.03125) 
D(mem_oth) 0.0240108 0.0167546 0.0193084 0.0236689 -0.0198288 -0.0218215 -0.0230852 -0.0195853 
  (0.05825) (0.05738) (0.05833) (0.05837) (0.03321) (0.03325) (0.03328) (0.03334) 
P(men) 0.1037625 0.1150435 0.1094787 0.1096722 0.0025942 0.0025213 0.0018089 0.0030401 
  (0.07712) (0.07607) (0.07705) (0.07731) (0.03486) (0.03500) (0.03493) (0.03499) 
D(gender_head) 0.0291611 0.0425008 0.0342658 0.0295973 0.1280272*** 0.1266019*** 0.1279973*** 0.1283822*** 
  (0.08315) (0.08329) (0.08323) (0.08165) (0.03669) (0.03655) (0.03701) (0.03669) 
Pcoh_1 -0.3564595 -0.5246614 -0.3408949 -0.387828 0.3142017 0.3193505 0.3031131 0.309086 
  (0.39962) (0.40292) (0.39845) (0.40583) (0.30986) (0.30488) (0.31406) (0.31061) 
Pcoh_2 -0.1917646 -0.3533744 -0.1691339 -0.2179071 0.1483084 0.1555765 0.1381793 0.1433655 
  (0.38414) (0.38815) (0.38284) (0.39146) (0.30989) (0.30450) (0.31423) (0.31062) 
Pcoh_3 -0.1050958 -0.2732469 -0.0707616 -0.1253084 0.1091505 0.1171593 0.1078111 0.1039092 
  (0.39627) (0.39940) (0.39425) (0.40327) (0.30803) (0.30281) (0.31206) (0.30871) 
Pcoh_4 -0.1627651 -0.3280236 -0.1528452 -0.2079144 0.1197314 0.124637 0.1116995 0.1156993 
  (0.40196) (0.40471) (0.40016) (0.40887) (0.31105) (0.30557) (0.31523) (0.31165) 
Pcoh_5 -0.3180297 -0.4866043 -0.3033571 -0.3386244 0.151626 0.1570678 0.1502299 0.1479308 
  (0.38713) (0.38985) (0.38610) (0.39407) (0.30696) (0.30165) (0.31089) (0.30761) 
Pcoh_6 -0.3731382 -0.5550232 -0.3496894 -0.4028654 0.1105036 0.1197547 0.1107894 0.1083078 
  (0.40105) (0.40463) (0.39999) (0.40843) (0.31012) (0.30507) (0.31397) (0.31089) 
Pcoh_7 -0.340934 -0.5189267 -0.3225524 -0.3701955 0.0519087 0.0560508 0.0510979 0.0471719 
  (0.40348) (0.40825) (0.40245) (0.41071) (0.31397) (0.30857) (0.31786) (0.31475) 
Pcoh_8 -0.1496671 -0.3524831 -0.1278878 -0.1815558 0.0434485 0.0486655 0.0402798 0.0384268 
  (0.39490) (0.39996) (0.39365) (0.40247) (0.31037) (0.30511) (0.31441) (0.31120) 
D(Lima) 
0.3009861*** 0.172806** 0.2868914*** 0.3065272*** -0.0176292 -0.0369379 -0.021148 -0.0148052 
  (0.03514) (0.06956) (0.03516) (0.03528) (0.01547) (0.03006) (0.01559) (0.01574) 
theta_educ_prima 
0.1310116*** 0.1120577*** 0.1336611*** 0.1318579*** 0.0419933*** 0.0439289*** 0.0432206*** 0.0422976*** 
  (0.02534) (0.02541) (0.02543) (0.02536) (0.01266) (0.01282) (0.01268) (0.01274) 
year_educ_female 
0.0270207 0.0170677 0.0225344 0.0288752* 0.0559976*** 0.0567456*** 0.0537988*** 0.0561802*** 
  (0.01745) (0.01745) (0.01755) (0.01745) (0.00889) (0.00891) (0.00893) (0.00893) 
year_educ_female-sq 
0.0004855 0.0006638 0.0006955 0.0003798  -0.0028809***  -0.0029016***  -0.0028018***  -0.0028918*** 
  (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00075) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) 
D(risk7) 
0.0621036 0.0594658 0.0583262 0.0674177 0.0326945 0.0311767 0.0316915 0.0328063 
  (0.06237) (0.06287) (0.06179) (0.06242) (0.02651) (0.02649) (0.02640) (0.02659) 
L(asset) 
0.1230444*** 0.1176553*** 0.1209895*** 0.1236983***  -0.0103031**  -0.0098302**  -0.0114781** -0.0105715 
  (0.01090) (0.01070) (0.01082) (0.01087) (0.00456) (0.00459) (0.00454) (0.00456) 
D(house1) 
0.0295482 0.0241008 0.0287137 0.034095 -0.0121048 -0.0098793 -0.0122316 -0.0118686 
  (0.03965) (0.03866) (0.03944) (0.03983) (0.02208) (0.02225) (0.02197) (0.02219) 
L(pop_urb_dist)   0.4186855**      -0.0531487    
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    (0.16762)      (0.06606)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq    -0.0170306**      0.0022392    
    (0.00779)      (0.00317)    
pop_den_distx1000   0.0084922**      0.0007554    
    (0.00348)      (0.00167)    
D(not_slum)   0.0781417***      0.0070608    
    (0.02727)      (0.01264)    
D(mid_city)   0.0062827       -0.0245477*    
    (0.03053)      (0.01387)    
D(border)   0.0140438      -0.0070176    
    (0.03609)      (0.01901)    
D(tongue)     -0.0587655*       -0.0401179***   
     (0.03219)      (0.01471)   
D(migrant)    0.0335221      0.0165262   
     (0.02739)      (0.01265)   
D(social)     -0.0663367**      -0.0098416   
     (0.02601)      (0.01185)   
Station_distx1000     -0.0393366     0.0202458 
      (0.07480)     (0.05611) 
Muni_persx1000     -0.0012476     0.0022099 
      (0.00706)     (0.00136) 
L(budget_dist_pc)     0.0527569**     -0.0018856 
      (0.02412)     (0.01045) 
D(sdp_dist)     -0.0226302     0.0140404 
      (0.07774)     (0.02985) 
Constant 6.476497*** 4.241068*** 6.483705*** 6.225002*** 0.3689078 0.673102 0.3880934 0.3714068 
  (0.44716) (0.95374) (0.44798) (0.46748) (0.32190) (0.44123) (0.32597) (0.32877) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
R-squared 0.2305 0.2521 0.2346 0.2326 0.0854 0.0889 0.0896 0.0865 
 
u) Second-stage regression for IV model for informal Fon shares (2SLS version) 
  With labour supply Without labour supply 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  0.26964** 0.26080** 0.25840** 0.26260** 0.32146*** 0.29603** 0.31028** 0.31076** 
  (0.10839) (0.10449) (0.11021) (0.10729) (0.12323) (0.11722) (0.12534) (0.12163) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.11017*** 0.06604** 0.12884*** 0.11542*** 0.12870*** 0.08324** 0.14936*** 0.13386*** 
  (0.02952) (0.03096) (0.03084) (0.02938) (0.03305) (0.03443) (0.03488) (0.03292) 
L(fam_size) 0.03146 0.04397 0.01300 0.02390 0.02897 0.04139 0.00831 0.02126 
  (0.04378) (0.04221) (0.04475) (0.04369) (0.04456) (0.04263) (0.04586) (0.04449) 
D(mem_son) -0.00062 0.00003 0.00123 -0.00049 -0.00069 -0.00061 0.00124 -0.00085 
  (0.03518) (0.03386) (0.03546) (0.03496) (0.03589) (0.03435) (0.03629) (0.03564) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01335 0.01513 0.01656 0.01180 0.01116 0.01321 0.01485 0.00935 
  (0.03289) (0.03151) (0.03277) (0.03254) (0.03339) (0.03188) (0.03329) (0.03305) 
P(men) -0.08636** -0.07382** -0.08406** -0.08691** -0.08800** -0.07524** -0.08545** -0.08838** 
  (0.03878) (0.03717) (0.03903) (0.03866) (0.03994) (0.03804) (0.04026) (0.03977) 
D(gender_head) -0.04520 -0.04313 -0.04431 -0.04767 -0.04797 -0.04416 -0.04713 -0.04997 
  (0.04010) (0.03762) (0.04076) (0.03958) (0.04005) (0.03733) (0.04077) (0.03957) 
Pcoh_1 -0.19117 -0.35414 -0.18200 -0.17968 -0.28381 -0.43224* -0.27127 -0.27150 
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  (0.21498) (0.21660) (0.21389) (0.21271) (0.22158) (0.22075) (0.22206) (0.21927) 
Pcoh_2 -0.06785 -0.20258 -0.06078 -0.05605 -0.15610 -0.27788 -0.14590 -0.14311 
  (0.21072) (0.21244) (0.20953) (0.20842) (0.21620) (0.21547) (0.21657) (0.21401) 
Pcoh_3 -0.01949 -0.15682 -0.03278 -0.00700 -0.08627 -0.21329 -0.09884 -0.07339 
  (0.21320) (0.21470) (0.21163) (0.21096) (0.21897) (0.21801) (0.21906) (0.21683) 
Pcoh_4 0.01081 -0.11640 0.00315 0.02582 -0.04043 -0.15996 -0.04675 -0.02434 
  (0.21380) (0.21553) (0.21226) (0.21170) (0.22016) (0.21932) (0.22016) (0.21822) 
Pcoh_5 0.02581 -0.11966 0.02609 0.03713 -0.04935 -0.18413 -0.04757 -0.03746 
  (0.21209) (0.21455) (0.21049) (0.20960) (0.21688) (0.21688) (0.21687) (0.21444) 
Pcoh_6 0.06091 -0.10061 0.05801 0.06497 -0.00860 -0.16074 -0.01026 -0.00468 
  (0.21703) (0.21904) (0.21560) (0.21465) (0.22080) (0.22058) (0.22096) (0.21851) 
Pcoh_7 0.14770 -0.01686 0.14451 0.15868 0.08478 -0.07215 0.08281 0.09557 
  (0.22005) (0.22148) (0.21855) (0.21775) (0.22344) (0.22266) (0.22355) (0.22119) 
Pcoh_8 0.18884 0.03291 0.17982 0.19829 0.11932 -0.02805 0.11135 0.12830 
  (0.21616) (0.21841) (0.21461) (0.21397) (0.21911) (0.21922) (0.21916) (0.21698) 
Hrs_both 0.00112*** 0.00099*** 0.00111*** 0.00110***       
  (0.00029) (0.00027) (0.00029) (0.00029)       
D(Hrs_both) -0.10941** -0.08322* -0.10788** -0.10286**       
  (0.04801) (0.04700) (0.04730) (0.04771)       
D(Lima) 0.10376*** 0.11309*** 0.09635*** 0.08856*** 0.09895*** 0.11597*** 0.09118*** 0.08289*** 
  (0.01883) (0.03360) (0.01915) (0.01931) (0.01987) (0.03435) (0.02022) (0.02040) 
L(pop_urb_dist)  0.30006***     0.29935***    
   (0.07365)     (0.07600)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq  -0.01238***     -0.01244***    
   (0.00348)     (0.00358)    
pop_den_distx1000  -0.00317*     -0.00332*    
   (0.00165)     (0.00173)    
D(not_slum)  0.04277***     0.03998***    
   (0.01317)     (0.01354)    
D(mid_city)  -0.01972     -0.01801    
   (0.01474)     (0.01519)    
D(border)  0.07619***     0.08409***    
   (0.01966)     (0.01987)    
D(tongue)   0.06620***     0.07363***   
    (0.01662)     (0.01781)   
D(migrant)   0.02348*     0.02290   
    (0.01412)     (0.01453)   
D(social)   0.00358     0.00410   
    (0.01324)     (0.01377)   
Station_distx1000    -0.13594***     -0.14690*** 
     (0.03308)     (0.03495) 
Muni_persx1000    -0.00384**     -0.00402*** 
     (0.00150)     (0.00146) 
L(budget_dist_pc)    -0.00510     -0.00624 
     (0.01053)     (0.01077) 
D(sdp_dist)    -0.06507**     -0.06318* 
     (0.03241)     (0.03393) 
Constant -0.53409 -1.84047*** -0.69085* -0.52146 -0.66219* -1.92725*** -0.83605** -0.63449* 
  (0.36702) (0.47951) (0.37564) (0.36477) (0.38336) (0.49497) (0.39680) (0.38062) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -391.546 -302.536 -394.581 -383.647 -461.121 -355.022 -467.245 -450.639 
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v) Second-stage regression for IV model for informal Fon shares (LIML version) 
  With labour supply Without labour supply 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  0.27536** 0.26812** 0.26097** 0.26770** 0.33365*** 0.31477** 0.31653** 0.32224** 
  (0.11060) (0.10747) (0.11122) (0.10928) (0.12776) (0.12467) (0.12769) (0.12594) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.11136*** 0.06760** 0.12944*** 0.11651*** 0.13131*** 0.08753** 0.15083*** 0.13638*** 
  (0.02986) (0.03146) (0.03100) (0.02969) (0.03384) (0.03586) (0.03532) (0.03368) 
L(fam_size) 0.03128 0.04371 0.01287 0.02372 0.02855 0.04067 0.00796 0.02082 
  (0.04384) (0.04230) (0.04478) (0.04375) (0.04476) (0.04292) (0.04598) (0.04469) 
D(mem_son) -0.00092 -0.00034 0.00110 -0.00076 -0.00123 -0.00150 0.00096 -0.00136 
  (0.03526) (0.03396) (0.03550) (0.03503) (0.03607) (0.03463) (0.03639) (0.03581) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01348 0.01531 0.01662 0.01191 0.01133 0.01355 0.01496 0.00951 
  (0.03294) (0.03157) (0.03280) (0.03259) (0.03353) (0.03207) (0.03336) (0.03318) 
P(men) -0.08651** -0.07403** -0.08414** -0.08706** -0.08831** -0.07581** -0.08563** -0.08870** 
  (0.03885) (0.03726) (0.03907) (0.03872) (0.04013) (0.03833) (0.04036) (0.03995) 
D(gender_head) -0.04602 -0.04420 -0.04468 -0.04841 -0.04963 -0.04676 -0.04799 -0.05155 
  (0.04028) (0.03785) (0.04084) (0.03975) (0.04043) (0.03792) (0.04097) (0.03994) 
Pcoh_1 -0.19145 -0.35421 -0.18209 -0.17985 -0.28646 -0.43535** -0.27254 -0.27386 
  (0.21509) (0.21662) (0.21392) (0.21279) (0.22236) (0.22147) (0.22245) (0.21997) 
Pcoh_2 -0.06733 -0.20168 -0.06053 -0.05552 -0.15704 -0.27854 -0.14635 -0.14389 
  (0.21082) (0.21245) (0.20955) (0.20850) (0.21688) (0.21603) (0.21691) (0.21463) 
Pcoh_3 -0.01918 -0.15618 -0.03265 -0.00665 -0.08720 -0.21392 -0.09937 -0.07415 
  (0.21329) (0.21469) (0.21165) (0.21102) (0.21962) (0.21856) (0.21939) (0.21741) 
Pcoh_4 0.01095 -0.11597 0.00325 0.02602 -0.04140 -0.16064 -0.04720 -0.02512 
  (0.21388) (0.21551) (0.21228) (0.21176) (0.22082) (0.21988) (0.22049) (0.21882) 
Pcoh_5 0.02626 -0.11882 0.02630 0.03759 -0.05025 -0.18462 -0.04802 -0.03820 
  (0.21216) (0.21452) (0.21050) (0.20965) (0.21749) (0.21733) (0.21717) (0.21497) 
Pcoh_6 0.06173 -0.09930 0.05837 0.06576 -0.00872 -0.16001 -0.01034 -0.00470 
  (0.21712) (0.21905) (0.21562) (0.21472) (0.22141) (0.22105) (0.22126) (0.21906) 
Pcoh_7 0.14885 -0.01508 0.14502 0.15978 0.08549 -0.07008 0.08315 0.09635 
  (0.22018) (0.22154) (0.21859) (0.21786) (0.22408) (0.22321) (0.22387) (0.22178) 
Pcoh_8 0.18998 0.03467 0.18033 0.19938 0.11982 -0.02629 0.11157 0.12889 
  (0.21627) (0.21844) (0.21465) (0.21406) (0.21972) (0.21968) (0.21946) (0.21753) 
Hrs_both 0.00113*** 0.00101*** 0.00111*** 0.00111***       
  (0.00029) (0.00028) (0.00030) (0.00029)       
D(Hrs_both) -0.11005** -0.08411* -0.10818** -0.10343**       
  (0.04821) (0.04725) (0.04739) (0.04789)       
D(Lima) 0.10344*** 0.11294*** 0.09621*** 0.08825*** 0.09825*** 0.11574*** 0.09083*** 0.08217*** 
  (0.01891) (0.03368) (0.01919) (0.01939) (0.02008) (0.03461) (0.02032) (0.02060) 
L(pop_urb_dist)  0.29940***     0.29774***    
   (0.07388)     (0.07671)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq  -0.01235***     -0.01237***    
   (0.00349)     (0.00362)    
pop_den_distx1000  -0.00319*     -0.00336*    
   (0.00166)     (0.00175)    
D(not_slum)  0.04262***     0.03953***    
   (0.01321)     (0.01368)    
D(mid_city)  -0.01952     -0.01748    
   (0.01478)     (0.01534)    
D(border)  0.07612***     0.08420***    
   (0.01971)     (0.02001)    
D(tongue)   0.06634***     0.07400***   
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    (0.01665)     (0.01790)   
D(migrant)   0.02340*     0.02273   
    (0.01414)     (0.01458)   
D(social)   0.00367     0.00429   
    (0.01326)     (0.01382)   
Station_distx1000    -0.13595***     -0.14714*** 
     (0.03312)     (0.03520) 
Muni_persx1000    -0.00385**     -0.00404*** 
     (0.00150)     (0.00146) 
L(budget_dist_pc)    -0.00512     -0.00629 
     (0.01055)     (0.01081) 
D(sdp_dist)    -0.06518**     -0.06338* 
     (0.03241)     (0.03401) 
Constant -0.54799 -1.85496*** -0.69753* -0.53399 -0.69003* -1.96362*** -0.85130** -0.66087* 
  (0.37043) (0.48203) (0.37728) (0.36785) (0.39088) (0.50270) (0.40095) (0.38778) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -395.423 -307.291 -396.401 -387.124 -471.408 -370.356 -472.691 -460.325 
 
w) Second-stage regression for IV model for informal Fon shares (GMM version) 
  With labour supply Without labour supply 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  0.27767** 0.27026*** 0.25814** 0.26993** 0.33881*** 0.31355*** 0.31574** 0.32661*** 
  (0.10804) (0.10428) (0.10971) (0.10697) (0.12227) (0.11672) (0.12415) (0.12067) 
L(expend_Fon) 0.11088*** 0.06687** 0.12875*** 0.11604*** 0.13052*** 0.08537** 0.14964*** 0.13544*** 
  (0.02951) (0.03095) (0.03080) (0.02937) (0.03294) (0.03435) (0.03471) (0.03280) 
L(fam_size) 0.03383 0.04617 0.01365 0.02600 0.03044 0.04268 0.00805 0.02239 
  (0.04373) (0.04218) (0.04473) (0.04365) (0.04448) (0.04255) (0.04581) (0.04441) 
D(mem_son) -0.00231 0.00021 -0.00046 -0.00198 -0.00104 0.00046 0.00159 -0.00089 
  (0.03505) (0.03376) (0.03532) (0.03485) (0.03575) (0.03423) (0.03614) (0.03550) 
D(mem_oth) 0.01189 0.01427 0.01612 0.01044 0.01011 0.01266 0.01524 0.00840 
  (0.03286) (0.03150) (0.03277) (0.03252) (0.03336) (0.03186) (0.03327) (0.03302) 
P(men) -0.08683** -0.07336** -0.08543** -0.08748** -0.08798** -0.07562** -0.08633** -0.08857** 
  (0.03872) (0.03713) (0.03898) (0.03861) (0.03988) (0.03797) (0.04022) (0.03971) 
D(gender_head) -0.04472 -0.04299 -0.04264 -0.04696 -0.04765 -0.04449 -0.04475 -0.04942 
  (0.04003) (0.03759) (0.04063) (0.03951) (0.04000) (0.03730) (0.04068) (0.03952) 
Pcoh_1 -0.20181 -0.35569* -0.17950 -0.18798 -0.30039 -0.43921** -0.27230 -0.28552 
  (0.21467) (0.21606) (0.21377) (0.21244) (0.22101) (0.22015) (0.22176) (0.21874) 
Pcoh_2 -0.07607 -0.20328 -0.05819 -0.06205 -0.16953 -0.28553 -0.14562 -0.15396 
  (0.21049) (0.21192) (0.20943) (0.20822) (0.21572) (0.21481) (0.21627) (0.21354) 
Pcoh_3 -0.02828 -0.15860 -0.03144 -0.01372 -0.10019 -0.22001 -0.10031 -0.08498 
  (0.21297) (0.21422) (0.21154) (0.21076) (0.21858) (0.21749) (0.21884) (0.21644) 
Pcoh_4 0.00312 -0.11449 0.00335 0.02007 -0.05136 -0.16353 -0.04805 -0.03335 
  (0.21368) (0.21517) (0.21225) (0.21160) (0.21984) (0.21885) (0.22000) (0.21791) 
Pcoh_5 0.01653 -0.11737 0.02595 0.02998 -0.06223 -0.18584 -0.04773 -0.04787 
  (0.21193) (0.21425) (0.21045) (0.20947) (0.21651) (0.21651) (0.21668) (0.21410) 
Pcoh_6 0.05468 -0.09521 0.05764 0.06025 -0.01753 -0.15893 -0.01067 -0.01178 
  (0.21696) (0.21877) (0.21559) (0.21459) (0.22057) (0.22022) (0.22082) (0.21829) 
Pcoh_7 0.14151 -0.01122 0.14501 0.15437 0.07741 -0.06851 0.08484 0.09013 
  (0.21996) (0.22120) (0.21853) (0.21768) (0.22325) (0.22234) (0.22346) (0.22103) 
Pcoh_8 0.18256 0.03862 0.18047 0.19400 0.11135 -0.02533 0.11313 0.12261 
  (0.21606) (0.21810) (0.21459) (0.21389) (0.21886) (0.21882) (0.21902) (0.21675) 
Hrs_both 0.00114*** 0.00101*** 0.00110*** 0.00112***       
  (0.00029) (0.00027) (0.00029) (0.00029)       
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D(Hrs_both) -0.11041** -0.08375* -0.10848** -0.10362**       
  (0.04799) (0.04698) (0.04729) (0.04769)       
D(Lima) 0.10222*** 0.11356*** 0.09561*** 0.08694*** 0.09725*** 0.11596*** 0.09059*** 0.08123*** 
  (0.01878) (0.03355) (0.01912) (0.01927) (0.01976) (0.03428) (0.02010) (0.02027) 
L(pop_urb_dist)  0.29662***     0.29371***    
   (0.07356)     (0.07589)    
L(pop_urb_dist)-sq  -0.01220***     -0.01216***    
   (0.00347)     (0.00358)    
pop_den_distx1000  -0.00338**     -0.00355**    
   (0.00165)     (0.00172)    
D(not_slum)  0.04226***     0.03956***    
   (0.01315)     (0.01349)    
D(mid_city)  -0.01872     -0.01720    
   (0.01471)     (0.01517)    
D(border)  0.07613***     0.08430***    
   (0.01966)     (0.01986)    
D(tongue)   0.06686***     0.07346***   
    (0.01656)     (0.01771)   
D(migrant)   0.02361*     0.02236   
    (0.01408)     (0.01449)   
D(social)   0.00366     0.00416   
    (0.01322)     (0.01374)   
Station_distx1000    -0.13555***     -0.14631*** 
     (0.03308)     (0.03494) 
Muni_persx1000    -0.00387***     -0.00408*** 
     (0.00150)     (0.00145) 
L(budget_dist_pc)    -0.00535     -0.00617 
     (0.01052)     (0.01075) 
D(sdp_dist)    -0.06664**     -0.06558* 
     (0.03238)     (0.03387) 
Constant -0.54059 -1.84488*** -0.69032* -0.52713 -0.68160* -1.93123*** -0.84429** -0.65306* 
  (0.36687) (0.47943) (0.37506) (0.36458) (0.38275) (0.49480) (0.39552) (0.37994) 
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 
LogL -396.032 -307.731 -394.368 -387.652 -473.564 -367.416 -470.667 -461.713 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
